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PREFACE
By 1965, from a perspective within the Christian 
pastoral ministry, two theological questions had grown to 
have major importance for me. The first and primary con­
cern was with the doctrine of Christ. Most theological 
interest followed one of two directions. On the one hand, 
Karl Barth's thundering insistence upon the primacy of the 
concept of God still dominated a large sector of theologi­
cal discussion and writing. But murraurings of dissatis­
faction were steadily piercing that domination. Therefore, 
on the other hand, increasing efforts were being undertaken 
to direct theological concern toward a confrontation with 
a modem post-war, post-atomic-bomb age. It was an effort 
to lead theological attention to an open dialogue, and in 
some cases an active involvement with the secular world.
The "Death of God" men, and thinkers like J.A.T. Robinson 
and Harvey Cox, were finding in some suggestions in the 
writings and personal example of Dietrich Bonhpeffer, a 
Christian theologian executed by the Nazis, grounds for 
this theological examination.
It seemed to me that neither of these two directions 
pursued the crucial question. Neither direction emphasized 
the primacy of the question of Jesus Christ for Christianity.
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Yet this question was the principal concern for large num­
bers of Christian parishoners. Theology's main task must 
be in service to the Church; in enriching our understanding 
of the meaning of our Christian faith. That theology 
largely ignored parishoners' concern for a helpful under­
standing of the concept of Christ, motivated me to resign 
from the parish ministry, engage in theological research, 
and make Christology, the doctrine of Christ, the focus of 
that research.
A second theological question of importance for me 
concerned Liberal Theology. The apparent inability of the 
two chief theological directions to deal with Christology 
suggested the appropriate need to seek a new direction. 
Nineteenth century Liberal Theology had endeavored to give 
a primary importance to the concept of Christ, particularly 
in respect to His humanity. In time much of that effort 
was justifiably discredited. But for a different age, seek­
ing a new theological direction, might not a reexamination 
of Liberalism's insights be in order? Surely it was, and 
some had already begun such an undertaking.
The result of the motivation provided by these two 
questions has been the research into, and finally the com­
pletion of, this thesis. Because of this background the 
treatment given the various Christological positions ex­
amined in this thesis has been candidly sympathetic, al­
though, I trust, not uncritical. The Christian Church of 
today stands in need of all the creative insight which
vil
theology can provide in order to help its adherents under­
stand their faith and employ it in the task of daily living. 
I hope that both this thesis and I can be part of this 
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CHAPTER I
NINETEENTH CENTURY PROTESTANT LIBERALISM
A . Introduction
The nineteenth century was a most notable period in 
the history of man's intellectual development. It was a 
century of remarkable achievements in the fields of science, 
technology, education, psychology, philosophy and theology. 
Man discovered the fascination of his world and himself. He 
probed this discovery extensively in almost every direction. 
Science provided the method for the probing. W. C. Dampier 
writes of this period:
If the nineteenth century has a just claim to be regarded as the beginning of the scientific age, the reason is to be sought not merely, or even chiefly, in the rapid growth of our knowledge of nature for which that century was remarkable . . . .  But, during the last hundred or hundred and fifty years, the whole conception of the natural Universe has been changed by the recognition that man, subject to the same physi­cal laws and processes as the world around him, cannot be considered separately from the world, and that scien­tific methods of observation, induction, deduction and experiment are applicable, not only to the original subject-matter of pure science, but to nearly all the many and varied fields of human thought and activity.^
The most significant nineteenth century development
C. Dampier, A History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1971), p . 20Ô. Chapters VI, VII, VIII all deal with the development of nineteenth cen­tury science and philosophy.
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in the field of theology is to be found in the rise of Lib­
eral Theology. In spite of the volumes which have been 
written on the subject it is most difficult to define pre­
cisely the meaning of the term. Alec Vidler proposes re­
stricting the term Liberalism to the nineteenth century 
phenomenon bearing that title. Yet many theologians with 
diverse methodological credentials laid claim to the title. 
Furthermore, the content offered under the rubric of Liber-oalism does not yield readily to easy systematization. 
Reardon suggests that Liberalism is in fact:
. . . simply what those who would think of them­selves as at once Protestant and liberal conceive the Christian religion essentially to be; a wholly per­sonal estimate, therefore, in which differing inter­ests and emphases are bound to manifest themselves.^
2Alec Vidler, Essays in Liberality (London; SCM Press, 1957), pp. 21 ffl
3"No such thing as a system of liberal theology ex­ists." A. C. McGiffert, Jr., ''The Future of Liberal Christi­anity," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XV, 1935, p. 162. See also S. Ahlstrom's article,^^Theology in America: A HistoricSurvey," Religion in American Life, ed. by James W. Smith andA. L. Jamison, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1961), p. 309.
M. C. Reardon, Liberal Protestantism (London:Adam and Charles Black, 1968), p. 9. Reardon goes on to stress the essentially personal judgment characteristic of Liberal Protestantism. "No two liberal thinkers are ever quite in agreement." Ibid., p. 64. Walter Horton puts the point in a quite pithy form, "Liberalisms perish, liberalism remains." W. M. Horton, Contemporary English Theology (New York: Harper & Bros., 1936),p. 62. To be sure a liberalmovement took place also in Roman Catholicism, perhaps pre­eminently in the Modernist movement. But in a church heav­ily dependent upon a doctrinal system, the shape Liberalism took, and the opposition it encountered, render it a subject to be undertaken as its own study. The limits of this thesis are set within Protestantism.
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This thesis is concerned with the appropriateness 
and vitality of Liberalism in the middle of the twentieth 
century. Its birth took place in the nineteenth century 
after an erratic gestation period of several preceding cen­
turies,^ An understanding of present day Liberalism re­
quires some examination of its progenitors in the previous 
century. At the same time the establishment of some limits 
is required in order to gain an understanding of the direc­
tion that modern-day Liberals are taking. Since nineteenth 
century Liberalism was Christocentric^ the purpose of this 
thesis is to examine contemporary Liberal Christologies. 
However, in view of the fact that contemporary views are 
being offered without benefit of the perspective of time, 
it is more appropriate to speak of Christological trends. 
This chapter will be concerned with various nineteenth cen­
tury Liberal Christological trends to indicate something of 
the diversity of views in this broad theological perspective 
The movement from then to today is not without its critics. 
Notable among them is the theological giant of the twentieth 
century, Karl Barth, Attention will be given to his criti­
cism to focus more sharply upon the problems faced by the 
theologians concerned with contemporary Liberal Christologi­
cal trends. Theological thought does not stand still. It
5Though some would argue for a Liberal base in the very beginning of the Christian era. Cf., infra, ChapterII. See also John Knox, The Hi^anity and Divin ity of Jesus (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1967.
^Infra, footnote 42, p. 19.
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operates like the pendulum's swing as Mackintosh reminds 
usj In the reaction of its critics the swing was away from 
Liberalism. Has the swing now returned to the side of Lib­
eralism? Its contemporary proponents claim it has. The 
purpose of this thesis is to assess their claim in the area 
of Christological thought.
However, note should be taken of some of the general 
characteristics of Liberal Theology. Reardon argues Liber­
alism should be understood in terras of its " . . .  historical 
emergence and progress . . . "^ He finds that the main 
prompting of Liberalism in the last century was due to the 
advance of science, with its challenge to the Genesis story 
of creation.^ Charles Darwin's Origin of Species was pub­
lished in 1859, but various approaches to a theory of evo­
lution had begun before the end of the eighteenth century. 
Moreover the application of the scientific method to the 
study of Scripture produced results which seriously chal- • 
lenged the authenticity of Scripture's descriptions of the 
world and man's place in it.^^ It was by accepting the
^H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology (London; Nisbet and Co., 1937), p. I’STT
^Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11. See also Dampier, A History of Sci­ence, p. Y5T7 There is a curious omission of science's part in the development of nineteenth century thought in an other* wise very helpful and clear article by Hans W. Frei, "Nie­buhr's Theological Background," Faith and Ethics. ed. by Paul Ramsey (New York; Harper Torctibooks, l9é5), pp. 9-64,
^^Fundamentalism arose from the refusal of some to accept the results. At Princeton Seminary the conflict was
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scientific account of creation and utilizing the scientific 
method to develop knowledge that Liberalism, as a new theo­
logical system, emerged in the last century. Such accept­
ance and utilization of science's findings and method meant 
that for theology experiences which could be tested, analyzed, 
and verified provided the content for all knowledge.
Two corollary results of an acceptance of scientific 
method and the theory of evolution should be noted, for they 
became generally characteristic of Liberalism. The first 
was the utilization of the principle of continuity. Simply 
expressed this principle argues that all things hold together, 
are of one piece, and that, therefore, a discovery in any 
area is a clue to the whole. Throughout its history Chris­
tian thought had utilized the principle of discontinuity to 
emphasize, for example, the Holiness of God in contrast to 
the sinfulness of man, or revelation in contrast to man's 
reason. The application of the principle of continuity to 
Christian thought meant that man could discover for himself, 
by methods available to him as a reasoning being, what tradi­
tionally had been held to be solely within the realm of 
revelation. Liberalism embraced science's axiom of continuity
intense and produced a strong counter-scientific view of Scripture. See E. R. Sandeen, "The Princeton Theology; One Source of Biblical Literalism in American Protestantism," Church History. Vol. XXXI, 1962, pp. 307-321.
11J, Smith argues religion lost its "metaphysical nerve," its "cosmic sense," in conflict with science. Taking science seriously resulted in the emergence of the schools of pragmatism and positivism. See J. Smith, "Religion and Sci­ence in American Philosophy," Religion in American Life, Vol. I, pp. 422 ff. ----  ---------------------
12as one of its principle foundation blocks. The result of 
the application of this principle in Liberal Theology was, 
on the one hand, to stress the immanence rather than the 
transcendence of G o d F o r  if any part is a clue to the 
whole, then man from within his own experience can come to 
know God. It might be said experience becomes revelation!
A further result, on the other hand, was to underscore, if 
not to discover anew, the human Jesus, Jesus as available to 
and known in our experience. So through the ranks of emerg­
ing Liberalism swept " . . .  a vivid and all-compelling dis­
covery of the presence of God, 'the living Christ,' within
^J. Haroutunian claims Liberalism placed all its hopes in this principle, and has never realized the neces­sity of a principle of discontinuity as equally important for understanding the Christian faith. "A Critique of the Principle of Continuity," Religion in Life, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1943, pp. 374-388. Fenn describes Liberalism as having " . . .  an absorbing passion for unity." "Modem Liberalism," The i^nerican Journal of Theology, Vol. XVII, 1913, p. 511. Mackintosh says Kierkegaard insisted that " . . , whereas the philosopher can only make headway by utilizing at each step the notion of continuity, it is on discontinuity that faith rests . . . . " Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology, p. 235. Harold De Wolf agrees that nineteenth century liberal theol- ogy relied on the theme of continuity held by science. How­ever, even as twentieth century science has discovered more discontinuity in nature--in evolution as a series of leaps rather than smooth progress, or the absolute conservation of energy--so has theology embraced the concept of discon­tinuity along with continuity. He sees Scripture as grasp­ing both sides. Faithful to Liberalism, De Wolf concludes continuity will have the last word. Therefore he suggests a broader and more flexible understanding of continuity which will include the sharp discontinuities within faith and ex­perience, and between faith and culture. Harold De Wolf, '"Motifs of Continuity and Discontinuity," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, 1963, pp. 344-350.
^^Cf., Arthur C. McGiffert, The Rise of Modem Re­ligious Ideas (New York: Macmillan Co., 1521), pp. 201 ff.
their own spirits.
The second corollary result of the acceptance of 
science was that attention was fastened upon man. "The whole 
tone and outlook of the age was anthropocentric; . . .  it be­
gan not with God and what he had done, but with man, and 
what man felt . . . .  Anthropology was virtually substi­
tuted for t h e o l o g y . M a n y  came to hold that man's moral 
development as well as his biological one was part of the 
evolutionary process. In this perspective evil is held to 
be a more primitive human characteristic which will inevit­
ably be overcome as man progresses to higher forms of exist­
ence.^^ The optimism about man gained from science was
P. Van Dusen, "A Half-Century of Liberal Theol­ogy," Religion in Life, Vol. V, No. 3, 1936, p. 344, italics added. Lawton summarizes, "It will . . .  be clear that to one whose outlook upon the world was dominated by the idea of evolution from within, by the unfolding of the riches of God from inside nature rather than by his miraculous inter­vention from without; to one who thence began his theorizing from the side of man and not of God, who replaced metaphysics by psychology and ethics; for such a one, the first datum must be the human Jesus, our brother, essentially of our nature, and as such capable of examination; the only possi­ble basis for a living Christology." J. S. Lawton, Conflict in Christology (London and New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 21.
^^Lawton, Conflict in Christology, pp. 13-14, 17.
^^Herbert Spencer was convinced that " . . .  evil perpetually disappears." He went on to argue that just as a biological " . . .  system gradually acquires power to re­sist what is noxious . . . " so would man. His conclusion was that " . . .  surely must man become perfect." Social Statics (London; John Chapman, 1851), pp. 59-65. It is in­teresting to note that G. Hammar finds something of this same optimistic spirit in American Revivalism in the middle of the nineteenth century. "Pelagianism, anthropocentricity, sub­jectivism, optimism with regard to sin, and moralism, are marks not only of American liberal theology, but also of American revivalism with its stress on the activity of man.
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coupled with the idealism concerning man which had been de­
veloping for some time, and which was reflected in both the 
American and the French Revolutions. Langdon Gilkey argues
that humanitarianism was a significant trend steadily influ-
17encing Christian theology from 1700.
Reardon argues that the appeal to reason and con­
science which characterized nineteenth century Liberalism 
was inherent in Luther's protest. Both were set against the 
dogmatic systems in which they found themselves. And both 
appealed to the facts of human experience to support their 
position. It is this for Reardon which, in spite of all
1 Qtheir differences, relates Luther and Kant. ° Frei claims 
that " . . .  Kant's thought was the crucial dividing point 
for Protestant theology in the nineteenth c e n t u r y H e  
sees the Kantian tradition reducing metaphysics to epistemol- 
ogy. Reardon argues that Kantian epistemology was a reaction 
to an empiricism which reduced knowledge solely to external
its stress on sanctification and the necessity of good works." George Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology (Uppsala, Sweden: A. B . Lundequistska BokhandeIn,194Ù), p . 116. Hammar may have cast too wide a net, but the eminent revivalist Charles Finney did claim perfection was available, and that regeneration meant an " . . . instantan­eous change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness."Charles C. Cole, The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangel­ists 1826-1860 (New York; Columbia University Press, l554), p T T T T
^^Langdon Gilkey, "The Concept of Providence in Con­temporary Theology," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XLIII,1963, p. 178.
18Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, pp. 10, 15.
^^Frei, "Niebuhr's Theological Background," p. 17.
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stimuli on the one hand, and to that view which proposed all 
knowledge originates solely within the mind. Thus Kant 
offered the solution of a dual capacity of the mind, recep­
tive of presentations from the external world and at the
20same time constructive from within the mind. But he re­
mained an eighteenth century figure. It was Schleiermacher
who introduced a different spirit into religious reflection,
21so that his shadow falls across the whole century. For
Schleiermacher the contact point betiveen man and God, the
place where alone truth is to be found, resides in the inner
consciousness of man, in what Schleiermacher terms the "feel-
22ing of dependence." Truth--at least in the religious sense
20Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, pp. 15-16.
^^Ibid., pp. 17-19. Frei takes this influence fur­ther. "Undoubtedly Barth was absolutely sincere when he said that one is never done with Schleiermacher." Frei, "Neibuhr's Theological Background," p. 47.
22Schleiermacher in The Christian Faith in Outline, trans , by D, M. Bailie (Edinburgh; Renderson, 1922) , works out this point. Feeling is held to be the center of religi­ous consciousness for it is dependent upon nothing else ex­cept the subject in which it exists. Schleiermacher felt this renders religious consciousness independent of reason or discovery. His critics have charged him with subjectiv­ism. Robert Clyde Johnson in Authority in Protestant Theol­ogy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), argues that all modem Protestant theology is a conversation with Schle­iermacher in the formal rather than the material sense. His influence is to be found in the orientation he effected rather than the doctrines he expounded, Johnson defends Schleiermacher against the charge of sheer subjectivism on the basis that God exists prior to, and is the cause of, man's feeling. God, not man, is the Creator of man's con­sciousness where He confronts man. See pp. 64 ff. H. R. Mackintosh in Types of Modem Theology concurs that this is Schleiermacher"s Intent in proposing "feeling" as the con­tact point of an objective apprehension in which God con­fronts . But his argument often proceeds upon a line in which psychological subjectivism is the appropriate inter­pretation. See pp. 47 ff.
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— is to be found in that which man experiences. Religion is 
a matter of the heart. In terms of Christianity it is 
" . . .  a feeling of absolute dependence upon God in Christ-- 
and therefore a matter of individual experience, of a per­
sonal intuition,
Ritschl thought Schleiermacher*s conceptions quite 
prone to subjectivism. Accordingly Ritschl*s tack is some­
what different, "Not personal feeling but the objective 
testimony of history was the only bedrock of doctrine.
Man still experiences, but what he experiences is caused by 
objective data. For Ritschl the initiative for this objec­
tive data is provided by God. God provides the revelation, 
and that revelation is in Christ. The Christian approaches 
this revelation through the gospel. Since the gospel is 
grounded in history, historical study becomes crucial to the 
development of Christian theology. Frei views the rise of 
historical thought and historiography as characteristic of . 
the nineteenth century tradition in theology. " . . .  his­
torians of the nineteenth century never lost sight of the
conviction that history, properly so called, is a particular
25mode of the self-understanding of man."
23Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, p. 17. This was not mere individual sentiment, Reardon points out, for Schleiermacher went on to posit the crucial necessity of the Church, not in any specific form but as the society of those sharing the Christian consciousness. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
^4ibld.. p. 22.
^^Frei, "Niebuhr's Theological Background," p. 21.
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These were the general characteristics of nineteenth 
century Liberal Theology; compatibility with science and 
utilization of its methodology; acceptance of both experi­
ence and the principle of continuity as indicative of the 
way in which theological inquiry should proceed; a greatly 
increased concentration on anthropology; the use of reason 
and conscience on the one hand and an appeal to historical 
thought on the other for understanding religious experience. 
At this point attention must now be directed to the Chris­
tological trends of nineteenth century Liberalism.
B. Chris tological Trends in Nineteenth Century 
Liberal Theology Before 1918
This section will deal with Christological trends in 
nineteenth century Liberal thought. Attention will be de­
voted in the first part to the Christological suggestions 
of the most influential Liberals of the period; Schleier­
macher, Ritschl, Strauss (very briefly), and Bushnell. The 
second part will occupy the major portion of this section. 
Here an attempt will be made to indicate the three main 
Christological trends in nineteenth century Liberal Theology. 
The selection of the theologians represented in this section 
is made on the basis of their expression of a particular 
trend. A third part will endeavor to summarize the study 
of nineteenth century Liberal Christological trends.
The Christological thought of key nineteenth century liberals
The revelation and redemption, the Person and work,
12
of Jesus Christ provide the framework for all Christological 
formulations. "Who do you say that I am?" is the vital ques­
tion which theology must attempt to answer. Rejecting the 
use of philosophy and science on the one side, and the mirac­
ulous and the mysterious on the other, Schleiermacher turned 
to the subjective life of man upon which to ground his theol­
ogy. He argued that it is within man's inner feeling alone 
where truth can be known and experienced. This means that 
the contact point between God and man resides within man.
In terms of Christology it means that for Christ, as for all 
other men, the contact point is internal. Simultaneously 
this led Schleiermacher to affirm Christ's Incarnation as a 
human possibility. " . . . as certainly as Christ was a man, 
there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking 
up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ.
Man must be capable of bearing the divine. Here the accent 
is upon "the possibility." For if Christ is not like other 
men, then He is an "arbitrary act" on God's part, miraculous 
and mysterious, outside the truth man experiences. As such 
an exception to the human norm. He could have no meaning for 
that relationship between God and man having its center in
man's feeling. Therefore, the Incarnation is not super- 
27natural.^' Conversely, if every man is as Christ then man
OfSchleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 64. See also Oman's translation, Schleiermacher on Religion, d o .LIII ff.  ^ -
27The supernatural aspect of Christ's Person contin­ued to be a major problem plaguing Liberal Theology. It will be seen more specifically later in the Andover Liberals.
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could effect his own redemption, making Christ unnecessary, 
Schleierraacher does not intend to go this far. It is not 
"the possibility" which actualizes Christ, it is God's 
gracious act. The Incarnation is "supra-rational." That 
is, Christ is divine in a thoroughness man has not yet 
reached, namely, a God-consciousness of sinless perfection 
so that every thought and deed is controlled by this con­
sciousness, But in this, Christ differs from His fellows 
in the degree of God-consciousness, not in the kind of con­
sciousness . If Christ were "absolutely supra-rational" the 
supernatural problem would be reintroduced. Man could not 
know God and enter into relationship with Him,
"The possibility" in man proceeds from "an original 
perfection," No less true is there present an original "sin­
fulness." Sin is universal. Any man would have sinned in 
Adam's place, Dialectically both consciousness of sin and an 
original perfection are part of man's nature, and both are 
essential to man's feeling of "absolute dependence" upon God 
from which arises the awareness of his need for redemption, 
God, then, is the Author of sin in respect to redemption, 
but not in respect to actual sin for which man alone is re­
s p o n s i b l e , Without sin man would be as God, Awareness
Once the immanence of God is stressed as strongly as it was in Liberal Theology, there is little need to go outside man himself for what is true or divine.OQSchleierraacher's construct of "feeling" as the cen­ter of religious consciousness does not imply it is an area devoid of reason. What it involves is its own reason. Philo­sophically Schleierraacher is Kant's offspring!
29Schleierraacher, The Christian Faith, p, 328,
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of sin is necessary that man may know his need for God. At 
the same time the effect of sin is to restrain, to hamper, 
God-consciousness. This leads Schleierraacher to a defini­
tion of sin as a "derangement" or a "disturbance" of man's 
nature. Redemption is needed to loosen the restraints that 
sin may lessen while original perfection develops.
The exposition of redemption "is based entirely on 
the inner experience of the b e l i e v e r . C h r i s t ' s  redemp­
tive activity is that of influence.
Accordingly, the original activity of the Redeemer is best conceived as a pervasive influence which is received by its object in virtue of the free movement with which he turns himself to the attraction, just as we ascribe an attractive power to everyone to whose educative intellectual influence we gladly submit our­selves. Now, if every activity of the Redeemer proceeds from the being of God in Him, and if in the formation of the Redeemer's Person the only active power was the creative divine activity which established itself as the being of God in Him, then also His every activity may be regarded as a continuation of that person-forming divine influence upon human nature.
Man must be willing to give himself in faith to Christ, to 
be influenced by Him, in order for Christ's redemption to be 
effective.32 Under Christ's influence man's God-conscious­
ness increases to the point where man attains a "religious 
personality not his before."33 This influence is perpetuated 
through Christ's followers in a continuing redemptive
p. 428. ^4 b l d .. p. 427.
32" . . . those who are not yet miserable must first become so in order to be received by Christ." Ibid., p. 461.
33ibxd., p. 476. What'is effected is not the achieve­ment of a new personality, .but the attainment of a possibility not previously achieved.
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community, the Church.
In terms of his concept of sin, Schleierraacher did 
undoubtedly contribute significantly to the insight of 
Christian theology by " . . . calling attention freshly to 
the significance of sin in its corporate or social char­
acter."^^ In positing sin as a disturbance of man's nature 
Schleierraacher became the first-bom of many Liberal theolo­
gians. He was also to establish many of the characteristic 
positions in Christology found in Liberal Theology. Among 
these are the insistence that Christ differs in degree not 
kind from His fellows; that Christianity is primarily a 
religion of redemption in which Christ's work is to provide 
the influence leading men to a restoration of the possibil­
ity of the same self-conscious communion with God exempli­
fied in the historic Jesus; and that the religious relation­
ship to God resides in man's subjective experience. However, 
his particular treatment of sin in terms of an original con­
dition of human nature subjects him to the charge of supra- 
lapsarianism. Further, if the only active power at work in 
the formation of Christ's Person is the "creative divine 
activity which established itself as the being of God in 
Him," then surely this suggests an Incarnation for which 
"supernatural" rather than "supra-rational" is the more apt 
description.
If Schleierraacher is credited with being the Father
^Slackintosh, Types of Modem Theology, p. 85.
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of Liberal Theology, Ritschl is described as "the most in- 
financial theologian of the late nineteenth century, and 
the principal teacher of American liberal thinkers."35 
Ritschl started with an epistemological presupposition not 
unlike Schleiermacher's: " ,  . .we can only know God in
the measure that He puts Himself sovereignly within reach 
of our knowledge."3^ To this he immediately adds the quali­
fication, " . . .  what God has written of Himself into 
Nature can only be truly read by those whose eyes have been
I} Q"7Opened by the great revelation in Jesus. This revelationo ois, and must be, historical for Ritschl, In this approach
he consciously seeks to guard against Schleierraacher*s sub­
jectivism on the one side, and a speculative rationalism on 
the other. While Ritschl agrees with Schleierraacher that 
experience contains subjective attitudes, he held that Chris­
tian experience is caused by objective data, namely, God's 
revelation in the historic Christ, Confronting this
35H. P. Van Dusen, "A Half-Century of Liberal Theol­ogy," Religion in Life. Vol. V, No. 3, 1936, pp. 345 ff.
3^Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology, p. 147.
Q TIbid. Though Schleierraacher gave much weight to the revelation in Jesus Christ, he allowed for other possibilities for God's disclosure of Himself, Ritschl was not similarly inclined. McGiffert concludes, " . . .  no one ever assigned Christ a higher place. Instead of beginning with God and descending to Christ, his revealer, he began with Christ and found God through him." McGiffert, The Rise of Modem Re­ligious Ideas, pp. 236 ff.
O Q"The principle of Ritschl's Christology is that nothing can be attributed to the exalted Christ that is not already visible in the historical Jesus." R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Scribners'Sons, 19 57), p . 41. "
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revelation, this objective data, compels man to a "value-
judgment." Jesus, then, has the value of God for the be- 
3 0liever. Jesus is divine not by what He is, this would 
necessitate speculation, but by what He does: He redeems
man from sin and brings him to faith,
Ritschl differs from Schleierraacher in his concept of 
sin, holding instead that sin is neither original for each 
nor universal for all, but rather is individual resulting in 
separation. Sin is ignorance. Not by overcoming something, 
but by patient suffering Christ enables man to believe in 
His deity and in God. In this belief ignorance is overcome, 
reason is transformed, separation bridged, and man can par­
ticipate in the work of Christ, This requires a moral 
definition for Christ and His work, and, consequently, for 
Christianity, Thus, Ritschl makes "value-judgment" a key
QQ^Mackintosh rejects the charge of subjectivism made against Ritschl. " . . .  in the realities disclosed through Christ, faith has a norm or standard to which it is ever striving to conform; so that, evoked and sustained at every point by revelation, it lives and moves not by suf­ferance or permission of philosophy or science, but by the meaning of what God has done in Christ . . . [Christian men] only seek to let God in Christ tell them what they ought to believe about Himself, or sin, or pardon, or eternal life. . . .  as to the objective intention of religious value-judgments, then, no question ought to have been raised." Types of Modern Theology, pp. 154 ff. R. R. Niebuhr argues that in spite of his aim, Ritschl did not tie together the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history, as the former existed only in the inner experience of the individual. Ritschl concluded with more and more emphasis upon spiritual individuality. Resurrection and Historical Reason, pp. 33 ff. See also Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, ppTTZ ff. ----------------------
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concept in his t h e o l o g y L i k e  Schleierraacher, Ritschl
stressed the importance of the community of believers, the 
Church, for perpetuating the redemptive work of.Christ. 
However, he was to underscore individualism far more heavily 
than community. Given his orientation this was perhaps in­
evitable. He held that sin is individual ignorance, that 
redemption is achieved through accepting the moral value of 
Christ, and that the effect of redemption is to be found in 
a transformed reason. The result of this process is that 
the redeemed individual can make God's purposes his own.
R. R. Niebuhr concludes that more and more Ritschl swung 
away from stressing the importance of the Christian commun­
ity to underscoring a "spiritual individualism."
Three of Ritschl's emphases appear over and over 
again in formulations of Liberal Christologies, First,
Niebuhr defends Ritschl at this point. "Ritschl pointed out that the central Christian doctrine of forgive­ness of sin derived its vitality from the death-resurrection- community complex of biblical history and thought . . . this insight proves that Ritschl did in fact offer far more than a simple moral interpretation of Christianity." Resurrec­tion and Historical Reason, p. 38. No doubt more was in­volved than "a simple moral interpretation," but it was the singleness of aim in Ritschl's thinking which did not enable him to see fully the implications of his own system. Mac­kintosh's analysis is more to the point. "Ritschl . . . shows himself wholly unaware of the paradox inherent in the believing response to Christ, viz., that while He does ap­peal to our sense of right and wrong--and thus is acknowl­edged and appraised in what may be suitably called a judg­ment of value--yet His effect is to transform from end to end our very capacity to judge what is good. Ritschl saw the first side of this antinomy, not the second." Mackin­tosh, Types of Modem Theology, p. 175.
Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason, pp.41 ff. -----------------------------------
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Christ is to be the center for all Christian understanding.^^ 
Second, sin is viewed as ignorance suggesting that Christ's 
redemptive activity is to be seen as primarily educational.^^ 
Third, reason then becomes the medium through which God's 
redemptive grace in Christ is given to and received by man.
In the preoccupation of the nineteenth century with 
scientific investigation it was perhaps inevitable that both 
the Bible and the life of Jesus would become material for 
scientific scrutiny. The not always articulated assumption 
was that proper research yields knowledge, and this knowl­
edge is the truth which redeems man from the only evil, 
namely ignorance. When applied to theology this assumption 
meant a reversal of the traditional Christian understanding. 
If man himself can initiate the process culminating in re­
demption, then he is no longer a helpless object, utterly 
dependent upon God's grace. David Strauss' Life of Jesus 
was an attempt to deal with Jesus' life on a scientific
"It is an axiom with Ritschl that in theology every detail must be Christocentric, though his system is so in avowed method rather than in reality." Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 161. " . . .  Liberal Theology in everyone of its authentic expressions has been through and through Christocentric. More than that, it has been the most deter­minedly Christocentric theology in Christian history." H. P. Van Dusen, The Vindication of Liberal Theology (New York: Charles Scribner^h Sons, 1963), p. 41.
general acceptance of this emphasis led Liberal Theology to underestimate gravely the seriousness of sin and its effect upon man, perhaps the most glaring weakness in nineteenth century Liberalism, If sin is mere ignorance, obviously proper education corrects the defect. But man doesn't always act in consistency with his knowledge. Edu­cation can scarcely redirect, resolve, or remake a stubborn or contrary will.
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basis eliminating both the supernatural elements and the 
rationale by which the supernatural was understood. It was 
an attempt at a demythologizing process including both myth 
and history.
Every mythical feature added to the form of Jesus, has not only obscured an historical one, so that with the removal of the first the latter would come to light, but very many have been destroyed by the mythi­cal forms that have overlaid them, and been thus com­pletely lost.44
Thirty years after the publication of the Life of 
Jesus, Strauss rewrote it, feeling compelled by the dis­
coveries of the intervening years not to revise it but to 
write it anew.45 His method and findings are not of concern 
here. What should be noted is his view of Jesus in his 
later edition. Jesus is the great example. Revealing an 
evolutionary position Strauss claims no uniqueness for 
Jesus as that example. " . . .  however high may be the 
place of Jesus among those who have shown to mankind most 
purely and most plainly what it ought to be, still he was 
not the first to do so, nor will he be the l a s t S t r a u s s  
summarizes his position which is clearly Liberal.
Only when it is seen that in Christianity man did but become more deeply conscious of his own true nature.
F. Strauss, New Life of Jesus, Vol. II (London and Edinburgh; Williams & Norgate, 1865), p. 431.
^3Ibid., Vol. I, p. IX. A, Schweitzer argues that this New Life of Jesus definitely places Strauss in the school of Liberal Theology. A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Histori- cal Jesus, trans, by W. Montgomery (London; Adam & Charles Black, 1910), p. 200.
46Strauss, New Life of Jesus, Vol. II, p. 437. See also Vol. I, pp. 223 £f.
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that Jesus was the individual in whom this deeper con­sciousness first became a supreme all-pervading influ­ence, that redemption means but the advent of such a disposition and its inward adoption as our very life­blood, then only is Christianity really and thoroughlyunderstood.47
A radical extension of Strauss* position is to be 
found in Bruno Bauer's thought.
Bauer ended by asserting that there never was any historical Jesus, that the historical Christ and every­thing known and said about him belonged to the imagin­ation of the primitive Christian community and had no connection with any man who belonged to the real world.
Liberalism had its first major spokesman in America 
in Horace Bushnell, sometimes referred to as the "American 
Schleiermacher" and the "Father of American L i b e r a l i s m ."49 
In the middle of the nineteenth century America was not as 
ready for Liberalism as its neighbors across the Atlantic. 
Orthodoxy was still strong. Revivalism was especially 
vigorous. The question of slavery occupied much theological
^^Ibid., Vol. I, p. XV.
48Hugh Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins (New 4York: Oxford University Press, l9#4), p. 35.
^^Ahlstrom, "Theology in America; A Historical Sur­vey," Religion in American Life, Vol. I, p. 280. "What is loftiestand most transcendent in the character of God, His purity, goodness, beauty, and gentleness, can never be suf­ficiently apprehended by mere intellect, or by any other power than a heart configured to these divine qualities. And the whole gospel of Christ is subject, in a great degree, to the same conditions. It requires a heart, a good, right- feeling heart, to receive so much of heart as God here opens to us." Horace Bushnell, God in Christ (London; Turbner &Co., 1863), pp. 276 ff. Schleierraacher may not have written these words, but he could have believed them without remain­der. "Bushnell in the Church and Emerson outside it had begun to lay the basis of theological liberalism through German romantic idealism." Nelson R. Burr, Religion in Amer- ican Life, Vol. IV, p. 1116. ---- -----------
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attention.
In religious matters [Bushnell] came along at the precise moment to bring about the final over­throw of Calvinism's tyranny over the minds of American divines and his writings were among the first signs of a new theology for which his gener­ation was not yet r e a d y , 50
In 1848 Bushnell delivered three discourses; "The 
Divinity of Christ," "The Atonement," "Dogma and Spirit," 
Together with a preliminary dissertation on the use of 
language these comprise his notable book, God in Christ, 
proclaiming a "new liberal t h e o l o g y . In the last dis­
course he expresses at length, as did Schleiermacher and 
Ritschl, his dissatisfaction with metaphysical dogma.
Dogma is based on man's opinion and his use of specula­
tive reasoning. It tends to replace the object of faith 
which it was formulated to clarify. Bushnell is far from 
unaware of the debt Christianity owes to its tradition 
manifested in dogma, symbols, language. Accordingly he 
proposes that Christian thought must include on the one 
hand the objective reason, and dogma, and on the other hand 
the subjective faith, and the spirit. But for Bushnell 
preeminence is given to the l a t t e r .^2
It is with this concern for faith, the spirit and 
the subjective that Bushnell faces the question of sin. He
^^Cole, The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists, p. 54, brackets added.
3^Bushnell, God in Christ, p. 99.
CO"It appears . . . that we have two distinct methods of knowledge, a lower method in the life of nature and a higher in the life of faith." Ibid., p. 290.
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reveals a profound respect for what he sees as the inevit­
ably debilitating effect of sin. Sin is a state of man's 
negation of God and a withdrawal into himself. In sin man's 
life revolves around himself. He is unable to change this 
state, to heal himself of this brokenness. Man needs a new 
motive to break his will, engage his love, renew the liberty 
of fallen affections. This is the work of Christ.
For Bushnell the problem of relating the divinity and 
humanity of Christ arises not from what is possible in an in­
carnation but from what he holds to be the inescapably ster­
ile nature of metaphysical dogma. God has a "capacity of 
self-expression," Bushnell affirms. In this capacity He has 
expressed Himself in Jesus Christ without conflict of what 
is divine and what is human.
I insist that he stands before us a simple unity, one person, the divine-human representing the qualities of his double parentage as the Son of God, and the son of Mary, I do not say that he is composed of three elements, a divine person, a human soul, and a human body ; nor of these that they are distinctly three, or absolutely one, I look upon him only in the external way; for he comes to be viewed externally in what may be expressed through him, and not in any other way.As to any metaphysical or speculative difficulties involved in the union of the divine and the human, I dismiss them all, by observing that Christ is not here for the sake of something accomplished in his meta­physical or psychological interior, but for that which appears and is outwardly signified in his l i f e .53
Cognizance must be taken of several points here.
First, in Ritschlian fashion Bushnell attempts to 
resolve the traditional problem of the two natures of Christ
33ibid.. p. 147
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not by speculation but by stressing the primacy of the work 
of Christ. He joins the company of those beginning with 
Melanethon and following after Ritschl who argue that Christ 
is known through His benefits. It is what Christ accomp­
lishes which makes Him the Christ, Such an understanding 
then requires a moral definition of Christology, which both 
Ritschl and Bushnell give. What saves Bushnell from Ritschl's 
problem in his Christological development is the seriousness 
with which Bushnell treats sin, its effect and man's need 
for regeneration, in a way that Ritschl never saw.34-
Second, Bushnell consistently refuses to interpret 
the interior life of Christ.33 arguing from the activity
and revelation of Christ rather than from His nature, Bush­
nell is accused of the charge of Sabellianism— one God, one
56nature, three progressive revelations. Nowhere does Bush­
nell propose a SabeIlian understanding of the Trinity. He 
holds that any attempt to deal with the nature of Christ
See supra, p . 16. Much of Liberal Theology was to reproduce that moral element in Ritschl*s theology, but did so anthropocentrically by placing its weight upon the side of what happens in man. Bushnell put the weight upon the moral work of Christ. Some sixty years later P. T. Forsyth was to give a central place in his theology to this emphasis. Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary Ameri­can Theology, concludes : "Bushnell is not only the Schleier­macher of America, but also the Ritschl of America," p. 129.
55"All . . . efforts . . .  at the interior conception or analysis of Christ, are to be discarded, and we are to accept Him as the identification of the divine and the human — the Word become flesh," Bushnell, God in Christ, p. 222. See also pp. 94 ff, 141 ff, 158 ff, 2T01
3^McGiffert, The Rise of Modem Religious Ideas, p. 115. ------------------------ -----------
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involves speculation, an approach he emphatically rejects. 
Arguing only from the actions of God and Christ, Bushnell's 
formulation tends to blur the distinction between the two, 
hence the charge of Sabellianism. Later he answered this 
charge in part when he came to affirm that God's actions can 
be a clue to His nature. Since His actions are seen in 
Father, Christ, Holy Spirit, then, Bushnell concludes. His 
nature is Triune.37
Third, the Son represents the Father. We cannot 
know God as Absolute. Rather we know Him representatively 
through revelation and activity. Christ represents not the 
Absolute--that would make Him God--but the Father--that 
makes Him the faithful and subordinate Son.
Sinful man cannot save himself. To effect the 
reconciliation of man to God is Christ's work. Sin is more 
than an impairment of will. It becomes a "corporate author­
ity," moulding life, even developing its own morality. Re­
generation is necessary to free man from confinement to the 
mould, to sin. Christ comes to organize and make possible a 
new society, the Kingdom of God on earth. How is this accom­
plished? Not by an atonement in which God unjustly lets the 
guilty go and is satisfied by punishing the innocent. Rather, 
the aim of Christ is to make man penitent so that he will 
want forgiveness. Christ does this by awakening man to a
37gee F . Kirschenmann's defense of Bushnell against the charge of Sabellianism.in "Horace Bushnell; Orthodox or Sabellian?" Church History. Vol. XXXII, 1964, pp. 49-59.
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great consciousness of himself and his importance to God,
Man then sees his sin more clearly and yearns for forgive­
ness , He despairs of his own resources. In faith through 
Christ he is given the courage to turn to God's forgiveness. 
New life springs from this dying to himself. It is not a
possibility already within him which is released, but a pos-
58sibility given only by faith in Christ, Subjectively the 
atonement is what happens within man. Objectively it is 
what happens in Christ's sacrifice, His offering Himself for 
sin. His blood poured out. The objective work is needed to 
bring about the subjective result,not to reconcile God to 
man, for God has already taken the initiative, but to lead 
man to reconciliation with God, It is a spiritual work in 
which Christ engages, and since the work with its achieve­
ment is outside the cause-effect process of nature, it is 
affirmed as supernatural.
In Bushnell's thought one can see a Liberalism being 
shaped within, and partly dependent upon the Orthodoxy of 
his own day. A belief in the potential goodness of man is 
tempered by a thoroughgoing concept of sin. Redemption liber­
ates man to participate in the love of God, but it is brought 
about only by the grace of God, not the evolutionary unfolding
58"Therefore it is the total aim of Christianity to destroy the life of self, bring us off from the self-centers about which we revolve in our sins, and set us moving as in God;--that is, to take us away, at last, from our separate contrivings and willings and the life of prudence, and ele­vate us into a life of perpetual inspiration, whose impulse and perfection are the pure inbreathing of God." Bushnell, God in Christ, p. 223.
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of man's created possibility. Christ's redemptive work seen 
as the influence to persuade men to respond to God and, 
therefore, to their own potential is tempered by the equal 
conviction that it is supernatural work.
A man of his day Bushnell reveals a Liberal convic­
tion that somewhere beneath the dogma and speculations of 
the centuries there is a simple faith Christianity once pos­
sessed and lost. Though he felt theological formulations 
had curtailed this faith, he foresaw the dawning of a new 
day of spiritual faith. His optimism proceeds from a con­
viction of the primacy of subjectivism held as firmly as 
Schleiermacher's. And it is subject to the same criticisms. 
For how can it avoid the peril of self-centeredness which 
is sin? Is not the actual danger in theology not that man 
speculates, but that he thinks incorrectly since his vantage 
point resides in the realm of sin? Man in his thinking as 
well as his will needs redemption. If the removal of dogma 
can release the activity of a pristine spiritual faith, then 
man can save himself and scarcely requires a supernatural 
Redeemer.
More peculiarly Bushnell so strongly proclaims love 
as the motive of the Incarnation and of the reconciling 
atonement, that he is led to propose that even God is under 
an obligation to the law of goodness and love.3^ Is God 
less than the law? Is He merely the Mediator of this law?
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Surely this is not Bushnell's intent. It would seem that he 
has failed to heed his own admonition not to interiorize the 
nature of God.
Trends in Liberal Christological Thought
Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Bushnell set the stage 
for the development of a variety of Liberal Christologies.
Not always were the disciples faithful to their mentors.
The proliferation of views was extensive. Therefore, it is 
more helpful to follow the trends of Christological thought 
which emerged than to classify them according to schools. 
Basically three trends were followed: the "Ideal Man" view,
the "Psychological-effect" view, and the "Evangelical Liber­
al" view. The examination to be made will be of the Chris- 
tological trends each view expressed, rather than of com­
pleted Christological positions.
The first approach regarded Jesus primarily as the 
Ideal Man, the chief example for humanity. It was this view 
which Strauss took. His concluding statement represents 
this approach.
Therefore the [Biblical] critic is convinced that he is committing no offence against what is sacred, nay rather that he is doing a good and necessary work when he sweeps away all that makes Jesus a supernatural Being, as well meant and perhaps even at first sight beneficial, but in the long run mischievous and now absolutely de­structive, restores, as well as may be, the image of the historical Jesus in its simply human features, but re­fers mankind for salvation to the ideal Christ, to that moral pattern in which the historical Jesus did indeed first bring to light many principal features, but which as an elementary principle as much belongs to the gen­eral endowment of our kind, as its improvement and
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perfection can only be the problem and the work of man­kind in general.60
Rev. R. Roberts^^ presented a view not unlike that of 
Bauer and the later Strauss. Because of the strong reaction 
occasioned by the publication of his view a special Supple­
ment was issued on the theme, containing Roberts' original
contribution as well as seventeen other essays, revealing
62much of the Christological discussion of the time. Roberts, 
as Bauer before him, proposed that it is foolish to speak 
of the historical Christ, for there is no Christ as God 
in the historical Jesus. Arguing in a style reminiscent 
of S t r a u s s , ^3 Roberts points to the errors in ethical, 
political and economic judgment for which Jesus is to be 
held responsible. It matters little if the errors be 
through wrong choice, ignorance, or wilful neglect. That
6 Athey exist at all exposes Jesus' lack of genuine divinity. 
Logically Roberts then rejects the concept of Jesus as 
divine, an idea he finds repulsive as well as incorrect.
At the same time he accepts the Christ Ideal as historically 
true; as one "to which history bears its witness, and from
^^Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, Vol. II, p. 439, brackets added.
^^R. Roberts, "Jesus or Christ?" Hibbert Journal Sup­plement for 1909. ed. by L, P. Jacks (London: Norgate, 1909).
G^Hibbert Journal Supplement for 1909.
63See Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, Vol. II, pp.437 ff. --------------------
^^This line of reasoning reveals one of the motives for the appeal of the "kenotic theory" for some theologians of this period who used it against this argument.
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the hope inspired by which humanity may draw encouragement 
and strength in its conflict with ignorance and wrong. I, 
for one, will subscribe myself a b e l i e v e r . "^5
Roberts* view is sheer contradiction. If Jesus is 
denied divinity upon the grounds of error, ignorance and 
wrong, then Jesus cannot be the Ideal by which to dispel 
error, ignorance and wrong. However, for Roberts the Ideal 
is valuable only for its utilization by man, not for an 
efficacy within itself. Historical authenticity is not 
necessary. What is important is that man can believe in and 
respond to an Ideal. Even Schleiermacher saw the dangers 
in a subjectivism pushed this far I
R. J. Campbell also accepted the premise that the 
ideal is important irrespective of the authenticity of its 
incarnation. " . . .  the ideal would still exist whether 
there be a personality in which to incarnate it or no.
But to be effective the ideal needs a personality even if • 
" . . . that personality be idealized for the purpose."
What makes Jesus the Ideal? For Campbell there can be no 
movement without a personality. Further, no movement can 
ethically transcend that personality. Therefore, we can 
judge the man by the movement, Christianity implies the 
personality of Jesus as its founder. Since it can have no 
ethical comprehension higher than His, then Jesus must have
^^Roberts, "Jesus or Christ?" p. 281.
J. Campbell, "Jesus or Christ?" Hibbert Journal Supplement for 1909. p. 188.
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given Christianity its ideal. Campbell concludes, "the 
greatness of Jesus consists in the fact that He has made the 
word 'Christ' a synonym for the best and highest that can 
truly be called human.
The problem with Campbell's view is that it proceeds 
upon a rather shaky epistemological premise, namely, that 
the actuality of Christianity implies the actuality of Jesus, 
or at least Jesus' "Christ I d e a l . an inference is 
not necessarily the same as reality. Moreover, if there is 
no living reality to Christ, what criterion guards Christian­
ity from perpetrating an illusion? Campbell says:
. . . the only part of the original Christ idea which has power with the modem mind is the thought of an Ideal Man, the soul of the universal order, germinally present in every individual, and becoming increasingly manifest as time goes on in the per­fecting of human relations,59
The Incarnation is thereby reduced to the "thought of an
Ideal Man" contemporary man possesses.
Campbell's theological aim was to render Christian 
theology intelligible to modem man. While maintaining the 
traditional Christian terms, he infused them with such a
^^Ibld.. p. 192,
This epistemological view, hauntingly reminiscent of Descartes, is found in Campbell's New Theology, p. 18, quoted in Walter Marshall Horton, Contemporary English The­ology (New York: Harper & Bros., l 9 M ) , p . 33. "When I sayGod, I mean that mysterious Power which is finding expres­sion in the universe, and which is present in every tiniest atom of the wondrous whole, I find that this Power is the one reality I cannot get away from, for whatever else it may be, it is myself,"
^^Campbell, "Jesus or Christ?" p. 187.
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radically different interpretation that it is doubtful the 
ascription "Christian" can be descriptive of what is left 
standing in his thought. He treated sin as an evolutionary 
redemptive process, insisting that in sin man was in reality 
seeking God. Campbell*s theological position must surely be 
the most radical and unique variation of the Ideal-Man trend 
of Liberal Christology. Later he repudiated his views, and 
caused his primary work. The New Theology, to be withdrawn 
from publication.70
In Hastings Rashdall's view Christ is the culmination 
of God's continuous revelation which is reflected in all 
human love and self-sacrifice. Discrediting the expiational 
explanation of the atonement as immoral, he held Christ's 
atoning work to be one of moral influence. Man's redemption, 
an evolutionary process stretching beyond even man's death, 
begins as "men follow the ideal exhibited in Christ . . , ”71 
H. S. Holland in his formulation of Christology, pro­
poses : "His reality as Jesus in the flesh is the measure of
His capacity to be the Christ."7% Jesus is the example for 
all mankind. He is the Man, the only Man, providing the 
"impulse under which humanity forever moves f o r w a r d . "75
7^Published 1907, withdrawn 1915. His conversion is recorded in A Spiritual Pilgrimage (London: Williams andNorgate, 191^77------  ----
7^John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London: S.C.M., 1963), p. 55.
72h . s . Holland, "The Jesus of History and the Christ of Religion," Hibbert Journal Supplement, 1909, p. 135.23ibid.
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The "Idea1-Man" trend of Liberal Christological 
thought suffers from several serious defects. First, it is 
anthropocentric through and through. It elevates man to an 
Ideal, and the Ideal to the Godlike. As Father Tyrrell 
tersely observes, "Between God and Godlike the distance is 
i n f i n i t e . "74 For these Liberals Jesus is Godlike, not of 
God. Christ is not more than man, albeit an Ideal Man. He 
differs in degree not kind. The charge of Unitarianism is 
not without validity. However, secondly, the defect runs 
even deeper. According to this argument there is no Jesus 
at all. What is presented and believed in is an idea of 
Christ produced from the needs and desires of man himself.
It is this created Ideal, not the Jesus of history, which 
is c r u c i a l . 73 jesus of Nazareth is but incidental or pre­
liminary to the Ideal. Unitarianism does not make this mis­
take, for it upholds the reality of Jesus of Palestine 
though denying He is the Christ. Finally, this view is de­
fective in its concept of redemption, if it can be said to 
have one at all. Here there is no Christ Who for us men and 
our salvation did come from the Father, and who lived and
7^FpC George Tyrrell, "The Point at Issue," Hibbert Journal Supplement, 1909. p. 15.
73uietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology (London: Collins,1966) claims this view is Docetic as it makes the Ideal Man and not the actual man the center of its faith. "The idea is substance, the phenomenon is accident: Christ the God issubstance, Jesus the man is accident. The docetic doctrine of the incarnation is moulded by a philosophical presupposi­tion. Anyone who does not free himself from this presupposi­tion (idea-phenomenon) will seek in vain to escape docetism whether of a cruder or more subtle kind," pp. 81-82.
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died. Rather there is the Christ-Ideal revealing what man 
can become, and, through evolutional inevitability, is be­
coming, It is not a Person, or a decision, or a sacrifice 
but an Ideal which provides the influence to enable man to 
progress toward an unmistakably brighter future.
A second trend of Christological thought in the nine­
teenth century Liberal Theology was the "psychological- 
effect" trend. Here the accent is given to the response man 
makes to Christ, It differs from the previous type of 
Christological thought through a shift from the Ideal in 
Christ to the response possibility in man.
W. H. Moberly's objective^^ %^ as to combine the bet­
ter insights of both Liberalism and Conservatism, and there­
by to offer a middle-way he designated as the "inclusive" 
view on atonement. He accepts the Liberal position that sin 
is a matter of spirit and character not law, but he agrees 
with the Conservative view that the question is more than 
one of mere morality since man cannot make himself good.
What is required must come from God in the redemptive work 
of Jesus Christ. Liberalism tended to propose the life of 
Christ as an example man is to follow, while Conservatism 
underlined the death of Christ as the exclusive act winning 
release for man from the otherwise inescapable burden of sin. 
Moberly's "inclusive" view is that there is real achievement 
gained through a strong emphasis upon Christ's life, but
7^W, H. Moberly, "The Atonement," Foundations ed. by B. H. Streeter (London: Macmillan & Co., 1912), pp. 265-335,
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also that the death and resurrection cannot be separated 
from that life. The sinner needs more than an example, he 
needs to be transformed.
An atonement for sin is necessary in the shape of something that will abolish it by doing away with its effects and transforming the sinner. And the experi­ence of penitence seemed to afford the only indication of how this might be.77
Christian theology has generally proposed either an
78objective or subjective theory of atonement. In simplest 
terms the objective theory holds that a change in the order 
of things is necessary to deal with the reality of sin, 
while the subjective theory holds that a change within man 
is required to deal with this reality. In this respect 
Moberly falls into the latter classification, but his posi- 
tion is quite different from that taken by Abelard,
" . . . the classic exponent of the subjective theory."79 
Moberly proposes a theory of a "vicarious penitence." How 
does this operate to effect redemption?
It is by doing more perfectly what punishment does imperfectly; namely, destroying the sin-taste in the sinner by 'showing-up' sin and so producing such an
^^Ibid.. p. 307.
780. C. Quick proposes there are four theories of atonement in Christian theology; subjective, dramatic, juridical, or sacrificial. 0. C. Quick, Doctrines of the Creed (London: Collins, The Fontana Library, 1963), pp. 224*23^. In conclusion, however, he sees no reason to hold the latter two apart and he then yokes them with the second type in the objective theory position. Ibid., pp. 239-240. In effect. Quick seems to wish to bridge the gap between the subjective and the objective theories in a way which main­tains the subjective theory as dominant in the merger.
Ibid.. p. 226.
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intense realization of the true nature of sin and good­ness as must find outlet in action . . . .  Thus, when we see the trouble and suffering that our faults have brought on those whom we love, our eyes are most likely to be opened to a true understanding of spiritual values.SO
The troubles and sufferings we bring on our loved, ones enable 
us to realize what we have done and do to Christ. Christ's 
dying was both His offering and our crime. This combination 
evokes our repentance by which we are transformed.
Christ's death was necessary to perfect character in 
two ways. First, to die is to gain true life. Second, as 
selfishness is at the heart of sin, then its opposite, self­
surrender, must be closest to faithfulness to God, Self- 
sacrifice meets temptation at its strongest point, the self- 
centered demand for personal survival, and conquers it.
This is the human work of Christ.
Though sinned against in His death, Christ identi­
fied with all His offenders, which includes us. However, if 
His act is to be efficacious for all time, it must be God's 
act. Resurrection provides God's approval of Christ and the 
endorsement of His work. The resurrection victory completes 
the atonement. It is, thus, more than a moral act. It is 
the work of God for each and for all time. This is the 
divine work of Christ.
The effect of redemption is to transform us within 
but necessarily from outside ourselves through Christ. Jus­
tification cannot be separated from sanctification. Receiving
80Moberly, "The Atonement," p. 309.
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forgiveness and becoming righteous are both part of God's 
way with us. His work of grace. It is slow work, but both 
must hold together.
Moberly*s view presents several problems. First, 
Jesus is held to have to suffer to be perfected in His char­
acter. This would suggest a deficiency in Him. It is one 
thing to be tested or proved through suffering. It is quite 
another thing to be defective, or at least less than whole, 
until suffering occurs. Second, Moberly fails to make 
clear how his conviction, that the crucifixion must be an 
act of God and not just a moral act, takes place. That is, 
he does not clarify God's part in Jesus' act of seIf-surren­
der. If the act is more than Jesus' decision, but indeed 
is entered into by God, then the act is more than merely a 
moral one. But if this is the case, then Jesus' human work 
of self-surrender, and consequently the atonement, is ren­
dered meaningless as His work. Further, Moberly could 
scarcely hold the resurrection as God's approval of Jesus* 
act. Thus, Moberly must offer an explanation for God's par­
ticipation in Jesus' act of atonement which does not make it 
less of a genuine act. This Moberly does not do.
Third, Moberly correctly sees the weakness in Liber­
alism's concept of Jesus as the example for imitation. "It 
is not a moral standard or ideal that we need so much as 
power to live up to it."^^ Yet, for Moberly the dynamic of
p. 318.
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the atonement, the ‘Vicarious penitence,” depends upon man’s 
ability to respond to the suffering he has caused. The cen­
ter is in man. It is a theological construction which fails 
to understand the extent to which man will go to hide his 
sin. Confronted by the effect or the charge of his sin man 
is not so inclined to repent as to hide himself from God 
among the trees\ Fourth, surely Moberly has erred in equat­
ing "vicarious penitence" with atonement. Evoking penitence 
is not the same as achieving reconciliation, and it is the 
latter which is the purpose of atonement in both its objec­
tive and subjective formulations. Penitence may be a neces­
sary step, even the first one, in the redemptive process, 
but theologically it can in no way bear the weight the doc­
trine of the atonement expresses.
Though he sought a middle way, in this paper Moberly 
has undoubtedly laid his pathway down the Liberal road.
Man stands in the center of his view. His construction of 
the theory of atonement rests on the analogue of human ex­
perience, and the direction of the argument is, therefore, 
from man to God. Christ is no Ideal Man for Moberly. But, 
as in the "ideal-type" of Christology, Christ’s own life and 
decisions have little real meaning. Rather, the purpose of 
Christ's death is primarily to serve as a stimulus to evoke 
a repentant response from within men.
09Wilhelm Herrmann in his classroom lectures proposed
82Wilhelm Herrmann, Systematic Theology, trans. by N. Micklema and K. A. Saunde r s ( London : Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927).
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a different solution though starting at the same place. For 
him the reaction in men created by the Cross is no less in­
itially an awareness of guilt than for Moberly. But, where 
Moberly suggested the appropriate response to be one of peni­
tence activated by remorse through which the process of re­
demption begins, Herrmann contends that the appropriate 
response is one of recognizing that in spite of our guilt 
God loves us• It is at this point that the atonement has 
meaning, and the redemptive work begins,
. . . Christ for our salvation answers for us. He answers for us against those doubts and accusations which God allows our bad conscience to breed in us.If we do not live through these accusations and over­come them in our hearts, we do not win free from sin.The Reformers* doctrine of justification based on Pauline teaching explains why this experience of the forgiveness of God is to be understood as the sinner'sredemption.83
It is in awareness of God's forgiveness that we repent and 
desire Christ's power to work in our lives.
Rejecting both dogma and rationalism Herrmann adopts 
an "inner quickening created in mankind through the power 
of the Person of J e s u s a s  the ground for religion. Our 
true life is founded upon an "unqualified dependence" on God, 
but the choice for it is ours to make. Were it not free 
choice from within man it would be qualified. Both freedom 
and dependence are held together "that God has given us to 
have life in ourselves.
pp. 124 ff. S^Ibid., p. 64,
Ibid.. p. 92. Schleiermacher argued the necessity of a "feeling of freedom" to balance and make meaningful the "feeling of absolute dependence."
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The effect of sin is seen in our experience of a
feeling of being rejected by and unacceptable to God, of
86being paralyzed in the courage to start a new life. Herr­
mann is more keenly aware than Moberly of the ways in which 
man endeavors to hide his sin and guilt in the fear of God's 
j u d g m e n t . T h i s  fear prevents man from being redeemed. 
Until man gains "confidence" in God no faith can make him 
whole, no act can redeem.
That Jesus Christ has the power to redeem us can only mean that our present experience of the reality of his Person convinces us as nothing else does that God will accept us . . .  . We can be saved only by a reality presented to us as a fact of our own experi­ence, a reality indubitable as our need.88
Here again the tension of dependency and freedom is main­
tained. We must submit completely of our free will to the 
power of Jesus in order to gain confidence and be redeemed. 
It is this power which then "condemns our sins and stirs in 
us courage to start a new life."89 it is this power of 
Jesus operating within us which prompts faith as trust in 
God, and that faith is itself salvation.90
Herrmann's position, like Moberly's, can be criti­
cized for his theory of the Atonement. The crucifixion is 
part of the vocation of Christ, not as a necessity to per­
fect His character as in Moberly's view, but as the act of 
obedience without which His unity with the Father would have
G^ibid.. pp. 105 ff. p. 116.
88lbid.. pp. 115 ff. ®^Ibld., p. 122. 
90Ibid.. p. 133.
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been destroyed. But what was the purpose of that death? Not 
to reconcile God in His justice to man in his sin. Not to 
appease the wrath of God. Rather Christ's death reveals to 
men that God forgives all who turn to Him. The death of 
Christ is revelation, not atonement I It is the disclosure of 
"God's own working in order to reconcile sinners."91 Surely 
Herrmann is misusing the meaning of the concept of Atonement,
In Herrmann's theological view little significance 
remains to the life and career of Jesus. Christ reveals the 
attitude of love and forgiveness which is already there in 
God to the possibility of response which is already there in 
man. This revelation of what is, is completed by Christ's 
obedience in His death. Complete obedience to one's con­
victions is always an admirable trait. It may even be sus­
pected of being a rare trait among men. But it is not 
unique, not worthy of being followed as The Way, The Truth 
and The Life.
William Temple's position9^ initially appears to 
follow Herrmann's.
Love, if understood, always prevails at last; and it does so by making itself known; and it makes itself known by sacrifice. The sacrifice of the Love of God is the means by which sin is conquered; it is God's
p. 121.
William Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," Founds- tions, pp. 211-263. It is only this one article by Temple written prior to 1918— the terminal date of this examination (see supra, p. 11; and infra, p. 72)— which is examined here. Temple wrote well into the twentieth century and may more properly be identified with the latter in his major writings and theological stance.
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sacrifice of Himself, and therefore may reach and con­quer all at last.93
His conclusion is nearer Moberly. The starting place for 
Christology is with God. How do we know God? In the Person 
of Jesus Christ. What kind of Person is Christ? This can­
not be answered in the historical Jesus until the problem of 
Jesus' divine and human natures is resolved first. How is 
the divinity of Christ to be understood? In terms of 
"Spirit--that is of Will." Will is tied to inescapable duty. 
It is not when man can do anything he desires, but when he 
is dependent upon what he must do, that man's will can be 
said to be most free. It is duty, not freedom, which char­
acterizes the will. Christ's will is fully His, but in its 
content the purpose is the same as God's. In Christ we know 
what God "does and desires." Therefore, formally God and 
Christ are distinct. Materially they are one and the same. 
However, since there is no will apart from purpose, the Son 
and the Father are fully one; indeed, "in content of heart 
and will Christ is identically one with God."9^
However, Christ is not to be confused with the 
Father. "There is a sense, no doubt, in which we must say 
that something less than the whole Godhead is revealed in 
C h r i s t . "95 This limitation is not restrictive in respect to 
redemption for we can respond to Christ's love, and we can 
take God's purpose as our own even as Christ did. Materially
p. 221. '^'^ Ibid., p. 250.
95lbid., p. 251.
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we can be reconciled to God and this is what really matters. 
Christ is not representative of humanity as it now is, but of 
what all men "shall become." His example elicits our response 
through which redemption comes. For Moberly this response is 
brought about through the remorse created when we behold the 
hurt we have done Christ, In Herrmann's view our response 
arises from the awareness of God's forgiveness that Christ's 
example provides. Temple is not far from Moberly here.
As this image [He that hath seen Christ hath seen the Father] fastens on our mind, our hardness disappears. We become repentant, then receptive; at last we surren­der ourselves freely to the infinite Love; we take His Purpose as our own; He becomes to us no longer an im­posing and attractive Figure, but an indwelling and inspiring Presence, the breath of our l i v e s .96
In Kierkegaardian fashion goodness is consequently released
within us. What is true of Christ is true of us when we
respond to Him.
Temple, as do Moberly and Herrmann, puts the weight 
of the doctrine of Redemption upon the response of man 
rather than the achievement of Christ. Christ serves as 
the "Stimulus," focusing our attention upon the problem 
and the solution, but it is our response alone which effects 
the redemption. Christ's work and death are but weakly 
acknowledged. His mere existence at the Cross would seem 
sufficient to carry most of this Christological position.
Temple's theological construction raises again the 
two-nature problem of Christ's Person, though in modern 
terms. He is anxious to maintain distinctiveness for Christ
98Ibid., p. 262, brackets added.
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in respect both to God and to man. This he attempts to do 
by definition. "The form of His consciousness is Human, 
while its content is Divine."9? However, if it is remem­
bered that Temple has defined consciousness as will, and 
content as purpose, and that there is no will apart from 
purpose, then the distinction between the divine and the 
human in Christ cannot be affirmed. What is given by defin­
ition is taken away by application. If the purpose which is 
divine controls the will which is human, then in what real 
sense is Christ human? In what sense is He tempted? Does 
He resist sin? Does He effect redemption?
The "Psychological-effect" trend of Liberal Chris- 
tology took more seriously the problem of sin and its ef­
fect than did the "Ideal-Man" trend. Redemption is given 
a central place in its thought. Sin causes a debilitated 
state in man which must be overcome before man can become a 
loving person, a redeemed being. This position saw that 
mere example, even a very moral example, is insufficient 
to conquer sin. A genuine change must be brought about.
The atonement provides the basis for that change. It is pre­
cisely at this point that the deficiency in this approach is 
exposed. For the crucifixion is less atonement than example, 
a therapeutic example, by which man is enabled to break the 
psychological blocks restraining his true nature. When re­
leased from these blocks man becomes whole, he is redeemed.
^^Ibid.. p. 258.
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In the three positions presented the release is respectively 
from hidden guilt, from fear of rejection, from hardness of 
heart. The dynamic of the Atonement, however, is not to be 
found in Christ but within man.9% It is an anthropocentric 
atonement in which man is reconciled within himself. A 
reaction, even a therapeutic reaction, to an event cannot 
lay claim to the Christian understanding of Redemption. If 
this is the uniqueness Christ possesses, then He is but one 
among many brothers.
Moreover, this view blurs the distinctions between 
revelation, redemption, reconciliation, justification and 
sanctification. The release from one state does not auto­
matically place one in the hoped-for second state. For­
giveness cannot carry the entire weight of the purpose of 
Christ's vocation.
Finally, the life and career of Christ are as rela­
tively unimportant for this trend in Christology as for the 
"Ideal-Man" trend. Revelation is for the purpose of redemp­
tion, not to proclaim the righteous and merciful Father, but 
to unlock the human possibility.
One Liberal formulation of Christology did take more
98It may not be inappropriate to observe the parallel of symbols which can be drawn for this view between the Cross and the psychiatrist's couch. The couch symbolizing the psychotherapeutic method serves to draw out the patient's fears, repressions and hostilities, all those disruptions of personality by which he is unable to be a whole person.The premise upon which the procedure takes place is that the patient has within himself the seeds for his own cure, which only require inner release for the achievement of wholeness and health.
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seriously the work of Christ, This trend was Evangelical 
Liberalism. It tended to be an expression of Liberalism 
more typical in America than in Britain or on the Continent, 
As noted,American Liberalism developed in the midst of the 
Revival movement,99 in addition, though Liberalism was 
overthrowing New England Theology, its spokesmen were in the 
main products of the latter School, and much of this influ­
ence was carried into their new position.
One example of Evangelical Liberal Christology is to 
be found, not in an individual thinker, but in a school of 
theologians, Andover Seminary, Its publication. The Andover 
Review, provides a measure of their t h o u g h t . ^00 xhey were 
quite strenuously opposed to what they held to be the
QQ"The main stream of American Liberal Theology is evangelical, i.e., it stands on the basis of American Revi- valistic Christianity and it gets its devotional Christian note from this direction," Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology, p. 13Y, See also p. 93, and supra.footnote 16, p . 7 .
^^^An extensive presentation of their view is pro­vided in D. D, Williams' published doctoral thesis, The Andover Liberals (New York: King's Crown Press, 194TJTThe optimism of many liberals of this period concerning both man and the inevitability of progress, received an uneasy and somewhat skeptical hearing from the men of this school. Cf., ibid., pp. 116 ff. One wrote, "Nothing is more evident than that a certain sense of fear has begun to seize the heart of our generation. We are literally afraid of the world in which we live. It is so great, so uncon­trollable, in many ways so unintelligible. Who shall solve the problems of our civilization? Who shall master the forces which have passed beyond our control?" Ibid., p.192. Appropriately Williams observes, "The move from Liber­alism to the pessimism of the Barthian theology is not so far as has been thought." Ibid., p. 46, The wisdom of Reardon's definition of Protestant Liberalism is evidenced here. See supra, footnote 4, p, 2,
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dehumanized view resulting from nineteenth century natural­
ism. Though in its various attempts at formulating its 
Liberal Theology, specific evangelical doctrines disappeared 
or were reinterpreted, still an evangelical concern remained 
at the heart of Andover's attempt to restate Christology in 
terms of revelation and redemption. The main thrust of 
Andover's thought was to uphold a supernatural definition 
of Christ in relationship to God and to the world, and to 
refuse to disassociate the Christ of faith from the Jesus of 
history.
The Andover Liberals approached the problem of 
Christ's nature through an understanding of His work. They 
proposed three ways in which the effectiveness of this work 
is to be seen. First, Christ brings a new revelation into 
the world. It is not a repetition or an extension of pre­
vious revelation. It is not an evolutionary result. Rather, 
"God was in Christ, so far as God can manifest his life in a 
human personality at a given period of h i s t o r y . T h e y  
recognized the limits of human nature, but proposed that 
Christ is above these limits, as He is of God.
. . , the historical fact of a revelation of God in Jesus may be attested to the extent of its probability by reason. It can be made certain by the experience of the believer who finds in his own experience a new relationship to the historical figure and to God.^02
Reason and experience confirm the divinity of Christ. This
leads to their next argument.
^Q^Ibld.. p. 111. ^O^Xbid.. p. 86.
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Second, the redemption Christ effects leads to a new 
life, Christ is not the Ideal-Man we can follow to discover 
redemptively our true selves. Nor is He the "Redemptive 
Stimulus" to release the goodness pent-up within us. Rather, 
He effects a radical regeneration within us,
[The Andover Liberals] insisted upon the radical nature of the change from the non-Christian to the Christian life. "Christ-likeness does not mean a little more growth in character, but a radical change, the whole nature possessed by a new principle, and pervaded by a new spirit."103
The revivalistic inheritance is obvious. Clearly, here, the
evangelical spirit is in control. What is not clear in their
presentation is how the redemptive effect takes place. They
seem limited in their ability to explain this experience.
The third effective aspect of Christ's work is seen 
in the establishment of His Church. Jesus remains in the 
center of this fellowship. The Church is not an evolution­
ary product. It is something new and unique. Its influence 
is extensive, confirming the divine commission which lies 
behind it,^^^
Arguing that this threefold work is unique in history, 
they affirm the supernatural nature of Jesus Christ. But
^^^Ibid., p. 79, brackets added.
^^^uch loyalty to the missionary enterprise was evidenced by the Andover Liberals. It was a major concern in America throughout the nineteenth century. The salvation of the heathen was a constant theme expressed through the pages of the Andover Review. Was it necessary to be a Christian to be saved? In general, a Liberal stance was taken affirming both education through non-Christian revela­tion and Christ-confrontation as valid means for salvation.
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their reasoning obviously proceeds from their conclusion 
rather than leading toward it. Having endeavored to defend 
the supernatural divinity through reason, experience and 
historical testing, they fell back on faith, which is where 
they had been all the time. This reveals the uncertainty 
of their position. Requiring the absoluteness of Christ to 
support their concepts of revelation, redemption and ecclesi- 
ology, still as Liberals they are loath to argue beyond the 
finite situation and man's experience. Therefore, they 
ambivalate between a "natural humanity" and the "super­
natural divinity" of Christ.
It is the emphasis upon the "supernatural” in the 
divinity of Christ which underlies their concept of redemp­
tion.
Nor do we see any reason to believe that our human­ity can in Him be reconciled to God, and restored to God, save as it is true that in Him ethically, spirit­ually, and— that these words may have their necessary value— metaphysically and essentially dwells the full­ness of G o d . 105
The example of Christ's life is fact. But man is also to be 
led to repentance. Confronted by God in Christ, a supernat­
ural divinity, man is to experience a transformation, be 
converted, enter into a new relationship to the universe.
The ethical demand of Christ's life is there also, but it 
follows rather than precedes regeneration. In contrast to
Ibid., p. 106. See also pp. Ill ff, Bushnell had specifically rejected the validity of a metaphysical approach. For him the "supernatural" of Christ derived from the conviction that the spiritual nature of Christ's work places it outside the cause-effect process of nature.
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the concept of redemption in the other two trends of Liberal 
Christological thought examined, the Andover Liberals held 
that redemption through Christ involves a thorough conver­
sion, healing man's estrangement from God and instituting a 
new life not possible to man before.
The Andover Liberals endeavored to remain within the 
framework of traditional New England theology but to build 
with the materials of Liberalism. Evangelical Liberalism is 
the appropriate designation of their effort. But frequently 
it was indeed a house divided, with bricks at times separat­
ing from the framework. A constant shifting of emphasis 
marked its formulations, seen, for example, in the ambival­
ence evidenced about the nature of the Person of Christ.
Lewis F. Steams was an Evangelical L i b e r a l . ^^8 
1891 he presented a paper before the International Congre­
gational Council in London on "The Present Direction of 
Theological Thought in the Congregational Churches of the ■ 
United States." Here is to be found a succinct statement 
of the trend of Liberal Theology.
The way is . . , being opened for a larger and richer conception of God. The old theology, in deal­ing with this subject, looked too much to philosophy, too little to Christianity. But we are trying to "Christologize" our doctrine of God, to set Him forth as He is seen in the face of Jesus Christ. It is often said among us that we are coming to a more ethical conception of God. This is true. But it is more ethical because it is more Christian, because it is not of the God of Nature, but the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It is also said that we have corrected the old view of God which
^Q^Ibld.. p. 92,
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emphasized His transcendence at the expense of His immanence, by giving due place to the latter element. This is likewise true. But we have not learned the lesson from pantheism, as some would claim, but from our fuller and truer conception of Christianity. It is the unchristologized view of God that unduly empha­sizes His transcendence. It is the view of God through Christ the Mediator which gives the other element in its proper relation to the whole truth. It is in Christ and the Holy Spirit that God comes nearer to us and dwells in us, and it is through this wonderful fact that we leam the reality of God's indwelling in man and Nature apart from redemption. And thus also the way is opened for a far greater and truer understand­ing of the great Christian truth of the Trinity,i07
In this extensive quotation one sees quite clearly the Liber­
al stress on the centrality of Christ, the immanence of God, 
and the necessity of experience as the ground of revelation. 
Steams more successfully than the Andover Liberals 
negotiated the merger of Evangelicalism and Liberalism. On 
the one hand he emphasizes both the initiative and the grace 
of God's activity toward man, while on the other hand he af­
firms no less man's freedom, the objective of establishing 
the Kingdom of God, and God's revelation in nature. Though 
he speaks of Christ as the "Ideal Man" and the "leader of 
m a n k i n d , h e  denies man is saved solely by the example
of Christ.109
The starting place of theology is in Jesus Christ. 
Stressing both His humanity and His divinity, Christ is 
accepted as the theanthropic Person. "Only God can reveal
lO^Lewis F. Steams, Present Day Theology (London: Nisbet 6c Co., 1893), pp. 540 The book is a posthumousedition of his classroom lectures. This particular paper appears in its entirety at the conclusion of the book.
^Q^Ibid.. p. 182. ^09Ibid.. p. 366.
52
God, There can be no intermediary that is of a lower es­
sence than God. And only God can perform the divine work 
of redemption."11^ Man is a sinner. Negatively this is 
viewed as disobedience. Positively it is viewed as selfish­
ness, as choosing the wrong objectives, Man as sinner needs 
God's redemptive grace. To man is reserved the power of 
choice but not of action. Man can choose to accept God's 
gift of grace, but man cannot choose to save himself. Christ 
is the means of redemption. Something happens through Christ 
which has not happened before. No redemption through example 
or self-discovery is allowed. It is only because of Christ 
that man can become a transformed person. How does this 
come about?
Revelation must be qualified by redemption, requir­
ing us to speak of the redemptive revelation. In this 
understanding there is a plan in redemptive revelation, a 
sacred history, of which Christ is the consummation. But 
redemption is not offered as a consequence of man's sin.
"The provision for redemption antedated the Fall."HI God 
foresaw man's sin and provided for it. Here a novel use of 
the Atonement is introduced.
The traditional view is reaffirmed that death occurs
Ibid.. p. 362. See also pp. 21 ff. and 30 ff. Steams is aware of the danger of supralapsarianism here. Cf., pp. 153 ff. But he does not escape the implication for his view. "The world was made that it might be the theater for Christ's redemptive work," p, 179.
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because of sin. It is indeed the punishment of sin. A sin­
less baby, having never merited the penalty of death, may 
still die. Thus, the baby takes on undeserved punishment, 
Christ's death occurs in a similar way. It is His gift of 
Himself to God. "He was not our Substitute in punishment, 
but our Substitute in atonement, However, the atonement 
cannot stand alone, it must be complemented by Christ's 
resurrection to have meaning in Steams' view.
The Saviour did not to any considerable degree enter upon the practical work of salvation during his earthly ministry . . , His work was chiefly pre­paratory . . . .  It was when he ascended into heaven and sat down at the right hand of God, that the truly kingly work, the work of establishing his kingdom in the world, began.113
The Atonement, by itself, has little meaning. Regeneration
is effected by the application of Christ's post-resurrection
power to those who in faith accept this gift,
A redemption planned before the advent of sin, and 
made part of an unfolding sacred history, surely suggests 
an evolutionary revelation in which little real meaning is 
left to the "theanthropic" Person. Christ's life is pre­
paratory rather than effective, and His humanity is devoid 
of a genuine vocation.
As it was worked out in the nineteenth century the 
"Evangelical Liberal" approach to Christological thought 
suffered the handicap that both Evangelicalism and Liberal­
ism were rendered something less by the merger. This led
p. 394. ^^^Ibid.. pp. 403 ff.
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to the chief defect in this Liberal formulation; a polari­
zation of the divine and the human in Christ. A very unsat­
isfactory account of Christ's Person, His life, and His 
vocation was the consequence. On the positive side in this 
view can be seen the tempered optimism of the Evangelical 
Liberal theologians which led them to raise serious questions 
about man and his supposed progress. This position was 
coupled with a more realistic appraisal of the drastic 
effects of sin than was realized by most of their Liberal 
companions. In this view the effects of sin could be over­
come only by a radical regeneration which could be provided 
redemptively only by God.
On the negative side this position never could get 
to a clear or coherent view of Christ. It arabivalated be­
tween stressing the divinity— at times a supernatural divin­
ity— of Christ and the humanity all men could understand 
through their own experience. But more importantly, though 
theologically committed to a central focus on the redemptive 
work of Christ, the theologians of this view did not arrive 
at a Christological presentation which put soteriology first, 
and interpreted Christ, as man, in this perspective. In 
Christology they did not achieve their purpose.
P. T. Forsyth did present a Christology sufficient for this purpose. It may be argued that he was an Evangeli­cal Liberal, but his emphasis upon soteriology gave greater stress to the first of the two terms, while most theologians in this school seemed to be Liberals first. Mcquarrie states the case quite well; "Peter Taylor Forsyth . 4 . had already made the transition from a typically 'liberal' position to a theology which emphasized the need for atonement," Mèquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, p. 339.
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Summary
In spite of the differences between the three trends 
in Liberal Christology, at least three interpretations are 
common to all. First, from Schleiermacher*s time all Liber­
al expressions proceed from a premise of "experience as the 
only legitimate basis of t h e o l o g y I n  terms of Chris­
tology it means man's experience can bear God's revelation 
in Christ. Indeed, it is man's experience which alone can 
testify to the Christ, Whatever of Christ cannot be known 
in this way is rejected as metaphysical speculation. If 
Christ is primarily seen as the Ideal, He is always the 
"Ideal Man." If He is primarily seen as the "Redemptive 
Influence," His is an influence determined and limited by 
man's experience. If He is seen primarily as "Saviour," His 
saving work of radical regeneration is kept within the 
bounds of what man can experience. It is man's experience 
of Christ which provides the key for the Liberal interpreta­
tion of Christology. Williams argues that for Liberal The­
ology, "Religious experience is more important than doc­
trine ."^^8
115A. C. McGiffert, "The Progress of Theological Thought During the Past Fifty Years," Journal of Theology. 1916, pp. 323 ff. "It has served to moderate the claims of a speculative theology that knows no bounds or limits, and has brought to the fore and emphasized those ideas and those doctrines which have a direct bearing upon experience and a vital relation to it. And this means a real advance, even if in the name of science theologians are claiming for the experimental method in theology more than that method will bear." Ibid.. p. 325.
^^^Williams, The Andover Liberals, p. 22.
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In his inaugural address given upon occupying the
chair of systematic divinity at Bangor Seminary, Lewis
Steams placed the center of Christian theology in the
humanity of Jesus, proclaiming the old age with its center
in transcendence replaced by a new center in Christ moving
u p w a r d . T h i s  represented the temper of Liberal Theology.
Therefore, in the second place, regardless of the Christo-
logical trend followed, Christ is the central focus for all
118Liberal Theology. At least that is the intention Liberal 
Theology proclaimed to follow. It necessitates a rather 
broad definition of Christology to conclude that intention 
fulfilled. Sometimes Christ appears as no more than an idea 
of man. In most interpretations the life and work of Jesus 
are relatively unimportant. What remains in all is that 
Christ is a man. Through the use of the principle of con­
tinuity this allowed the Liberals to reason from their own 
experience through Christ to G o d . ^^9 may be argued with
considerable merit that the real center of Liberal Theology 
in its nineteenth century formulations resides in man. But, 
for the Liberals, man is Christ and Christ is man. The dif­
ference is always quantitative, never qualitative. No separ­
ation of the two is allowed. Liberalism resolved the problem
117Steams, Present Day Theology, pp. xi ff.
supra. footnote 42, p. 19.
[Liberalism] established continuity between God and man by adjusting God to man." R. R. Niebuhr, The King- dom of God in America, p. 192, brackets added.
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of the two natures of Christ simply by making every man 
divine,
When the suspicion began to grow that there was a 
distinctive difference between Christ and man. Liberal Chris- 
tological thought began to break apart. Lawton's thesis is 
that the problem of Christ's omniscience brought this 
a b o u t . T h i s  might be true if the Liberal formulations 
of Christology were really attempts to deal with the Person 
of Christ. But they were attempts to deal with the divine 
nature of man through the Person of Christ. A growing ap­
preciation of the reality of sin began to point to a genu­
inely qualitative distinction between Christ and man. As
1 91seen in the Andover Liberals this growing awareness was 
evidenced by some of the Liberals even in the height of the 
movement. Wherever the distinction was accepted the premise 
upon which Liberal Christology was built was being destroyed.
In spite of, but with these qualifications Liberal 
Theology can be said to be Christocentrie. That is, the 
three trends in Liberal Christological thought were all 
aimed in the direction of keeping an interpretation of 
Christ at the center of the interpretation of all that is 
Christian. However, the weaknesses of their Christological
120J. Lawton, Conflict in Christology. Lawton argues that Chalcedon resolved the differences between the Antio­chene and the Alexandra in Schools by making them the two limits between which Christian Christology must find its way. Liberalism, he then argues, attempted to fuse the two limits. It was a fusion which came apart at the point of omniscience.
121 See supra, footnote 100, p. 46.
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views are evident. The Christ they presented is rendered 
consistently subordinate to God if not always distinguish- 
ably superior to man. Incarnation is actually given more 
weight than crucifixion since revelation is more crucial for 
their view than atonement. Indeed, an inadequate doctrine 
of the Atonement is shared by all.
Finally, all three trends affirm redemption as a 
contemporary process. Schweitzer points out, "At the close 
of the nineteenth century [Liberal Protestantism] seemed to 
see it finally proved that our religious thought could with­
out further ado adopt as its own Jesus* religion of a King­
dom of God to be founded on e a r t h . R e d e m p t i o n  is offered 
for the here and now. As man is redeemed he can be part of
the purpose and work of God upon earth. Liberalism's optim­
ism about man and his possibilities is clearly evidenced.
The weakness of doctrine which resulted is, as Hammar cor­
rectly indicates, "The idea of the Kingdom of God is robbed 
of all eschatological content.
Nineteenth century Liberal Christology in each of 
its various expressions uses man's experience as the inter­
pretive key for understanding Christ. The Christ understood 
is seen as One Who both reveals man's possibilities and 
enables man to respond to these possibilities. Man then 
can fully participate with God in establishing the Kingdom
122Albert Schweitzer, My Life and Thought (London: Allen & Unwin, 1946), p. 73, brackets added.
•^Hammar, Christian Realism, p. 161.
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of God on earth. The beginning of the dissolution of this 
theological position has been noted. That decline must now 
be examined.
C. The Decline of Liberalism
The general outlook of Liberal Theology at the time 
of World War I was quite optimistic.
Theologies and churches may seem to totter, but never before in history has the real spirit of Chris­tianity had more influence on national and social life. His Kingdom has not yet come, but salvation is surely nearer now than when men first b e l i e v e d . 124
However, the optimism was. not universally shared, even within
L i b e r a l i s m . O t h e r s  were viewing developing events with
alarm and penetrating insight.
. . , the whole mind of our time is tainted by the moral powerlessness of men in modern competitive busi­ness— where sway over human volition of uncontrolled and accidental forces is at its highest; where the natural struggle for existence is made many times worse by the intricate devices of scientific ingenuity; where men are as good as they dare be; where it is most evi­dent that the world left to run loose and not battled with is indifferent to the hopes and fears of individual human beings.Thus the firm footing of Victorian Liberalism wheth­er in thought or practice has slipped. The revolt of a greater realism has proved its bed-rock of assumptions to be a false bottom.126
B. H. Streeter, "The Historical bhrist," Founda­tions , p. 143. "It is interesting to recall that most Anglican teachers at the time of the 1914-18 war did not (Charles Gore being a glowing exception) see it in terms of the Biblical idea of judgment, but rather as a bitter and sorrowful delay in the march of that progress which is indeed the Kingdom of God." A. M. Ramsêy, From Gore to Temple (London; Longmans, 1960), p. 130.
pp. 8-9.
. supra. Chapter II, footnote 100, p. 46.
N. S. Talbot, "The Modem Situation," Foundations.
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That was a quite different interpretation than the one the 
Liberals were offering. Yet, in another generation an ardent 
Liberal theologian acknowledged that Liberal Theology must 
"suffer drastic reconstruction, if not abandonment."127 Two 
major forces worked to produce this change in Liberal Theol­
ogy: events occurring outside theology and weaknesses
emerging within Liberal Theology.
Events in the world were seriously challenging the 
easy optimism about man so largely characteristic of nine­
teenth century Liberalism, World War I had more impact both 
physically and ideationslly on the Continent than in Britain 
or America, In fact in America its effect was to heighten 
Liberal optimism through an identification of the war as a 
" C r u s a d e  ."128 However, even where the war did not suffi­
ciently dampen Liberalism's unqualified trust in human 
nature, the collapse everywhere of the economic system did.
The failure of the peace treaty, the rise of fascism in 
Europe and the military lords in Japan, the Russian revolution
Van Dusen, "A Half-Century of Liberal Theology," p. 349. The entire statement is worth noting. "The main burden of the current criticism is a simple one. Theology in the past fifty years has been deeply enmeshed in the dominant secular outlook, sharing its presuppositions, part­nering its enterprises, glorying in its utopian anticipa­tions. That outlook is now definitely discredited. Criti­cism has proven its premises invalid. The passage of events has branded its expectations absurd. It must be discarded. Liberal theology, its child, must likewise suffer drastic reconstruction, if not abandonment."
1 9 AS, E. Ahlstrom, "Continental Influence on Ameri­can Christian Thought," Church History, Vol. 27, 1958, p. 260. --------------
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and its aftermath, additionally served during the two dec­
ades following the war to repudiate the Liberal confidence 
in the inevitability of social progress and the goodness of 
m a n .^29 The reality of evil and the difficulty of creating 
the righteous society did force Liberal Theology to recon­
struct or perish.
Within theology itself the Liberal premises were 
proving inadequate to sustain its system in the contemporary 
world. The time was ripe to hear a Karl Barth. "In times 
of despair it is natural to emphasize the transcendence and 
aloofness of the Godhead . . . .  The theological movement 
of which Barth is the chief prophet is a m odem instance of 
this tendency."130 In The Epistle to the Romans, published 
in 1918, edited and republished in 1921, Barth unleashed a 
scathing attack on Liberalism in particular respect to its 
concept and spirit of immanence. Barth's attack and its 
meaning will be the concern of the next section. It is suf­
ficient here to note that in the perspective of contemporary
129"For a century the Church of England had again and again appeared to be failing the people of England, and had been threatened with collapse under the irresistible pres­sure of Progress ; but in the event it was Progress and not the Church which collapsed." M. B. Reckitt, Maurice to Temple (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), p. 154. Progresshere refers to secular thought and activities designated as Liberal. "Events have shattered the vision of a simple pro­gressive direction in history. Most upholders of the Liberal view have accepted the necessity for a drastic revision of our expectations in history," D. D. Williams, Interpreting Theology 1918-1952 (London: S.C.M. Press, 1953), p. 83. Seealso Van Dusen, "A Half-Century of Liberal Theology," p. 352.
^^^C. E. Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 193l)T"pl 336.
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events Barth hit a sensitive premise in Liberal Theology by 
attacking its concept of immanence.
Second, Liberal Theology held man's experience to be 
the avenue through which man finds religious truth. The re­
sult of this perspective in many Liberal views led to a 
level of anthropocentricity which had to fail at precisely 
that point where optimism about man collapsed, Roberts 
points out that the Liberals failed to "recognize how near
they were to humanism when they identified revelation with
131religious experience," A shaky view of man inevitably
calls into question truth derived solely from man's experi- 
132ence
Third, if Liberal Theology had not fused revelation 
and nature, it had certainly blurred the distinction between 
the t w o . ^33 Liberalism held that since truth is directly 
available through man's experience, then nature is the 
major, if not entire, area for revelation. This Liberal
1 31 D. E. Roberts, "Philosophical Theism," Liberal Theology; An Appraisal, ed, by David E, Roberts and A. P. Van Dusen (New York; Scribner's Sons, 1942), pp. 182 ff.
132!'iThe whole modem philosophy,' says Emil Brunner in a recent essay, 'from Descartes on, insofar as it has not degenerated into a crass materialism and cyni­cism, has been a series of variations upon this one theme-- the divine truth in man. The fearfulness of recent his­torical events has given the death blow to this faith.'"T. Wedel, "Christian Apologetics Today," Religion in Life, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1938, p. 79, ----------------
1 33 "Because of [Modem Liberalism's] faith in the spirit universally inhabiting humanity, the 'soul of man naturally Christian' is emphasized anew and the distinction between natural and revealed religion like that between the natural and the supematural tends to disappear." Fenn, "Modem Liberalism," p. 513, brackets added.
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premise may have yielded truth, but only part of the truth. 
Man’s experience and his knowledge of that experience in­
cludes more than mere n a t u r e . F u r t h e r ,  the collapse of 
both optimism and the concept of inevitable progress revealed 
the gulf between the tenets of the theory of evolution and 
the Christian concept of eschatology which holds that God 
chooses the outcome of history. There is more to revelation 
than nature can possibly disclose.
Fourth, Liberal Theology's concept of sin could notTOCcarry "the weight of the tragedies of human experience,"
When sin is seen mainly as a restraining influence, or as 
ignorance, or as a temporary drag in the process of a suc­
cessful evolutionary development, then it is overcome by the 
simple application of better information, or clearer think­
ing, or even the passage of time. World events from the 
war on rendered suspect these definitions of sin, and 
toppled the easy solutions. Sin had to be faced as a
reality in the lives and affairs of men, and a distorting
136reality at that. When sin is confronted in these new
^^^See Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason, pp. 77 ff.  -
1 3SFenn, "Modem Liberalism," p. 516.
136iiwhat liberalism has until recently failed to appreciate is the extent to which the minds and hearts of men--even the best men and the 'higher selves' of the best men--are blinded and distorted by sin." Roberts, "Philosoph­ical Theism," p. 180. However, it should be noted that some thinkers saw this very mark of sin as an indication of real progress. N. I. Konrad, a Marxist, says that now we call 'evil evil, coercion coercion, and crime crime . . . .  The development of the understanding of that which had to be evaluated as evil is . proof of progress." p. A. Carter,
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terras, the very center of nineteenth century Liberal Chris- 
tology is shaken. Christ's work to be effective can no 
longer be seen as mere example, influence, or persuasion. 
Nothing less than a total redemption beyond the capabilities 
and possibilities in man, himself, is required. As P. T. 
Forsyth saw correctly, the shift in Christology must be from 
Incarnation to Soteriology.^^? Christology must be dealt 
with fully in terms of both revelation and redemption.
Fifth, as a corollary to its concept of sin. Liberal 
Theology tended to equate progress with redemption. By this 
it meant not only that man progresses, but that this progress 
is itself redemptive; that is, progress is unavoidably aimed 
at perfection. This view carried with it the rather clear 
implication that progress is due to the guiding hand of God. 
Current events exposed the fallacy of this view.
Few theological systems die easily. Nineteenth 
century Liberal Theology is no exception to that rule. Dur­
ing the two decades following World War I the attacks upon 
it from without and within caused Liberal Theology to reel. 
McGiffert protested that the report of Protestant Liberal­
ism's "theological death is grossly exaggerated,"^^® for he
"The Idea of Progress in Most Recent American Protestant Thought, 1930-1960." Church History, Vol. XXXII, 1963, p. 86 Christian Theology can no longer share that kind of twisted thinking, as it no longer can accept as fact that identifi­cation or a problem equals redemption.,
13?cf. supra, footnote 114, p. 54.
^^^A. C. McGiffert, Jr., "Protestant Liberalism," Liberal Theology: An Appraisal, p. 120.
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saw that reconstruction was underway in some of its varieties 
of forms. But his protest serves to indicate the severity 
of the blow Liberal Theology received. Among the first blows 
struck at Liberalism, and undoubtedly the most serious 
attack came from Barth's Romans. That criticism and its 
implications must now be examined.
D. Barth's "No" to Liberal Theology 
Barth's stated purpose in The Epistle to the Romans 
was "to please none but the very few, to swim against the 
current, to beat upon doors which I thought were firmly 
bolted."139 That current was Liberal Theology. It was in 
fact a turning tide. Its turning was signaled by Barth's 
unshakeable insistence: "God is in heaven, and thou art
upon earth."1^^ In Barth's view Liberal Theology had blurred 
and then obliterated the distinctions between God and man, 
the Creator and the creature. He undertook the task of 
bringing these distinctions back into proper focus.
Beginning with Schleiermacher all Liberal Theology
IS^Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London! Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 22. Hereafter the book will be referred to simply as Romans.
1^0Ibid., pp. 10 and 310. "One man . , . succeeded beyond all others in impressing the evangelical message, as well as the need for it, into the heart, conscience, and mind of the Continental churches. This was Karl Barth, who exploded his R’omerbrief 'on the playground of the theolo­gians* in 1918, and again in 1921 through an expanded yet tightened version . . . .  What he proclaimed was man's de­pendence- -but, with the opposite implication from Schleier­macher, also God's utter transcendence." Ahlstrom, "Contin­ental Influence on American Christian Thought," p. 263.
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had rejected in principle the validity of metaphysical spec­
ulation for theological truth. Barth, too, accepted this 
p r i n c i p l e B u t  where Liberalism turned to feeling and 
experience, Barth rejected all human ways of knowing God,
[The only way God can be known is] . , . not psy­chologically or sociologically or historically or scientifically; not by some superior and detached academic power of perception; not by means of some pious illumination of religion; not by introducing surreptitiously the assumption of a harmony or provi­dence by which the whole is regulated; but existen- tially, earnestly, unavoidably, unescapably, unambig­uous ly . . • [by a man addressed by God, Himself,]1^2
Thus, Barth's attack upon Liberalism was launched from a 
position which possessed two sides. Negatively, he dissoci­
ated himself "from every semi-theological interpretation of 
Nature and of History."^43 All natural theology was deemed 
error and apostasy. Positively, he affirmed the existence 
of a gulf between God and man which no man could possibly 
bridge. From this position he then proceeded to attack 
Liberal Theology at every one of its key tenets.
This rejection can be no more than one in princi­ple, for it is difficult to find any theological expression devoid of its use. Indeed, it is part of the theological task to enter into such speculation. Schleiermacher placed the center of the religious expression in man's feeling, but in order to provide some objectivity for it he also posited as necessary the prior existence of a transcendent God. Barth's theology certainly rests upon a basis of Kantian philosophy. See Williams, Interpreting Theology 1918-1952, p . 49 ; and Bernard M , Loomer, "Neo-Naturalism and Neo-Ortho- doxy," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXVIII, 1948, p. 91. Both of these men point to the Kantian basis in Barth and Neo-Orthodoxy.
^^^Barth, Romans, pp. 299 ff., brackets added.
143ibid., p. 318.
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First, Liberalism held to the immanence of God.
Barth spoke only of God's utter transcendence. "The Gospel 
proclaims a God utterly distinct from men."144 por Barth 
that distinction was so pronounced he had to speak of it in 
dialectical terms ; God is the "No" to our "Yes," and the 
"Yes" to our "No"; when we speak of God we are in fact speak­
ing of "no-God," and when we confess "no-God" we then are 
proclaiming the God Who is. "The things which are must be 
seen as though they were not in order that the things which 
are not may be called as though they were."^^® Nothing was 
to be left to man by which he might possibly possess in any 
way whatsoever a knowledge of and relationship to the God 
Who is. The gulf between man and God to which Barth pointed 
was so deep and wide that not even God could seem to bridge 
it directly. "Direct communication from God is no divine
communication."147
Second, Liberalism saw in experience the content for 
religious truth. Barth replied, " , . . the power of God 
can be detected neither in the world of nature nor in the
.. p. 28. •
Tillich argues that Barth was not dialectic enough. "What Is Wrong With the 'Dialectic' Theology?" The Journal of Religion. Vol. XV, 1935, pp. 127-145. Surely Tt~ is obvious that the intent of Barth's dialectic was to pro­claim the division between the divine and the human, not the synthesis.
14^Barth, Romans. p # 141, "When we are blind and dumb, then we see end speak; when we are bereft of question and answer, then we ask and find . . . "  Ibid., p. 306.
147ibid.. p. 314.
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souls of m e n . "148 be sure, man could know the world. He
could know It very well, and he should. But such knowledge
could never disclose God. Nothing of God could be known
directly to man. Man's experience could never divulge God,
nor anything of God. Only God gives truth.
The Gospel is not one thing in the midst of other things, to be directly apprehended or comprehended . . . .  The Gospel is therefore not an event, nor an experience, nor an emotion— however delicate 1 Rather, it is the clear and objective perception of what eye hath not seen nor ear heard . . . it is a communication which presumes faith in the living God, and which creates that which it presumes.159
God, not experience, provides the content for truth. There­
fore, Barth reminded man of the "hiddenness of God." God 
alone determines what is veiled and unveiled, what is hid­
den and revealed, what is withheld and what is given of 
truth. "Men, as men, cannot apprehend God."150
Third, continuity provided the method by which Lib­
eral Theology argued from man to God, from experience to 
truth. No such process was possible, according to Barth.
Man could argue only from man to man, never from man to God. 
That was the way of sin. Man could not bridge the abyss 
between the finite and the infinite, the human and the 
divine, earth and heaven, the flesh and the spirit, no 
matter how careful the thinking or intense the willing. 
" . . .  our intelligence can never be stretched to a 'higher* 
knowledge . . . "151 There could be no foundation on earth
148ibid.. p. 36. ^^^Ibld.. p. 28.
Ibid.. p. 414. See also pp. 185 and 504.
151Ibid.. p. 310.
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for what is in heaven, rather all truth and grace hang in 
"mid-air," a given of God, beyond the reach of every man.
” . . .  on whatever level it occurs, if the experience of 
religion is more than a void, or claims to contain or to 
possess or to 'enjoy* God, it is a shameless and abortive 
anticipation of that which can proceed from the unknown God 
alone."152
Fourth, Liberal Theology saw in progress a more re­
liable indicator of man's nature than sin. Sin was con­
ceived to be but an interruption, even if an extremely ag­
gravating one at times, in man's inevitable march toward 
perfection. That very concept pointedly expressed the 
reality of sin for Barth*
[Sin is] the pre-supposition which underlies every human event and conditions every human status.Sin is the characteristic mark of human nature as such; it is not a lapse or a series of lapses in a man's life; it is the Fall which occurred with the emergence of human life.153
Whenever man found hope in himself, saw the possibilities
in his own existence, trusted in his own resources, Barth
held him to be confusing himself with God. "[Men] have the
opportunity of making themselves God. The knowledge of this
opportunity, and the subsequent capacity to make use of it,
is s i n . "^^4 Adhering firmly to the absolute distinction
between God and man, Barth could do no other than declare
^^^Ibid., p. 50.
^^^Ibid.. p. 173, brackets added, 
^^^xbid.. p. 246, brackets added.
70
no way was open to man to overcome sin. It could be over­
come solely by the grace of God.
This leads to the last point of difference. Build­
ing upon a foundation of its concepts of experience, con­
tinuity, sin, Liberal Theology concluded that man was a 
participant in the redemptive process. Redemption did not 
culminate in a new man, but a "realized" man, one lifted to 
the fulness of his "given," divine possibility. Barth would 
have none of this. God alone elects for him. There could 
be no assurance of redemption for man, no way man could 
touch it. Redemption was held to be a pure gift of un­
merited grace from on high.
The mercy of God which is directed towards us can be true, and can remain true, only as a miracle— 'ver­tical from above.' When the mercy of God is thought of as an element in history or as a factor in human spiritual experience, its untruth is emphasized. We stand really before God, inasmuch as we perpetually recognize that the declaration that we are justified by God in His Presence takes place freely by his grace, and only by His grace. Grace is the generous and free ' will of God, His will to accept us; its necessity pro­ceeds from Him and from Him only, . , . Grace is, then, no spiritual power residing in the man of this world; no physical energy residing in Nature; no cosmic power in this earth, Grace is and remains always the Power of God , , . the promise of a new man, of a new nature, of a new world; it is the promise of the Kingdom of God.155
These were the criticisms Barth hurled against all 
Liberal Theology, They were criticisms launched from a 
theological position quite antithetical to Liberalism. It 
is for this reason that Barth's criticisms have been stated
155%bid., pp. 102 ff.
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in terms of his own theological orientation. Before con­
cluding this line of thought, Barth's criticism should be 
examined as it applies to Christology in particular respect 
to revelation and redemption.
In terms of revelation Liberal Theology had utilized 
man's experience as the interpretive key for understanding 
Christ and His truth. Barth stood in utter opposition to 
this view. For him Christ could be spoken of only in terms 
of His "impenetrable incognito." No less than God Christ is 
"wholly other" than man, and no process of analysing human 
experience or history could ever yield Christ to the minds
of m a n .  156
Liberalism viewed the work of Christ, redemption, as 
one of unlocking the possibilities latent within man. As 
already seen, Barth rejected all attempts to make room for 
man to have an active part in the redemptive process. Re­
demption for Barth was held to be none other than "a pure, 
absolute, vertical m i r a c l e . "157 it was confirmed as Christ's 
work, to be sure, but even this fact was not available to 
man, for God "speaks secretly both in what Jesus did and in 
what He left u n d o n e . "158
Barth's criticism alone did not bring nineteenth 
century Liberal Theology to its knees. There were other 
criticisms and other forces at work as indicated in the last
" . . .  we are not intended to understand [Jesus'] life as an illustration of human possibility, nor indeed can we thus interpret Him." Ibid., p. 202, brackets added.
p. 60. ISBlbid.. p. 279.
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section. But Barth raised the most profound single chal­
lenge. This observation is in no way lessened by the sug­
gestion that Barth was as ready for the time as the time was 
ripe for him. Nor does it intend to imply that all Liberal­
ism must answer to Barth as if he alone possessed all truth. 
What is argued is that Barth's ciriticisms in Romans provide 
the real watershed between nineteenth century Liberal The­
ology and what is designated here as "post-Barthian Liberal 
T h e o l o g y ."159 Liberal Theology is to reconstruct suc­
cessfully its theological position, it must pay attention 
to Barth's criticisms. The proposal for examining the re­
constructions in post-Barthian Liberal Theology must now be 
defined.
E. A Proposal 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine contempo­
rary Liberal Theology through one doctrinal concept, that 
of Christology. This chapter has been concerned to examine 
the development of Liberal Theology in the nineteenth cen­
tury, and, in particular, its Christological trends. It is 
clear that this Liberal movement did not pass unchallenged 
into the twentieth century. The single, most effective voice 
raised against its position was that of Barth. It is not so
159oden offers the correct observation, "Almost every major figure in recent theology has disagreed with Barth, but all have been influenced by him." Thomas C. Oden, The Promise of Barth (Philadelphia and New York; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1469), p. 20. De Wolf concurs, Barth's " . . .  theme is so widely influential that no one can be competent in present theology without acquaintance with it." De Wolf, "Motifs of Continuity and Discontinuity," p. 346.
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much Barth's own position which is to be noted here as it 
is his recall to what Meland calls " . . .  a sense of tradi­
tion . . . "160 Thornton reminds us that swings of thought 
need to take place to balance perspectives when one view 
goes too far.^®^ In the middle of the twentieth century 
Liberal theologians are at work, partly to recover some of 
the insights of nineteenth century Liberalism somewhat 
driven out of focus by the Barthian reaction, and partly to 
correct what they consider the extreme swing of Barthianism. 
It is to the Christological trends these post-Barthian Lib­
eral theologians are discussing that this thesis now turns. 
But first, note should be taken in Christological perspec­
tive of the relationship of Barth's recall to traditional 
Christian concerns with the premises nineteenth century 
Liberalism developed.
Surely Liberal Theology erred in holding to man's 
experience as the only means of knowing Christ. In doing 
so it largely eliminated the concept of revelation in.Christ 
Christ became but one among many brethren. But unless 
Christ is in some way unique, distinctive among men, it is 
difficult to see that Christianity has any legitimate basis 
for its claim to speak what is most profoundly true of God • 
and man. Christianity becomes but one religion among many. 
Barth's proclamation of a Christ unique and distinct was a
^^^B. E. Meland, Higher Education and the Human Spirit (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 90
^®^L. S. Thornton, The Incarnate Lord (London; Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), pp. 15-16.
74
needed corrective to Liberalism's error. But if Barth is 
correct in his view of a Christ so utterly distinct that 
nothing on earth can comprehend Him, then no possible basis 
for a Liberal Christology is left.
Liberal Theology did not deny a distinctive unique­
ness for Christ, What it held was that whatever was af­
firmed by His uniqueness must be confirmed by man's experi­
ence. Liberalism saw the genuine danger that any presenta­
tion of Christ, void of any validating experience readily 
available to man, could easily succumb to the tyranny of 
speculative dogma, as Christian Theology had so often done 
throughout its history. If Liberal Theology erred in put­
ting too much weight on that validating experience, it did 
not err in insisting upon its inclusion in any theological 
formulation. Barth's call for a return to a sense of a 
unique and distinct Christ was needed. In turn, however, 
that call erred in insisting upon a Christ so distinct that 
He cannot be considered in history at all.^®^ This is 
transcendence pushed to an extreme equally as costly and 
equally as much in error as Liberalism's insistence upon the 
primacy--almost exclusiveness— of the concept of immanence.
However, the focus of our attention is not upon 
Barth's system but upon his critical challenge to Liberalism. 
To meet that challenge requires that Liberal Theology should 
no longer argue simply from man through Christ to God
^®^See Barth, Romans, pp. 36, 171, 273.
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anthropologically. It can still insist upon validating ex­
perience as a vital part of faith's knowledge, for without 
this approach it cannot be Liberalism, But the position 
ought to express with equal firmness the reverse dimension 
of revelation: God through Christ to man. Continuity and
revelation must both be yielded their proper place in theol­
ogy without loss to either. This is the first concern for 
evaluating post-Barthian Liberal Christological trends,
A second concern arises at the point of the doctrine 
of sin. It has already been suggested that sin was the 
crucial doctrine upon which nineteenth century Liberal The­
ology f l o u n d e r e d . ^ ®3 was described as principally a
lack or a temporary condition in man himself which could 
fairly easily be overcome, since man already possessed within 
his own given nature the potentiality for his own perfection. 
Accordingly, education became the chief method for dealing 
with the problem of sin. That easy and naive attitude toward 
sin finally was shattered on the all-too-evident rock of 
human degeneracy. Barth correctly identified the thorough­
ness of sin in man's life and activities. He held sin to be 
not a simple attribute man could leam to avoid. Rather he 
viewed sin as a presupposition of man's very being, against 
which man had absolutely no resources of his own of any kind 
with which to confront and vanquish it. Sin required a re­
generation which could be provided only by the grace of God.
163See supra, pp. 56-64,
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History proved Liberalism's easy view of sin to be 
tragic error. Barth's representation of the total effect of 
sin upon a man's being was a needed corrective recall of 
theology to traditional insights. It means that Liberalism 
can still maintain that sin is not a permanent impairment 
of human nature, even though it does distort the human pos­
sibility for doing the good. But at the same time Liberal­
ism needs to take the reality of sin more seriously than it 
generally did in the nineteenth century. That is, it must 
account for the presence of sin as more than a social dis­
order, but rather as that which estranges man and God. Fur­
ther the acknowledgement of sin's effects requires also that 
Christ has real work to do. This is the second area of con­
cern for evaluating post-Barthian Liberal Christological 
trends.
Third, Liberalism held redemption to be dependent 
upon man's response to God through Christ. Barth's criti- . 
cism was that man's response could only be a sinful response, 
never the act enabling redemption to be effected. Indeed, 
Barth said that if man's hand appeared anywhere in the pro­
cess there could be no redemption in that process. Redemp­
tion could only be given by the sheer grace of God, an 
election from "on high." The effect of both positions was 
to minimize, if not to dismiss altogether, the vocation of 
Christ, But Barth's stand that redemption proceeds solely 
from God was a needed challenge of tradition to Liberalism's 
anthropocentric approach to redemption. In its reconstruction
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Liberal Theology can continue to make a valid place for 
man's participation in the redemptive process, but God's 
initiative in redemption so clearly demonstrated in Christ 
must no less be affirmed. This is the third Barthian con­
cern to be used in evaluating post-Barthian Liberal Chris­
tological trends.
In the light of these three concerns it is proposed 
to examine critically some post-Barthian Liberal Christo­
logical reconstructions in respect to the Person and Work of 
Christ. Does post-Barthian Liberal Theology correct sig­
nificantly the weaknesses of its nineteenth century pre­
decessor, or are these weaknesses simply being repeated in 
newer forms? Is Liberalism again a valid theological option 
in this post-Barthian age? The answer to these questions 
will have to await the outcome of an examination of some 
contemporary post-Barthian Liberal Christological trends.
CHAPTER II 
AN ANTIOCHENE APPROACH
A. Introduction; Back to Antioch 
One movement in post-Barthian liberal Christological 
thought may appropriately be called "Antiochene." "It is," 
in the words of C. E. Raven, "to the school of Antioch and 
the tradition which it inherited, if to anything in patristic 
Christology that we in our reconstruction of doctrine must 
return."^ This movement takes seriously the Christ whom the 
Concilier Creeds aimed to proclaim, while much of nineteenth 
century liberal thought was concerned primarily with the 
"Jesus of history."2 "It was the defect of much nineteenth 
and early twentieth century 'liberal Protestant* thought 
. . .  to confine its attention almost entirely to the sup­
posedly reasonable 'Jesus of history.'"® The modem
C. E. Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love (London: Hodden and Stoughton, T93T) . F . Loofs, Nestorius (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1914), also called for a return to the lines of the Antiochene theology," p. 130.
2Most notable is probably Hamack, What Is Chris­tianity? trans. by T. B. Saunders (5th ed. ; London; Ernest Benn Ltd., 1958), A. Schweitzer, Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. by W. Montgomery (London: Adam and CharlesBlack, 1910), was an attack upon the validity of the quest.
N. Pittenger, The Word Incarnate (London: Nis-bet, 1959), p. 76. Pittenger goes on to say, "When Jesus is regarded as significant in so-called 'historical' terms
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"Antiochene" liberals affirm with Barth the futility, indeed 
the defection, of this approach. The basis for their Chris­
tological thought is to be found in the theological position 
of the Antiochene School in the fourth and fifth centuries.
The Antiochene School is usually distinguished from 
the Alexandrian School in that the former emphasized the 
humanity of Christ while the latter stressed His divinity.4 
This is too simplistic an explanation of the crucial debate 
waged by these two schools in the fifth century. Nestorius, 
the chief spokesman for the Antiochene point of view was con­
demned at the Council of Ephesus in 431, while Cyril, the 
chief spokesman for the Alexandrians, was upheld. The
alone, so that the reality of the continuing experience of his presence and power in the life of the Christian commun­ity is neglected or dismissed as irrelevant, we then have a religion which can at best evaluate him as a great teacher and prophet," p. 77. D. M. Baillie speaks of its defect in even more severe terms. "[The 'Jesus of history'] movement was sometimes impatient of all Christological thought, re­garding it even as needless mystification, substituting for it the historical reconstruction, and thus laying itself open to the charge that its theology contained nothing that could fairly be called a Christology. And that is not merely a hiatus in a Christian theology: it is a defectwhich amounts to a perversion of the whole. It is not merely a question of who Jesus was: it is a question ofthe whole Christian doctrine of God. Nothing can be plainer than that the great Christological controversies of the early centuries were fundamentally concerned with the ques­tion of the nature and purpose of God. And I believe it to be true that if we have no Christology, we cannot have a good theology either, or even, with our 'historical re­construction,' a good understanding of the nature and mean­ing of history," D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 42-43, brackets added. See also Oliver C. Quick, Doctrines of the Creed (London: FontanaLibrary, Collins), pp. 137-141,
4J . W . C . Wand, The Four Great Heresies (London: Mowbrays, 1955), p. 103.
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argument did not end there. Though the Council of Chalcedon 
in 451 reaffirmed the deposition of Nestorius, the Fathers 
so gathered their thinking on the subject that those of a 
Nestorian persuasion felt their position vindicated at Chal­
cedon while some of the Alexandrians viewed the Chalcedonian 
formula as a repudiation of the Cyrillian orthodoxy.® The 
Antiochenes accused the Alexandrians of so stressing the 
divinity of Christ that the humanity was deprecated as in 
the Apollinarian heresy, while the Alexandrians accused 
their rivals of so formulating the relationship of Christ's 
humanity and divinity that the incarnated Word and the 
assumed humanity were virtually two persons. The Council of 
Chalcedon failed to resolve the argument as it accepted as 
auxiliary and valid documents both Cyril's Synodical Letters 
attacking Nestorius* position, and Leo's Tome which under­
scored the Antiochene insistence upon maintaining the clear 
distinction, and non-fusability, of the humanity and the 
divinity of the Lord. In its own formulation Chalcedon re­
affirmed both the statements of Nic^ea in 325 and Constanti­
nople in 371, and to these added a new statement;
5Cf. J, N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (2nd ed. ; New York: Harper and Row” 1966) , pp." 338-343, Kellyis careful to point out, however, that " . . .  if the Anti­ochene Christology was victorious at Chalcedon, it was so only after absorbing, and being itself modified by, the fundamental truths contained in the Alexandrian position," p. 342. Pittenger, The Word, p. 89, indicates that since Chalcedon "'orthodox Christology * . . . has tended toward an impersonal humanity . . . ," which is not an Antiochene tendency. M. G. Glazenbrook, "Christ and the Creeds," The Modem Churchman, Vol. XI, Nos. 5 & 6, September, 1921, pp. 201-213, argues that the die for Chalcedon was cast in Ephesus in 431.
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Following therefore the holy Fathers, we confess one and the same our Lord Jesus Christ, and we all teach harmoniously [that he is] the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the same of a reasonable soul and body; consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, and the same consubstantial with us in manhood, like us in all things except sin; begotten before ages of the Father in Godhead, the same in the last days for us; and for our salvation [bom] of Mary the virgin theotokis in manhood, one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, unique; acknowledged in two natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation--the difference of the natures being by no means taken away because of the union, but rather the distinctive character of each nature being preserved, and [each] combining in one Person and hypostasis--not divided or separated into - two Persons, Dut oneand the same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ; as the prophets of old and the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us about him, and the symbol of the Fathers has handed down to us .6
In spite of the confusion of this document, the statement of
Chalcedon became the orthodox formula for all succeeding
Christology•
The question concerning the Antiochene-Alexandrian 
debate, including the Chalcedonian problems, has been raised 
anew in the twentieth century by the discovery of Antiochene 
manuscripts, primarily those belonging to Nestorius, and to 
his mentor, often called the Father of the Antioch School, 
Theodore of Mopsuestia,^ J. F. Bethune-Baker was one of the
(1E. R. Hardy and C . G. Richardson, eds., Christology of the Later Fathers, Vol. Ill of the Library of Christian classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 373.
7Cf. F, A. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatxs Gregorianae,i956), p. iv. "[Theodore of Mopsuestia] is really a key- figure in the whole development of Antiochene theology, as well as the foremost exponent of Antiochene exegesis . . . this man has every right to stand as the spokesman of his school." brackets added. See also Rowan A. Greer, Theodore « of Mopsuestia (London: Faith Press, 1961), p. 9; R. A. Norris,Manhood and thrist (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. xi.
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first to argue that Nestorius was really not guilty of the 
heretical charge of "Nestorianism."® The result of this 
debate has been both to open doors to the Patristic p e r i o d , 9  
and to examine anew the question of orthodoxy in Concilier 
statements and the heresies against which they supposedly 
protected the Church. It is in the theological orientation 
of Antioch that some liberals have found the starting point 
for a reconstruction of a liberal Christology, However, the 
one to whom they turn is not Nestorius, but Theodore of 
Mopsuestia.^®
J. F. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching (Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 1908) . The basic argument of the book is that Nestorius* aim was never to promote division, but to clarify the distinction within the union. Bethune-Baker feels that Nestorius was a sacrifice given to reconcile Alexandria and Antioch. While admitting Nestorius* use of language was unorthodox, and perhaps sub­ject to an interpretation which seemed to divide the natures, he concludes the condemnation to have been an error, perhaps a calculated error, unfair to Nestorius* position. See pp. 198 ff. In Chapter XI, pp. 171-188, Bethune-Baker presents a contrived defense, using Nestorius* own statements against Cyril's charges, which he feels Nestorius would make, had he had the chance.
*^*The intervening period between the close of the labours of the ancient church in the field of Christology and the modem period is one of comparative barrenness,The Christological problem receded into the background, and for fourteen centuries became a mere side-issue." H. M.ReIton, A Study in Christology (London: S.P.C.K., 1934),
^®It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a full investigation and explanation of the Nestorian question, the Alexandrian-Antiochene debate, and the valid­ity of the Chalcedon Christological formula. These problems can be followed through the writings of several theologians after Bethune-Baker. Cf. Loofs, Nestorius, who disagrees with Bethune-Baker*s conclusion that Nestorius is really orthodox, when measured by church-orthodoxy. Loofs argues that the church-orthodoxy which interpreted Chalcedon was
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Cyrillian orthodoxy, and that Nestorius was more "histori­cally right" and consonant with the New Testament than Cyril. See pp. 107 ff. R. V. Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies (London: S.P.C.K., 1940), proposed that both sides of thedebate were attempting to get at a genuine incarnation and uphold both the divinity and humanity in one Person. Like Bethune-Baker, Sellers measures orthodoxy by the Alexandrian position, and argues that the Antiochenes meant to say pre­cisely the same thing as their opponents. See pp. 250 ff.In another work. The Council of Chalcedon (London: S.P.C.K.,1953), Sellers indicates, " . . the outstanding feature ofthe doctrine of the Antiochenes: they never fail to assertthat it is only as one 'divides* the natures in Jesus Christ that a real guarantee is afforded against the introduction of the idea of 'confusion.' [They aimed at neither confus­ing natures nor dividing the Person of the Lord. But they] also speak of 'recognizing' or 'apprehending,* the natures in their difference--terms, that is, which show that their 'dividing' is often all a purely mental process," pp. 177 ff., brackets added. H. M. Re1ton, Study in Christology, argues that the Antiochenes failed on the 'of the union [aterm Sellers avoids], by speaking of the "moral" mode of in­dwelling in Christ, which he believes "precludes a real Incarnation." See pp. 20 ff. Sullivan, Theodore, is con­cerned to evaluate the orthodoxy of Theodore of Mopsuestia.But the criterion he uses is derived from the Alexandrian Council of Ephesus in 431. The Antiochenes refused to attend this meeting and held an Ephesus of their own. (See Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies, pp. 202 ff., for a history of the politics iiivolved in the debate. Also see H. Chadwick,The Early Church [London: Penguin Books, 1967], pp. 194 ff.)Unfettered by Antiochene opposition the Alexandrian Ephesus reflected only Cyril's views. Sullivan presents the spe­cious argument that this Alexandrian Council was completely faithful to Nicea, and, therefore, possesses appropriate orthodox credentials. Accordingly he finds Theodore of Mopsuestia unorthodox, Sullivan's book contains a good bib­liography of works on the Antiochenes, as does R. H. Norris, Manhood and Christ. But Norris is sympathetic with the Antiochene position, dealing with Theodore in the context of his own total outlook. A sympathetic account is also presented by L. Patterson, Theodore of Mopsuestia and M odem Thought (London; S.P.C.K.,~T926). Rowan Greer, Theodore, argues that Nestorius strayed from Theodore's Biblical images into the Platonic metaphysical categories of Alexandria where he was forced to fight "his Christological battles on Alexandrian grounds." Consequently Theodore was drawn post­humously and erroneously into the Nestorius controversy.See pp. 37 f£. A position not too unlike Seller's conclu­sion is taken by A. Grilime1er, Christ in Christian Tradi­tion. trans, by J. S • Bowden (London: Mowbray and Go., 1965),pp* 433 ££., especially p.'453, though Grillmeier does fault Nestorius for not having taken seriously the communcatio
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Theodore was bishop of Mopsuestia from 392 to his
death in 428, three years before the Council of Ephesus.
11According to A. Mingana Theodore was held in such high 
esteem by his contemporaries that he, himself, was not con­
demned until one hundred and twenty-five years after his 
death at the Fifth Council, the Council of Three Chapters. 
Yet while it was Nestorianism which was condemned at Ephesus, 
"Nestorianism was in reality an amplification of some points 
in Theodore's teaching in connection with the mystery of the 
Incarnation of the Word . . . .
idiomatiy [the interchange of the attributes, experiences, etc/, of both divinity and humanity in the Incarnated Lord, seen as necessary to a genuine unity of Christ's Person].
11A. Mingana, Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Nicene Creed. Woodbrooke Studies, Vol. V (C^bridge; Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1932).
12"Leontius Byzantinus informs us . . . that Cyril of Alexandria advised against the condemnation of Theodore because all the bishops of the Eastern Church considered him an eminent Doctor, and if he were condemned there would be serious disturbance in that Church." Ibid., pp. 3 ff.
13Ibid., p. 1. However, it should be noted that Cyril of Alexandria, himself, distinguished Nestorius from the Antiochene School. "Nestorius pretends to acknowledge that the Word, who was God, was incarnate, and made man; but he does not recognize the meaning of the incarnation, and he uses the term 'two natures* and separates them, dividing off the divinity, and keeping the manhood apart, as being attached to the Godhead by habitual conjunction, merely by equality of honour or authority . . . .  Now the brethren of Antioch have accepted the components in Christ which are presented to our minds, but simply and solely in the sphere of thought . . . . " ep. 40 [ad Acad, lie lit.] cited in The Later Christian Fathers, ed. and trans. by Henry Betterson (London: Oxforcf University Press, 1970),p. 260. The ''brethren of Antioch," designated by Cyril were those who accepted the Reunion Formula of 433, and Cyril may have been "playing politics," a game at which he seemed to excel!
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H. R. Mackintosh contends, "Theodore came to the 
problems of Christology with a mind preoccupied with thoughts 
of the immutability of God, the freedom of the will, and the 
reality of Jesus* human l i f e ."^4 xt is his conclusion that 
the Antiochenes could not call Jesus "more than a divinely 
inspired man."^5 If this judgment were indeed the case, 
then to use the Antiochenes as one's starting point for a 
reconstruction of a liberal Christology would be to trample 
the same pathways as some of the nineteenth century liberals. 
Rowan Greer offers a different vantage point for understand­
ing Theodore.1® Labeling the attempt to measure Theodore by 
the standards of Chalcedon as "fundamentally anachronistic," 
and to continue a debate along these lines as a "fruitless 
quest," Greer argues Theodore must be understood and accepted 
primarily as a Biblical exegete rather than as a theologian.
R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 201.
^^Ibid., p. 203.
^^Greer, Theodore. In all fairness to Mackintosh, most of the documents and the interpretive work which opened a reexamination of the Antiochene position came after his book was written, Bethune-Baker*s book being the only major exception.
^^Ibid., pp. 9 ff. Greer's separation of exegesis from theology is misleading. A Biblical exegete can be a theologian; for example, one can speak of a theology of the Old Testament, as Eichrodt ^does, cf. infra, footnote 50, p. 97. In effect Greer is distinguishing between a Bibli­cal and a philosophical theologian. He agrees with Norris in arguing against trying to understand Theodore through a particular philosophical perspective, namely, Platonic philosophy, cf. infra, pp. 91 ff. What Greer and Norris are after is insight into the theological contribution of the Antiochenes which is usually lost when forced, into the confines of a Platonic philosophical analysis. The question
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The thesis of Norris’ book is that Theodore's Christology 
must be understood in the light of his anthropology. An 
examination of these two themes may serve to clarify the 
Antiochene position upon which some current liberal recon­
structions of Christology are based.
Greer acknowledges Theodore's background to be Pla­
tonic, by which man was held to be "an immortal soul in a 
mortal body; that man's problem was essentially his im­
prisonment in matter, and that man's destiny was to escape 
his body and have his soul released so as to be reunified 
with the divine stuff from which it has p r o c e e d e d . B u t  
Theodore modified this view in three ways: first, he links
mutability, moral freedom and rationality; " . . .  man's
raised here is not whether philosophy is essential to the­ology, but if a particular philosophical system--Platonic-- is adequate for the task of a particular theological attempt. Ogden correctly points out, " . . .  because the concepts available in a given situation are always a matter of the theologian's historical destiny, he is often forced to ex­press his intentions with limits that make their adequate expression impossible," S. Ogden, The Reality of God (Lon­don: S.C.M., 1967), p. 56. Cobb argues the inadequacyoccurs because "they had available to them no conceptuality for explaining how God could at his own initiative be genu­inely present to and in a man without displacing some ele­ment in the personal humanity of that man," J, Cobb, "The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian Perspective," The Finality of Christ, ed. by Dow Kirkpatrick (New York:Ab- ingdon Press, 1966), p. 139. See also ibid., pp, 146-47. These observations anticipate arguments still to be offered, but what is to be noted here is the firm position being taken that the Antiochene approach has something vital to offer to the Christological discussion which can be real­ized only if its contribution is allowed to stand on its own merits unencumbered by the requirements of Platonic philosophical consistency. It is the Antiochene insight with which this thesis is concerned at this point.
18Greer, Theodore, p. 13.
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dignity . • , is dependent upon his being mutable and re­
sponsible for freedom of c h o i c e ,"^9 Second, he thinks of 
man in an ethical rather than a philosophical way. Mut­
ability has an ethical ring for Theodore; it involves man's 
choice. Man has a dignity while creation has an inherent 
goodness. This life is a training ground for the next life. 
Third, he maintains clearly the distinction between the 
Creator and the created. Redemption is seen as communion 
with God, not union with the Godhead,^® His modifications 
are due, Greer contends, not to his work as a philosopher, 
this he was not, but as a Biblical exegete whose understand­
ing is informed by the "view implicit in the Old Testament 
and in the New T e s t a m e n t I n  contrast to the Hellenistic 
view the Old Testament presents the notions that participa­
tion in life is good and leads toward God; that history has 
meaning as God is at work in events; and that since God is 
the Creator life is worthwhile. For Theodore man possesses 
a free, rational and mutable soul. Salvation leads to im­
mortality and immutability, but only if man exercises his 
freedom of choice. All turns on man's moral freedom. It is 
with this understanding Theodore views Christology.
Christ has come as the perfect image of obedience, and Christian people must strive to follow Him down that path by the exercise of their own moral freedom in the direction of that perfect freedom which is God's service. The path of obedience leads to immutability and immortality. We do not know what the end of the
^^Ibld.. p. 16. ^°Ibid.. pp. 17 ff.
^4bld.. p. 20.
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road is like except that it has been revealed to us in Christ, for we are destined to become what He in His human nature is.2%
In terms of the Person of Christ, Theodore remains
faithful to his exegetical role. "Theodore is very little
inclined to speak in terras of abstractions. He speaks in
terms of particular things, events, and people. And this
literal manner of speaking can be seen to spring from his
23literal method of exegesis," For Theodore, if Christ is 
to be man, then He must be a free moral agent. "If Jesus 
did not possess freedom of choice and act as a free moral 
agent, then the humanity of Christ disappeared."^^ Without 
freedom of choice, there is no freedom of perfect service 
possible. Christ's obedience would not be real; it would 
be no real work, Jesus was like all other men, but "the 
notion of Christ as a man who by good works attained divin­
ity is as foreign to Antioch as to Alexandria. As the 
ground of being for all creation, God dwells in all, but in . 
"different men in different degrees by good pleasure.
How does God's indwelling in Christ differ from His indwell­
ing in others? In Christ He indwells "by good pleasure as
p. 25.
^^Ibid.. p. 54. Greer goes on to say, "Of course, such a generalization is based to a certain extent upon impressions, and its justification involves a study of Theo­dore's exegetical method. But it is certainly clear, even on the surface, that Theodore's approach is much truer to the Scriptures than the realist, Platonic approach of the Alexandr ians." Ibid.
Z^Ibid.. p. 53. ^^Ibid.. p. 64.
^^Ibid.. p. 57.
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in a Son."^^ In this Christ is unique and first,^8 To ana­
lyze this formula by the ontological concepts of the Alex­
andrians is to miss Theodore's point, for he "is trying to 
describe and not to define; his formula appeals to the 
deepest religious instincts of man and not to the cobwebs 
spun by man's m i n d T h e  union of the divine and the human 
in Christ for Theodore is a kind of moral harmony, i.e., a 
moral rather than a metaphysical concept. His imagery for 
the two natures, but one Christ--temple, marriage, body- 
8oui— are all drawn from scripture, and must be understood 
in this light. "This whole area of Theodore's thought is 
expressed in terms of the simple, pictorial Semitic images 
of Sonship, family life, and God's covenanted relationship 
with His people Israel,"^0
Theodore tends to think of man as innocent, as need­
ing a redemption to raise him from lower to higher things. 
This is an historical process. Using an Adam typological 
interpretation, Theodore's usual view of the atonement is 
as a perfecting of the first Adam, not a restoration. How­
ever, he also upholds the atonement as Christ's struggle 
with Satan, Christ's success does not remove our struggle. 
Satan still presses his claims. Man remains a free moral 
agent, who must fight his own battle. But Christ is a be­
ginning of "all our good things."81 Theodore's concept of
pp. 57, 61.
^^Ibld.. p. 71. 29Ibid.^  p. 58.
30lbid.. p. 65. ^4bid.. p. 69.
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the two ages is crucial here. The first age, the one in 
which we live, is mutable and we are mortal, while the 
second age is immutable and future. To be man, Christ had 
to be mutable and mortal, without which He could not be a 
free moral agent, capable of free moral choices. But the 
resurrection, depending upon the grace of God and the moral 
obedience of the Son, raised the man assumed, making Him 
immutable, immortal and the true Son in perfection. His 
resurrection becomes the sign and the promise of the second 
age, and of our future. "Theodore sought to avoid saying 
that man's redemption consisted in being d i v i n i z e d ."^2 "xhe 
end of the process has been revealed to us in Christ, and 
we live in the light of that revelation and hope,"^^ Christ 
is our pledge, our messenger of salvation. We participate 
in the Second Age of which He is the first-fruits, by antici­
pation in faith and hope. And that participation somehow 
transforms our present life,"^^
To recapitulate Greer's understanding of Theodore's 
position; Man is a mutable, moral being. It is this con­
dition which makes him a free moral agent, the heart of his 
humanness, his hope and his despair. God's way with man as 
revealed in Scripture is to win man to perfect obedience to 
Him. To effect redemption in the world God's Son must be a 
genuine man, mutable and moral, for these provide the condi­
tions of moral choice. Moral choice there must be if perfect
32lbid.. p. 15. 33
Ibid.. p. 75.
I ■^Ibid*» P- 73.
34.
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obedience, which is revealed to be the nature of the Second 
Age, is to be lived. Redemption resides in, and is directed 
to, the area of moral choice, not in a separation of sub­
stances, mortal and immortal, and the restoration of the 
immortal to its divine origins. The former position is 
obviously that of Antioch and Theodore. To hold to this 
position the Antiochenes were compelled to lay the greater 
stress on the humanity of Christ. Viewed through Alexan­
dria's Platonic glasses, that stress and its implications 
were held to be a serious and unacceptable error, even 
heresy. Through Antiochene Scriptural exegetical glasses, 
Alexandria's stress on the oneness of Christ in ontological 
terms was deemed pagan rather than true to Scripture, and 
resounded the Apollinarian heresy.
Neither Christology is an absolute expression or definition of who Christ is; there must always come a moment when Christ can be found and understood only in terms of religious experience. And there is a pro­found sense in which Christ is not so much an answer and a blueprint of reality as an eternal question and challenge to us,85
Differing in no substantial way from Greer's inter­
pretation of Theodore, Norris underscores more heavily than 
Greer the domination of Theodore's anthropology over his 
Christology. In spite of being informed and influenced by 
the Platonic tradition of his day, any use of this tradition 
by Theodore appears to be employed " . . .  not self-con­
sciously, but rather almost unthinkingly . . . .  Theodore
^^Ibid.. p. 65,
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is not a Neo-Platonist, and this fact is nowhere more evi­
dent than in his emphasis on the practical as opposed to the 
contemplative r e a s o n . R e a s o n  comprises both the capacity 
to leam and the capacity to choose, Man is responsible for 
his deeds. This Scriptural orientation remains at the cen­
ter of Theodore's understanding. In contrast to the Pla­
tonic tradition, Theodore holds that a rational act is not, 
per se, a "virtuous" act. Reason possesses a capacity for 
"deliberate false choice.
. . . sin itself is properly a deliberate act of the rational agent, having its root in the power of choice and judgment which is native to reason. The focus and centre of the human problem, then, lies not so much in a conflict between the natural tendency of the soul towards God and the natural tendency of the flesh towards indulgence in earthly delights, as it does in the conflict between the demands of the divine law and the voluntary dispositions of the human will . . . .  Theodore's insistent affirmation of the vol­untary nature of sin appears as a reaffirmation of certain elements of biblical religion and morality as against the teaching of late Platonism.88
It is clear that for Theodore man has the capacity to be 
obedient to God or to do deliberately what he knows is con­
trary to the good. Theodore refers to man as the "keystone 
of the created order" and as the "microcosmic bond of the
O Qwhole universe," and as one "in whom the nature and author­
ity of God himself are genuinely represented."^^ Only such 
a one could be morally free. Man may be the "image of God
^^Norris, Manhood, p. 136.
^7Ibid.. p. 132. 3Glbld.. pp. 158 ff.
39Ibid.. p. 143. ^Oibid.. p. 144.
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without actually functioning as the i m a g e , F e l l o w s h i p  
with God and man's perfection are effected through a moral 
relationship where man is obedient to the will of God. As 
the "microcosmic bond of the whole universe" man's disobedi­
ence affects the whole universe. One effect is man's mor­
tality. Here Theodore presents a double strain of thought. 
Sin is not inherited, but is always an act of will. On the 
other hand, mortality is inherited, and mortality carries 
with it a concomitant tendency to sin. Theodore's attempted 
solution is to claim that God, knowing man would disobey, 
created man mortal.42 in fact, he views man's mortality as 
necessary for man in terms of dealing with sin and the moral 
struggle, in which God wants man as a free moral agent to 
find righteousness through temptation. "At one and the same 
time [mortality] is God's punishment for sin foreseen, his 
provision for its ultimate expiation through death, and his 
instrument for the moral education of the race."48 ihe 
double strain is clear; sin presupposes mortality, the 
Platonic strain; mortality is the consequence of free dis­
obedience, the Biblical strain. However, the greater weight 
for Theodore is thrown to the latter side. Sin and mortality 
remain primarily as categories and realities of time and 
space.
The goal of redemption is not the divinization of
^^Ibld.. p. 145. ^^Ibid.. p. 182.
Ibid.. p. 184, brackets added.
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man but the "redemption of man as a creature implicated in 
the life of the created world. The restoration of man to 
his ideal state— and with this the 'reintegration of the 
cosmos'--depends primarily upon humanity's return to a 
state of perfect obedience .to God and to the fellowship 
with God which such obedience effects ."44 is required
is salvation from sin, or rather, the salvation of man's 
will from sin. It is not so much the act of sin as the sin­
ful will at which redemption must aim.45 This requires a 
"double agency," the action of God and man, divine self­
giving and human obedience.46 Theodore upholds God's in­
itiative in redemption. It is God's action in the Incarna­
tion by which man's will is enabled to achieve righteousness 
and overcome the power of sin. But for Theodore, man must 
also be active in the work of redemption, "Human as well 
as divine action is required, not so much because it is man 
who is to be saved, as because the kind of salvation which 
is in question presupposes the free accord of the human will 
as one of its constituent elements,"4^ The divine initia­
tive in Christ is coupled with Christ's work as man. His 
perfect obedience is real. Not meriting mortality, there­
fore, His death becomes a voluntary offering of free obedi­
ence to God, "Thus the work of redemption is effected by
44ibid.. p. 191.
If Norris' interpretation is correct, then Theodore sought to correct Athanasius' neglect of the problem of sin itself.
4^Ibid.. p. 196. ^^Ibid.. p. 194.
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A ûthe human activity of the assumed Man," Christ is the
pioneer of salvation, the first to cross the border to the 
Second Age,
For both Greer and Norris Theodore's position is to 
be understood in several ways. First, Theodore's approach 
to theology is not as a Platonic philosopher, but as a 
Biblical exegete, whose understanding and verbal imagery 
reflect a Scriptural view. Second, man is a sinner by his 
own will not by inheritance, though the condition of mor­
tality which he does inherit is the ground of his sin and 
of his freedom as a moral being. Third, salvation must be 
of the will to sin, rather than from the acts of sin.
Fourth, redemption, therefore, requires God's initiative 
and a man's obedience, cooperative divine and human work. 
This requires a genuine Incarnation, God and man. The In­
carnate One is Jesus Christ, Who becomes man's Redeemer 
through perfect obedience in real human work. Fifth, the 
present time knows of the age to come, the Second Age, 
because of Christ, its First Citizen,
The question of Theodore's orthodoxy, whether he was 
a "Nestorian," is not here being raised. It is his view 
which is important, since some have chosen his understanding 
as their starting point for developing a Christology, To­
day's intellectual and theolgical climate is not that of 
the fourth and fifth centuries. Questions closed then may
^^Ibid.. p. 195.
be reopened now, and, indeed, they are,^^ However, one
96
phase of the orthodox controversy must be noted.
The Christological controversies of the fourth and 
fifth centuries centered on the question of the divinity and 
humanity of Jesus Christ. In oversimplified terms, Nidea 
affirmed the divinity of Christ, Constantinople affirmed 
His humanity, and Chalcedon, reaffirming both aspects, 
affirmed His oneness. It was an approach limited to this 
debate which condemned Nestorius, and, by implication, even­
tually Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Antiochene School.
Both Greer and Norris point to the unfairness of such a 
judgment. Both indicate the primacy of exegesis not philos­
ophy for Theodore's Christology, But both miss a signifi­
cant implication of their own argument. If they are right, 
is it not possible that Theodore's Christology is to be 
understood in terms of the relationship of transcendence 
and immanence rather than of the divinity and humanity? 
Surely to one steeped in Biblical thought the question
In 1921 a Modem Churchman's Conference was held on the subject "Christ and the Creeds," Some of the papers engendered public controversy. In introducing the publica­tion of the papers the editor pointed out, " . . .  the re­statement of the Christian Christology, when circumstances or rather convictions demand it, is permissible: in fact,more than permissible: it is obligatory on Christianteachers," Editorial, The Modem Churchman, Vol. XI, Nos,5 and 6 (September, 1921), p. 199. **By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance," Erasmus cited, ibid., p. 193, The editor goes on to say, "It is the besetting sin of theological contro­versialists to strive to condemn any new view not primarily on the ground that it is false but on the ground that the church has already condemned it in some General Council fourteen hundred years ago." p, 194.
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centers not in the possibility of God invading humanity, a 
philosophical category, but in God being in a man. For 
Biblical thinkers God acts in history, in events, in people. 
Through these the Transcendent becomes the Immanent; God 
draws nigh to men.^O p . T. Forsyth recognizes this possi­
bility for theological construction, " . . .  the idea of 
immanence , . , is a very fertile idea if it is construed 
ethically as action, and not ontologically as mere presence
Transcendent and Immanent are not Biblical terms, but are used here as terms to represent Biblical understand­ing, hopefully reflected in the last part of the sentence.W. A. Matthews indicates the problem in the ancient world of understanding how a transcendent God could manifest Him­self to the finite order, Matthews, "The Doctrine of Christ," pp. 92-124 in The Future of Christianity, ed. by James Marchant (London: Johin Murray, 1927), see p . 115.But surely Matthews was not speaking of the Hebrews 1 Wal­ter Eichrodt in Theology of the Old Testament, trans. by J. A. Baker (Philadelphia : We s trains ter Press, Vol. I, 1961,Vol. II, 1967) though somewhat skeptical of Von Rojd's exis­tential interpretation of the Old Testament, does affirm that in the Old Testament view God does act in history.Cf. Vol. I, pp. 17-19, 512-520. "In Israel . . . theologi­cal thinking successfully averted a fragmentation of the divine unity, and in so doing reflected men's living ex­perience of the one God who had declared himself to his people as the will establishing and controlling their whole existence." Vol. II, p. 29. Eichrodt even utilizes the terras "immanence" and "transcendence" to describe the under­standing of the Hebrews. " . . .  The faith of Israel demon­strates an unmistakable tendency to emphasize both the mighty immanence and the exalted transcendence of the deity." Vol.I, p. 205. However, the problem or use of an exalted and a localized Yahweh is " . . . not a metaphysical and specula­tive but religious concern." Vol. II, p. 191. This is the understanding evident among the Antiochenes. Discussing the differences between the Greek and Hebrew views of God, Norris suggests that the Greeks used god as a universal principle of explanation, a principle of reason; whereas for the Hebrews God is the One encountered in decision and experi­ence. The one translated nature religion into a rational theology, the other into a theology of "historical experi­ence." R. A. Norris, Jr., God and World in Early Christian Thought (New York: Seabury Press, Ï965), p. 58.
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or mere movement • . . God's "mighty acts" include His
redemptive love as well as the enforcement of His Law and 
Justice. The Old Testament Messiah is to be a man who acts 
as a man in the world, in concrete history. The question is 
not the "how" of Relton,^^ but the "Who do you say that I 
am?" of Christ. To Theodore, then, it would be natural and 
consistent to speak of God indwelling in Christ as in the 
prophets. Theodore, too, held to the uniqueness of Christ, 
but his stress was upon God's action, the transcendent made 
known in the immanent, God revealing Himself and His ways. 
God always possesses the initiative, but little meaning re­
mains to the Old Testament if man is not responsible for his
P. T. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Christ (London; Independent Press, 1909), p. 340, Harold De Wolf points out that while theologians have ambivalated from an exclusive position stressing God's transcendent discon­tinuity from us to an exclusive position stressing God's immanent continuity with us, the Bible holds both together firmly. "Isaiah's vision of God's transcendence, described in the sixth chapter, is also an expression of God's con­cerned involvement in human history." De Wolf, "Motifs of Continuity and Discontinuity," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, 1963, pp. 348-349. It is this Biblical point which is often missed by the critics of Antiochene thought.
82supra, footnote 10, p. 82. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Chris tology (London; Collins, 1966), pp. 29-37, 109-110, contends the only appropriate question of Christology is "Who are you?" Bonhoeffer argues; "The question 'Who?' is the question of transcendence. The question 'How? ' is the question of immanence. Because the one who is questioned here is the Son, the immanent question cannot grasp him.Not, 'How are you possible?'--that is the godless question, the serpent's question— but 'Who are you?' . . . .  The question of transcendence is the question of existence and the question of existence is the question of transcendence.In theological terms: man only knows who he is in the lightof God." pp. 30-31. Surely Theodore would accept this last sentence Î
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own moral acts• What is being suggested here is that though 
Theodore had to speak in the thought patterns and expres­
sions of his own day, thereby speaking in terms of a Pla­
tonic divinity-humanity dualism, that which informed his own 
thought and is responsible for his concept of Christology 
is a Biblical understanding of God involved in history, the 
transcendent in the immanent. This approach lays stress 
upon "what" God is doing in Christ rather than "how" God is 
doing it. In this respect Jesus is accepted as the Christ 
by His actions rather than His nature. The problem of the 
divinity-humanity dualism is resolved. That problem is 
this; if the Christological formulation leans too far 
toward the divinity side of Christ's nature, a docetic 
Christ is presented; on the other hand, if the Christologi­
cal formulation leans too heavily toward the humanity side, 
the question of Christ's uniqueness— is He the One worthy 
to be followed by all— is raised. But can Theodore com­
pletely avoid this problem even with the transcendent- 
immanent argument? That is, with the focus upon Jesus' 
actions, the question still remains: why Jesus? Why is
Jesus the One Whose actions all men ought to acclaim as the 
point of God's immanence? Why is Jesus the unique One all 
men ought to follow? The question of the uniqueness of
Christ raises a problem with which all forms of Liberal
53Christological suggestions must wrestle.
^^This question is a constant problem for all Liberal Christological positions, with their strong stress on anthro­pology. The question will be raised again in Chapter V.
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In his commentary on the Nicene Creed, Theodore de­
clares of Christ, " . , . He is what God is . . " . . .
He is of the same nature as God and not a creature." " , , ,
He did not come into existence , . . but was in the begin­
ning from Him and was from eternity with Him . . . "54 pQj- 
Theodore Jesus is of the Godhead. It is God Who chooses to 
exist in a man. " . . .  God assumed (man) for the benefit 
of our human race, and that (man) was assumed so that He 
should remain in virtue and bestow on us the communion of 
His grace." " . . . it is not He who came but it is the 
Godhead that came down from heaven, not that it moved from 
place to place, but by its condescension and its Providence 
for us which it manifested in the man who was assumed on our 
behalf." " . . . it is God who was for us the source of all 
good things, and it is He who gave us the victory over all 
adversaries, either death of sin or any other evil b o m  of 
them; He who for us put on the man our Lord Jesus . , . 
Writing on the Nicene Fathers* statement "And in one Lord 
Jesus Christ," Theodore says, "it is as if they had said, 
'This one we understand to be one Lord who is of the Divine 
nature of God the Father, who for our salvation put on a man 
in whom He dwelt and through whom He appeared and became 
known to m a n k i n d , F a i t h f u l  to the Biblical message Theo­
dore sees God acting in events to make Himself known, and
^^Mingana, Theodore, pp. 42, 44.
^^Ibid.. pp. 89, 81, 61. ^^Ibid.. p. 37.
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finally acting in Christ, the "one who was visible."87 The 
question to be posed of Theodore at this point is not whether 
he has constructed a docetic Christ, but if he is guilty of 
rendering an interpretation of Christ which makes Him a mere 
theophany? Surely this is the peril involved if the Old 
Testament's view of God's action in and presence through 
events is pushed as the foundation for Christology. To guard 
against this danger it would be necessary for Theodore to 
argue strongly for the real humanity of Christ. This he does 
" . . .  He was not a man in appearance only, but . . .  He was 
a real man who suffered all the human [passions] according to 
human nature." "It would be against our duty to minimize 
that man who was assumed on our b e h a l f  ."88 The genuine 
humanity of Christ is also necessary both for Christ's human 
work to be efficacious for man's salvation,8^ and for the 
continuation of man's moral freedom with all its concomitant 
responsibilities. Therefore, there are two aspects to 
Christ's work. The one is an appeal to men as free moral 
beings to choose to become obedient to God. " . . .  He be­
came an example as man to man." "[He] . . . promulgated ways 
of acting congruous to His teaching . . , that the ways of 
acting of us who believe should be in harmony with His new
^7lbid.. p. 89. 38ibid.. pp. 73, 80.
39This is well stated in Gregory of Nazianzuz' fa- mous dictum: "Anyone who has placed his hope in a humanbeing who lacked a human mind is himself truly mindless, and does not deserve a complete salvation. For what was not assumed, was not healed. What is saved is that which has been united with God." ep, 101, 4-7, 10 quoted in Bat­tens on, Later Fathers, p. 108.
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teaching." "If Christ our Lord had immediately after His ris­
ing from the dead, raised also all men who had previously died, 
and had bestowed upon them new life fully and immediately, we 
should have been in no need of doing anything . . .
The second aspect of Christ's work is to usher in the 
Second Age, to indicate its promise, and the application of 
that promise to men as hope. " . . .  on those who believe
. . . [the] resurrection bestows confidence, and puts the 
seal on all the wonderful things accomplished in the Econ­
omy of Christ." " . . .  He died in reality . . .  to show 
that human death and all passions were abolished by the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ." He sits at the right hand 
of God " . . .  in order that we might understand the nature 
of the good things in which we shall dwell if we have truly 
communion with Him."^^
That Theodore at times uses terms and analogies 
which are Platonic is no license to evaluate him by that 
philosophy's presuppositions. He was a Biblical theologian 
who thought primarily in religious not philosophical terms 
and with religious not philosophical understanding. When 
Mackintosh claims Theodore approached Christology preoccupied 
to stress the "immutability of God, the freedom of the will, 
and the reality of Jesus's human l i f e , h i s  claim is staked
GOlbid., pp. 69, 70, brackets added.
^^Ibid., pp. 75, 73-74, 78, brackets added.
62H. R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p. 201; see supra, p. 85.
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on philosophical grounds unoccupied by Theodore, The conten­
tion would be more appropriately expressed that Theodore 
approached Christological problems preoccupied with thoughts 
of the transcendence and immanence of God, the reality of 
Jesus* humanity, and the moral freedom which makes man re­
sponsible for what he does, The Transcendence of God means 
God is truly Lord and Creator of all that is. Signs can 
point to Him, events can disclose His Law and His Will, men 
may act as agents of His activity, but God Himself is not a 
sign, an event, a man. At the same time Theodore believes 
God has drawn near in the Man, Jesus Christ, entering the 
imroanental realm as one of us. Genuine humanity for Jesus 
is essential to Theodore's thought both to insure the real­
ity of His obedience to God, and to preserve human moral 
responsibility. Of necessity, then, Christ's humanity is 
like other men's.68 Finally, faithful to a Biblical under­
standing, Theodore is concerned not so much with free will 
as with moral responsibility, not so much with the original 
reason for sin as with sin itself and the redemption neces­
sary to correct both its present and potential effects.
A word must be added here concerning the "Nestorian"
63To add the expression "save He was without sin," detracts from rather than adds to the statement. For either Christ's sinlessness was a possibility of the humanity, in which case the humanity does not differ, and what the human­ity accomplishes in Jesus is a perfect obedience never lived before; or Christ's sinlessness was due to an inability to sin, in which case, whatever else it is, it is not our human­ity. For a discussion of the inappropriateness of applying "sinless" to the Incarnate One as a givenness of His Incar­nation, see L. A. Reid, The Rediscovery of Belief (London; Lindsey Press, 1946), ppT 172-173.
10464charge which has been leveled against Theodore, what M. F, 
Wiles calls " . . .  the danger of parallelism,"^^ in which 
the humanity and divinity of Jesus are so separately dis­
tinguished as to impair unity, Theodore agrees that Christ 
is One Person. But he is after a religious faith, not what 
L, A. Reid labels the "speculative mythico-metaphysical con­
struction of theology,"66 The philosophical concept of 
unity is not Theodore * s . He is concerned to uphold the 
Holy God, "Who for us, children of men and for our salva­
tion, came down from heaven, was incarnate and became a man." 
But, as Lionel S, Thornton points out, " . . .  reason is dis­
satisfied with any form of dualism which cannot be resolved 
67into unity." Those engaged in a Platonic philosophical 
approach to Christology attacked Theodore's position, level­
ing the charge of duality by standards his thought was never 
intended to uphold. The suggestion being offered in these 
past pages is that the Antiochene position is more accurately 
and adequately represented by a transcendent-immanental ap­
proach than by the usual divinity-humanity understanding. It 
is the Antiochene position, understood on its own terms.
^^Supra, footnote 10, p. 82,
F. Wiles, "The Doctrine of Christ in the Patris­tic Age," Christ for Us Today, ed, by W. N. Pittenger (London: S,C,M, Press, l9é8), p. 89.
^6l . a . Reid, "Jesus's Significance Today— One Philos­opher's View," Christ for Us Today, p. 125.
^^L. S. Thornton, The Incarnate Lord (London: Long­mans, Greene & Co., 1928), p, 3.
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which provides the starting point for the liberal recon­
struction of Christology now to be examined. That position 
stresses the initiative and Holiness of God, a Christ Who 
is genuinely like other men though unique, and a mankind 
morally responsible for its actions.
B. The Concept of Sin 
A contemporary Antiochene view is taken by W, Norman 
Pittenger,whose basic work on Christology is The Word In­
carnate At the turn of the twentieth century one
F, G. Downing calls Pittenger*s position the "Antiochene view of Christ," A Man for Us and a God for Us (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1%8), p, 62. M. F. Wiles,"Doctrine of Christ," Christ for Us, pp. 88-89, argues that the "degree Chris tology" posit ion of Pittenger and others cannot be called Antiochene. He contends the ancient Antio­chenes stressed equally with the Alexandrines a devotion to Nic^a and a conviction the subject of the incarnation was the Logos-Son, whereas the modem "degree Christology" view seems more directly antithetical to the Alexandrines. Wiles * argument hinges on the premise that the patristic view of divinity would not recognize, and much less acknowledge, the meaning of divinity as represented by the modem "degree Christology" men. But to build a modem approach upon some of the significant insights of the fourth and fifth cen­turies does not require the assumption of all the presup­positions of those earlier theologians. Further, Wiles accepts the judgment that the Antiochenes presented a view of Christ in terms of divinity and humanity which provided less than full unity. In contrast. Wiles points out, the modem "degree Christology" men start with the historical person of Christ, Surely Wiles is wearing "Alexandrian spectacles"! Both the patristic and the modem Antiochenes aim at the act of God in Christ rather than a philosophical explication of the relationship of the divine and the human.
^^W. N. Pittenger, The Word Incarnate (London:Nisbet, 1959). Pittenger has written two other books on Christology, Christ and Christian Faith (New York: RoundTable Press, 1941T, was Pittenger*s first attempt to state his Christological position. The publishing company went out of business during the Second World War, and the book was never reprinted. The Word Incarnate, however, is a much
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theologian remarked that as a result of Chalcedon, " • . . 
more and more, all down the centuries since, the manhood re­
ceded further and further behind the G o d h e a d . "70 he saw
the emphasis upon the manhood .reemerging in theological 
circles. By the Modern Churchmen's Conference of 1921,
R, G. Parsons could say, "The prevailing spirit of the pres­
ent time is more Antiochene than Alexandrine . . ."7^ His 
claim may be somewhat broader than the facts allow, but it 
is clear that the "spirit" designated by him provided the 
climate in which Pittenger found his theological direction. 
One of Pittenger*s theological mentors was Professor F.
Bethune-Baker, formerly Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity 
in Cambridge University, whose own interest in Nestorius and 
the Christology of Antioch is fully shared by his pupil.
Cognizance must be taken of the appearance in Pit­
tenger *s writings of "process thought." It appears as but 
one among several themes in The Word I n c a r n a  t e . 72 his
writings since it emerges as a more commanding t h e m e ,73
more able and thorough statement than its predecessor. Re­cently Pittenger has published a third and "final effort" in Christology, Christology Reconsidered (London; S.C.M. Press, 1970), As the title suggests Pittenger reexamines his earlier Christological statements in the light of his theological development since 1959. He does not substan­tially alter his previous position, but he does indicate areas to which he would give greater stress,
7^Bethune-Baker, Nestorius, p. 208,
7^R. G, Parsons, "Jesus: Human and Divine," ModernChurchmen's Conference of 1921, p, 307,
72see e.g., pp. 146-156; pp. 169-175.
73One book is devoted to the subject: ProcessThought and Christian Faith (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968).
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concluding in the statement in his latest work on Chris­
tology, " . . .  in what follows I shall have occasion to 
make considerable use of process thought."74 %s Pittenger, 
then, to be counted among the "process" thinkers rather than 
as an Antiochene? Two points should be made here.
First, is Pittenger*s starting point within the 
field of philosophy? There is no doubt he employs philoso­
phy in his theology, but is the starting point there? If it 
is, then he is a "process" thinker. But in point of fact, 
he starts with an Anglican's loyalty to theological tradi­
tion and the creeds. " . . .  my own Christological position 
is indeed and avowedly A n t i o c h e n e ,"75 At least consciously
74pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, p. 2,
7 5"^ Christology Reconsidered, p. 41. Pittenger af­firms his Anglican loyalty : " } T , in order for Chris­tianity to be Christianity at all there must be the Church,In this sense Christology and ecclesiology are almost one and the same— not that the Church is Christ, in a simple way, but that the Church is the indispensable where in which Christ is encountered, received, followed." Proclaim­ing Christ Today (London: S.P.C.K., 1963), p. 40. However,Pittenger had previously rejected a former position where he had held Christ and the Church in a univocal relationship in which the doctrine of Christ applies directly to the doctrine of the Church. Pittenger, "Christ, the Church, and Reunion," Theology Today, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (January, 1957), pp. 499- 506. Pittenger criticizes John Knox's view of the Church as too high, and for being too uncritical. Pittenger, "Some Implications, Philosophical and Theological, in John Knox's Writing," Christian History and Interpretation ed. by W. R. Former, C . F . D . Moule, R . R , Niebuhr (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1967), pp. 3-16. In another article in the same book, "John Knox's Conception of History," pp. 17- 34, D. D. Williams accuses Knox of making the concrete ex­periences of the Church the key to historical reality, Pittenger would not choose to go this far, obviously. What he does say in Christology Reconsidered is, " , . . the Church is part of the event of Christ." p. 145. See infra, pp. 135-138.
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Pittenger considers himself an Antiochene. But unconsciously 
has he become primarily an exponent of the "process" school? 
This raises the second point. It was argued in the previous 
section that the Antiochene School seen through Theodore of 
Mopsuestia was one of Biblical theology, not philosophy. If 
Theodore utilized philosophical terms he did so "unthink­
ingly. "76 But in a culture as attuned to philosophy as the 
Graeco-Roman civilization the use of philosophy was not only 
unavoidable, but an apologetic necessity. The Antiochenes* 
lack of concern for philosophical thought resulted in a re­
jection of its Christological concepts by the judgment of a 
philosophical system inimical to it. Nestorius at least 
recognized the difficulty resulting from a philosophical 
vacuum among the Antiochenes. His error lay in his choice 
of the hostile Platonic philosophical system to explicate 
Antiochene Christology,^^ an endeavor in which he could not 
have succeeded, for Antiochene presuppositions were not 
Platonic. For example, the Platonists stressed the immut­
ability of the eternal in metaphysical terms. For an Antio­
chene steeped in Biblical thought God changes. He repents,
He alters His announced plan of action or His act of wrath. 
The Bible's God is one of encounter, not one of metaphysical 
speculation. No philosophical system was readily available 
for the Antiochene dynamic approach to theology. Nor did the
76Supra, pp. 91-92,
77Supra, footnote 10, p. 82.
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Antiochenes, with but few exceptions, see the need for one.
It was this blind spot which was largely responsible for 
their loss to the Alexandrians in the fifth century theolog­
ical arguments at Ephesus and Chalcedon. Process thought 
provides a possible philosophical system compatible with an 
Antiochene approach. But at best it can serve only an apolo­
getic function not the basis for an Antiochene reconstruc­
tion of Christology. It is in this way Pittenger uses it. 
Process thought provides for him a tool unavailable to the 
original Antiochenes. But his basic Christological concepts 
are Antiochene.7& Whitehead has stated that Christianity 
is "a religion seeking a m e t a p h y s i c . "79 while "process 
philosophy" provides that metaphysical perspective for 
Pittenger, his primary orientation is that of Biblical re­
ligion. This is most clearly revealed in his own statement 
indicating the appropriateness of utilizing "process" meta­
physics in Christian theology.
A metaphysic such as I have sketched provides a "natural" and "historical" basis for a Christian view of the world. This should not suggest, of course, that the Christian theologian is to begin with this metaphysic and then seek to force the biblical revela­tion into it. On the contrary, he will begin (as he always must) with the biblical revelation--with the living, dynamic, purposing, loving, and faithful God, who reveals himself in nature and in history--and he will then find that of all the available metaphysical
78The next chapter will discuss process thought and examine the Christological reconstructions of those for whom this philosophical approach is basic.
7^A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, World Publishing Co., I960),p. 50.
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points of view the "process" approach serves him mostsatisfactorily.80
Norris argues that the Christology of Theodore of 
Mopsuestia must be understood in the light of his anthro­
pology .31 what is the nature of man for Pittenger, and 
then, more specifically, what is the nature of sin? The 
two concepts are closely related. But it is the doctrine 
of sin which must be more closely scrutinized to analyze 
if the contemporary Antiochene liberal approach has in any 
significant way corrected nineteenth century liberal con­
cepts of sin, and met Barth's challenge.
Man, for Pittenger, is first of all a "dependent 
being." "He does not explain himself; he did not bring 
himself into existence . . . "  " . . .  we exist in an almost
terrifying dependence upon something else or someone else 
than ourselves."32 Though the theme is Schleiermacher's, 
the explication is Pittenger*s. Schleiermacher stresses the 
feeling of dependence as the clue to man's awareness of God.33
^^Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 154 ff. It was the lack of a philosophical system compatible with its exegeti­cal insights which plagued the Antiochenes. See supra, pp. 85 ff. and 91 ff.
3^Cf. supra, pp. 86 ff. and 91 ff.
32pittenger, The Christian Understanding of Hiaman Nature (London; Nisbet and Company, 1964), pp. 21-22.
33An interesting comparison might be drawn between Schleiermacher's "feeling of dependence" and Kierkegaard's "angst." The comparison might reveal more about the theo­logical climate of the early part of the nineteenth century than has generally been presented. As man came awake to himself and his potential, is it not conceivable that he awoke also to his terrifying aloneness? It was this "alone- ness" to which Nie triche responded by declaring God dead.
Ill
For Pittenger the dependence is a reality, a givenness of 
existence, not a feeling. It describes man's condition of 
existence, even if he does not acknowledge the existence of 
God. To accept the condition does not imply an acceptance 
of God, but of one's humanity. Not to recognize the condi­
tion of dependence, or more precisely, the condition of non­
independence, is to distort who we are, what we can be, and 
how we can live. The result is to act in a distorted way; 
we act inhumanely. In asserting ourselves as independent, 
we deny who we really are as human creatures. We take our­
selves too seriously rather than our condition seriously 
enough. This is why humility involves having a sense of 
humor about o u r s e l v e s . 34 "The root of man's trouble is pre­
cisely in [the] attempt which he makes to be independent."35 
At the same time man is a creature with a purpose.
He possesses an unfulfilled capacity, and he is less than 
man unless he moves toward that fulfillment. For Pittenger- 
this realization is a human cognition apart from any reli­
gious perspective. The fulfillment is possible with or 
without the name of God or the concept of God.
For God is much more than a concept; he is a real­ity- -the ultimate dependability in things, the ground of all existence, the determiner of all destiny— and recognition of him as such may be conceptually very vague indeed. There is this Reality which in fact does fulfill human life, wHatever may be the name or lack of name, that men use in speaking of it.86
^^Ibid.. pp. 23-24.
ft sIbid., p. 23, brackets added. 
^^Ibld.. p. 28.
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If the Reality is an essential part of man's condi­
tion and his purpose, then it would appear that some aware­
ness, however vague, of its existence is required, as Tillich
endeavors to allow in speaking of a Being beyond being, a
87God beyond God. Pittenger does not seem to think this is 
necessary. For him the Reality is a presupposition of his 
religious perspective. He confirms the incognito work of 
God, through which man's striving for fulfillment is a given­
ness of his creaturely existence. Pittenger surely does not 
take seriously enough the epistemological problem involved, 
namely, how can non-knowledge be knowledge? The contemporary 
secular movement recognizes quite clearly that modern man 
can exist very nicely without God or the concept of G o d . 33 
Is it apologetically valid, let alone honest, to claim such 
a secularist actually depends upon a Reality he specifically 
may reject? Pittenger even calls this Reality, "the determiner
87Cf. Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York: Har*per Torchbooks, 1957), pp. 44-46.
88Of. Langdon Gilkey, "Dissolution and Reconstruc­tion in Theology," Front Line Theology ed. by Dean Peerman (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967), pp. 29-38. Gilkey, more cor­rectly than Pittenger, indicates the problem. "At his core man is a religious being, and this tiruth provides the clue both to his humanity and to his relation to God--for God- language is the explication of the answers to the deepest questions about man's existence. Of course one must add at once that the validity of God-language is by no means demon­strated by pointing out these depths in man's nature. No analysis of man can establish the reality of God; it may well be that the ultimate which man longs and searches for exists nowhere! , . . Religious language is valid (that is, true with regard to the reality in and by which man exists) insofar as it reflects not just man's 'religious nature* but a positive experience of this ultimate ground . . . " pp. 35-36.
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of all destiny,” which is inconsistent both with an Antio­
chene approach leaning heavily on man's responsibility for 
his actions, and with Pittenger's own methodology dependent 
upon "process theology,” The use of the term "ultimate des­
tiny” would have been understandable, not the use of "all 
destiny."
In a later work Pittenger corrected this error in 
part. "When . . .  we use the phrase 'God acts,* what we are 
really saying is that the divine causal efficacy, moving 
towards the fulfillment of the divine aim, is in varying 
degrees the dominant element in each successive occasion,
Here Pittenger leans more heavily on "process thought," To 
conceive of God as a dominant element in varying degrees is 
obviously not the same as conceiving of God as "the deter­
miner of all destiny," The former concept of God is more 
in accord with an Antiochene anthropology. In this view 
there must be room for man to act as a free being, as one 
who is morally responsible for his actions. This is Pitten­
ger's third definition of man's n a t u r e m a n  is a free being, 
he is moral. He possesses the capacity to act wisely and un­
wisely, to move toward fulfillment and toward derangement.
This provides the climate for, if not the condition of, his 
sin.
89Pittenger, Process Thought, p. 46.
^^The order of classification here is not the same as appears in Pittenger*s Human Nature, but no unfairness to his view seems to result. Some of his concepts, such as man is a sexual being, are not particularly relevant to the discus­sion at hand.
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But to finish the anthropological picture Pittenger 
draws, man is also a communal being who cannot live in iso­
lation from his f e l l o w s . A n d  if the Reality upon which 
man depends, aware of or blind to it as he may be, is God, 
then it also follows man cannot exist in isolation from God.QOGod made man to be "towards himself,"^ which is the stress 
Pittenger wishes to place on Augustine's dictum. "Our 
hearts are restless until they rest" in God.
In the fifth place, man is a "soul-body unity,"93 
Neither can be held apart from the other. The Antiochene 
insistence on the Biblical acceptance of man as a single 
organism is obviously evident here in Pittenger's thought. 
Man is also mortal, but he is not completely explained in 
terms of this present world, for the immortal impinges upon 
his mortality, his mutability, as Theodore of Mopsuestia
argued.
Finally, man "is in defection from himself, he is a 
sinner."93 But he possesses the potentiality of restoration, 
of being saved 19^ Here is to be found the groundwork for
91Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 36.
9^Ibid., p. 26. See also The Word Incarnate, p. 179 and pp. 205-208. It is in this last cited section that Pit­tenger anticipates writing his later work. The Christian Understanding of Hiiman Nature. Adolphe Ham put it succinctly, "man is dehumanized without God." p. 207. A. Ham, "Towards a Christology for Today's Man," Communio Viatorum, PRAHA, 1967/4, pp. 203-210. -----------------
93Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 37.
94ibid., p . 133. Also cf. supra, p. 90.
95pittenger, Human Nature, p. 97. ^^Ibid.. p. 106.
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Christ's work.
Pittenger's anthropology is more informed than that 
of his Antiochene progenitors, but it remains consistent 
with their view that man while a creature, and therefore 
dependent, is also a free moral being who exercises choice 
for his good or his ill, and is responsible for the conse­
quences of his actions. At the same time man is also made 
for eternity, he is ever capable of restoration from his 
condition as a sinner.
In The Spirit and the Forms of L o v e ,97 Daniel Day 
Williams examines love as the clue for understanding God, 
man, Christ and the interrelationship of the three. "Since 
it is the Christian faith that God is love, it is curious 
that theology has been so late in taking love as the key to 
the Christian doctrine of m a n , "93 p[e proposes that love is 
the meaning of the imago dei, by which, then,
. . . all human loves have something in them which pulls them on a tangent toward the love of God. They reflect their origin in God. A doctrine of man follow­ing this clue will search in the human loves, even in their incredible distortions, for that which reveals man's relationship to the loving God who is his Creator. The love of God can be present whether it is overtly recognized or not.99
It would appear that Williams like Pittenger is making a pre­
supposition of the incognito work of God, But there is a 
difference, Pittenger focuses the relationship through man's
97D. D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (Digswell Place: Nisbet, 1968). “
p. 132. ^^Ibid.. p. 135.
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dependence upon Reality, an ontological approach, Williams 
examines human relationships for the meaning of God and man, 
an existential approach. Therefore, for Williams the imago 
dei must be conceived in "dynamic" terms as relatedness rather 
than as a set of a t t r i b u t e s . 100 this approach he proposes.
love is the meaning of the imago dei. In thisway we can recognize in man that which underlies hisspecial capacities such as reason, moral judgment, artis­tic creativity, and religious awareness. All these find their meaning in life which is created for communion, that is personal existence in community with o t h e r s .iOl
Williams* anthropology, then, is conceived in the single 
category of love, in which all human relations, and relations 
between God and man, provide the material for understanding 
that love, and consequently both man and God, An examina­
tion of that material is the work of the entire book and
provides its title. The Spirit and the Forms of Love. But 
Williams does offer what amounts to a single definition of 
love. "If love constitutes God's being, and if man is 
created in the image of God, then the key to man's being 
and to God's being is the capacity for free, self-giving 
mutuality and concern for the other."^0% por those of an 
Antiochene persuasion, the stress is on God's gift of free­
dom and man's response in freedom, hopefully obedience, 
Williams is arguing that this is a mutual interaction which 
is better understood in terms of love than law. Responsi­
bility and obedience are to be understood in terms of love.
lOOlbid., p. 133. . - lOllbid., p. 134.
lO^Ibid.. p. 160.
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which then provides a better understanding of freedom than 
the original Antiochenes had available to them. But in 
terms of their anthropology this is an understanding of the 
human condition with which, mutatis mutandis, Theodore of 
Mopsuestia and the Antiochenes would surely a g r e e ! ^^3
03go much attention has been paid to Williams as a leading spokesman for "process thought" in America that his theological contribution has been insufficiently noted. The Spirit and the Forms of Love is primarily a theological, father than a philosophical, attempt. It has been argued earlier in this section, supra, pp. 107-110, that "process thought" provides a philosophical support compatible with the Antiochenes* religious understanding which itself lacked a philosophical system. It is in this way Williams uses "process thought" for a theological work. His own words make this clear. " . . .  no philosophy is sufficient for Christian faith. Theology interprets the life of faith which needs philosophical structure for its intelligibility, but Christian faith is existential commitment and participa­tion in the church which is a community of historical experi­ence having its origin and centre in the New Testament wit­ness to Jesus Christ." Ibid., p. 106. In the very begin­ning of the book Williams states his theological base." . . .  our essay is theological in intention and perspec­tive," Ibid., p. 1. All this is not to claim Williams is as avowedly Antiochene as is Pittenger or C. E. Raven in Jesus and the Gospel of Love. This he is not; cf. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, pp. 158-160, 295, But the argument here offered is that in the first place Wil­liams approaches his task as a theologian, as one committed to an explanation of the Christian faith in the service of which "process thought" is enlisted. The next chapter will deal with an approach which finds necessary some degree of a philosophical grounding as a starting point for an explan­ation of the Christian, or any other, faith. At times the differences between the two approaches may not seem signifi­cant. But it is both interesting and significant to note that while the new "Antiochenes" devote the majority of their interest to Christology, man, sin, redemption, the "process" philosophy men focus chiefly on the development of a philo­sophical approach to religion, and the doctrine of God.In the second place, Williams uses human experiences, even those of the Bible, as the material for understanding the meaning of the Christian faith; cf. ibid., p. 135. This distinguishes him as more Antiochene than Alexandrian, but
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Though little attention is given to love as a reveal­
ing category in The Word Incarnate, Pittenger came to recog­
nize its neglect.
. . .  I wish to urge that one of the most signifi­cant developments in our day is the growing awareness of the reality of love as the key to our understanding of God and of man, of the relationship between them, of the whole human enterprise, and of the cosmos it­self .104
A closer examination must now be made of the concept 
of sin. Does a Liberal reconstruction, based upon an Antio­
chene approach, take a more serious and realistic view of 
sin than did nineteenth century Liberalism?
Pittenger argues that man is a sinner. This concept 
is part of his anthropological view, Man is a sinner be­
cause he is in "defection from h i m s e l f . "105 vThat does this
does it make him more Existential than Antiochene? Because he holds both to a universal human structure and to God as the Creator and the meaning of that structure, Williams re­jects Existentialism, " . . .  if there is a universal human structure then we have to ask for the source of this struc­ture, Surely we do not create that; but we discover it as the source of our own being. To admit that every man'par­ticipates in humanity is to acknowledge that we are dependent upon God, for we are not the source of our own participation in a common humanity," Williams, unpublished manuscript on "The Guilt and Renewal of Man," delivered as a series of lectures at Boston University School of Theology, 1952. Finally, Williams* understanding of man, the human situa­tion and the human possibility is one which closely approx­imates that of the Antiochenes,
104p^^tenger, Christology Reconsidered, p. 20. In 1967 Pittenger wrote a small, not very profound, book which indicated at least this growing awareness of the neglect of love as a clue to anthropology on his part; Love Is The Clue (London; Mowbrays, 1967),
105pittenger, Human Nature, p. 97.
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mean? Does it mean that sin is a denial of what man is?
Does it mean that man sins against himself? Is it part of 
man's nature to be a sinner, or at least part of his fallen 
nature as Barth would have it? Apparently, in part at 
least, it means all three for Pittenger.
Man is a dependent being. To be man requires a 
recognition of this dependence as a fact of existence. God 
is the One upon Whom man depends. " . . .  nothing will fin­
ally satisfy man but fellowship with God . . . anything short 
of communion with God will leave men lost and frustrated.
'Our hearts are restless until they rest' in God; this is 
the explanation of the dis-ease in man."^^^ when man for­
gets or denies his dependency upon God then he sins, and the 
sinning is a denial of his humanity. Falsely believing he 
can get along on his own, an act of pride, man gets
. . , twisted in on himself . . . .  He cannot de­prive himself of his true human good without at the same time seriously damaging the natural elements and areas in his life. Thus he is unable to think without prejudice; he is unable to love without false-seeking; he is unable to will completely that which would bring him abiding joy. He cannot see things in the right way, as they actually are; he sees them as they affect him. He cannot act as he ought, because his warped Besires get in his way. He cannot be the kind of being he was made to be.107
Pittenger stresses the term "dis-ease" as one indica­
tion of sin. Man is at "ease" only in communion with God, 
only in an acceptance of his own dependent situation. When
lOGpittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 206. 
^^^Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 102.
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man opts for his own independency, always an option since 
man is a free being who possesses a capacity for choice, 
then he enters a condition of "dis-ease" "which can, and 
observably does, lead to a state of alienation from his true 
end and hence to actual sinning, because it involves an in­
ordinate or disproportionate employment of his desire toward 
ends that are not finally good."1^3 ig not clear if 
"pride" leads to sin or is the result of sin in Pittenger*s 
thought. Apparently it is the latter, for two reasons. 
First, the effect of pride is that man stops seeing things 
as they really are, whereas sin "contradicts the true— that 
is, the divinely intended--nature of man . . . .  "1^9 goth 
pride and sin rest upon a theological predication: God has
an intention for man. Sin is a contradiction of that inten­
tion. Pittenger speaks of sin as a "deviation of aim and a 
failure of achievement."H^ Man gets lost; he fails to 
achieve his potential. But it is man who acts, man who 
chooses. Pride is a description of the activity of man's 
choosing what is not the will of God, Sin is the state of 
the contradiction, while pride is the activity of the wrong 
choice, the latter following upon the former. Pittenger 
does not argue that pride is the cause of the contradiction. 
It is not that man desires to be God, but that man chooses
pp. 62-63, p. 99.
^^^Pittenger, "A Contemporary Trend in North Ameri­can Theology; Process Thought and Christian Faith," Exposi' tory Times. Vol. 76, 1964-65, pp. 268-273, 272. •
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erroneously, he does not "aim" correctly. He fails to 
achieve the potential of his humanity, not so much through 
bad intentions as through poor choices.
Second, man is as capable of choosing the right as 
he is the wrong. Even in defection man is a creature of
God* Sin does not utterly destroy man's potential for
111achieving what God intends for him to be.^^^
[Man] . . . possesses a capacity for choice, how­ever limited the scope of that choice may be; used in this fashion he determines himself, who he shall be, by the choices which he has made and which he continues to make. It is only when that capacity for choosing is used aright and centered in the things that are good and pure, lovely and of good report--in God--that man is really himself . . . .112
Since man can continue to exercise real, though perhaps 
limited, choice pride does not become for Pittenger an in­
escapable condition of man's will. It may be present as a 
reality at any time, but it is not inevitably so. Whenever 
it is, there man denies the condition of his existence, and, 
thereby, denies his real self.
Though Pittenger believes Existentialism to be a 
"strain" of contemporary thought necessary to any current
Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 103. This obviously puts Pittenger in a different school from either Barth or Brunner as reflected in their renowned debate on the re­tention or loss of the imago dei in a "formal" not "material" sense in man's fallen state I See E. Brunner and K. Barth, Natural Theology, trans. by Peter Fraenkel (London: G. Bles, 1946). pittenger refers to it as "the never-destroyed image in us." Human Nature, p. 112,
112pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 206-207, brackets added. See also infra, Chapter II, pp. 161-162.
122
thinking about God's action in Jesus C h r i s t , ^^3 it is Wil­
liams who applies it more thoroughly to the concept of sin. 
Williams points to the obvious web of evil prevalent in the 
world: war, poverty, discrimination, tyranny. It is in
this web men live their lives, "It seems to define our be­
ing. We encounter one another in guilt . . . .  Guilt is 
the actual estrangement between us, the distortion of human 
comradeship which results from what men have done to one 
a n o t h e r . "114 williams here uses the terms "guilt" and "sin" 
in a somewhat different way than traditional usage has 
understood them.
Guilt implies responsibility. The Christian name for the action which leads to guilt is sin. I [speak]. . . of an encounter in guilt, rather than an encoun­ter in sin; for I am not at all certain that we ever say we experience "sin" objectively. Sin is the act of the spirit itself in its freedom. We do not see another's sin, we see the consequences . . . .  While we cannot encounter sin as an object we can reflect upon it "after the fact,"115
Where Pittenger uses the term "pride" Williams uses "sin," 
meaning the exercise of choice wrongly . Williams then uses 
the term "guilt" to denote the consequences of the choice, 
whereas Pittenger describes this situation as "sin." Wil­
liams is the more existential of the two.
H3cf, Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 161; "Neo- Liberalism— Hope and Cha 1 le'nge.^ * Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, 1963, pp. 364 ff.; Process Thought and Christian Faith (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp7 84 ff.
114yiiiiajns, "Guilt and Renewal," unpublished manu­script.
^^3j t ) , brackets added. See also Williams, Spirit and Forms. pTT41, sin "cannot be objectified."
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What is sin for Williams? He finds its meaning in a 
Protestant Reformation clue which
. , . holds that sin is unbelief . , . • Here the primal sin is disloyalty. It is a betrayal of the actual relationship between ourselves and God.When we say that sin is unbelief this does not mean that it is a refusal to subscribe to a dogma. That would become the basis of dogmatic tyranny. Sin is not initially the violation of an intellectual re­quirement, It is the breaking of the ultimate per­sonal bond which encloses our life within the one Holy community of life, It would follow then that all disobedience to law, all falling away into the abyss of the sense, and even all pride is a second stage after the central bond has been broken. All sinful pride conceals a secret distrust. It is be­cause we have already denied the truth, that we must tell ourselves the lie of our own right to take the place of God,3.16
To what is man disloyal? To God? To man's own self? To 
society? Existentially to participate in authentic exist­
ence men are to be themselves, their own full selves. The 
"Fall" takes place within the individual. He falls away 
from himself, from his inner determination. Instead of 
being himself he tries to be what others say he should be.
Thus man betrays himself.
It is not--notice--that we betray our best self; that is the moralistic way to put it. We betray our real self, with its struggling, its hopes and fears.We refuse to trust ourselves, to believe that life is good and worthy for us as we really are, that our little pinch of freedom with all its risks really makes the difference between fulfilling our life and destroying it. Sin is unbelief. Here it is unbelief in ourselves,3*17
Pittenger would agree that sin is a betrayal of one's
1 'I ^ Williams, unpublished manuscript. See also Wil­liams, Spirit and Forms, pp. 142, 207,
3'3*7yiiiiams, unpublished manuscript. See also Wil­liams, Spirit and Forms, pp. 149 ff.
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self, of one's own nature, and he would also agree with Wil­
liams' next step. Here Williams moves beyond modem exis­
tentialism. "It is not only the image of Man which we turn 
against but also the image of Him on whom we depend and in 
whose image we are created. Sin is disloyalty to G o d . "^ 3-8 
In betraying ourselves we are also betraying God. This 
double betrayal is for Pittenger expressed in the view that 
the effect of sin is to thwart man's becoming what he has 
in him to become, which is also a thwarting of the purpose 
God has for man.
Is guilt or sin, then, man's only condition before 
God? In Pittenger's view, man retains his potentiality for 
fulfilling the "capacity" with which God has endowed h i m , 3-3-9 
For Williams there is an element of spontaneous innocence 
in man, as well as his guilt. Even Augustine saw this,
"Yet there is not entirely extinct within man a certain 
spark of the character (scintilla rationis) in which he was 
created after the image of G o d . "3-20 it is possession of 
this innocence which enables us to recognize our guilt.
While men do encounter one another in recognizable guilt, 
it is also true that our innocence protests against evil; 
it does not will the evil we see, or know, or in which we 
are involved. However, this position is not without peril.
3-3-Swilliams, unpublished manuscript.
3-3-9cf,, supra. Chapter II, pp. 120-122. 
120Augustine, civ, dei, xxii. 24. 1,2,3,
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This necessary affirmation of the residual health of the human spirit can lead us to the most plausible but the most serious error of all. That is to suppose that all we need to do is to affirm and cultivate our "natural goodness" and thus throw off the burden of guilt. In other words we put our innocence against our guilt and hope that our innocence will be strong enough to put the spirit right. But this is to over­look the nature of guilt. We can never count on our innocence by itself, once we have recognized the threat of sinr for once we know that the human spirit can turn back upon itself and destroy its own humanity, we can never have enough natural goodness to remove thatthreat,121
In sinning we deny our potentiality as men, we betray our 
real selves, which is also a denial and a betrayal of the 
purposes of God and of God, Himself. At the same time we 
do, indeed, sin against ourselves. We sin " . . .  against 
society, . . . our friends and our enemies, against our
talents and abilities."^22
The question remains, is it part of man's nature to 
be a sinner? In the patristic Antiochene presentation the 
question is somewhat avoided. Sin is occasioned because 
man is mortal and mutable. These provide the condition also 
for his real freedom. Though God did not create man to sin, 
having foreseen that man would sin, God created man as mor­
tal. 3-28 Raven strikes the chord consonant with a modern 
Antiochene view. "[Jesus] never treats sin as the inevit­
able condition of man, but as an intrusion and an outrage."124
121 Williams, "Guilt and Renewal."
122Pittenger, Proclaiming Christ Today (London; S.P.C.K., 1963), p. 651---------   ^
123cf.p supra. Chapter II, p. 93.
3-2^aven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love, p. 316, brackets added.
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Sin is a condition to be reckoned with, but it is not held
to be an "inevitable condition" of man qua man. Pittenger
holds that sin is not something rooted in man's very nature
12 Sas such, but is a "failure of achievement." Yet its 
reality is obvious. Following F. R. Tennant's lead in The 
Concept of Sin, he argues that the presence of sin is occa­
sioned by "the insistent pressures that arise from a long- 
continued misuse of our original instincts and habits 
. . . "3*26 These effects are seriously damaging. Since 
man is communal, the effects are communicated directly as 
part of our corporate existence. We cannot get out. We 
need a deliverer, Williams agrees.
Once the story of guilt in history begins, and we are caught in the web of mutual injury and distrust, then there is no way to health except one which meets the problem of our guilt . . . .  [The] Christian understanding of our encounter in guilt does bring us to the point where we can begin to see why if we are to be saved one must come between us who deals with our guilt by restoring the true image of our humanity. In all sin and guilt we are dimly perceiving who the
3-25pittenger, "A Contemporary Trend," p. 272. In another place Pittenger comes close to arguing that right­eousness is the nature of man qua man. "[We] can surely say that, no matter how mythological the conception may be, the idea of an 'original righteousness,* from which one strain of Christian thought historically has begun, stands for the truth that God made man, and found it a good thing to have done, and that man's terrible defection is really a defection, from which he may be restored to a righteousness 1 I T”" Pittenger, Theology and Reality (Greenwich; Sea- bury Press, 1955), p. 73. See also The Historic Faith and A Changing World (New York; Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 95. But he does acknowledge man is in defection, and the defection is descriptive of what man is.
3*26pittenger, Human Nature, p. 104.
127
Christ is and what he must do to save us from our­selves, 127
The answers given by these thinkers deal not with 
the cause of sin but with its readily describable reality. 
They focus less on the sin of a man, and more on the sin­
fulness of the community of men. Man does not have to sin, 
but he does. Man can be what God intends for him to be, 
but is not. The conclusion of their view of sin for both 
the patristic and the contemporary Antiochenes is that man 
needs Christ.
C, The Person of Christ
If, as has been argued previously, an Antiochene 
approach to Christology requires an understanding of its 
anthropology, then something about the nature of knowledge 
is surely being expressed I It is not inappropriate to in­
quire at this point what this understanding of epistemology 
is for the Modem Antiochenes.
For Pittenger experience is necessary for truth.
"My own philosophy, apart from the religious convictions 
that I hold, is based on the assumption that experience 
rather than abstract theory is the best clue to significant 
truth."3*28 This view contains a decided nineteenth century
3*27\^illiams, "Guilt and Renewal." Williams calls this the "Christological structure of human life," Spirit and Forms, p. 153.
128pittenger, Human Nature, p. 144. See also, Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. XIV ff.
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Liberal r i n g , 3*29 philosophy and dogmatics are both to be 
assigned a minimal role while experience becomes the chief 
avenue to theological truth. To be sure Pittenger makes 
much of "process" philosophy, but its use is secondary not 
primary to the theological t a s k . 3-30 Knowledge of God and 
God's activity is knowledge which must be available to men 
as men, it roust be consonant
, . , with the whole range of life and experi­ence, in every area . . . .  For the Christian gos­pel made sense of, and gave sense to, this vast mass of data, this enormous range of human experi­ence, which constituted the "ordinary knowledge" of man in the world.3-51
Put another way, knowledge of the Reality upon which man is 
d e p e n d e n t 3 * 3 2 must be available to the kinds of experience 
and reflection which produce the knowledge man has of any­
thing. If it is not so available, then its existence is a
3-29lu The Word Incarnate, Pittenger prefers to desig­nate himself as a "Catholic” and a ’*modemist," pp. XIV-XVI, but begins to reveal, pp. 16-17, a willingness to be counted among the "liberals," a position he came later to embrace more firmly. See Pittenger, "Neo-Liberalism— Hope and Chal­lenge," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, Summer, 1963, pp. 361-66. He calls it "neo-liberalism" p. 362, and though he believes there is material at hand today to do a better job of theological reconstruction than the older liberals, still "we shall be in the same general tradition" p . 366.
3*3^ Cf. supra, Chapter II, pp. 106-110.
3-33-pittenger, Proclaiming Christ Today, pp. 55-56. Pittenger cites ProfessoF""s7~ZIexin3eF17îEEr7avor. "What we want is a religious mythology that does not contain flat inconsistencies with our ordinary experience." Word In** camate. p. 35*
3*32see supra. Chapter II, pp. 110-113.
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"moot" point. Whatever else it is it is not the truth men 
k n o w . 3*35 Barth, of course, objected to a primacy of man's 
reason or belief in religious e p i s t e m o l o g y  .3*34 argued
that any allowance for man's participation in the judgment 
of what constitutes knowledge of God would render that 
knowledge human, with all of man's bent toward evil and 
sin, rather than divine. Human knowledge and divine knowl­
edge are mutually exclusive realms for the Barth of Romans. 
Since only God's Word is true, it may then be argued that 
for Barth, in terms of religious truth, man's knowledge is 
in fact "no-knowledge."
What Barth was criticizing was the blurring of dis­
tinctions in nineteenth century Liberalism between the cate­
gories of "objectivity" and "subjectivity." He believed 
the blurring was inevitable as "subjectivity" by definition 
denies "objectivity" any place. At least that is how he 
read liberalism and its epistemology. Pittenger would con­
cur with Reardon's response;
The fact that the Christian thinker has to begin with his own experience--with himself, that is to say, --does not imply that he thereby substitutes his own subjectivity for God, especially when he realizes that the light of his reason--"the candle of the Lord," as Whichcote called it— is itself a divine gift and that therefore, as between reason and revelation, there is no inherent contradiction . . . .  [If the] Word is to reach the men and women of the present age or any other, it must find them where and as they are; it
3-35pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 29-30. 
3"34cf. supra, pp. 65 ff.
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must speak to them in their situation and throughtheir subjectivity.135
Whereas Barth saw only the danger that the "objective"— God's 
Word— would be swallowed up by the "subjective," Pittenger 
asks how we can "distinguish between true and false 'objec­
tivity '*'?3.36 do we know the Word is God's Word or man's
word? Both Barth and Pittenger would agree that only God
can reveal His Word. "[In] . . . all revelatory action it 
is God who is p r i o r . "3-37 gut how is the Word received or 
known? Here they part company. For Barth the Word is re­
ceived only through the "sheer grace" of God. Man can in
no way anticipate it or act upon it. The Word must remain
totally "objective," standing over against all human knowl­
edge, judging all human endeavor. But for Pittenger the 
"objective reality" cannot be known to us unless it is the 
object of our "subjective" experience. It must be experi­
enced in order to be true for man. Consequently, the ques­
tion is not one so much concerned with the "objective" and 
the "subjective," as one concerned with a true or false 
experience of the "objective." Inescapably men interpret 
their experiences. The interpretation is one side of the 
experience, while the object— the event, the activity, the 
disclosure--is the other. To guard against hallucinations
IQCB.M.G. Reardon, "In Defense of Theological Lib­eralism," Anglican Theological Review. 1958, p. 58, brack­ets added.
3*36pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 30.
^37jbid.. p. 23, brackets added.
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and fantasies there are checks of continuity with the experi­
ences of others and congruity with one's own past experiences, 
However, interpretation remains subjective. If such subjec­
tivity, per se, is disallowed as a legitimate part of the 
encounter between man and divine Reality, as for Barth, then 
knowledge is simply not possible to man. Therefore, Pitten­
ger affirms subjectivity as a necessary part of the objective 
e x p e r i e n c e .3-38 "[Reality] . . . acquires its meaning when it 
is known to someone as 'object* of his 'subjective' experi­
ence ."3*39
In terras of revelation Pittenger's epistemological 
approach involves two aspects ; that which is given of God 
and that which is apprehended by man. God's act and man's 
response are both essential to revelation. Revelation is 
" . . .  the response of men in faith to what they believe 
to be God's action towards them."3.40 man's response a 
free response, is it a moral response? Does the weight 
fall equally on both sides of the meaning of revelation?
If the scales are tipped too far toward the God-ward side 
a Barthian understanding results in which man's response as 
a free response is rendered meaningless. Tipped too far 
man-ward, the grossest form of humanism results in which 
God is created in the image of man. Pittenger hedges
p p .  29-33.
Ibid.. p. 30, brackets added.
140ibid.. p. 20.
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somewhat here. Men respond in faith, but faith
. . .  is not something which men create within themselves . . . .  [It] is something that happens in men when they meet God, confronting him in his revelation of himself. Then they are grasped by him, impelled to respond to him, brought to commit them­selves . . . .141
The stress on men's faith as a gift from God enjoys 
an honorable place in the history of Christian thought. But 
is it appropriate to the methodology that Pittenger is fol­
lowing? To what extent is God responsible for initiating 
men's response? If it is such that men are "impelled to 
respond to him," then man is not a free being. What Pitten­
ger intends to argue, and later does, is that both freedom 
to choose and a desire toward God are basic to man's nature, 
a nature given of God, not created by man himself. "[What] 
. . .  is the basic nature of man? Is it not his God-movement, 
his drive to respond in moral and spiritual ways to the pres­
sure of God upon him?"3-42 Mail's freedom is exercised as
Ibid., p. 44, brackets added. Elsewhere Pitten- get cites approvingly William Temple's definition of revela­tion as " . . . the coincidence of divinely guided event and divinely guided response." Pittenger, Reconceptions in Chris» tian Thinking 1817-1967 (New York; Seabury Press, 1968), p. 56.
3‘42pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 197, brackets added. In a later work, utilizing "process thought" far more exten­sively, Pittenger argues that God acts with "persuasive not coercive power"; and that even God cannot "act without regard for the created occasions." pp. 47 and 71 in Process-Thought and Christian Faith (New York; Macmillan Co., 1968). Wil­liams argues, " . 7 . if God is love, then the means he uses to communicate with man will leave man free, as he seeks to persuade, not to coerce the human spirit." The Spirit and Forms of Love, p. 164. See also Pittenger, Christology Re­considered. pp. 136-139. Raven calls it, "His reverence for personality," Jesus and the Gospel of Love, p. 271.
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well in choices to fulfill his potential as to "miss his 
a i m . "3*43 To respond to God's act is an exercise of man's 
freedom. To choose to exercise the "toward Thee" dimension of 
his nature, his "God-movement" inclination, seems to describe 
what Pittenger means when he uses the term "faith." It occa­
sions the response, not the object of God's action toward men.
Pittenger sets his direction to Christology through 
the terrain of human experience. Only in this terrain can 
man and God meet. It is not an inevitable meeting, but for 
Pittenger neither the meeting, nor knowledge, nor revelation, 
nor faith, nor the Christ can be found on other grounds than 
this. To know Jesus requires the mutual, if not intermin­
gled "relationship of objective fact and subjective appre­
hension. "3*44
Pittenger begins his Christological reconstruction 
proper by reaffirming the creedal positions that Jesus is 
fully human, fully divine, One Person, To this he adds that 
Jesus is also historical, i.e., He is related to the ongoing 
disclosures and actions of G o d . 3*43 pittenger's aim is to 
"try to take account of the double truth of our Lord's human 
and historical existence and of the divine action which took 
place and still takes place in and through that human his­
torical e x i s t e n c e  ."3-45 this meant to equate the Person
3’43pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, p. 57. 
3*44pittenger. Human Nature, p. 110. 
3*45pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 11-14.
3-46Ibid.. p. 11.
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of Christ— His historical existence— with His humanity, and 
the activity of Christ— His work— with His divinity? If 
this is the case then the concern for the historical Jesus 
would be considerably weakened, as it is for Bultmann, No 
such simple distinction holds for Pittenger. He wishes to 
affirm a genuine humanity and a real work. "The basic ele­
ment, historically speaking, in the total story of Jesus 
Christ is the reality of a life lived, an impact made, a 
death conquered, a renewed presence made known . . . ,"3.47 
What is important is not the particular details of Christ's 
life, but that we can affirm something like the total pic- 
ture we have of Christ did in fact occur. In Christology 
for Pittenger as for Raven, " . . .  our starting point is 
His life upon earth."^49
How do we know what this life is? The data for
1 SOchristology is provided by three interdependent facts.
The first element is the witness to Christ of the community 
which bears His name. In one sense this is an historical 
element in that it preserves the reality of the life that 
was lived. The second element is to be found in the response 
of the community to the "impression" or "impact" Christ has 
had upon it. And the third element is composed of the Bib­
lical picture, that which Raven calls " . . .  a portrait.
147ibid.. p. 52. 148lbid.. p. 51.
3-49Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love, p . 286. 
3-50pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 55-65.
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not a p h o t o g r a p h . "3-51 Two subsequent developments of the 
data to which he appeals in later writings throw some light 
on what is already at work in Pittenger's thought at this 
point «
First, and somewhat tangential to it, as Pittenger 
more and more self-consciously appeals to "process" thought 
as a suitable system for his Christological apologetics, 
he utilizes more extensively three "related" fields ; exis­
tentialism, the new interpretation of history— vis-a-vis 
R. G. Collingwood--which holds history to be societal in 
nature, and depth p s y c h o l o g y .3-52 gy changing the order to 
history, existentialism, and depth psychology, and then 
paralleling them to the three elements of the data for 
Christology, Pittenger's commitment to the Antiochene pre­
suppositions becomes more obvious. These are ; the valid­
ity of God's revelatory act in Christ, the necessity of 
man's response in faith, and the genuine humanity of Christ. 
In paralleling, for example, depth psychology with the "por­
trait" of Christ rather than returning to the fruitless 
quests for the historical Jesus prevalent in the nineteenth 
century, Pittenger is led to stress more firmly the human 
meaning of love as the clue to Christ's Person and work. It 
is a clue which Williams uses more fully, but which Pittenger
1 Cl Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love, p. 284.
3-52pittenger, Process-Thought and Christian Faith, pp. 84 ff.
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wishes to u s e . 3*33
Second, in Christology Reconsidered Pittenger chooses 
to restate the three elements in a manner somewhat different 
in terms but not in intention.
First, there is the firm conviction that in some fashion we meet God in the event of Jesus Christ,Second, there is the equally firm conviction that God is thus met in a genuine, historically conditioned, and entirely human being. Third, there is the assur­ance that God, met in that man, and the man in whom God is met, are in relationship one with the other, in a manner or mode which is neither accidental nor inci­dental but the most complete interpenetration— and this means that the relationship of the union, as the ancient formulations call it, must be conceived after the anal­ogy of personal union rather than after some model which suggests a less secure and abiding togetherness of God and m a n . 154
Now if a direct parallel is drawn from these three points to 
the three elements in The Word Incarnate, what is the result? 
If the original first element of historicity broadly intends 
the same interpretation as the more recently offered first 
element of the reality of God in the event of Jesus Christ, 
then the implication must surely be that God to be known at 
all by men must act in history. That implication is con­
sistent with Pittenger's epistemological presuppositions.155 
But if that is the intention of the original first element, 
then a translation is required. Originally the stress was 
clearly on the continuum of history, the continuity of his­
toric events, which insures the reality of the events and
3'33(]f, supra, Chapter II, p. 118. 
3-34pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, p. 7. 
135cf, supra. Chapter II, pp. 127-130.
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the persons involved, particularly the Christ remembered by 
the C h u r c h . 3-36 The stress of the later interpretation rests 
upon the argument that God works in and is known in the 
world, preeminently in and through the event of Jesus Christ, 
that there is no contradiction in the affirmation that God 
was in a m a n . 3-57 Undoubtedly Pittenger in the earlier work 
was upholding the appropriateness of the human situation and 
the human possibility for the activity of God, in contradis­
tinction to Barth who insisted that God nowhere is to be 
found in human affairs. Even Christ in Barth's view is a 
"bolt from the blue." In the wake of the subsidence of the 
neo-orthodox storm, it is perhaps understandable that Pit­
tenger should underscore more self-consciously the activity 
of God in the event of Jesus Christ, At any rate when he 
affirms that God was in Christ, he affirms what the ancients 
intended to convey by speaking of Christ as fully divine.
Similar translations can be applied to the original 
and revised second and third elements. To say that the com­
munity responded to a real man, one who lived in their midst,
ICQwho was the embodiment of his own message, is to insist 
equally upon the primacy of Christ's humanity for God's 
activity.3*39 defining the Biblical picture as a
3‘36pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp, 56-59. 
3-37pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, pp. 7-9. 
3-3^ Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 59-63.
1 CQ■'^Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, pp. 9-11.
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"portrait” due weight is being given to the total Biblical
view of Christ which announces both His reality as man and
as the One in Whom men b e l i e v e S u c h  a view indicates
that the relationship of man and God encountered in Jesus
161Christ is a unified relationship, all of one piece, so
that "in the total being and action of Jesus Christ, both
God and man are simultaneously and continually present and
at work."^^^ But to speak of the relationship of union in
the analogy of personal union is to risk being Antiochene1^0in the Nestorian sense.
If one proposes to argue, as Pittenger does, that 
knowledge of God, or of God's activities, is confined to 
what men can know through their own experiences, and if 
Jesus is in any sense part of God's activity, then Jesus 
must be available to human experience in such a way as to 
respect that experience. Further, that experience must of 
necessity be free experience; i.e., it must be such as to 
maintain man's freedom of choice in the midst of the con­
frontation; "Who do you say that I am?" "It is precisely 
in and under the conditions of manhood that his deity has 
been discovered and w o r s h i p p e d . "^64 xhis is the accent the
^Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 63-65.
^Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, pp. 11-14; see also p. 135.
p. 13, 163lbid.. p. 12.
^®^Plttenger, Word Incarnate, p. 129. It Is curious to note that apparently nowhere does Pittenger appeal to the Old Testament idea of "theophany" in support of his argument. To be sure there is peril in this approach insofar as a
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Antiochene8 and Pittenger wish to stress.
Whatever else He is, Christ is a man. His is a 
"full and real h u m a n i t y I t  is in His manhood that the 
divine activity is expressed and apprehended.
The heart of the Christian faith, we are often told, is the doctrine of the Incarnation. This, it seems to me, is not strictly true. The heart of the Christian faith is the living awareness of the real­ity of God's presence, activity and love, as appre­hended through Jesus Christ . . . .  From that real­ity, theologians have quite properly arrived at the doctrine of the Incarnation as an explanation--to my mind, the only adequate explanation--of Christ, His work and His person.1&6
It is the apprehension in.Christ of what men believe to be
"theophany" is not itself the "reality" expressed. But it does say for the ancient Hebrews that whatever knowledge of Yahweh they possessed resulted from their human experi­ence and was limited to it, F. G. Downing also points out that the earliest Christian writers "do not pretend to an awareness of *God* which their lives and experience cannot substantiate." Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation? (London: STC.M. Press, 196'4)', p . 283, italics added. Pit­tenger provides a hint of the possibility of using theophany as an explanation of Christology in his discussion of the nearness of God to man. Cf. Word Incarnate, pp. 176-178.For the place where this touches Theodore * s thought see supra, Chapter II, pp. 100 ff. Mircea Eliade points to the Incarnation as the supreme hierophany: the manifestationof the sacred in ordinary objects, in this case, in Jesus Christ. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. by Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper, T96Ï), pp. 11 ff. J.N. Sanders warns against approaching New Testament studies through the error made by the Alexandrian Fathers "who started from the premise that Christ is divine, and went on to ask how then he could be human. We on the other hand would be inclined to start from Christ's humanity, and go on to ask how he could be divine," "The Meaning and Author­ity of the New Testament," Soundings (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1964), p ."T3'9 ,
p. 237.
Pittenger, a speech in response, p. 403, The Modem Churchman. Vol. XXVI, 1936-1937, pp. 402-405.
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the reality of God's "presence, activity and love" which 
makes men speak of His divinity. But to speak glibly of two 
distinct entities of the human and the divine is to suggest 
a mutual exclusiveness inconsonant with Pittenger's anthro­
pology. Man possesses an unfilled potential, a God-aim, 
which in spite of sin remains in man as a possibility for 
fulfillment, "The reality of God . . .  is apprehended in 
faith through the very conditions of the creaturely 
Man is capable of fulfillment. The "creaturely" is not 
over against God, as for Barth. Pittenger advances a step 
beyond potentiality;
It is also a matter of partial realization; it involves God's making actual the purpose for which he has made man, the expression of the ground which is the hidden but continual base upon which man's existence depends. In some men more, in some men less, this realization or making actual is to be seen.168
But if there is a partial realization of the potential in 
some men, then what does Pittenger mean when he defines 
original sin as " . . . the straightforward fact that our 
situation and state is conditioned by the 'solidarity of 
the race' in accumulated wrong-doing and wrong-thinking and 
hence 'wrong-being' In "wrong-being" is he suggesting 
an ontological understanding of what sin does to man? If
167pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 185,
l^^Ibid., p. 181. The Antiochenes' method of using a personal analogy to speak of God's indwelling in Christ as in prophets and saints is apparent here in Pittenger*s thought,
169Ibid.. p. 213.
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so, then, the partial realization is ruled out* It can be 
read this way, but surely he intends to convey an existen­
tial understanding, in which man's wrong-doing and wrong- 
thinking result in a loss of actualizing his potential ful­
fillment but not a loss of the possibility itself. The 
possibility is ever capable of being " . . .  [empowered] 
by the grace of God . . .
It is this possibility, this human possibility, 
which provides the basis for the Incarnation.
. . . the fulfillment of human life demands that the Self-Expression of God in and toward man­kind be focused, concentrated, intensified, deci­sively manifest, in One of our own kind. Only so can that Self-Expression really touch us and make us what we are meant to be. 1*71
This statement is consistent with the views of Theodore
of Mopsuestia, but a difference in stress causes Pittenger
to present an argument which, while not inappropriate to
the Antiochenes' thought, would not have been put forth
by Theodore himself. Theodore was concerned to emphasize
the possibility of God's indwelling in a man, the tran-
172scendent in the immanent. At the same time he wished 
to underscore man's full moral responsibility. Pittenger 
is no less committed to the latter point, but where 
Theodore stresses what is possible to God, Pittenger
Ibid., p. 210, brackets added. For Pittenger's Christologicalargument potentiality and degree are re­lated; cf. infra. Chapter II, pp. 144.
171Pittenger, Human Nature* p. 117.
^72q£^ supra* Chapter II, pp. 96 ff.
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more self-consciously throws the weight of his argument to 
the side of what is possible to man. To be sure what dis­
tinguishes them from one another is to be found in accent 
rather than difference. For Theodore the heart of his Chris- 
tology lies in what he conceives that God can do, namely be 
Incarnated, though this involves anthropologically a manhood 
in whom God can "indwell." But for Pittenger, the key to 
his Christological view is to be found anthropologically in 
what man qua man can become in the realized potential, 
namely the Incarnate One, 1-73 though this involves the view 
of God expressing Himself as Origin held.^^^ In Pittenger*s 
view Christ must be one of "our own kind."
Recognizing that the term "person" today is under­
stood quite differently from the understanding available to 
the Fathers of the Patristic period, Pittenger defines "per­
son" as "the psychological centre of subjective experience," 
the "self," the "ego."^^^ "There is no human nature which
is not individuated, so that it constitutes a true human
176self, a real personality," If Jesus is human He must at
least be this kind of person. His humanity must be our
173"j-Christ] is not the denial of what we really are; he is the fulfillment of it." Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 128, brackets added,
^^^Norris, Early Christian Thought, p. 128. See also H. Rashdall, "Christ as Logos and Son of God," Modem Churchmen's Conference 1921, p. 285,
175pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 112-114,
p. 115.
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humanity, " . . .  the 'person* of Jesus Christ as an histor­
ical figure, in his manhood, must necessarily be h u m a n ."^77 
Whatever else the Incarnation means, it cannot for Pittenger 
lend itself to an Appollinarian interpretation in which the 
human center is replaced by the divine Word. Rather the 
humanity is the ground for the Incarnation.
Arguing from the view of a humanity-divinity typol­
ogy, Pittenger claims the priority of humanity over divinity 
in man's acceptance of the Incarnate One. "It is precisely 
in and under the conditions of manhood that his deity has
been discovered and w o r s h i p p e d . "^78 This is consistent with
1 7QPittenger*s epistemological understanding. It is in terms 
of man's subjective experience that Jesus is known. It is 
through faith He is affirmed as One Who is divine, even 
though the Initiator of the event is God, The divinity 
which is ascribed to Jesus is ascribed by faith. "His 
divinity is to be discovered, as God and his operations must 
always be discovered, through the eyes of faith, which dis­
cerns the hidden reality of the divinity 'in, through, and 
under* the manifest reality of human historical existence.
The faith in His divinity, to which the community witnesses, 
rests upon an actual historical Being, One Who lived. Who
^^^Ibid.. p. 114, italics added, 
p. 129.
17Q^ ^ C f . supra. Chapter II, pp. 128-130, 136 ff. 
180Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 117.
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was known to, and acted amid, His fellow men. It was their 
experience of Him which resulted in their proclamation of 
His divinity.
If Christ's humanity is like ours, if in fact it 
must be our humanity, does it imply the same humanity?
Does nothing distinguish it from our humanity? Is there no 
uniqueness to the Person of Christ? For Pittenger there is 
a uniqueness to Christ, but it is not an absolute unique­
ness for " . . .  the absolutely unique is absolutely im- 
knowable,"^^^ rather it is a matter of "degree." That 
which distinguishes Christ from other men is a matter of 
degree not kind. Though Pittenger accepts the choice of 
"degree" as against "kind," he prefers to affirm that in 
Christ there is an "'intensity' of the divine operation" 
not realized in other men. The potential is there for 
any man, but the realization is there in only one man,
Jesus Christ.
It could be argued that in Pittenger's view there 
could be more than one C h r i s t . T h i s  possibility is to 
be found on the one hand through Pittenger's anthropological
IbW., p. 15 and p. 239. See also, Pittenger, Significanceof Christology, p. 27. Pittenger criticizes Brunner's insistence upon an absolutely, utterly, unique Christ, Word Incarnate, pp. 137-138.
182pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 189.
183Pittenger cites with favor a statement by William Scott Palmer. "If a man never opposed God, if he were always permeable to the divine influx, he would be God's son, wholly his, as a man amongst men." Ibid., pp. 204 ff. See also, Pittenger, Human Nature, p. 3D1
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position which reserves to every man the potential for being 
actualized in terms of the fulfillment God intends for man. 
While in Christ it is actualized, in all other men thus far 
it is only a potential. On the other hand the possibility 
of more than one Christ is also to be found in Pittenger*s 
affirmation that Christ differs from other men in terms of 
degree, not kind. Differences in degrees can be overcome, 
and another man could be as Christ.
However, Pittenger seems to see his choice as one of 
opting either for a difference in degree within the Deity, 
between the Father and the Son, or for a difference in de­
gree within the humanity, the Incarnation, between the Son 
and other men. Clearly he repudiates the former choice. 
" . . .  there are no 'degrees* of D e i t y . T h e  Antio- 
chenes spoke of God's "indwelling" in Christ as in the 
prophets. It is that direction Pittenger takes, though the 
Antiochene8 themselves would not consciously have followed
him to assert that the difference between Christ and other
18Smen is a matter of degree.
1 A4Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 240.
185^heodore himself says, "It is not possible thatthe one who grants benefits which are unchangeable and im­perishable should not Himself be eternal and imperishable in His nature, and such a one is indeed Divine nature which is eternal." Mingana, Theodore and Nicene Creed, p. 107." . . , we . . . think only of one Son, who did not become. . . a Son through the process of transformation . , . butHe is truly alone Son of a Father who is eternal, and He is eternally from Him and with Him . , . . " Ibid., p. 99. Raven argues Theodore viewed the Incarnation as a matter of difference in degree rather than kind, but that Theodore so stressed the gulf of the actual difference between Christ,
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If what Christ actualizes is precisely what is 
potentially in any man, then a matter of degree is all that 
separates any man from Christ, At the same time Pittenger 
is quite clear about a separation between God and man. 
Though he feels that the Fathers, and Barth later, made 
the gulf too wide, he recognizes the existence of the gulf;
. God and man are not identical. Yet God does pene­
trate history and indwell the life of man at every point
• • • God and man are closely related.
There is a tension in Pittenger*s thought at this
point that he never fully resolves. On the one hand if God 
is to be known at all, the knowledge of Him must be present 
to man's experience, and this requirement includes the In­
carnation.
We are to find Godhead, not apart from or along­side the human, but in, through, and under the condi­tions of humanity Itself, And that which is true of the particular Incarnation with which we are concerned.
as the sinless and powerful Saviour, and other men that only ;in Him does God dwell. However, Raven also suggests that iTheodore did not formulate this position very well. See |Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love, pp. 341-342, i
186pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 176, italics added.Though Tillich de fend s^Liberai Christology from Arianism, |he faults it for not picturing Jesus as One Who has con- jquered existential estrangement. Yet he recognizes the |need for a Christology which genuinely related God and man. i" . . .  salvation can be derived only from him who fully |participated in man's existential predicament, not from a iGod walking on earth, 'unequal to us in all respects,*" !Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Chicago: The Uni- ;versity or Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 146-147. Both Lawton,Conflict in Christology, p. 91, and Quick, Doctrines of the |Creed, pp. 140-141, argue that Liberalism paid little atten­tion to soteriology. j
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is true also in an analogous manner of all of God's work in his world.187
On the other hand, Pittenger wishes to assert the uniqueness 
of Christ, that in Christ there is the "emergence of genuine 
n o v e l t y ."^G8 The uniqueness must be there for Pittenger to 
justify the worship of Christ. He endeavors to hold the two 
moments of thought together in his latest Christological 
work, accepting each as valid elements in our experience.
" . . .  Christian faith finds itself obliged to say both
that the event of Christ is a human and historical event and 
that this same event is a point in which God is acting in a 
manner unparalleled elsewhere."^89 it is "unparalleled 
elsewhere," then can Pittenger continue to uphold a Christo- 
logical view which proposes that only a "difference in de­
gree" exists between Christ and other men? Has he in fact 
moved to a position which accepts a "difference in kind"?
Pittenger holds that no contradiction is involved.
There is always union between God and man, of somesort and in some way; in Jesus Christ, there is the union, towards which all others point and from which they are seen in all their rich potentiality yet in all their tragic failure . . . .  The difference in degree between our Lord's actualization of union be­tween God and man, and our own pitiful approximations, is a difference so great that it leads us to adore him, to find in him both our Lord and Saviour, and also our Master and Pattern, and hence one whom we can love as Brother and worship as Lord.190
It is clear he is claiming that the actualization which
occurs in Christ is potentially present in every man, but
^^^Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 185. ^^^Ibid., p.192
189pittenger, Christology Reconsidered, p. 151.
190Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 241.
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that the actualization has actually occurred in no man other 
than Christ. If this were all there were to it, the claim 
for a difference in degree might be upheld. But Pittenger 
in his faith wishes the actualization in Christ to be such 
that Christ is worthy of man's worship. In the presentation 
of Christ as worshipped Lord has Pittenger not crossed the 
boundary to a difference in kind? Pittenger would reject a 
difference in kind between Christ and other men. His anthro­
pology requires the "degree" definition, but has the demand 
of his faith in fact opened the door to the suspicion that 
he is talking about a difference in kind ? ^
^  The concern for a difference in "degree" or "kind" has occupied a prominent place in twentieth century theology. M. F. Wiles contends a "degree Christology" position, such as Pittenger's, cannot be held to be Antio­chene. Supra, Chapter II, footnote 66, p. 104. P. T. For­syth upholds a difference in kind position. "Christ is more precious to us by what distinguishes Him from us than by what identifies Him with us." The Person and Place of Jesus Christ (London: Independent Press, 1509), p. 103. H. M.Relton argues for a difference in kind, pp. 220-267, A Study in Christology. Both Patterson and Greer argue tEat Theodore of Mopsuestia would not have held to a differencein degree. " . . .  he declares that the mode is the same,but the degree is different [in God's indwelling in the man Jesus as against His indwelling in righteous men]." Patter­son, Theodore of Mopsuestia, p. 38, brackets added. Greer contends Theodore’s view is that Christ is not the best of us, but the foundation or the first, that we do not possessHis worthiness, and in this Jesus is unique and first, R. A.Greer, Theodore, pp. 70-71, L. A. Reid, The Rediscovery of Belief (London: The Lindsey Press, 1946), believes that a difference in degree is a "ridiculously crude" way to put it when comparing human beings. " . . .  personality is not quantitative but qualitative, and each person is unique . . . . Jesus is, in a profound sense [the sense of being filled with the holy spirit of God while others possess it a little and sometimes], utterly different from anyone else," p. 177, brackets added.In a later work Reid seems to have changed his posi­tion somewhat. "Perhaps divinity was in Jesus more fully
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than in any other man. The post-Christian or the non-Chris­tian does not infallibly know this, and the orthodox Chris­tian can only affirm that Jesus was divine and sinless with the support of his special theology. But for the post- Christian- -if it is ever true to say that divinity is at work in men at all--divinity is at work not only in Jesus Christ, but here and now. And the experience— or if you prefer, sense— of it here and now can be far more direct than the sense of it in Jesus incarnate, of whom we have records and who is separated from us in space, time, and a complex maze of concepts and images," L. A. Reid, "Jesus* Significance Today— One Philosopher's View," Christ For Us Today, ed. by W. N. Pittenger, pp. 130-131,G. E, Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love, rejects the entweder-oder of Christology which makes the choice " . 1 . either the divine Saviour whose manhood is a mere incognito, . . .  or else the human Teacher." p. 434, In words similar to those of the Antiochenes Raven proposes:"In mankind at its highest there is an emergence of the divine : all our talk about inspiration or prayer involvesa belief that in us at such moments there is a real mani­festation, a real indwelling of God; and a study of person­ality reveals that in its purest form it transcends individ­uality and is rapt into union with the universal . . . . [When] St. Paul can say 'Christ lives in men,* he surely means more than that he receives and responds to an influ­ence acting upon him from without." p. 435, brackets added,W. H, Moberly seems to indicate a difference in kind. " . . .  [In] the process from sin to holiness, there is a change of character so complete that the difference between the two stages may seem greater than the identity, and this leads to paradoxical expressions . , , Jesus was not merely one among men, separate from all others. He was ’ not only a man but Man." "The Atonement," Foundations, ed. by B. H, Streeter (London: Macmillan, l9l2), p. 327,brackets added. Such paradoxical expressions are given by H. R, Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, who speaks of Jesus in relation to others, not " . . . simply as different from others in degree; the difference is one of type." p. 404. Yet he goes on to speak in quite Antiochene terms, " . . .  Divine immanence is essentially a matter ofdegree, and that the degrees of it are morally conditioned." p . 432. He speaks of Christ's person as the "absolute im­manence," but in the moral life of man "Christ is last and highest," p. 432. J . Baillie, The Place of Jesus Christ, argues for a uniqueness in Christ which will not allow "any kind of quantitative computation of measure or degree," pp. 118-122, But like Mackintosh, Baillie later adds, "God's nature and man's nature, we believe, are not different in kind, because in kind they are both spiritual nature, both ethical nature." p. 135. See also pp. 206-211. W. R. Inge, "The Person of Christ," Contentio Verltatis. ed. by H. Rash­dall (London; J. Murray, 1916), p p . 59-104, suggests that
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The problem encountered in Pittenger*s thought, the 
unresolved tension, is due in part to his determination to 
remain within the humanity-divinity typological perspective 
of the early Fathers. In spite of acknowledging the inade­
quacies of their understanding of the component parts, he 
seems unable to move much beyond their presuppositions.
Hence, the confusion of "degree or kind" is evident in his 
thought.
D. D. Williams sees more clearly than Pittenger the 
difficulty of arguing the humanity-divinity typological view 
of the Fathers. He argues that the metaphysical definitions 
given the two natures by the Greeks are open to question.
The problem of the suffering of God in Christ which dominated 
the Fathers* thinking about Christology, preceded from these 
d e f i n i t i o n s I n s t e a d  of continuing the debate, Williams 
proposes that a different approach to Christology be taken.
Suppose we reverse the Greek assumption and hold that God's capacity to involve himself in the suffer­ing of his creatures and of his incarnate Son is the supreme manifestation of his divinity. His suffering is the exhibition of his perfection, which is not that
J-»-~Mu-r-ray-y— 19i6“)y“'“pP'*“~59'^ J.-04,-sugges-t'S--tha-t while the Cath­olic Church was probably right in rejecting Monophysitism, nevertheless the latter revealed a truth, not to be lost, that " . . .  the difference between the Divine and human natures, immense as it is, is not absolute. Man is a par­taker of the Divine nature, and, as a member of Christ, is capable of reigning with Him in His glory." See pp. 76-77. Pittenger expressed a preference for the concept of "inten­sity of the divine operation" rather than degree. Supra, Chapter II, p. 144. The idea of "intensity" would seem closer to an Antiochene understanding than degree.
1Q2D . D. Williams, Spirit and Forms of Love. pp.158-160.
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of impossible being but love which cannot be impos­sible . . .  • What would happen to traditional doc­trines if the love of God were made the criterion for our understanding who Jesus is and what he hasdone?193
His criticism and his proposal are not dissimilar to those 
of Bushnell.^^^ Like Bushnell, he argues against the attempt 
to reconstruct the inner life of C h r i s t . R a t h e r  Christ 
is to be understood in terms of man's situation. That 
situation is one of sin, sin which thwarts the purpose of 
God's good creation. Christ is God's response in love to 
this situation. "The love which God expresses in Jesus is 
love taking the form required by the situation it meets.
God takes the initiative. The Incarnation is an act of 
God's prevenient grace attempting to raise His people from 
their situation of sin. Christ as the Incarnated One is not 
a union of the divine and the human, but " . . .  a communion 
in which the deity of God and the humanity of Jesus are 
joined in the freedom of l o v e F o r  Williams as for the 
Antiochenes,
Without freedom Jesus would not be man. His freedom is not a contradiction to the power of God but the condition of that humanity which God seeks in love. To love is to accept the freedom of the other with all its consequences, even for God.T98
^^^Ibid.. pp. 160, 155. See also pp. 127-128. 
^^^Cf. supra. Chapter I, pp. 21 ff.IQ QWilliams, Spirit and Forms of Love, p. 158. 
p. 161. ^^^Xbid.. p. 162.
^^ ®Ibid.
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Williams defines sin as the "rupture of communion 
between God and man." In Jesus this communion is unbroken. 
This is what Williams takes the New Testament picture of 
Jesus* sinlessness to mean. The sinlessness of Jesus is not 
a matter of "empirical historical description," but of the 
life he lived in unbroken communion with God.^^^ If sin is 
a matter of the communion between God and man, then the re­
lationship rather than specific actions becomes the more 
important. It has been the attempt to. read humanity in the 
latter category which has made it more difficult to accept 
Jesus * humanity and has led to a misunderstanding of the 
impassibility of the love of God.^^^ Since love cannot be 
impassible, then to propose the incarnation as the expres­
sion that God's love takes to restore communion between Him­
self and man is to by-pass the problem of impassibility.
Jesus is God's involvement in the world which exists 
in broken communion. It is this broken communion, this con^ 
text of sin, which evokes God's response in Jesus,
This does not mean that God's love for man is con­tingent upon what man does but the form which love takes is contingent upon man's need. God enters into and takes into himself the situation created by the sin of man. As Jesus suffers in his love with and for sinners, he discloses the suffering love of G o d . 201
For Williams God's deity is disclosed in the suffering of
Jesus, the very point at which the ancients could see only
His humanity. The suffering occurs because God has responded
p. 165. ^QQlbid.. p. 163.
^0^-Ibid.. p. 166.
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to the human predicament by involving Himself in Jesus in the
202suffering of the world for the sake of love.
The danger in this view is the humanization of God. 
Williams attempts to guard against this danger in a Barthian 
way. "God is hidden in his self-manifestation."^03 He is 
both revealed and hidden in Jesus Christ. Williams admits 
that God does not die, neither does He hunger, but in man's 
suffering God suffers. The Fathers tended to separate Jesus' 
divinity from His humanity, assigning categories to each, in 
specific response to the problem of the impassibility of 
God. What Williams has done is to reassign the categories 
to allow for God's real involvement in the suffering of man. 
At the same time he maintains the cleavage between the 
divinity and humanity in Jesus as did the Fathers. The 
problem of God's impassibility is resolved in respect to 
love and the broken communion, but in respect to all other 
human activities and experiences it seems to remain.
What Williams is after is a real work for Christ to 
do. There is real suffering in the world. The world ex­
presses the reality of the broken community between God and 
man. Jesus is God's address to that situation. It is an 
address not of revelation but of work, a redemptive work.
For Pittenger and for Williams the incarnation and the atone­
ment are a unity. But it is a unity which, as P. T. Forsyth 
saw, proceeded; " . , .‘ first redemption then incarnation--
^Q^Ibld.. p. 167. 203jg^_^ p. 167.
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that is the order of experience, ”204 * Q^iarles Raven concurs,
If we are defending the divinity of Christ [today], we shall . . .  be concerned rather with experience than with abstractions; first, with what He has done and does and only then with what He is. We shall in fact be concerned rather with Atonement than with Incarna­tion; for it is only as we perceive the scale and sig­nificance of His atoning work that we shall be in a position to appreciate His divine nature.205
Pittenger, himself, while suspecting they were too 
Christocentrie, nevertheless agrees with Barth and Bethune- 
Baker
. . .  in their insistence that any Christian the­ology, even though it necessarily and naturally may begin with some treatment of the God who in Christ has so supremely declared himself, must find in the Chris- tological question the key to the whole theological structure. For otherwise, the theology would not be built upon the distinctively and specifically Chris­tian datyn, which surely is nothing other than Jesus Christ himself, in the full reality of his person and work . . . .  In this sense, soteriology is the essential pre-condition for any discussion of Chris­tology. 206
For Williams the Atonement "is the central action in the 
incarnation."207
D. The Work of Christ
Pittenger approves Melanethon*s aphorism that
^^^P, T. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p. 10.
203C, Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology. Vol. II; "Experience and Interpretation" (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1953, p. 90, brackets added.
^^^Pittenger, "The Significance of the Christologi­cal Question," The Modem Churchman, New Series Vol. 2-3. 1958-60, pp. 18:1?:
207Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, p.173. ----- --------------- ------------
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knowledge of Christ, and of God, lies in His benefits rather
20ftthan His nature. In the use of such terms for Christ as 
the "Self-expressed activity" of God, he is underscoring 
this orientation. But it is an orientation which holds to 
the unity of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Raven finds 
this unity expressed in the Fourth Gospel.
So long as life in Christ was a matter of daily experience there was no possibility of distinguishing between the Incarnation and the Atonement, between what Christ was and what He did . . . the Cross was only a phase in His ministry of Salvation.209
However, Pittenger is concerned with much more than merely
the unity.
. . . since man has in fact sinned, the Christ- event is not simply the crowning of the divine-human relationship Intended "from the creation of the world"; but is also, and centrally for us men in our sin, the bringing into our human realm of the grace which is effectual in restoring men to their status as consciously and gratefully responding sons of God, In this way Incarnation and Atonement are a unity, with the Cross literally crucial for men, since through it as the supreme act of obedi­ence unto death of him who is focal in the God-man relationship, the redemption or life-fulfilling of men by God is made a fact for us. It is "placaded," as St. Paul says, for our acceptance and apprehen­sion, a response which is made through the Spirit who says "Amen" in our spirits.210
Several points are to be noted in this passage.
208Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, pp. 143, 189-190; see also Process-Thought and Christian Faith, p. 39.
209Raven, Jesus and The Gospel of Love, p. 351.
ZTOpittenger, "Some Important Contemporary Theologi­cal Issues," The Modem Churchman. New Series, Vol. I, 1957- 58, p. 167. For the way in which Pittenger relates redemp­tion and life-fulfillment see infra, pp. 164 ff. and par­ticularly citation 240, and its footnote.
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First, in denoting the "Christ-event" as "intended 'from the 
creation of the world,"' Pittenger acknowledges his Scotist 
position: that the incarnation would have taken place even
if there were no sin. The incarnation is the "crowning act" 
of creation. It is the fulfillment of the purpose God had 
in creating the world. This is not to say that the "Christ- 
event" is the aim of creation; rather it is the fulfillment 
of God's intended purpose for divine-human relationships. 
"The union of God and man accomplished in Jesus Christ is 
the divinely intended 'goal and centre' for the divine-human 
relationship . . . "211 Christ is not an "afterthought of 
the divine mind" in response to man's sin. However, the 
reality of man's sin does intrude. Therefore, Pittenger is 
compelled to refer to the "primary purpose" of the incarna­
tion as that of the "crowning of creation." To extricate 
man from sin is not held to be a subordinate matter, but 
" . . .  the distinctively 'saving work' of Christ is much 
more the bringing of man to that which God purposed for him 
than the desperate attempt at his extrication from evil 
ways."212
211Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 252; see also p. 4; and Williams, The Spirit and the Forms, p. 161.
910Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 252, Pitten­ger 's lack of a thoroughgoing ‘'process theology" position is observable here. For "process thought" there is no in­herent problem in an "afterthought" as God responds with what is necessary for the situation at the time. Pittenger in his concern for a definition of God which holds Him to be immutable has posited a position inconsistent with "process thought," Since "process thought" contends God changes, then it can be held that Christ's Incarnation, and His Redemptive
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What Pittenger is after through his Scotist view is 
to focus attention on the action and intentionality of God 
Who "always gives Himself in love." The "Christ-event" is 
to be seen primarily as God's act in love, as God's inten­
tion to unite man and Himself, and to manifest this union, 
rather than primarily as God's response to the sin which pre­
vents such a unification. Evil introduces a "second inten­
tion," which is no less real, no less an occasion for the?
work of Christ, but which is "second." The movement of God 
into the world is relative to the capacity of the world to 
respond. What the union means is that unless God is able 
to evoke a response from man, His purpose has not been 
fully accomplished. As Origen said, "God is educating the 
race."^^^ Williams consents in this stress. "Humanity, in 
the Christian view, is prospective, not retrospective. This 
is why Christianity shares our openness to the future with 
the existentialists. Man has yet to become what God is pre­
paring him to be," "We know our humanity not in looking 
back to a lost perfection, but in looking forward towards 
the consummation of the new creation.
Work, is God's response to man's need in his situation. This is not a predestined act, nor a confused "afterthought," but an act of love both to overcome the deleterious effects of sin and to make real the purposes and hope of God. "Proc­ess thought" and a Scotist position proceed from distinctly different premises concerning the nature of God.
213The citations and the substance of this paragraph are taken from notes of a personal interview with W. Norman Pittenger in Cambridge, February 13, 1968.
^^^illiams, Spirit and Forms, pp. 172,170.
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The Antiochene sense of a perfecting of man rather 
than a retum^TS to a lost state is maintained in this view. 
Similarly God's initiative and man's moral freedom to re­
spond are both safeguarded. But does this view entail 
"adoptionism" in the sense that God's action in the "Christ- 
event" is relative to the capacity of the world to respond? 
That is, does God's ability to effect the Incarnation depend 
upon a certain development of mankind? Pittenger seems to 
say that it does. "God is working in the world incarnating 
Himself until He can incarnate Himself in Christ, to the 
point in Christ where Jesus says, 'It is finished,' 'It is 
done.*"216 1$ John Knox's argument that the earliest
phase of Christological thinking, reflected in the earlier 
source materials used by the author of Luke-Acts, was adop- 
tionist. A kenotic and finally a docetic Christology were 
subsequent developments.21? Along these lines Pittenger 
would opt for adoptionism. In a formal sense, which is the 
perjorative one in the tradition of Christian thought, he 
should not wish the term attached to his view. However, he 
does hold that all forms of orthodoxy contain adoptionism of 
some sort, that through all eternity God purposes to bring
215Pittenger uses the term "restoring" in the cita­tion under examination. It is clear he intends it to convey a sense of "lifting" or "educating" in the "e-ducio" meaning of that term, and not a "return."o I £Pittenger, interview cited, February 13, 1968.
217J. Knox, The Humanity and Divinity of Christ (Cam­bridge : Cambridge University Press, 1967), Chapter 1.
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together such a l i f e . 2 T 8  what Pittenger emphatically repud­
iates is any Christological view which raises the suspicion 
of the Incarnation as an "irruption" into the world by God,
He is the unique focus for a universal presence and operation. But that focus is the act of God who nowhere leaves himself without witnesses and everlastingly works with love and compassion for his creatures, precisely because he is so deeply involved in the affairs of the world and so truly shapes it into conformity with the purpose for which he has brought it into existence,219
John H, Hick has criticized the position of Pittenger, 
and other "degree Christology" or "neo-Arian" theologians for 
what he claims is "the theological essence of adoptionism."220
218pittenger, second interview, February 21, 1968. " . . .  it is God's action upon the human life by union and penetration which both has made the response possible and which also has actualized it, as it is God's action by way of divine causation which made the human life a possibility and an actuality. Here we have God who has united human nature to himself, 'by taking the manhood into God'; here we have God-man, and only Man-God in the secondary sense that the true humanity has been so united to the divine nature." Pittenger, Christ and Christian Faith, p. 87.At least at this point in his thinking Pittenger believes "adoptionism" has been circumvented because it comes "down" from God rather than "up" from man. As his thinking pro­gressed, and as he turned more to "process thought" for a philosophical undergirding, he became more concerned to stress the human possibility for God's response in the In­carnation to the human predicament. The more Alexandrian "taking the manhood into God" gave way to the more Antio­chene emphasis upon the "indwelling in a man." "He was a Man fully indwelt by the Word of God." The Word Incarnate, p. 93; for a fuller argument see pp. 82-95. See also pp 12-13, and pp. 165-169. "In Christ God 'entered' into and was united with human life to as full an extent as it is to us conceivable that genuine human life can receive and as­similate God. He is Lord." p. 169.
^^^Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 192.
^^^J. Hick, "Christology at the Cross Roads," Pros- pect for Theology, ed. by F. C. Healy (Digswell Place: J.Nlsbet, 1966), p. 145.
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His argument proceeds from the question he raises concerning 
the uniqueness of Christ in Pittenger*s thought. If Christ 
differs from other men only in degree why has God been In­
carnated but once? Either God did not want to, or God could 
not. Hick rejects the first for Pittenger*s thought, and, 
therefore, assumes the latter applies. He takes this to 
infer that God had to wait until a righteous man arose who 
could be "indwelled." Having equated "degree Christology" 
with adoptionism Hick faults the former by the latter on 
three grounds : adoptionism fails to resolve the problem
of the uniqueness of Christ; scripture proclaims Christ's 
uniqueness ; tradition demands an absoluteness for the ob­
ject of its worship.
Hick's point in raising the question, "Why only 
once?" is well taken. There is a problem in Pittenger*s 
thought which is not fully resolved, as previously indi­
c a t e d .  221 But Hick's argument is itself subject to argu­
ment. He limits the options concerning the "why only once" 
to two: God did not want to; God could not. Christian
tradition has always posited a third option as its faith: 
in the fullness of time Christ was bom. The choice is 
God's, and is held to be a part of His continuing redemptive 
activity. Pittenger has more than adequately argued that 
the initiative for the Incarnation rests with God, while the 
meaning of the Incarnation is found in redemption. It is
^^^See supra. Chapter II, pp. 144-'150.
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work that Christ's divinity is discovered. Hick has put on 
Alexandrian spectacles and concentrated on the personhood 
of the Incarnation, while Pittenger has focused upon the 
work of Christ and the initiative of God. Surely Pittenger 
is closer to tradition than Hick! Yet, though Hick's argu­
ment is doubtful, the point he is after bears careful con­
sideration. Pittenger seems to feel he can speak of the 
uniqueness of Christ insofar as he insists upon the prior­
ity of God's act in Christ. However, in insisting equally 
emphatically that God acts elsewhere in ways similar to 
His acts in Christ, Pittenger tends to weaken severely his 
argument for Christ's uniqueness.
The second point to be noted concerns Pittenger's 
understanding of the reality of sin. His Scotist position 
defines the original intentional ity of God which remains the 
primary focus of Christ's work, but the reality of man's 
sin also defines the nature of Christ's work. Though Wil­
liams does not concur in a Scotist position, he does argue 
that life in communion is the original or primary relation­
ship, and sin is viewed as a turning away from this com­
munion. 222
The final point to be noted is that in Pittenger's 
view Christ's obedience provides the means by which re­
demption is "made a fact" or effective for us men. This 
is distinctly an Antiochene p o s i t i o n , I n  order to have
^^^Williams, Spirit and Forms, pp. 141-143. 
^^^Supra. Chapter II, pp. 88-90, 93-95, 101-102.
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a true humanity Christ has to be free, specifically free to 
refuse to become the man God intended men should become. It 
is in obedience that the potentiality in man is actualized.
. . , man is free . . .  he possesses a capacity for choice, . . .  he determines himself, who he shall be, by the choices which he has made and which he continues to make. It is only when that capacity for choosing is used aright and centered in the things that are good and pure, lovely and of good report-- in God and the things of God--that man is really him­self; hence his highest freedom is to be held a will­ing captive to the excellence which he sees and above all to the Excellence which is God.224
That choice to be a "willing captive" is what marks Christ.
His was the life of perfect obedience.
Redemption from God's side as expressed in Jesus 
Christ, is effected by Christ's life of perfect obedience, 
including the Cross. This obedience establishes the com­
munity God wills to have with men. Christ's obedience, even 
to death, achieves the "at-one-ment" God purposes for all 
men. Thus, Christ's death is not the payment of a penalty, 
but the conclusive act of a life lived in complete community 
with God. Does this say anything about other men? If the 
redemption does not include other men in their plight then 
it can scarcely avoid being merely God's unveiling in the 
Barthian sense. Williams indicates the problem in a slightly 
different way.
The New Testament message deals with human nature, desires and actions. God has made his love known in the way a man lived and died. Without this involve­ment in experience no Christian account of redemption
^^^Pittenger, Word Incarnate, pp. 206-207; see alsosupra, Chapter II, p. 121.
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will be anything but a dream in an unreal w o r l d . ^25 
How is Christ’s redemption effected through perfect obedi­
ence effective for us who are disobedient? For Pittenger 
Christ actualizes what is potentially possible for all men. 
This is the grounding point where Christ and our lives touch. 
But how does His achievement become ours? Pittenger resorts 
to a variety of expressions for this. At one point he talks
about sharing in Christ’s victory to achieve ours, or that
226He might achieve it in us. In another place he speaks of
the wholeness of life ” . . .  which comes through adjustment
to God made known and available in the emergent life of our
L o r d . ”227 At still another point he indicates the situation
to be one where ” . . .  God has brought about the supreme con*
dition in which a right response may be made to him . . .”228
And yet again, man needs ’’commitment” and ’’identification, ”
For by commitment to that One . . .  we are shown man as he is intended to be; and by such commitment true health, wholeness, right integration, genuine fulfillment, is made possible for men as they are identified with Jesus^ loving activity . . . .  We become true men . . . .229
22 SWilliams, Spirit and Forms, p. 177.
226pittenger, The Christian Sacrifice (New York: Oxford University Press7 K 5 Ï ) , p . Ï06 .
^27pittenger, ’’The Significance of the Christological Question,” The Modem Churchman. N.S., Vol. 2-3, 1958-60,p. 20.
2 2 8 Pittenger, ’’Some Important Contemporary Theo­logical Issues,” The M odem Churchman, N.S., Vol. I, 1957- 58, p. 166.
2 2 9 Pittenger, ”A Contemporary Trend in North Ameri­can Theology: Process-Thought and Christian Faith,” Exposi-tory Times, Vol. 76, 1964-65, p. 272,
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The result of this response Is that
. . . the Christian is delivered from the deep sense of estrangement and alienation from the sources of his being; he receives power to live as he was intended to live; he is granted the assurance that however trivial and insignificant his mortal finite existence may be, there are available for him the resources which God has provided for his children; and he is given the privilege of living "in Christ," triumphant over the exegencies of suffering and death.2 3 0
In all this the question still remains as to how 
Christ’s benefits accrue to us sinful men. The effective 
center, or at least the activity which renders the redemp­
tion effective for us, seems to reside in men. "This some­
thing will not ’come alive ’ in us unless we accept it, but 
it is there to be accepted."231 Man has both the potential 
to be what God intended him to become, and the potential 
for restoration, for redemption, for being saved. The 
actualization seems to be brought about by man’s response 
to Christ. Is this merely a new form of the "psychological- 
effect" type of nineteenth century Liberal T h e o l o g y ? 2 3 2  
nineteenth century view laid the weight of the argument upon 
man’s response. Effectively, Pittenger does, too. But the 
former position put the whole weight upon man's response to 
the point where Christ’s life became rather insignificant. 
Pittenger gives due recognition to man’s response, without 
which man would not be free or else God would be coercive,
2 3 0 Pittenger, Word Incarnate, p. 1 9 2 .
231pittenger, The Christian Understanding of HumanNature, p. 108.
^^^Cf., supra, pp. 34 ff.
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but he also upholds the real work that Christ has enacted 
through His perfect obedience. It is not a matter of pro­
viding an example which elicits a response of remorse, or 
an acceptance of God’s forgiveness, or even an attitude of 
penitence. Rather Christ’s work is real work achieved 
throughout His life including its end.
For Pittenger our acceptance of God’s ’’Self-Expres­
sion in a M a n , ’’233 of the obedient Man, of Christ, is the 
work of faith. It is more than an episode of the mind. In­
deed, God is known only by faith, and we confuse the affair 
if we think that the incarnation can give us God’s working 
directly without faith on our part. Faith is ’’ . . . the 
self-giving, the commitment, the surrender, the whole-lived 
trust, which is the meaning of faith." But faith also re­
quires a "historical fact" upon which to work. "We require 
both fact and f a i t h . T h e  fact is there in Jesus Christ, 
The faith is there in man, but not man alone, for faith also 
needs God and His initiation of the gift of faith. Justi­
fication by faith " . . .  is not something that we can do in 
and of ourselves, ’under our own steam,’ so to say. It comes 
to us when we lose ourselves and when we are willing to lose 
ourselves; in fact, it comes to us when we fall in l o v e . "23 5  
We love God because He first loved us I In Pittenger’s view 
to be able to love is a gift, it cannot be created, it
233pittenget, The Christian Understanding of Human Nature, p. 126. ----  ---------
p. 109. 235lbid.\ p. 115.
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happens to us. The question follows, then, what empowers 
this love? If God empowers it, then can it be truly de­
scribed as a man’s free response? For Pittenger God initi­
ates the possibility of the empowerment, but it becomes real 
when man responds as a free choice. However, the question 
remains, what occasions the empowering response?
One possibility for occasioning the response would 
be the confrontation of the fact in Christ to which we re­
spond by faith. The problem here concerns how the fact of 
Christ is presented. It could be argued that Pittenger pre­
sumes the community of believers. This is what he does do.236 
The community conveys the fact of Christ, To this fac(^ we 
can respond and allow the norm which is Jesus Christ to 
become our norm.
If we leam to know him through meditation, through prayer, through communion, through letting our atten­tion focus on him as he is portrayed for us in the Gos­pels, this essential spirit of his humanity can become our freely chosen norm of human life and authentic manhood, and here the clue to what we shall seek to be and to what we shall seek to do. And with that selection, on our part, of the norm which we would make our own, there can come a quickening of our own powers as we set our hearts and direct our thoughts on him and his center of choice . . . until his Spirit comes alive in our spirits and we begin to reflect, in however slight measure, his kind of choosing, his way of attending, his sort of selectivity.237
The italics indicate Pittenger’s insistence upon man’s own
choice in this response, a choice a Christian thinks of as
236g^pya, Chapter II, pp. 136-137, footnote 75,p. 107.
237pittenger, Human Nature, pp. 148-149.
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" . . . nothing but his own e f f o r t . "^38 Yet, equally he in­
sists that the response, or more properly the ability to re­
spond, is a gift, not our own achievement by our own effort, 
even though much effort is required of us. "In this paradox 
of divine grace and free human response is the whole mystery 
of the Christian life.”239 pittenger finally seems content to 
let the case rest at this point. "[Christ] is the Man, and 
by fellowship with him through life en Christo men are re­
stored and brought to their own fulfillment by the gracious
Ibid., pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 .  In relying heavily upon the response in”THe community Pittenger must face the problem of non-Christians. He holds they are not to be condemned for not accepting the Christian faith. Ibid., pp. 1 2 3  ff. Pit­tenger goes further than this, however, and argues God’s activity is more than the Christ event. " . . .  we must maintain, with Baron Von Hugel, that the work of the ’unin- camate God* . . .  is wider than the specific Christian fact . . . "  Christ and the Christian Faith, p. 1 0 1 .  Jesus is the clue, but never the " . . whole of God’s action inhis creation. For Christian faith Jesus defines but does not confine God in his relationship to the created world." Word Incarnate, p. 2 4 9 .  This position allows for God’s redemp- tive activity in the midst of non-Christians. It is the next step G. S. Hendry criticizes. "Whatever is divine in operation in the creation is all God (that is all divine) but yet not all of God (that is, exhausting the fullness of deity) . . . ] " ibid., p. 2 1 7 .  Similarly, " . . .  whatever is divine in Jesus~Christ is all divine but it is not all of divinity." Ibid., p. 2 3 7 .  It is " . , . not all there is that is divine: totus Pens, non totum Dei." Ibid., p. 2 8 6 .Hendry argues this position cannot avoid the inference that God is divisible. George S. Hendry, Review of Pittenger's The Word Incarnate, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 1 3 ,  I960, pp. 1 8 4 - 1 8 7 .  It could be argued in Pittenger*s de­fense that Hendry is criticizing an Antiochene position through an Alexandrian bias, for Pittenger has argued exten­sively the historical necessity of God’s Self-expression in the Incarnate Lord. No historic fact can ever be the totality of God. The errors Pittenger is guarding against are those of pantheism in ontology, and Apo 1 1 inarianism in Ghristology. In this context Hendry’s criticism seems somewhat strained.
239pittenger, Human Nature, p. 150.
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loving action of God in him, and through him in his breth­
ren . "240
Pursuing his intention of taking love seriously as 
the key to the Incarnation, Williams applies the same key 
to the Atonement. He argues that none of the traditional 
doctrines has taken an experiential analysis of love as the 
key for the Atonement. It is this analysis he elects to put 
at the center. "Our clue is that if the Atonement means God 
doing what needs to be done to reconcile the world to him­
self, then the human experiences which may reflect this work
Pittenger, The Word Incarnate, p. 285, brackets added. A position not too dissimilar to Pittenger*s is taken by C. E. Raven, Jesus and the Gospel of Love. See particularly Chapters X and XV. Raven leansmore heavily on Biblical exegesis, especially on the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel of Love. It was the apostles* experience of Jesus that empowered them through receiving His revelation and influence. Arguing that the evolutionary progress visible in the physical realm applies also to the psychic. Raven sees the increase in the areas of choice and relationships. In the emergent experience of fellowship and the reflection of tension between the individual and the universal is to be found the essence of man’s spirituality. As a man lives more in communion with the universal, he grows toward one­ness with God, "he incarnates deity." Jesus is the particu­lar which fully expresses the universal. In atonement Jesus is held to accomplish a real work which transforms us by the power of love, and, coupled with our love response, lifts our broken individualities to the place of His per­fection. But the completion of the action requires man’s response, the objective must become subjective. It is not enough to "believe and shudder," but we must also take up the Cross and bear His sufferings in the world. As we do so, as we grow in discipleship, our "dissociated elements, incongruous twists of our inheritance, defects of develop­ment, flaws and scars of sin" are disclosed and gradually broken down by Christ, making over the soul, drawing good out of evil. "We become one with Him as He becomes incar­nate in us." pp. 446-447. The progress is not inevitable but the process is available.  ^Raven, as does Pittenger, relies on the community of^  the Church for the exposure to the empowering love of Christ.
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of God must be those of personal reconciliation." He asks 
the pointed question, " . . .  why political transactions, 
or forms of religious sacrifice, or ransom payments are more 
able to bear the freight of the divine meaning than are the 
personal relationships of love, betrayal and f o r g i v e n e s s .
It is an analysis of the latter that he proposes to follow 
for an understanding of the Atonement.
Williams sees four phases in the process of recon­
ciliation after a break in human relationships. The first 
phase is " d i s c l o s u r e , "242 what might be termed an acknowl­
edgement or confession both to self and to the other. It 
is facing the break in all its depths and roots, in contrast 
to sin which hides and distorts the real situation. But it 
is also facing the break positively. "To love is to will 
to find the conditions of human community whatever they may 
be." We find our humanity illuminated by the humanity 
of Jesus.
The second phase calls for an action which renews 
" l o y a l t y "^44 the community in spite of separation. "Atone* 
ment requires constructive recommitment in the midst of dis­
a s t e r .  "245 xt is in this phase that Williams sets Christ’s 
work of atonement, and it is a phase composed of both loyalty
Williams, Spirit and Forms of Love, p. 176. He also speaks of it as the "renewal of the 'marriage bond,” ’ in clear Antiochene strains. Ibid.
242ibld., pp. 177-180. ^^^Xbid.. p. 180.
pp. 180-186. p. 180.
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and suffering. Loyalty means commitment to the community 
God’s love wills. Pittenger speaks of perfect obedience, 
even to death, whereas Williams speaks of a loyalty which 
involves suffering. He then raises the question of how the 
suffering of Jesus achieves reconciliation. Limits are set 
for exploring this problem, "Suffering can only be under­
stood in the context of the personal history where it occurs. 
This means that the suffering involved in reconciliation 
must be understood in its existential function and situa­
tion. It appears that Williams * initial concept of
suffering is similar to that of pain. That is, it identi­
fies disruption, a need, a yearning, and, as such, is 
symptomatic of a problem. But it is a deeper meaning he
is after. "Suffering’s greatest work is to become the
247vehicle of human expression." Williams is not so naive 
as to assume all suffering is constructive or communica­
tive. It becomes constructive when it exposes the truth.
This understanding is then applied to an understanding of 
Jesus * suffering.
Jesus’ suffering not only exposed the sources of evil, but it communicated the loving will to oppose those evils and to see the reconciliation of mankind.It is a common misunderstanding of love religiously viewed that it must always try to create immediate peace and harmony. Nothing could be further from the picture of love in the New Testament. Jesus* accept­ance in love of his vocation to expose human inequity leads to open conflict. It leads to misunderstanding and violence. It stiffens human defences as men begin to know the judgment against them.248
p. 182. 247Ibid.. p. 183.
2^^Ibid., pp. 183-184.
171
It would have seemed natural for Williams to relate this 
point to the first phase, as an essential element of "dis­
closure." Either we "stiffen" our defenses or we can begin 
to respond to our humanity seen in Jesus Christ. Instead 
Williams discusses the dynamics of personal interaction 
where love becomes effective. "Jesus’ suffering has trans­
forming power not merely as a demonstration of a truth but 
as an action which creates a new field of force in which 
forgiven men can be changed.”249
By appealing to the dynamic nature of interpersonal 
relationships as the clue for God’s interaction with men in 
the suffering Christ, Williams has conceived of the atone­
ment as more than a mere example to win our response.
Rather, a "new field of force" is created in which men can 
respond in a way not available to them on their own. God 
has instituted the relationship with all the possibilities 
that human relationships can bear. Jesus in His suffering 
and dying not only reveals God’s love which is at work in 
our lives and loves, but also opens the way to our partici­
pation in God’s love.
The cause of Jesus’ suffering is sin and the human predicament. He meets that situation by bearing what has to be h ome that the work of love may get done.God in Jesus Christ suffers with his world, not mean­ingless ly but redemptively. He has inaugurated a new history by an action which restores the possibility of loyalty in this broken, suffering, yet still hopeful human community.250
249Ibid.. p. 184.
p. 186.
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The third phase, "I and T h o u , "251 holds that speech 
is part of the action in redemption’s work of reconcilia­
t i o n .  232 Love’s words of forgiveness must be given and
heard in the process of renewing communion. Finally, a new
2 5 3community is established: this is the fourth phase.
"God’s loving action in Jesus Christ is the creation of a 
new humanity and a new community in history. The new human­
ity is constituted by how it has been brought into being 
through love which suffers and f o r g i v e s . "234 The church is 
created by God’s atoning action, and is the form of the new 
community. This creation is not of the church’s own making, 
but is a gift of grace, both in its inception and in its 
continuance. "The church should never think of itself as 
possessing grace, but as participating in it, and that par­
ticipation is above all dependence upon grace as forgive­
ness. At the same time the atonement requires the
231ibid., pp. 186-187.
ocoE. Fuchs makes much of the relationship between speech and person. "The concept of the situation, which is understood as the essence of the ’speech-event,’ is able to reveal that Jesus’ person belongs to the content of his proclamation." "Proclamation and Speech-Event," Theology Today, Vol. 19, 1962-63, p. 350. Williams would argue the other way, that Jesus* proclamation belongs to the content of His Person. The Old Testament concept of the insepar­ability of word and act is apropos here.
^^^illiams. Spirit and Forms of Love, pp. 187-191. Williams holds to no chronblogica1 order, but proposes them as "four aspects of one history." Ibid., p. 177.
^^4ibld.. p. 187.
Ibid.. p. 189. Williams, thereby, puts the bur- den of participating in continuing reconciliation upon the church as its obligation. He specifically rejects the idea
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participating action of man in order to achieve the new 
community.
Williams has argued from the human experience of 
reconciliation to find the clue for understanding the atone­
ment in Jesus Christ. But why should men respond to this 
act, the act of Christ? If man is free to respond, why does 
he respond to Christ? What empowers the interpenetration of
God’s gracious love and forgiveness and man’s free response
256of acceptance? Williams adds to his anthropology. He 
argues that it is the nature of man to respond to love, but 
he grants that men can distort this nature. If this is true 
then there is that within the atonement to which men are 
able to respond. Williams defines self as a "becoming," a 
"move toward being." This allows him to deal with man’s 
relation to the atonement in a moral rather than an onto­
logical sense. That is, man can respond to the atonement’s 
forgiveness as a process, a personal history, a continuing, 
a growth, rather than as merely the acknowledgement of the
of the exclusion of non-Christians from God’s activity. "By describing the atonement as the action which we see in the history of Jesus we in no way deny the working of the gra­cious love of God outside the Christian circle. Whenever men experience their self-betrayal and their loveless divisions and find a new power to love one another and discover a deeper human community, there we see analogies to what we have experienced decisively in Jesus Christ. To believe in atonement as the revelation of the love which fulfills and reconciles all human loves is to see all history in a new way. Human life is the search for the love which fulfills the will to belong, and which has passed through the story of love’s betrayal and found a new possibility of hope." Ibid.. p. 191.
256ibid.. pp. 204-212.
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"fixed structure" of human substance before the otherness of 
God.
Our question is how the love of God, agape, with its absolute self-giving, can fulfil the human loves without destroying them.The thesis I propose is that the human loves have two aspects which make them a preparation for agape.They have the power to open up the self, and thus begin to show the requirement of self-giving. Second, they reach the limits of self-fulfilment, and thus prepare for the acknowledgement that only a love which tran­scends the human loves can fulfil the self.257
Clearly he indicates that the nature of human love is both 
to participate to some degree in self-giving, and to acknowl­
edge dependence upon God to fulfill love. In both aspects 
growth is involved. Williams argues that there are three 
aspects or discoveries involved in this growth. The first 
is a "will to belong which is the core of selfhood," or, as 
expressed in the doctrine of the imago dei. "the will to 
c o m m u n i o n , "238 but one in which "God wills communion on 
terms of man’s real freedom and r e s p o n s i v e n e s s ."259 ^t the 
same time there is the discovery that " . . .  belonging re­
quires self-giving as well as receiving and the consequent 
search for an adequate object of l o v e ."280 Williams indi­
cates that there is growth in this discovery ranging from 
an elemental giving of self in such a way that a return re­
sponse will be given, to a higher form of self-giving in 
which the self seeks an integrity which requires change with
p. 204. See also p. 137. 
258ibid.. p. 205. 259ibid.. p. 137.
2^0lbld.. p. 205.
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all of its risks. It is here that the adequate object of 
love is required, so that growth in integrity can occur.
For there is a natural resistance of the self to becoming. 
Sin is not so much self-centeredness as the "refusal to 
trust in the giver of life and the greater community he is 
creating . . . "261 ^o grow in love, then, requires self­
giving which can be achieved only by God and man together. 
"It is the God relationship which makes a man a m a n . "262 
Finally, love "does not demand to know," it lives in hope, 
it "is the mark of love to be willing to await consummation, 
not to seize it."263
By such an anthropology in respect to love Williams 
seeks to provide a basis for man’s response to God’s act of 
love in Christ’s atonement.
Our doctrine, then, makes no claim that we are really good and loving beings. But it does throw some light upon the dark side of the human story if we see human cruelties and destructiveness as corrup­tions of the power to love, and thus as belonging not to the norm of human nature but to its pathology.The need to belong, to be secure in relationship to the other, to find the self fulfilled and loved is so great that when it is blocked the power of love bursts into the demonic passions of fanaticism, self­worship , arrogance and superiority toward those who threaten our little securities . . . .  In part, at least, the perversity of man exploits the good in his humanity. The need for the love which he cannot es­cape when unfilled, becomes his torment, his agony, the source of his self-destruction and his violence.
Williams has certainly taken a step beyond Pittenger in
exploring a doctrine of the atonement which takes more
p. 207. ^^^Ibid.. p. 209.
263ibld.. pp. 213, 212. ^®^Ibid., p. 211.
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seriously the role man plays in the redemptive process.
In terms of the work of Christ the modem Antio­
chene s have upheld the axioms of their Patristic Fathers, 
namely an insistence upon Christ’s work as real moral work 
and upon the retention of a genuine human moral freedom. 
Their explication of these axioms is informed by a contempo­
rary understanding of anthropology unavailable to men in the 
Fifth Century. It may be argued that psychology is given 
too much attention in their thought. It may also be argued 
that their anthropological view is too idealistic. And it 
may even be argued that Christ’s work is somewhat hampered 
by, and efficaciously dependent upon, man’s response, rais­
ing a quite legitimate question concerning the finality of 
Christ. But for all of this, the question still remains: 
to whom is Christ’s work addressed? No answer thus far 
given can claim all the votes of orthodoxy. For the modem 
Antiochenes the answer is clear. Christ’s work is God’s 
work meeting man in his human predicament to enable him to 
become the man, and to establish the community, God intended 
from creation.
CHAPTER III 
PROCESS THOUGHT
A. Introduction; A New Beginning in Philosophy
A grounding for Ghristology not inimical to an Antio­
chene understanding is to be found in "Process Thought."
All three modern Antiochenes, Pittenger, Williams and Raven, 
turn to some form of "Process Thought" to find a philosophi­
cal basis of support unavailable to Theodore of Mopsuestia 
and his followers. This is not to infer that a "process" 
philosophy is the only philosophical view compatible with an 
Antiochene Ghristology. What is maintained is that for the 
Antiochene Christological theologians, Antiochene thought, 
to be tenable, requires a philosophical undergirding. Re­
lating his theological position at the time of encountering 
"process thought," Pittenger felt the inadequacy of his 
religious ideas standing on their own:
I needed some conceptuality upon which to ground, or to which to relate, whatever I did theologically.. . .  I was floundering about; and I discovered that my theological ideas were in danger of having no cor­relation with what I could believe to be true in termé of ordinary human experience and historical develop­ment . 1
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Christo-
Norman Pittenger, "A Strictly Personal Account," Process Studies. Vol. 1, No. 2, 1971, p. 131.
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logical positions which emerge directly from "process 
thought." While Pittenger and Williams have made extensive 
use of "process thought," their starting point resides in 
Antioch in explication and defense of which "process philos- 
ophy" proves an invaluable ally. Other thinkers, however, 
have constructed their theology on the foundation of "proc­
ess" philosophy, ^ o  men who have proceeded in this direc­
tion are John B. Cobb, Jr., and Schubert Ogden.
"Process thought" is the term attached to the move­
ment which finds its basic themes in the writings of Alfred 
North Whitehead and Charles Hartshome. It must be quickly 
added, however, that since there are some differences in the 
thought of these two men, the system of "process thought" 
evidences quite a good bit of diversity. Cobb relies more 
on Whitehead while Ogden turns primarily to Hartshome. ^
After a brilliant career as a mathematician in his 
native England, Whitehead, referred to by Peters as the 
"Einstein of process philosophy,"4 was invited in 1924, at 
age sixty-three, to become a Professor in the Philosophy 
Department at Harvard University. The next year his first 
book in philosophy was published, Science and the Modem
^Cf. supra. Chapter II, P P . 106 ff.: p. 117. foot­note 103.
3Ralph E. James, The Concrete God (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. TST.------------
4Eugene H. Peters, ed., The Creative Advance (St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 1966), p. 16.
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W o r l d This was rapidly followed in 1926 by Religion in 
the Making; Symbolism; Its Meaning and Effect in 1927 ; 
Process and Reality in 1929, called by Christian, White­
head’s "most important" book and his "magnum opus" by Sher­
burne ;6 The Function of Reason in 1929; The Aims of Educa­
tion in 1929 ; Adventures of Ideas in 1933; Modes of Thought 
in 1938; and Science and Philosophy in 1948.
Charles Hartshome was associated in teaching at 
Harvard with Whitehead from 1925-28. Although the philo­
sophical systems of Hartshome and Whitehead have much in 
common, indeed enough to merit their mutual classification 
as process philosophers, Hartshome seems to have arrived 
at his position independently of Whitehead. He credits 
W. E. Hocking, under whom he studied at Harvard, for a sig­
nificant contribution to the development of his own thought, 
but in Whitehead’s thought he found confirmation for the 
approach he had chosen to take, namely one based upon a
In his autobiographical notes Whitehead writes that his philosophical writings started in London toward the end of World War I. Paul A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York; Tudor Publishing Co.. 1941), p. 13.
^William A. Christian, An Interpretation of White­head’s Metaphysics (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p ♦ 2. Donald W . Sherbume, ed., A Key to Whitehead’s "Proc­ess and Reality" (New York and London ; Macroi 1 Ian Co . ,  1 9 6 6 )  ,  p . 1. Both authors indicate the extreme difficulty to be encountered in reading and understanding Process and Reality. Sherbume in spite of his sympathy with the views expressed in it states it is "a book that . . .  in opacity is monu­mental." Ibid., p. 2,
^Hartshome, "Comment by Professor Charles Hart­shome," The Creative Advance, ed. by Eugene H. Peters,
180
rejection of the traditionally accepted axiom that God is 
" . . . a being in all respects immutable, complete, self- 
sufficient, or absolute."6 In accordance with this premise 
Hartshome argues that Bergson, C, S. Pierce, James Ward, 
Berdyaev, Varisco and E. S. Brightman might also be called 
process philosophers
Neither Whitehead nor Hartshome constructed a Chris­
to logy . Whitehead conceived his task to be that of a meta­
physician. He refers to his system as the philosophy of 
organism,which he claims to be
. . • the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective Sata pass^fhto the appearance of an objec­tive world. The philosophy of organism seeks to de­scribe how objective data pass into subjective satis­faction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction.il
For Whitehead the central task is the development of a phil­
osophical system. However, both the place of religion and 
the concept of God have a part in this system. Whitehead 
argues that religion possesses four dimensions: ritual,
emotion, belief, rationalization. These are to be seen in
p. 134. See also Hartshome, ’’The Dipolar Conception of Deity,’* The Review, of Metaphysics, Vol. XXI, 1967-68, pp. 280-282,TW:------  -----  ----gHartshome, ’’Comment by Professor Charles Hart­shome,’* p. 133.
^Ibid.
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, Free Press Paperback,1969), P • v .
11Ibid., p. 106. See also Alfred North Whitehead, Religion inT the Making (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co.Paperback, 19 6 0), pp. 101 and 137.
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a progression of Importance from ritual to rationalization 
which is "the adjustment of • • . beliefs into a system, 
internally coherent and coherent with other b e l i e f s . "^2 
Those who would engage in religious thought must, by defini­
tion for Whitehead, engage in rational religion which is 
"the wider conscious reaction of men to the universe in 
which they find themselves. The entire book. Religion 
in the Making. is Whitehead’s attempt to set the task of 
religion in this perspective, that is, to do religion from 
a metaphysical perspective. The conceptual task for White­
head is the primary one. "Progress in truth--truth of 
science and truth of religion--is mainly a progress in the 
framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions 
or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike 
more deeply into the root of r e a l i t y . " ^ 4  Accordingly, he 
conceives the task of theology to be to "show how the World 
is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how 
it issues in something beyond the perishing of o c c a s i o n s ."^3 
But he leaves to others the development of theology. White­
head remains the theoretician, the mathematician become 
philosopher. As theoretician, he is not always intelli­
gible even to those sympathetic to his views. In particu­
lar, those who would utilize his philosophical system for
^^Whitehead, Religion in the Making. p. 18,
p. 41. p. 127.
^Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press Paperback, 1967), p . 172.
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theology must engage in the arduous chore of translation.
His philosophical companion, Hartshome, comments, "White­
head has set his statements about God in a highly complex 
intellectual context. Nor is his exposition all that could
be desired. For these reasons his idea of God cannot with-
16out difficulty be taken over by religious persons."
Charles Hartshome devotes his energies and talents
primarily to the philosophy of religion. A significant
portion of his writing deals with proofs for the existence 
17of God. However, in his approach to the problem of God
18hé differs decidedly from Whitehead. For Whitehead the 
concept of God is seen as necessary to the development of a 
genuine philosophy. In contrast Hartshome is concerned 
with the problem of God from the very start* For him God 
is the One Who is " , . . experienced, not just proved in­
directly."^^ In this approach he appeals to the direct per­
ception and awareness of God that he believes man possesses.
16Charles Hartshome, Reality as Social Process j(Glencoe, Illinois ; The Free Press, 1953) , p l 9 6 . I
^^Cf. The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle, Illinois; |Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), particularly Chapter II;Anselm’s Discovery (LaSalle, Illinois; Open Court Publish- 1ihg Co:, 1965).
^^Bixler refers to Whitehead as a " . . . philoso- !pher who inquires about the meaning of religious intuitions •rather than a theologian who offers proofs for the existence |of a divine being." J. S. Bixler, "Whitehead’s Philosophy of Religion," The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. iby P. A, Schilpp, p. 489. ”
19 !Charles Hartshome, "A Philosopher’s Assessment iof Christianity," Religion and Culture, ed. by Walter Lei-brecht, p. 179.
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He, himself, indicates his difference from Whitehead in 
that the latter holds God to be the " . . . supreme form 
of ’actual entity’ . . . " while Hartshome defines God as 
the " . . .  supreme form of the category of ’personally 
ordered society.*"20 what is to be noted here is not so 
much the difference as the accent. For both men God is 
"concrete," not mere abstraction unrelated to reality. But 
for Hartshome the concreteness resides in relationship 
which raises the question of value. The problem of God is 
not only a concem for a proper definition but also for the 
value which such a concept has for man. In this respect 
God, for Hartshome, is one "to whom prayer may properly be 
addressed."21 But the point must not be pushed too far.
As Ralph James has pointed out, Hartshome is a Whiteheadian 
even though it is in theology he has made his most original
contribution. 22
Perhaps the most precise definition of Hartshome ’s
aim, and by implication the aim of process thought in terms
of religion, is to be found in the preface to his recent
book, A Natural Theology for Our Time;
The possibility of natural theology, or a theory of divinity appealing to "natural reason"--that is.
20Hartshome, "Comments by Professor Charles Hart­shome," The Creative Advance, ed. by E. H. Peters, p. 139.
2^Hartshome, "A Philosopher’s Assessment of Chris­tianity," p. 180.
22%alph E . James, The Concrete God, p. 79. See Chapter 5; "Hartshome; The Inclusive' Concrete," for James* presentation of Hartshome*s philosophical under­standing of concreteness for his theological contribution.
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critical consideration of the most general ideas and ideals necessary to interpret life and reality — is often said to have been thoroughly discredited by Hume and Kant. I do not share this trust in the ability of these men— whose climate of opinion was not ours--to settle for us, or for all time, the relations of theoretical reason to religion. Not details only but first principles are being recon­sidered today, in natural science, logic, mathematics --and theology. Had they not better be reconsidered in philosophy of religion also? How "cause," "sub­stance," any universal or a priori conception you please, including that of deity (which in final an­alysis is the a priori conception, summing up all the rest), should be viewed today seems to me to be our problem, not that of the giants of the 18th century.The question of rational or natural theology, I hold, is open, not closed. Once this is granted, I am not much worried about the eventual outcome. For at least the "path of inquiry" will no longer be "barred."23
However, in terms of a process construction of Chris­
to logy neither Whitehead nor Hartshome can provide direct 
guidance for two reasons. First, for both men the doctrine 
of sin occupies but a very minor role. Peters suggests, 
"Doubtless the chief reason is that process philosophy is a
^Charles Hartshome, A Natural Theology for Our Time (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1967),pp. x-xi. H. E. Root agrees with Hartshome that the ques­tion of natural theology must be reopened. In Root’s view the health of theology is tied to the health of natural the­ology. The death of the latter is prelude to the former’s death. Further, the death of theology involves the death of faith, for faith also possesses conceptual content. Root finds that the road to a recovery of metaphysical specula­tion lies in the realm of the artist who can make us sensi­tive to God’s creation, indeed His very Incamation. H. E. Root, "Beginning All Oyer Again," Soundings, ed. by A. R. Vidler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp.1-19. In contrast, Hartshome, and Whitehead with him, argues that an understanding of the world requires that one engage in proposing metaphysical abstractions which are to serve the task of defining and bringing into sharper focus the concrete reality in which men live.
185
metaphysical system, not a doctrine of m a n . "24 Lowe claims 
Whitehead " . . .  simply had no occasion for a theological 
concept of sin, since he did not conceive God as omnipotent 
or issuing d e c r e e s . "23 Whitehead preferred to talk about 
"divine persuasion." Hartshome simply sees sin primarily 
as a category outside philosophy.^6 since the failure of 
nineteenth century liberalism to pay sufficient heed to the 
problem and concept of sin was largely responsible for the 
inadequacy of its theological position, the absence of a 
concept of sin in the thought of Whitehead and Hartshome 
renders them less than adequate mentors for the task of re- 
cons tmcting a liberal Christological position today.
It should not be surprising then^ in the second 
place, to discover that neither Whitehead nor Hartshome 
offers a Christology in any form. Whitehead recognizes that 
a traditional Christology poses a serious problem for his 
metaphysical system. Christian theologians conceived the 
person of Christ as the direct immanence of a God who is in 
Himself absolute, intemally complete, requiring no relations 
beyond H i m s e l f . 27 This view is an obvious contradiction to
^^Peters, The Creative Advance, p. 128.
25Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 112.
26Hartshome, "Comment," pp. 141-142.
27Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. pp. 168-169. Cobb points out that "Whitehead certainly did not develop his phi­losophy for the purpose of assisting Christians to rethink the relation of God to Jesus." John B. Cobb, Jr., "A White­headian Christology," Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971), p. 384.
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Whitehead’s metaphysical system, insofar as the being of 
God so conceived transcends the metaphysical structure of 
inter-relationships. For Whitehead Christology is held to 
be outside philosophy. Hartshome claims to have no Chris­
tology to offer, but he does suggest that Jesus as a supreme 
symbol in history denotes that God receives into His own 
experience the sufferings and joys of the world.2& Ralph 
James proposes that an implicit Christology is to be found 
in Hartshome’s views in that Hartshome *s philosophical 
critique of the classical understanding of God is at the 
same time a critique of the classical understanding of Jesus 
Christ.29 However, Hartshome*s own philosophical view does 
not allow him to take the step James would take on his be­
half.
Although I believe the doctrine of the Incama­tion enshrined important religious truth, I feel in honesty bound to add the following. I very much doubt if there ever hàs been or ever can be a form of theism whicli will enable such phrases as "Jesus was God" or the "divinity of Jesus" to have a sufficiently unam­biguous meaning to entitle them to serve as require- , ments for Christian unity. The most they can do is to name a mystery which is felt rather than thought ; and people may well feel differently about different ways of phrasing the mystery,30
If "process" thought is to be used as a foundation 
for reconstmcting Christology, then the way must be found
9 o^Hartshome, Reality as Social Process, p. 24, See also pp. 149-150; and "A Philosopher’s Assessment of Chris­tianity," p. 175.
29James, The Concrete God, p. 130. James, himself, offers a Christology which he believes to be consistent with Hartshome’s implicit suggestions. Cf. infra, pp. 215 ff^
30Hartshome, Reality As Social Process, p. 152.
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through those who have purposely translated "process" philos­
ophy into an understanding convenient to and compatible with 
a theological undertaking. A brief examination of the cogent 
ideas of process thought for employment in theology must now 
be undertaken. It may be argued that process thought is pre- 
Platonic, assuming as the basic tenet for its understanding 
of the nature of reality, Heraclitus’ assertion of flux as 
the primary mode of reality.
Deliberately process thinkers reverse the direction 
of traditional theism which holds firmly to the concept of 
an immutable, omniscient God. In its place is proposed the 
view that God changes, is affected by the responses and 
activities of His creatures. Where the Patristic Fathers 
were careful to guard against any suggestion that God suf­
fers, process thinkers enthusiastically embrace the concept. 
They see no other way by which to make intelligible God’s 
gift and man’s reception of freedom. To this approach is 
added the concept that immutability is not of substance but 
of purpose, and both God and man share in the activity of
31To be sure Heraclitus believed in permanence of the stuff of the real, namely divine fire. This process thought would reject. But like Heraclitus, process thought aims to find meaning in the reality of change rather than in Platonic abstractions which seek meaning in changeless categories. How* ever, to achieve that aim, like Heraclitus, process thought is forced to propose exceptions to the law of change, such as the concept of the primordial nature of God and the con­cept of everlastingness or immortality. "In God’s nature permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the world; in the world’s nature, flux is primordial and per­manence is derivative from God . . . .  Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness— the Apotheosis of the World." Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 410-411.
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working toward the achievement of that purpose.
The cardinal tenets of process thought are; change 
is the condition which describes the immediate reality of 
both God and man; the present moment is reality; all choices 
for possible action are partly determined and partly free; 
objectivity is meaningful only when it enters into the sub­
jective; reality is held together by the original intention- 
ality of God which is one of two exceptions to the condition 
of change, the other being immortality since it is held to 
be the nature of God to keep all entities, all moments of 
reality, imperishable. These tenets are all concepts, ab­
stractions. In neither experience nor revelation is to be 
found the truth about reality. This is a task for philosophy 
Whitehead underscores this viewpoint. "Apart from some under* 
standing, however dim, of these characteristics of the his­
toric process, we enjoy no rationality of e x p e r i e n c e . "^2 
Whitehead is concerned for the "rationality of experience," 
to devise a conceptual framework which allows him some re­
sponsible or rational comprehension of what is happening. 
Therefore, while experience provides the material for con­
ceptualization, that is, the metaphysical system, it is the 
conceptualization which allows the encounter with reality 
to be both more rational and more purposeful, or as White­
head might have put it, that which is more aesthetically
^^Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Macmillan,Free Press Paperback, T Ô è S ) , p. 88/ italics added.
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satisfying.^^ These concepts must be examined in somewhat 
more detail.
Reality as we know it is to be understood in terms 
of change rather than absolutes. While all previous theol­
ogy had endeavored to get at truth through the changeless, 
that which is held to be eternally the same, process thought 
enthusiastically embraces the nature of change as indicative 
of reality, both for understanding man in his human situa­
tion and for understanding the nature and activities of God. 
Reality is composed of the actual. Actuality is to be 
understood in terms of process and becoming, not substance 
and b e i n g . 34 Ogden calls it "creative b e c o m i n g , "33 while 
Whitehead designates the ultimate metaphysical ground as 
"the creative advance into novelty."3^ D. M. Mackinnon 
takes issue with this approach. He sees as a danger in do­
ing away with substance and being as ontological categories
It might be noted here that Whitehead's inclusion of purpose in his metaphysical system in part defines his rather limited interest in theology and ethics. Satisfac­tion takes the place purpose— or eschatology— holds for the Christian faith. By slightly anticipating the argument to come: since Whitehead insists upon the autonomy of the pres*ent moment of every experience to which satisfaction is attached, it becomes clearer why Harts h o m e , possessed of a more theological interest, should stress reality as a social process in which more weight is given to the inter-relation­ships of experiences, thus allowing more room for purpose understood along more traditional theological lines.
34cf. Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modem Chris- tology," Christ for Us Today, ed. by W. N. Pittenger, p.161; Ogden> Reality of God ^ p . 58.
33ogden, Reality of God, p. 58.
3^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 411.
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that the relation between God and man becomes a b s t r a c t . 37 
Consequently he argues that some form of "substance philoso­
phy" is required to guard against this abstraction. In par­
ticular the criticism is seen in relation to Christology.
Once we can convert statements about the actuality of Jesus as the Christ into statements concerning our response to him, we may be tempted to suppose we have set our theological convictions upon the rock-like foundation of unchallengeable spiritual experience.But it is not only our ordinary Christian common sense that is outraged by this procedure. We have in fact committed ourselves to an anthropocentrism in theology that could be criticized as a most dangerous species of mythological illusion. For is it not dangerous illusion so to conceive the supposed ultimate Reality that we deliberately, and of set policy, preclude our­selves from thinking it in other than human terms?Are we not committing ourselves to an anthropomorphism far more radical, far more uncompromising, than that from which the old-fashioned "substance theology" sought to liberate our fathers?38
For Mackinnon*s part, the idea of substance in Christology
is more than attractive.
The notion of substance is indispensable in Chris- tology in order to hammer out some sensible form of it. Only by using substance can we keep our feet on the ground . . . .  The more I read modem theology the more aware I am there is a kind of theology which wants to swallow up ontology into epistemology.39
37D. M. Mackinnon, Borderlands of Theology (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p 1X7.
33Ibid.^  p. 88; see the entire chapter, "Our Con­temporary Christ."
^^Mackinnon, unpublished lecture, February 7, 1968, The Divinity School, Cambridge University. See also Mac­kinnon, Borderlands of Theology. pp. 3D-31. For Mackinnon an insistence upon substance ïn Christology implies the necessity of a kenotic approach, which Charles Gore, one of the chief exponents of the kenotic theory, holds to be a "necessary presupposition of any view of the Incarnation which can claim to be regarded as philosophical." Rashdall, "Basic Theism," p. 51. Cognizant of the difficulties
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Mackinnon*s criticism has raised the epistemologi- 
cal question. The starting point of knowledge for process 
thought is the experiencing, reflective self.4^
The God who is present to us can be known through our direct experience of Him . . . .  In simplest statement, the position of the experiential theology is that we know God in the same fundamental manner that we know anything else: by interpreting our im­mediate experience to discover what realities are impinging upon us.41
This view contrasts with the classical philosophy for which 
Mackinnon would argue. Process thinkers see this latter 
view as one whose center is away from selfhood "toward the 
secondary phenomenon of the world constituted by the experi­
ence of our senses."4^ Here the basis is **substance," the 
**But there** discoverable by the senses. The presumption is 
that there is a reality which is immutable, and that this 
reality is to be discovered. Whitehead views this as the 
final problem for Platonism. That is to say, by explaining 
static and fluent so separately as to "characterize diverse 
actualities,** Platonists do divorce the two so that any 
interplay between them is inconceivable, and '‘illusion** and 
"mere appearance" become an ultimate principle.43 indeed,
inherent in a kenotic approach to Christology, nevertheless Mackinnon proposes to join Gore, Holland, Forsyth, and others in developing this approach to the concept of the Incarnation.
45-46 «
40(
D . D. Williams, God's Grace and Man's Hope, pp
4^0gden, Reality of God, p. 57.
43whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 408-409.
Cf. Ogden, Reality of God, p. 57. 
4L
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Harts h om e contends that an ultimate dualism of mind and 
mere matter is an a b s u r d i t y . 44 process thinking argues for 
a dynamic rather than a static understanding of reality. If 
the concept of substance implies the concept of something 
which is immutable, as it seems it does, then by definition 
for process thought it is to be rejected. Whitehead con­
cludes that " . • . it is absurd to speak of 'human nature* 
as if it were an entity that could be described in cate­
gories of substance . . .**45 vThat makes it absurd? Simply 
that to be immutable and to have experiences are held to be 
incompatible statements, except as statements about God. 
Therefore, to speak of human nature as "substance** is to 
deny to man the actuality of experience; that is, his free­
dom to decide, to choose, to be.
Process thought's particular use of two key terms, 
which appear repeatedly in its writings, should be noted 
here. The terms are: concrete and abstract. In general
usage "concrete" expresses particularity while "abstract" 
expresses that which is general. It is in this way that 
Mackinnon, committed to substance philosophy, uses the terms. 
But behind and before the particular--the concrete--is the 
general.4^ For him the ultimate general is the eternal
44James, The Concrete God. "Comment by Professor Hart* shome," p. 135.
45pittenger, Process Thought and Christian Faith, p.
4^For example, in speaking of Jesus, Mackinnon says, "Jesus is sheerly concrete, sheerly particular . . . .  But the self-giving which makes him this 'man for man* . . .
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being of God. All else derives its particularity and its 
identity from God. Accordingly, Mackinnon holds Barth to be 
the champion of the view which argues for the primacy of the 
concrete as against the abstract, or that which is merely 
possible or potential.4? This view requires that one pursue 
the ontological category to establish the real.
While not differing from this understanding of con­
crete, process thought utilizes "concrete" in a quite dif­
ferent way. Here the concrete is not an illustration or an 
example of the real; it is the real. The concrete does not 
derive from a principle, but is held to be an event, rather 
a continuous sequence of events.43 xt is the event which 
is real and which provides the understanding of what is pos­
sible. Therefore, to understand reality it is necessary 
for one to understand one's experiences. In turn, this 
requires metaphysical abstraction to describe the reality 
of these experiences.4^ What metaphysical thought does is
belongs to eternity; this life . . , has its ultimate ground and setting in the love of God; which indeed it makes con­crete in the depth of human history." Borderlands of The- ology;, pp. 67-68.
4^Ibid., p. 68. Mackinnon goes on to indicate the primacy of the ontological for Barth.
48Hartshome uses the term "events" while Whitehead speaks of "activities." The meanings are interchangeable. James, The Concrete God, pp. 52, 27 ff.
4^Cf. James, The Concrete God, pp. xxiii, 45, 172- 173. For a fuller statement oh the role of abstraction in the thought of Whitehead and Hartshome, see Chapters 4 and 5. For Whitehead's own more thorough discussion on the pri­macy and necessity of abstraction for understanding reality, see Whitehead, Modes of Thought, Lecture VI.
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to provide descriptions to illumine our experiences, to 
render them more coherent and intelligible, to enable us to 
know what we are experiencing, so that we can both leam 
from our experiences and retain our freedom to interpret 
and act upon them. But such descriptions are not provable 
as mathematical t h e o r e m s . 30 Nieville points out that Hart­
shome *s view here follows the Aristotelian thesis in that 
potentiality is derived from concrete reality. This con­
trasts with the Platonic thesis--i.e,, Mackinnon--that the
c-iconcrete derives from the universal. It is this use of 
"concrete" as identical to rather than derived from the real 
which characterizes process thought. Accordingly, meta­
physical abstractions are held to be related to the con­
crete in the same way that it is our knowledge which tells 
us what our senses are experiencing, such as: the smell of
automobile exhaust, the sight of da Vinci's "Last Supper," 
the grand sound of Beethoven's "Ninth S y m p h o n y . "32
D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love,p . 109.
3^Robert Neville, "Experience and Philosophy," Proc­ess Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, pp. 57-61. Neville faults Hartshome ' s position for its deficiency in being able to deal with the formal possibility of universal structures or potentialities, pp. 59-61. His position is admittedly that of a Platonist, p. 61. Process thought simply stands in a different place from Neville's concern; a place which holds that all universels are deficient until actualized. Cf. infra, pp. 202 ff. as this is applied to the concept of God.~ Of. also James' criticism on this point, infra, pp.201 ff.
3^D. D. Williams puts this point quite succinctly and strongly: " . . . all our human knowing comes throughparticular experiences. We always experience in particular ways here and now. In short, our knowledge of anything is
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It has been necessairy to deal with something of proc­
ess epistemology here under the process tenet that change 
describes the nature of reality. If change rather than a 
discernible or revealed order of things characterizes the 
reality with which man must come to terms, the problem be­
comes one of identifying meaning. For process thought con­
ceptualization provides the only way, a conceptualization 
which arises from man's ability to take into account and 
order as much of his experience as possible, including, and 
perhaps even primarily, his experience of himself. In turn, 
the concepts then enable man to understand the conditions of 
his existence, thus enriching his freedom. This leads to a 
second tenet of process thought; the present moment is 
reality.
The one concept . . . that of the actual occasion of experience . . .  is the key to Whitehead's cosmo­logical formulation . . . .  The actual entities are the finally real things, the ultimate individuals.Apart from them there is nothing at all. The whole of the philosophy is an analysis of such entities and their relations with each other.53
historical. It is derived from concrete happenings through which the real order of things is disclosed to us. Every happening can yield knowledge; but knowledge depends in part on the subjective element in our encounter with the world. Where there is no sensitivity there is no experience. Weourselves have to be equipped and transformed so that wecan respond to what is given to us in our total experience." God's Grace and Man's Hope, p . 49. Williams admits to the need for delicacy in sucn an approach, but when he speaks of being "equipped and transformed" in order to respond to what "is there," surely he would find many neo-orthodox heads nod* ding in agreement. The epistemological problems of "objec­tivity" and "subjectivity" are not easily resolved! See also John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Lon­don: Lutterworth press, 1966), pp. 23-28.
33cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 37-38.
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Three points are to be noted here. The first is that the 
actual occasion, the actual entity, is reality. It is the 
only reality we can know. It is from these actual occasions 
that our concepts for understanding reality are drawn, for 
an actual occasion is analysable.34 At the same time each 
actual occasion is but a small part of the totality being 
expressed and experienced in the occasion. What this means 
is that we experience more than the analysis can provide of 
the actual occasion. "The mere immediate exemplification 
is only one aspect of our experience."35 experience
provides our concepts which in turn can never be univocally 
declared to be identical with reality. But the emphasis 
upon an actual occasion is an emphasis upon the concrete as 
against the merely abstract. An actual occasion is concrete 
reality. It is what Whitehead terms "concrescence." "Actu­
ality means nothing else than this ultimate entry into the 
concrete, in abstraction from which there is mere non­
entity ."36
The second point to be noted is that change is not a 
series of events which are disconnected or unrelated. There­
fore, the term "process" is used to describe the fundamental 
condition of reality. However, nothing "progressive" is
34%itehead, Process and Reality, p. 244. See also Modes of Thought, pp.' '93-97,
33whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 99; see also p. 89
3^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 243. See also pp. 244-246.
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intended by the use of the term. Rather, Whitehead speaks 
of "the trend toward order," "the frustration of order," and 
"the absence of n e c e s s i t y ."37 process is fundamental to this 
position for no static view of actuality is allowed. An 
actual entity is always in a relationship which is described 
by the term " p r o c e s s . "38 xhis leads to the third point.
" . . .  each actual entity is itself only describ- 
able as an organic process." "Process and individuality re­
quire each o t h e r . "39 The clue to understanding process then 
is relationships. "There is no entity, not even God, which 
requires nothing but itself in order to e x i s t . E a c h  
actual occasion is composed of its past, the previous actual 
occasions; its present, the aim at concrescence by decision; 
and its future, the effect of its concrescence upon subse­
quent actual occasions."Immediacy is the realization of 
the potentialities of the past, and is the storehouse of the 
potentialities of the future."^^ This leads to a third
3^Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 87-88.
33whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 247; Modes of Thought, pp. 89-90, 991
3^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 248; Modes of Thought, p. 97. " . 1 r every individual thing infects anyprocess in which it is involved, and thus any process can­not be considered in abstraction from particular things in­volved. Also the converse holds." Ibid., pp. 97-98.
^^Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 104.
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 105; see also Modes of Thought. pp. 89-90,
^^Whitehead, Modes of Thought, pp. 99-100. For a statement on Hartshome * s s imllar pos it ion, see Peters,The Creative Advance, pp. 83-87.
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tenet of process thought.
For process thought each actual occasion is partly 
determined because no occasion is free of its antecedents. 
These antecedents partly limit the possibilities, or poten­
tialities, to which any given occasion may have access. But 
in themselves, they do not determine which of the possibil­
ities available to the actual occasion will be chosen nor
63how the choice may alter the possibility. Thus any actual 
occasion is a partly determined and a partly free occasion. 
Here Whitehead introduces another concept, that of "prehen­
sion." By this he means a subjective "impression" in the 
actual entity of those things available for decision making 
to a given actual occasion, Hamilton suggests that the term 
"grasping at" would be a better one for understanding "pre­
hension, " for it expresses a more active role for the process 
than "impression" tends to convey.84 The actual entity pre- 
hends some aspects of its antecedents, while it rejects, or 
cannot take adequately into account, others, which are termed 
"negative prehensions." No actual entity can prehend every­
thing, God being the only exception to this principle.^3 in
" . . .  every occasion takes account of its past, but the way in which it does so is finally its own decision." John B. Cobb, Jr., "The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian Perspective," The Finality of Christ ed. by Dow Kirkpatrick (New York: Abin^on, 1966) , p . 123,
^^Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modem Chr is tology, " Christ for Us Today ed. by Pittenger, pp. 161-162.
^^This involves the "subjective aim" of God, See infra, Chapter III, pp. 200 ff.
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turn this means that the actualization of all possibilities 
is simply i m p o s s i b l e T h u s  every actual occasion is partly 
free and partly determined. It is linked to what has gone 
before, but by prehension and selection it chooses its pres­
ent actualization, and in turn it serves to become the ante­
cedent or determiner for a subsequent actual occasion. In­
terrelatedness describes this p r o c e s s G e n u i n e  newness or 
novelty is the result. Something new is introduced by the 
process.
A fourth tenet follows: whatever is objective pos­
sesses meaning only when it enters into the subjective; only 
when it is part of the choice in the present moment of the 
experiencing organism. Whitehead calls it the "experient 
s u b j e c t . "88 This is not to say that the objective is value­
less. It forms the material out of which each actual occa­
sion selects its relevant data for the choices which make 
the present moment real, which give concrescence to an actual 
occasion. But for process thought reality is to be experi­
enced in the present moment's actuality. "Self-realization
^^Peters, The Creative Advance, p. 72.
^^Pittenger refers to this process as a "penetrating interrelationship" rather than a "chain of events." Process Thought and Christian Faith, p. 15. Man, himself, then is held to be one who "is all that has gone to make him up, all that surrounds him, all that presses upon him, all that he himself enters into and in which he shares, all which he may be." Ibid., p. 13, See also Ogden, The Reality of God, pp. 57-58. This tenet is particularly important for Cobb's Christological understanding. See infra. Chapter III, pp. 228 ff.
68Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 188.
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is the ultimate fact of facts. An actuality is self-realiz­
ing, and whatever is self-realizing is an a c t u a l i t y ."89 
turn, then, each actual occasion passes into the data for 
prehension by its own continuing experiencing subject as 
well as other experiencing subjects. The subjective choice 
becomes; actual, and then it becomes object for another sub­
jective prehension. But the process of becoming by defini­
tion means that whatever is going on, whatever is the state 
of reality, must be understood in terms of present actual 
occasions where the subjective is operative.
Process is the becoming of experience. It follows that the philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivist bias of mode m philosophy. It also ac­cepts Hume's doctrine that nothing is to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discover­able as an element in subjective experience. This is the ontological principle.70
A fifth tenet of process thought to be explored is 
that reality is held together by the original intentionality 
of God, or God's "subjective aim." Several points must
^^Ibld.. p. 260.
Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 193. This tenet is dealt with extensively by Whitehead in Process and Reality, Parts II and III. "Thus for Kant the process where* by there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity whereby there is one individual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from the inclu­sion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no knowledge." Ibid., p. 180. " . . . the philos­ophy of organism . . . fullyaccepts Descartes' discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for analysis." Ibid.. p. 186.
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necessarily be made to clarify this tenet, for it involves 
the concept of God characteristic of process thought. This 
concept holds a central position in process thought. Indeed, 
it is hereby suggested that process thought's primary con­
cern with the concept of God has in large measure been re­
sponsible for its difficulty in offering a Christology 
Nineteenth century Liberalism regained a strong sense of 
Christology in particular respect of Christ's humanity, per­
haps due to its stress on anthropology, as much as any other 
concept. The approaches of both Deism and Rationalism before 
Liberalism, as well as Neo-Orthodoxy after, gave primary 
stress to the concept of God. The two choices have seemed to 
be; start with God and explain how God could be in Christ; 
or start with Christ and suggest how God can be understood 
through Christ. Put another way, the choice seems to be 
God-downward or m a n - u p w a r d H e r z o g  suggests, "Every con­
cept of theology, every theological assertion, grows out of 
the elementary understanding of God."^^ peters, a process
^^See supra. Chapter III, pp, 180, 185 ff.
72The latter option is embraced by Ferre, see infra. Chapter IV. The former position is exemplified by Barth, see supra, Chapter I, The former position also suggests Alexandria, and the latter, Antioch, Feuerback*"suggests the latter approach but without Christ, i.e., start with man and attempt to understand God. Bethune-Baker's chal­lenge that " . . .  'orthodoxy,' in beginning with God, be­gan at the wrong end" also must be directed at these fellow liberals I Bethune-Baker, "Jesus As Both Human and Divine," Mo d e m  Churchmen's Conference of 1921, p. 287.
73Frederick Herzog, Understanding God (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 96; see also pp. 131 ff.
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theologian, agrees, but puts the point more forcibly: "A
man must already know God in order to know that Jesus truly 
reveals him and is therefore decisive. But if one already 
knows God, it is this knowledge that is decisive, not the 
revelation in Jesus* history."^4 while Peters has indicated 
a chief reason for process thought's difficulty in offering 
a Christology, he has also described the limits within which 
process Christology is offered.73
While both Whitehead and Hartshome base their philo­
sophical methodology upon the previous four tenets discussed, 
the "touchstone" of their systems is to be found in their 
concept of God, The concept is a philosophical one. White­
head puts it this way: " . . .  God is not to be treated as
an exception to all metaphysical principles, involved to save 
their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."78 jf 
change is to describe the characteristic nature of reality 
then the immediate question which must be raised is this ; 
is the change chaotic or purposeful? That is, do organisms 
and events merely happen or is there a discemible pattem
Peters, The Creative Advance, p. 115. See this entire section, pp. Ï11-117. At this point Barth and the process thinkers are not far apart. But as Barth opts for revelation while process men use metaphysics, the gulf be­tween them appears,
^^It is interesting to note that Reeves classifies the thought of Cobb and Ogden as "Christless Theology." He admits the term is too strong, but "it is meant to be sug­gested of their treatment of Christology." G. Reeves, "A Look at Contemporary American Theology," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXIV, No, 4, Autumn, 1965, p. 523.
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 405.
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of some sort involved? If the former, it is difficult to
comprehend how even subjective experiences can be related to
one another. On the other hand, if the conceptual option is
for pattem, the problem to be faced is this: does the
presence of a discemible pattem involve a concomitant loss
77of genuine freedom for individual organisms? Whitehead
In The Incamate Lord, L. S. Thornton makes a sin­cere effort to utilize the insights of biology's concept of evolution for both freedom for the individual organisms and an understanding of God's incamation in Christ. While it may not be fair to contend Thornton is a process theologian, he does appeal to similar insights. However, Thornton devi­ates from his avowed intentionality in that his concern is primarily to argue for the absolute uniqueness of Christ.In so doing he renders Christ an exception from the biologi­cal: categories in which all other men are involved. Cf. Pittenger's criticism. The Word Incamate, pp. 107-109. Pittenger commends Thomton's attempt in the first part of his book to follow an evolutionary argument, based on bio­logical change, for theology, but criticizes his retreat in the second part to a Christological concept of special crea­tion. But Thornton expresses this restriction in the first part. In Chapters V, VI, and VII he discusses the partici­pation of organisms, men in particular, in an ascending level of revelation, from imraanental to transcendent, what he terms, " . . .  an advancing apprehension of the eternal order through the medium of the external world," Thornton. The Incamate Lord, p. 129. God reveals Himself to man "in the concrete activity of history and of the human life story, in order that this concrete activity of man's spiritual exist­ence may pass beyond itself and its own achievements and attainments and may find its end in pure activity, in the surrender of creaturehood to the embrace of Creator." Ibid., p. 151. Thomton has made man's movement essentially "up- ward" by response. In this movement the etemal order be­comes more concretely embodied, Christ is central to this movement for Thomton, for there is in Him implicitly a solu­tion to the non-attainment of fullness in the rest of us. Ibid., p. 171. But where the Antiochenes saw Christ's con­crete obedience as a genuine participating work on Christ's part as a fully free human being, a view compatible with what Thomton argues to this point, Thornton suddenly coun­ters his own method. "Jesus Christ is not the product of history in its cumulative development. He stands within its succession: but he entered it from beyond." p, 164, italicsadded. The obviousdanger to which Tbornton succumbs is
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proposes to solve the problem by offering a dipolar concept 
of God. He suggests that there is both a primordial nature 
of God and a consequent nature o f  G o d . 78
Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality . . . He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this prim­ordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of etemal objects to the process of creation.79
What Whitehead is after is a concept which provides the
that whenever the uniqueness of Christ is guarded by defini­tion rather than by attention to Christ's own accomplishment the humanity of Christ is seriously weakened, if not alto­gether lost. Therefore it should not be surprising to Pit­tenger or other readers that Thornton commences Part II with: " . . .  the historical person Jesus Christ is to beidentified with that absolute actuality we call God . . . "  p. 219. Christ's manhood is in the succession of history but " . . .  in a sense peculiar to Himself and precisely determined by His Godhead." p. 223. Whatever else it is, that is not the manhood possessed by the rest of us! T h o m ­ton would have done well to heed Inge's advice, "The develop­ment of humanity, whether in the race or in the individual, must not be identified with the life of God." W. R. Inge, "The Person of Christ," Contentio Veritatis, ed. by Rashdall (London: J. Murray, 1916 [3rd ed.J), p. 82. Inge was par­ticularly concemed for Strauss' application of evolution to the Person of Christ, which Inge holds to be a view sub­ordinating the Incamation to evolutionary progress in that Christ appears only when evolutionary development is ready for Him. In contrast, Inge argues both that there is no uniformity in progress, for the highest possibility for man occurred long ago in Christ, and that the Incamation does not end in advance but inaugurates a new era, pp. 101 ff. Thomton ' s Chris tological position is established near that of Inge's; but he seems either not to have realized it or to have ignored it in his concern for evolution.
^^Cf. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 407.
7^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 405; see also p. 263. See further."Re11gion in the Making, pp. 147-148. For a fuller explanation of eternal objects see Process and Realityé pp* 57-60. "God , . . iS that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts." Ibid,« p. 286.
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structure for change, so that change is not chaotic. To 
God in His primordial nature is reserved the "conceptual 
realization" of all potentiality. God cannot be surprised I 
But by process thought's definition, conceptualization is 
deficient. Reality resides in actual occasions. To each 
actual occasion is reserved the actual realization of poten­
tiality. Thus Whitehead believes that in this view genuine 
freedom for each organism, as well as for God; is maintained & 
But there is also a consequent nature of God, namely God's 
actual nature by reason of the effects or reactions upon 
Qod of actual occasions, the reality of the world prehended 
by God, objectified in God. "God's conceptual nature is 
unchanged, by reason of its final completeness. But his 
derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance 
of the world."80 Thus Whitehead ascribes to God a dipolar 
nature, embracing both changelessness and change, that which 
is complete and incomplete, deficient in actuality and fully 
actual.81 God links actuality and potentiality. Both sides 
or aspects of God are required, for each side can only be 
explained in respect to the other.82
Though Whitehead speaks frequently of the immanence 
of God in the world, such a view is not held to be a condi­
tion of the dipolar nature of God. Rather he uses the term
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 407.
8Iibid. For a brief statement on the two natures, see L. Charles Birch, Nature and God (London: SCM Press,1965), p. 110.
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 409.
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"superject" to indicate the way in which men experience the 
immanence of God, By this he means that God is both present 
to the world objectively in terms of potentialities, and He 
is present effectively in terms of the possibilities which
83He may influence--for God is the principle of concretion-- 
in any actual occasion. This is the immanence of God that 
men experience, but his consequent nature can only be inter­
preted or inferred by m e n , ^4 this way Whitehead seeks
to preserve both the transcendence and the immanence of
God: God as the principle of etemal objects without which
85there could be no relevant novelty in change;®'^ and as One 
to Whom what happens in the world makes a difference, there­
by preserving the genuine freedom of o r g a n i s m s .
It appears that Whitehead has created an absolute 
with his concept of the primordial nature of God, a possi­
bility his system would not seem to allow. Has he, in 
effect, returned to the Platonic notion of absoluteness 
which he earlier rejected?^^ To be sure his focus is upon 
change, and the primordial nature of God is introduced to
^^Ibid., p. 406.
^4bowe, Under8tending Whitehead. pp. 104-105. See also William A. Christian. An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp.376-381; and Peters, The Creative Advance, pp. 75-76.
^^whitehead. Process and Reality, pp. 190 and 411. 
86Williams. The Spirit and the Forms of Love, pp.108-109.
87See supra. Chapter III, pp. 179 ff., 187 ff.
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hold change within the rationality of man's experience. But 
the problem remains. Williams argues that Whitehead " . . . 
has to allow for categorical differences between God's way 
of being and that of the finite actual occasions. God is 
necessary to every finite being, but no particular finite 
being is necessary to God."^^ Yet surely if God is defi­
cient until actual, or until He possesses both a primordial 
and a consequent nature, and where in turn this requires 
others to provide the occasions which act upon or are ob­
jectified in God, and where further it seems unlikely there 
can be others unless there are particular others, then it 
can certainly be argued that particular finite beings are
O Qas necessary to God as He is to t h e m . A l s o  the question 
must be raised as to the meaning of the primordial nature
^^Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, p. 125. See also pp. 108 ff. and ±28.
8^Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 410-411. "It is as true to say that God creates the World as that the World creates God." p. 410. Mackintosh argues that this is Hegel's view. "The World is required to make God not less than God to make the World." Hügh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology (London: Nisbet & Co., 1937), p. 104. Mac­kintosh suggests there is a line from Schelling through Hegel to process philosophy and theology, pp. 28-29. Forsyth credits to Hegel the creation of process thinking. P. T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (London: Independent Press,1910;, p p . 67 ££. Pringle-Pattison argues with the Hegelian origin of process thinking. He points to a theism expressed by Hegel and Ulrici in which it is held that God and crea­tion are simultaneous expressions of the essence of each and cannot be separated in time. It is impossible to conceive of either independent of the other. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), pp. 304-307. For Pringle-Pattison if there were no finite world, there would be no God, p. 304. See also Lewis B. Smedes,The Incamation (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1953), p. 8.
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without persons. What does the wealth of potentiality mean 
apart from actual occasions?
Hartshome seeks to correct this problem in White­
head by arguing for a dipolar concept of God in which God 
is conceived to be abstract and concrete where the concrete 
is greater than and includes the abstract. Hartshome seems 
to accept the abstract as resident in man's conceptual 
nature. Therefore, for him the concrete, the actual way in 
which God and the world interact, is the central clue to the 
reality of God. That the concrete is greater means " . . .  
that the inclusive concrete contains the abstract; is onto- 
logically prior to the abstract; precedes the abstract 
temporally; and that the changing concrete is superior to 
abstractions which do not change.Whatever being God 
has abstractly depends in part upon what happens in time, 
upon what man does Both Whitehead and Hartshome insist 
on concreteness as the meaning of reality, but Hartshome 
more fully stresses concreteness as the reality of God, and 
freedom as the condition of man. For Hartshome God's 
future
. . . must be as undetermined as the universe's future and as free as the universe's freedom. When novel events occur they change the reality of God out of which they act by adding to His reality. This
90James, The Concrete God, p. 58, See also Hart­shome and Reese, Philosophers ^eak of God, pp. 1-25, 499 514, being the opening and concluding essays dealing with Hartshome's concept of "panentheism."
9 1 James, The Concrete God, pp. 115-116. See also Hartshome, Reality As Social Process, pp. 150-151.
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means that God and the universe are interdependent and involved in significant interaction,92
The only thing that does not change is that God changes 
For this reason Hartshome argues that since only societies 
change, then God is "the supreme form of the category of 
'personally ordered society' of actual entities" rather 
than as Whitehead puts it that God is "the supreme form of 
'actual identity,'"94 Hartshome, therefore, holds that 
only in the abstract sense is God to be thought of as abso­
l u t e . S i n c e  the concrete is greater than and includes 
the abstract, then the absolute can neither be descriptive
9  2 James, The Concrete God, p . 126. See also Hart­shome, Reality As Social Process, pp. 39-41, Here Hart­shome indicates the social nature of God and the way in which God--as only God can— acts to preserve the society of which He is a part. Sèe also Chapter 1.
9 3 James, The Concrete God, p. 124. See also Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 60.
^^Hartshome, "Comment by Professor Charles Hart­shome," The Creative Advance, ed. by Peters, p. 139. See also supra. Chapter III, p. 183.
9  5 ^ James, The Concrete God, p. 86. Even here Hart­shome, cons is tent with his me thodology, subordinates the abstract to the concrete, the absolute to the relative."The concrete God that metaphysics finds reason to accept must be described as supreme both in relativity and in abso­luteness, both in becoming of novel value and in permanence of values once achieved . . . . " Hartshome, Reality As Social Process, p. 168, italics added. Chapter 6 presentsa discussion of the categories of absolute and relative withan Anselmian understanding. See also Charles Hartshome, The Divine Relativity (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1948), chapter II. " . . . in conceiving God as absolute, we must recognize that we are abstracting from his actual subjec­tivity or knowing. The absolute is God with something left out of account. God is more than his absolute character." Ibid., p. 83. "God is not the absolute, and there is an absolute principle in him only as an abstractable aspect." Hartshome, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity," p. 287.
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of the total nature of God nor ontologically prior. Hart­
shome holds it to be a dangerous enterprise to propose a 
concept which renders Him as an absolute. "It is God wholly 
out of time, rather than one in some sense of flux, that has 
been found difficult if not impossible to render even dimly 
intelligible."98
James raises two q u e s t i o n s ^ 7 conceming Hartshome *s 
formulation of the proposition that "the concrete is greater 
than and includes the abstract." The first question is: 
are there no etemal principles? Principles for Hartshome 
appear to be derivative and, therefore, not eternal. The 
second question concems the possibility of change in the 
principle, even in the basic principle that the "concrete is 
greater than and includes the abstract." "There always seems 
to be one principle that is necessary in order for every­
thing else to make sense, including this principle, but what 
if this principle ceases to be t r u e ? "98 presumably Hart­
shome could indicate the temporality of any abstraction
Hart shome. Reality As Social Process, p. 150.James in The Concrete God deals with the tbougbt of Hart­shome through the rubric of the "Death of God" movement, in which he finds parallels, particularly in respect to a mutual repudiation of the traditional views of God which hold Him to be omnipotent and timeless. James argues that Hartshome has resolved the dilemma of God conceived to be timeless and yet present to history, to events, to time. This resolution lies in the concept of the dipolarity of God in which the concrete contains and is greater than the abstract. In James* view the problem is to draw God into time, into rele­vant relationships, into history and actual events, while at the same time acknowledging that which makes Him God!
^7James, The Concrete God, pp. 180-183*
, ^^Ibid.. p. 183.
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conceived by man. But does this answer the problem raised 
by James? Further, if the philosophical construct is of­
fered to interpret our experiences, then does not a failure 
of principle concomitantly mean a failure of being able to 
order our experiences? But then, this is ever the possi­
bility man faces. Even Paul suggested that man's predica­
ment is to work out his own salvation in fear and trembling. 
It has been necessary to deal with process thought's 
dipolar concept of God in order to understand God's "subjec­
tive aim."^^ The primordial nature of God is the unrealized 
conceptualization of all potentiality. The subjective aim 
is God's attempt to introduce to an actual occasion His own 
aims. By definition this müst be done without restricting 
the: freedom of each actual occaèion to choose for itself. 
Thus God does not control; rather He endeavors to lure or 
to persuade the organism toward His aim; toward the possi­
bilities involved in the subjective aim, derived from the 
primordial nature, according to the given situation of the 
actual w o r l d . 180 "Each temporal entity derives from God its 
basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with
9^Certainly the philosophical aspects of this con­cept of God require much more extensive argumentation than has been given here. The discussion has been limited both philosophically and theologically to the purpose of provid­ing an understanding of the "subjective aim." It is the concept of the "subjective aim" which is central for process thought's development of a Christology.
180whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 407.
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Indéterminations awaiting its own d e c i s i o n s F o r  each 
actual occasion there is both the datum of the past, of 
other occasions182 objectified to it, and the lure of God's 
conceptual aim for it. The actual entity remains relatively 
free to choose. " . . .  every actual entity . . . shares 
with God the characteristic of transcending all other actual 
entities, including God. The universe is thus a creative 
advance into novelty."18^ The freedom exists because God 
exists; because God possesses a primordial nature ; because 
to each actual occasion is present God's persuasion toward 
the actualization of His sujective aim. Thus reality is 
held together by the original intentionality of God,
One final minor comment should be made in regard 
to this fifth tenet. Immortality is defined for process 
thought here. Simply it means that all actual occasions do 
not perishl84 but are retained by God. They become part 
of His nature. All experience is a divine treasure, ever­
lastingly kept in God. But the idea of personal immortality
D. W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's "Process and Reality" (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 2$.
102That process thought has to keep referring to actual occasions or actual entities to be consistent with its premise that the present moment is reality, suggests the appropriateness of P. T. Forsyth's criticism that it is not moral since it holds primarily to the idea of an act. The Work of Christ, p. 68.
^8^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 260.
^^^Hartshome "deplores" Whitehead's use of the term "perishing," and in a more positive vein declares that the actual occasions "live evermore," Hartshome,"A Dipolar Conception of Deity," p. 287.
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is not seen as necessary to this view.^^^
These five tenets provide the conceptual framework 
for those who attempt to develop a Christology in terms of 
process thought. To recapitulate, the five tenets, are;
1) change is the characteristic of actual reality and it is 
within the terms of this characteristic that man understands 
himself and his condition; 2) the present moment is reality, 
the only reality there is, though the present moment does 
not, and can not, exist in isolation from the past, from 
current interrelationships and influences, and from its 
impingement upon the future; 3) every event or experience, 
the actual occasion of an individual entity^ is partly de­
termined and partly free in that while there are influences 
which remain from previous actualizations and while there 
are other influences which lure the entity toward possi-
Hartshorne, ”A Philosopher’s Assessment of Chris­tianity," pp. 177-178. John Cobb disagrees with this evalu­ation on two accounts: first, because he finds nothingwhich of necessity negates the conceptual possibility of per­sonal immortality in a process thought frame of reference; and second, because he notes that the continuity of experi­ences is held together by the psyche, by personal identity, which is not dependent only on the bodily environment, thus allowing for the possibility of continuation of the psyche beyond death as compatible with, rather than contradictory to, process thought. Cf. Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 63-79; "Whitehead’s Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of Man," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXII, 1964, pp. 215- 220; God and the World (PhiiadeXphia: Westminster Press,1969), ipp. 97-102. In this last work Cobb indicates the necessity of hope for man: that on the one hand, God’s im­mortal retention of all values achieved is more than merely accumulative, for the individual is more important than values achieved; and on the other hand, that the same God who operates creatively to lure organisms to higher fulfill­ment, with creative novelty also has " . . .  the power to sustain or create man in a quite new form." Ibid., p. 102.
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billties not yet actualized for the individual entity, and 
thus serve to act as determiners, at the same time the 
individual entity is free to interpret and select material 
it deems relevant from its past and from contemporary ex­
ternal influences while also selecting a choice for actuali­
zation which is not necessarily included in these materials 
presented as objects; 4) the objective is meaningful only 
when it enters into, is prehended by, the subjective, since 
it is only in the subjectivity of an actual entity that the 
decision which actualizes occurs; 5) reality is held to­
gether by the original intentionality of God; that is, the 
continuity which holds all reality together is given by 
the subjective aim of God which provides the lure toward 
actualization in process, in time and place, of God’s aim 
for each particular occasion to fulfill God’s original in­
tention for creation, totally envisioned within God as 
conceptual potential. The tenets suggested here are not 
intended to be exhaustive of process philosophical thinking, 
but rather are an attempt to grasp those concepts which 
seem appropriate to the task of formulating a Christology 
in terms of process thought,
Students of process thought will undoubtedly choose to be more thorough than the above attempt has been. In particular, more would be made of such concepts as "feel­ing," "satisfaction," "superject," etc. The attempt above has been restricted to those concepts which have a more di­rect bearing for theology, and Christology in particular.For those unfamiliar with process thought, Sherburne’s book, A Key to Whitehead’s "Process and Reality," provides good 'insight "Int chief but difficult book, and in­cludes a rather extensive Glossary of Whitehead’s technical
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B . Ralph James 
Though it is primarily with the process thought 
Christological proposals of Schubert Ogden and John Cobb 
that this chapter is concerned, note should be taken of 
Ralph James* argument that a Christology is implied in the 
thought of Charles Hartshorne, James pursues this implica­
tion in a way that Hartshorne, himself, never has. Indeed,
Hartshorne finds Christology to be too complicated an in-
1 0 7tellectual problem, containing too many ambiguous ideas.
However, he does pay attention to Jesus in such a way as
to verge on dealing with Christology.
If God has a genuinely relative and mutable aspect,he can genuinely and literally love his creatures. Itfollows that a man Jesus whose life exemplifies and symbolizes love in uniquely impressive fashion can, at least in some sense (possibly in a rather attenuated one), be said to incarnate or at least symbolize the nature of deity,108
Hartshorne also finds helpful one aspect of the proposal
that God was incarnate in Christa It is that in accepting
suffering— and that not only on the cross--Jesus symbolizes
the supreme value of humility, Hartshorne*s concern here
is not with Christology but with the suffering of God. He
terms, pp. 205-248. James, The Concrete God, and Peters,The Creative Advance, are helpful both Tn drawing out the theological possibilities in process thought and in relating Whitehead and Hartshorne, A recent book of essays on proc­ess thought presents many of the central ideas of this field: Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. by D, Brown, fe. E, James and G. Reeves (New York; Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971).
1 0 7 Hartshorne, Reality As Social Process, pp. 152- 154. See also supra. Chapter III, pp. 184 f£.
^^^Hartshome, Reality As Social Process, p . 169.
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allows that God’s suffering cannot be likened to our bodily 
suffering. Rather it is a sympathetic sharing, an imagina­
tive, intuitive p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s  is consistent with 
Hartshorne’s insistence upon the nature of God being one in 
which effective change occurs, and to whom what happens 
makes a difference. Apart from a willingness to discuss 
the symbolic value of Jesus in an analogical way for under­
standing our humanity and the nature of God, Hartshorne re­
fuses to be drawn into the Christological discussion con­
cerning the relationship of Jesus to God. Whitehead does 
not go even this f a r  .3-10
Jameslll finds in Hartshorne’s principle that the 
concrete is greater than and includes the abstract, coupled 
with his discussion of Jesus as a symbol, legitimate grounds
^^^Hartshome, "A Philosopher’s Assessment of Chris­tianity," p. 175.
^^^It is interesting to note that there is the merest hint of a Christological possibility in Whitehead’s thought. God " . . .  does not create the world, he saves it; or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness," Whitehead, Process and Reality> p. 408. If the vision is to have meaning it must become concrete, an actualized subjective aim. Does the vision become a true example at some point? In discussing the highest form of religion, Whitehead writes: "In a communal religion youstudy the will of God in order that He may preserve you; in a purified religion, rationalized under the influence of the world-concept, you study His goodness in order to be like Him. It is the difference between the enemy you conciliate and the companion whom you imitate." Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 40, Surely "to be like" and to "imitate” suggest the necessity for concreteness, and thus allow for Christology, if indeed the suggestions do not re­quire it 2
111James, The Concrete God, Chapter 8.
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for an extension into Christology proper. Jesus, for Hart- 
shome, is seen in two ways: as actual, involved and suf­
fering in the concrete world as a concrete event, and in 
this concreteness as symbolic of the nature of reality. 
Hartshorne*s focus on Jesus is primarily at the concrete 
event of the cross.
. . . the cross, of God’s love, transcends symbols—  it is an occurrence which, as actual, is consistent with the reality in which it stands and, as symbolic, is an indication that the reality is best understood as being like the love shown in the cross. Jesus is literally divine in that He is God loving--not merely lïïce God, but as a part of God. Jesus is symbolically divine in that His actual love analogically points to the whole of the reality of God as love.112
Neither Hartshorne nor James states why the cross is to be 
understood this way. That is, what makes the cross this 
symbol? Both assume it is and accept its importance. Cer­
tainly Hartshorne takes it to be a key for understanding 
the nature of the reality of God as involved, at least in­
tuitively, with humanity in love and suffering. Why is the 
cross, or Jesus at the cross, selected for this literal and 
symbolic designation? Why: not another? Hartshorne does not 
answer this. Can it be that his own Christian heritage 
speaks in his philosophical system?
The contrast between the modem Antiochenes* posi­
tion and Process Thought can be sharply drawn here. The 
modem Antiochenes start from a position within the Chris­
tian Faith. Attention is then given to discover a philo­
sophical system appropriate for helping explain the faith
^^^Ibid.. p. 133.
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position. Pittenger and Williams have so utilized process 
philosophy, but their starting point is clearly from within 
the Christian F a i t h . J e s u s  has already been chosen. But 
those who select process philosophy as the starting point 
face a different problem; namely, how does one get to a clear 
Christian Faith position from the philosophical stance? Why 
should the philosophical process result in the affirmation of 
the Christian Faith as against another religion, or even in 
no religion? The question is not whether Christian theology 
can employ process thought in its explication and defense, 
for clearly it can do so; rather, the question is whether 
there is a theological outcome to process philosophy, and 
whether that outcome lands one in the domain of the Christian 
Faith? Hartshorne does express a Christian position, but his 
system does not clearly argue it. The problem becomes more 
acute when it comes to Christology. Both Hartshorne and 
Whitehead seemed to have recognized the acuteness, and re­
fused to get directly involved in Christology. James feels 
the Christological suggestions are there to be drawn out and 
used.
James finds two other ideas in Hartshorne*s thought 
helpful in suggesting a Christology, namely, personal im­
mortality and prayer. While Hartshorne rejects any concept 
of immortality which stresses the idea of reward and punish-
^^^See supra. Chapter II, pp. 106 ff., 117, Footnote
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he does accept an "objectively real" sense of im­
mortality, in which actual occurrences are not lost. In 
this Jesus is not different from any other man. How is 
Jesus then unique? It is novelty which makes any event 
unique. That is, it is the exercise of freedom of choice 
in an occasion to advance into novelty rather than to re­
produce merely its past which makes an event unique. While 
this may define Jesus* own uniqueness, it is a process not 
limited to Him. Jesus* uniqueness occurs in the same way 
as uniqueness does for other men.
But by adding the understanding of prayer the prop-
11508ition of Jesus* uniqueness becomes clearer. In order 
" . . .  to become consciously aware of God, man must speak 
about or to Him."^^^ This is necessary since in terms of 
consciousness man is linguistic. James* idea of the "her­
meneutical circle" is introduced here. This idea proposes 
that in order to recognize reality when it appears some 
knowledge of it must already be p r e s e n t . T h e r e f o r e ,  to
^^^Though Hartshorne does see the necessity for man’s awareness of divine good and his need to do it,
James utilizes the concept of prayer as an il­lustration of the Christology he finds implicit in Hart- 8h o m e  *8 thought, but James advances the concept as an argu­ment quite necessary to the development of that Christology. James, The .Concrete God, p. 138.
p. 139.
. Ogden's position is not too dissimilar in proposing that some knowledge of God is already there in man whether he likes to acknowledge it or not. Cf. infra. Chap­ter III, pp. 257 ff.
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refuse to speak to God is to refuse to call upon the reality 
where one stands, and, at the same time, to pray, to address 
God is possible only because He is the reality. Since James 
is following Hartshorne here, it must also be remembered 
that the concrete is greater than and includes the abstract. 
Therefore, to pray is both to acknowledge the idea of God 
and, in a greater sense, to experience the concrete reality 
of God. Such an experience means everyone has faith. Faith 
is positive in two directions; as an " . . . intuitive 
realization of God . . . "  and as the " . . . definite ex­
perience of God . , . . ”118 the concrete includes the 
abstract, so does faith, as the experience of God, include 
reason, as the realization of God. There is a problem 
in this form of argument ; namely, how does one guard against 
subjectivity? The appeal to experience to confirm reason 
may well provide an objective measure, but modem psychology 
argues persuasively that man may twist his experiences to 
confirm his delusions, thus rendering experience to be 
nothing more than mere subjectivity.
In James * view, " . . .  to posit faith is to affirm 
God. It is . . . possible for *Jesus Christ* to symbolize 
being in God because of the logical necessity of prior con­
crete faith.”120 This allows for the possibility that Jesus 
may symbolize being in God, but by itself this does not lead
^^^James, The Concrete God, p. 140.
Ibid.. p. 142. ^^Olbid.. p. 141.
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to the conclusion that He is. James pursues the idea of 
the "hermeneutical circle** he has proposed, namely, that we 
can interpret what comes to us only because we already pos­
sess some knowledge or awareness of it. In this argument, 
interpretation is circular rather than linear. Accordingly, 
then, theological abstractions are employed to enable us to 
know essentially what we already know intuitively. Presum­
ably this suggests that by utilizing the abstract term 
Christ, as the symbol of being in God, theology can help 
us understand what intuitively we sense in our experience 
of Jesus,
Ontologically, the one to whom the name [of Jesus] is spoken already intuitively knows that God is love. This knowledge makes possible the recognition of Jesus as the act of God*s love. One can know Jesus as the love of God only if he already understands love to some extent.121
Epistemologically, that which is offered as a symbol can be
one only because that which is symbolized is already known,
not just knowable. Granted this view, James* conclusion is
not surprising.
The task of Christian theology is not to bring to the hearer the experience of Jesus Christ, but to point out that the hearer already **has it.** That is, the concrete experience of Jesus Christ, as an actual occur­rence in God is the inevitability to which Christian theology points. Hence, Christian faith is experienced before it is named by Christian theology. Christian faith must be ontologically prior to abstract naming in the same way that the concrete is ontologically priorto all abstract naming.122
^^^Ibid., p. 145, brackets added. See also supra,Chapter III, pp. 201 ff.
^^^Ibld.. p. 148.
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For James, Jesus is the Christ because we already 
know in experience what such a designation means • Can James * 
approach be appropriately designated an epistemological 
Christology? As a process thinker he has avoided the prob­
lem of revelation, but does experience, as James understands 
it, function in the same way as revelation, namely, as an 
impetus to and a check upon our faith. Accordingly, can 
James avoid dealing with the problem of true versus false 
experience, since experience is to occupy the same terrain 
held by the concept of revelation? Also, what are the cri­
teria which enable one to designate Jesus Christ as the 
symbol of being in God, and not Buddha, or another? Further, 
does not the "naming,** though an abstraction from concrete 
experience, become a concretion? The Hebrews held it does. 
To name God is to express His reality. Then is to name 
Jesus Christ as the symbol of being in God at the same 
time to create the concretion which produces the naming?
C . John Cobb 
In spite of James * helpfulness in indicating a 
Christology compatible with Hartshorne*s thought, the view 
James presents is somewhat deficient. It has been suggested 
throughout this thesis that an inadequate concept of sin was 
part of the reason for the increasing dissatisfaction with, 
if not the downfall of, nineteenth century liberal theology, 
and its doctrine of Christology in p a r t i c u l a r W h i l e
1 9 0 Cf. supra. Chapter I. pp. 57. 63 ff.. 69. 75 ff.: Chapter II, pp.*TI5"ff.
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liberalism did regain a sense of the genuine humanity of 
Jesus and His work, at the same time, by weakening the con­
cept of sin against which Christ’s work is pitted, the work 
itself loses significance. As liberalism swung more weight 
to the side of the human ppssibility for man’s extrication 
from evil, reliance, accordingly, upon Christ’s redemptive 
work was rendered less necessary. Such a swing in liberal­
ism opened the door to a consideration of any human endeavor 
to redeem, thus paralleling concern for Jesus with an in­
creasing concern for other religions. Consequently, both 
the effectiveness and the uniqueness of Christ were called 
into question. P. T. Forsyth recalled Christian theology 
to a concern for soteriology, while Barth’s recall was to 
the uniqueness of God’s Christ. For whatever the content 
of orthodox Christian theology may be, it can contain no 
less than an affirmation that it proceeds from and with 
Jesus Christ, who for us men and our salvation came down 
from heaven! Unless those, who would construct a Chris­
tology upon the basis of process thought, pay attention to 
the concept of sin, they can scarcely avoid the deficiency 
of their liberal forebears. Yet process philosophy itself 
is not very helpful at this point.
In a frequently quoted statement Whitehead indicated, 
’’All simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon 
the rock of the problem of evil.*'^^^ At least Whitehead, 
himself, gave little consideration to the doctrine of sin.
^^^Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 74.
224
Peters argues that the neglect occurs because process phi­
losophy is a metaphysical system rather than a doctrine of 
man.^25 Lowe points out that Whitehead discusses sin no­
where, since in rejecting an understanding of God as omni­
potent or issuing decrees, he had no need for the theologi­
cal concept of sin.^^^ It is on this point that Madden and 
Hare criticize Whitehead. Their main argument is that 
Whitehead’s system does not guarantee the triumph of good 
over evilI Such a triumph, they contend, is essential to 
a theism of any kind.^^^ Whitehead’s response could be 
that the attack assumes categories of absolutes for God 
which Whitehead explicitly rejects. That is, a position 
which guarantees the triumph of good over evil requires 
the establishment or recognition of the power to effect 
the g u a r a n t e e . F o r  Whitehead this direction of thought
^^^Peters. The Creative Advance. p. 128.
^^^Lowe, Understending Whitehead, p. 112, See supra. Chapter III, p. 1851
^^^Madden and Hare, "Evil and Unlimited Power," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XX, 1946, pp. 278-289. Both the triumph of good and^ a concept of a personal being are requi­sites, in their view, for any theism.
^^^adden and Hare argue for the inclusion of abso­lutes, even though in a somewhat tempered view. '*Surely he [God] must have been powerful enough to ’call the whole thing off’ even if not in a position to create and change the World as he liked. If he had anything approaching the power associated with a theistic God, he surely would have been able at least to nip some of the more agonizing aspects of existence in the bud." Ibid., pp. 288-289. Cobb indi­cates the problem theologians must face in dealing with Whitehead. ” . . .  the questions in the foreground of con­cern for the Christian theologian were on the periphery of concern for Whitehead. Philosophy of science, epistemology.
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is unacceptable as his philosophical commitment is to a 
process of development rather than to a concept of substance. 
Thus, there can be for Whitehead no assumed triumph of good 
over evil. Further, in Whitehead’s view, if there is to be 
freedom for the organism worthy of the name of freedom, then 
no guarantee of a specific outcome to choices can be pre- 
sumed, But if God remains merely neutral in decision 
making, in what an actual occasion is and what it becomes as 
object for other actualizations, then surely what is called 
into question is the appropriateness of designating this 
conceptual entity ’’God
Reeves and Brown^^^ seek to defend process thought, 
vis-a-vis Whitehead, regarding the category of evil on the 
one hand, by underscoring an insistence upon a freedom for
ontology, logic and mathematics, along with broad humanistic concerns, dominated his thought. He never organized his work extensively around the doctrine of man or the doctrine of God. Hence, the theologian approaches Whitehead’s work asking questions, the answers to which are not readily avail­able." Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 268-2b9. Surely a doctrine of God is central for Whitehead but along philosophical rather than theological lines. While Cobb’s remarks are appropriate, and indicate the kind of problem theologians face in confronting Whitehead, it is pertinent to note that as much, if not more, use is made of Whitehead by theologians as by philosophers.
1 OQ^Hartshorne makes this point most emphatically."God cannot wish to cut off the conditions of freedom thatmake evil possible, for then he would cut off also thosethat make good possible, and this would not be ’preventing evil ’ in the sense in which one could want evil to be pre­vented." "A Philosopher’s Assessment of Christianity," p. 171. See also Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity,"The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXI, 1967, p. 285.
^^^Reeves and Brown, "The Development of Process Theology," Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, pp. 21-64.
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actual entities which necessitates that God’s participation 
in decision making be one of providing a ’’lure’’ toward the 
actualization of His aim, but a ’’lure’’ to be held alongside 
other lures by the organism, and on the other hand by argu­
ing that God, within the limits of his persuasion and the 
organism’s freedom, is interested in the emergence of good 
in the w o r l d , B u t  Madden and Hare object at precisely 
this point: i.e., that in order to preserve freedom God
cannot act to secure the triumph of good over evil, and in 
principle must abide by an acceptance of the possibility of 
the effectiveness of any lure. In rebuttal, Hartshorne 
points out that neither Whitehead nor he conceived God as
desiring evil, rather one aims at the good if one is ethi-
132cal, and this is entirely so in the case of the divine. 
However, both men uphold value in the realms of aesthetic 
satisfaction and the emergence of novelty, rather than in 
the moral realm. Christian argues further that for White­
head God is not morally good, since the choices of inclu­
sion and exclusion necessary to moral conduct simply do not
131Ibid., pp. 43-44. Meland frames the question as one which must resolve the issue between power and goodness In his view it is part of the problem of transcendence and immanence. In both cases balance is required. Power quali­fies goodness, providing it with redemptive activity; while goodness qualifies power, providing God with a relational and participating character by which redemptive activity is initiated. In terms of Christology Meland finds the image of the Suffering Servant most apropos. Bernard Meland, The Realities of Faith (New York: Oxford University Press,1962), Chapter XII.
132Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity,"p. 286.
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apply to God,^^^ Lowe indicates Whitehead never wrote on 
ethical t h e o r y . F o r  Hartshorne, sin as historical, as a 
contingent factor about man, lies outside of metaphysics, 
and more properly belongs to the fields of psychology, an­
thropology, or t h e o l o g y . A t  this point, therefore, at­
tention must be directed to John Cobb’s attempt to deal 
with the concepts of anthropology and of sin.
Cobb’s approach to anthropology begins with a mini­
mal statement about God. Indeed, almost all process think­
ers start here, for the concept of God is the keystone in 
process t houghtTherefore, for Cobb, " . . .  the possi- 
bility of affirming life and humanity depends on belief in 
God. The historic ground for affirming the goodness of 
creation is belief in the goodness of the c r e a t o r . T h e  
belief is directed not " . . . as an instrument to human 
good but for what God is in himself . . . It is with
faith in God that our understanding of ourselves begins.
This faith takes two directions. First, it affirms both 
God’s goodness, and the possibility for this goodness to
^^^Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Meta­physics , pp. 400-403.
•■Lowe, Understanding Whitehead, p. 111. " . . .in fact he disliked the s u b j e c t i b i d .
134 
135
136
^Hartshorne, "Comment by Professor Hartshorne," p . 142.
Cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 201 ff.
^^^Cobb, God and the World (Philadelphia: Westmin­ster, 1969), p. 971
228
exist in the world. Then secondly, this faith is yoked 
to hope in God. What these mean in Cobb’s view is that 
" . . .  the past is not lost, that achieved value is cumu­
lative . Human experience is cumulative. No signifi­
cant human experience is possible if every experience 
starts from scratch. Without cumulative experience man is 
not a decision maker; he is not free. For Cobb, this means 
that man " . . .  is primarily formed by history.
It is important to note here that Cobb distinguishes 
between natural theology, which he holds to be the overlap 
between philosophy and theology, and historical analysis of 
the materials Christians believe, which is the overlap be­
tween history and theo logy .Increasingly  since writing 
A Christian Natural Theology Cobb has turned to history for 
his understanding of Christian theological concepts. When 
he claims that man is formed primarily by history, he is not 
offering a determinism in some form. Rather, " . . .  his­
tory is ultimately the history of subjects in their sub­
jectivity and not the account of events externally viewed 
or r e c o n s t r u c t e d . "142 cobb is arguing, as a process thinker, 
that the objective is meaningful only when it enters the
p. 98.
^^®Cobb, "The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian Perspective," The Finality of Christ, ed. by Dow Kirkpatrick (New York: Abingdon, 196b), p. 124.
141cobb, The Structure of Christian Existence (Phil- adeIphia; Westminster, 1967),~p. 6.
142cobb, "The Finality of Christ," p. 124.
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subjective. He distinguishes between "hypothetical facts," 
meaning those events as would be recorded by a neutral ob­
server, and "real facts," meaning what actually occurred 
to the many persons experiencing, and thereby interpreting, 
the e v e n t s . 148 The real facts become part of the decision 
making process. The objective becomes subjective through 
interpretation which enables the experience to become part
of subsequent experiences. It is in this sense that Cobb
144speaks of man being formed primarily by history. James 
agrees with Cobb. He suggests that by using the category 
of history in understanding personal experience, process 
thought guards against what he holds to be Kierkegaard’s 
distortion of the meaning of truth when seen only as sub­
jective personal experience.
Experience contains the realm of objectivity.Who we are is contingent upon where we are. What we have experienced depends upon what has happened beyond our control in objective history as well as what we have subjectively caused. The test of the adequacy of the concrete God is history itself,145
In terms of anthropology, Cobb suggests that we really
understand ourselves only as we understand our past,148
Yet, while past experiences act upon the present
14^Cobb, "Ontology, History, and Christian Faith," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, Spring, 1965, pp. 273-7761^rT[soT. 281.
144This is apparently Cobb’s adaptation of White­head’s concept of "prehension."
14^james, The Concrete God, p. 186.
148Cobb, "Ontology, History, and Christian Faith," pp. 272-273.
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actual occasion, at the same time man possesses freedom by 
which he may change the determinative direction of the past. 
Cobb holds that freedom and responsibility are necessary 
categories for anthropology in order for man to be acknowl­
edged as a subject rather than as a mere o b j e c t . 1^7 gut, 
instead of turning to existentialism, as Ogden and others 
do, Cobb proceeds from a position critical of existentialism.
In his use of freedom, man is a decision maker.
What "ought" he to decide? The weakness in existentialism, 
as Cobb sees it, is that it does not " . . .  allow us to 
understand man as encountered by a demand objective to his 
preference, yet rightfully commanding his obedience.”148 
For the existentialist responsibility includes the estab- 
lishment of one’s own norms. In Kant’s view the norms are 
written into the rational nature of man and should yield 
to reflection, but " . . .  the claim that there is an in­
escapable oughtness in human experience is subject to 
phenomenological verification."14^ Cobb agrees that the 
norms should derive from reflection, but " . . .  as a sub­
jective form of certain prepositional feelings of the 
imaginative variety . . . "  rather than as an objective form 
derived merely from human experience.1^^ For Cobb the
147Cobb, "Whitehead’s Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of Man," The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, July, 1964, p. 211.
148ibid., p. 213. 149Ibid.
l^Olbid.. p. 214.
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objective category is set over against man. It is not de­
termined by natural forces, nor by man’s own past. Both of 
these areas would deny man’s freedom in an actual occasion.
What is it which is set over against man, so that a 
given occasion may be more than a continuous repetition of 
the past? Whitehead speaks of the "lure" of God. Cobb de­
fines this lure as the "call forward," In both cases, if 
responded to, the result is an advance into novelty, a new 
actualization which is not directly derivative from the past, 
for the past requires conformity in a present occasion. 
Therefore, the call forward provides freedom for an actual 
occasion. No total freedom is provided. Man is primarily 
formed by history. But growth, new and richer possibili­
ties in concrete novelty for our being, can occur. This 
means that the ideal, or the pure possibility, in terms of 
its relevant application to a given actual situation, can 
serve to call man beyond conformity and to offer " . . . the 
possibility of achieving some novel synthesis out of all 
that it receives from the past."151 Real decision making 
is involved, but only because the ideal stands over against 
our past. "It is this claim of the normative possibility 
upon us which I am naming the call forward . . .”^82 Cobb 
speaks of this process as one of our "self-actualization."^^^ 
He sees the result of our response to the call creating that
^^^Cobb, God and the World, p. 54, 
^^^Ibid.. p. 49. ^^^Ibid.
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condition which enables us to participate in a continuing 
process of becoming. It is a matter of becoming as against 
conformity.
In Cobb’s view the past requires conformity to it­
self. Therefore, the lure toward greater self-actualiza­
tion stands in tension with the determinative nature of the
p a s t ,^^4 "The power of our own past over us in each new
present is immense . . . .  It is easier to ignore the lure
155of God than to overcome the weight of that past
That it is easier to accept the determinism of the past does
not absolve man of responsibility in his choice. He can 
decide against his past. He can respond to God’s call for- 
ward.^^^ It is here that Cobb can be said to reply to the 
criticism against process thought offered by Madden and 
H a r e . ^^7 That criticism was that process thought does not 
offer a view of theism which insures the triumph of good 
over evil. Such a view, they contend, means that either God 
lacks the power or He chooses not to use His power to achieve 
this aim. Neither option is worthy of the term "God."
Cobb proposes a different definition of God’s power. He 
suggests that God’s power is that of persuasion, the power to 
influence others in their exercise of power. If it were
^^4ibid., p. 49. ^^^Ibld., p. 82.
156
157.
p. 49.
Supra. Chapter III, pp. 224 ff. 
^^^Cobb, God and the World, pp. 89-90.
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more than this, man would not possess freedom. God’s per­
suasion must not be coercive. Therefore, Cobb speaks of 
God’s exercise of optimum persuasive power according to the 
situation.
Two points should be noted. First, power exercised 
as persuasion allows for evil. That is, God calls us for­
ward, exercising persuasion, toward the good He knows to 
be possible in the situation (through His subjective aim). 
Yet in our freedom we can resist this lure. We can resist 
because there is something to be resisted. It is the pres­
ence in actuality of concrete choices in an actual occasion 
which allows for good and evil. Where significant values 
exist, where real choice is possible, there can evil exist. 
By creating good, God provides the context in which there 
is evil.^^^ In this respect God is responsible for evil.
What Cobb has done is to redefine the meaning of 
God’s power in terms of the need of his anthropology. That 
is, God’s power defined as persuasion, even as optimum per­
s u a s i o n ,  ^ 80 Is required to establish man’s freedom. Thus 
he has sought to define God’s power in such a way as to pro­
vide a basis for understanding an ongoing interrelationship 
between God and the world, an interrelationship composed 
of decision making on the part of both.^^l This approach
^89Ibid., p. 96.
160This is Cobb’s substitute understanding of God's ’’omnipotence.’’ Ibid., p. 90.
161Ibid., p. 92.
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by-passes the criticism of Madden and Hare rather than meets 
it. God simply does not confront evil in Cobb’s view. What 
He confronts is the decision making process of actual occa­
sions in which He can participate persuasively but not 
coercively. Cobb is concerned primarily, perhaps even ex­
clusively, with the world as it is. But can he do theology 
and ignore the meaning of God as Creator? Cobb’s own view 
of history as necessary to theology would suggest he cannot. 
To acknowledge God as Creator is also to acknowledge our 
need to understand the meaning and purpose of that creation. 
At least in dealing with the problem of evil and sin, and 
the relationship of God’s power to these, Cobb has not 
seemed to do this,
The second point to be observed is that man is, 
nevertheless, responsible for his sin.
Sin is the self-determination of the actual occa­sion in such a way as to inhibit the actualization [of the best self-actualization for the occasion de­rived from the influence of God’s subjective aim for the present situation].^82
Man is a free being as a gift of God. In the exercise of 
his freedom man can choose to resist God’s persuasive power. 
Yet man recognizes the reality in which he lives. There­
fore, sin is . the disproportion between a man’s
motives and acts, on the one hand, and the reality he ac­
knowledges, on the o t h e r . "183 if man cannot choose, then
l^^Cobb, "Whitehead’s Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of Man," p. 214; brackets added.
^^^Ibld.. p. 210. See also p. 213.
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he cannot sin. But since he can both choose and know he is 
choosing in the midst of a given, acknowledged understanding 
of reality, then he sins. That is, he chooses contrary to 
the reality he acknowledges. Note that man does not create 
the reality, he acknowledges it. It exists as a given. God 
is the Creator, His purpose makes demands on man. Just how 
strong are these demands?
Here Cobb introduces a modification in his thought 
which seems out of character with his methodology.
A demand made of me from beyond inevitably con­flicts with my appetites and passions, Yet I cannot understand my obedience and passion as merely natural, for I cannot but acknowledge my Creator’s claim upon me. Hence I experience myself as an agent of choice, a will, responsible for obedience or disobedience, transcending both reason and i m p u l s e . 184
Cobb has already established the latter part of this state­
ment. That is, man’s freedom is as a decision maker for 
whom in a present situation the weight of past experiences 
is greater than the lure of novelty to transcend that past 
in some way, though both the past and the lure of novelty 
are part of the freedom. But has Cobb introduced the sug­
gestion of a concept of original sin in proposing the in­
evitable conflict between the demand from beyond and my 
appetites and passions? That there is conflict between the 
lure and my history to any given point, is a position both 
reasonable and consistent with Cobb’s presuppositions.
Ibid., p. 122; italics are added. Elsewhere Cobb speaks of a power of sin in man’s life that is not simply subject to his will. The Structure of Christian Existence, pp. 120-121,
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Indeed, the conflict is the clearest indication of the ex­
istence of genuine freedom for man. But does not the pro­
posal of inevitability in the conflict suggest something 
less than freedom? That is, would not the existence of 
freedom include at times the possibility that man would 
choose the lure without conflict? Surely it does! Man’s 
proneness to repeat past decisions suggests the appropri­
ateness of the term "conflict" to define man’s relationship 
to God. But for Cobb to exclude the possibility of in­
stances where no conflict is evidenced is to raise the
1 ^  cquestion of methodological inconsistency.
If man is to be responsible for his sin, then note 
must be taken of two additional points in Cobb’s thought. 
First, God’s forgiveness is essential to man’s burden for 
his own sinfulness.
If God, who places me into the situation where again and again I sin by resistance to his persuasive powers, judged me harshly for my sin, I might still complain against him. But if instead he continuously forgives me for my resistance to him and offers me again in each new moment the best possibility for my fresh realization, then the fact that my sin is a function of his gift is no reason for contempt of the gift or resentment toward the giver. 166
In this concept Cobb leans on his affirmation that faith and
Cobb’s subsequent argument that man is to be known in the depths of his inward being as well as outward behavior, and that man is not free because of habitual responses in the inner man, but that he can choose to transcend this self, only serves to highlight further this confusing statement. However, cf. also infra. pp. 238 ff,
^86qqLl  ^ God and the World, p. 91.
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hope in God are essential to man’s decision making. Not 
only does man’s actual decision count— that is, it possesses 
accumulative value— but also there is real freedom in his 
decision making, as much freedom from an inevitable burden 
of his own past as from God’s demands. Forgiveness is, 
therefore, required in order for man to be free and respon­
sible .
The second point follows as Cobb turns to love for 
an understanding of the meaning of sin. "Sin exists as the 
corruption of the capacity for love."^^® What does love 
mean? Cobb’s understanding in traditional Christian terms 
is that the Jewish concern for love in the context of the 
law was transformed by Jesus in three ways. First, the 
demand of love was held to be " . . . an unselfseeking open­
ness to the need of the neighbor, and this neighbor was any 
man who was in n e e d N o  law was to obstruct this demand. 
Second, while actions and motives are both important, Jesus 
radically expressed the priority of the latter. Obedience 
to principles was to be superseded by an attitude of the 
heart. Third, the motives, furthermore, were to be pure.
The demand for purity proceeded not from the power of men 
to act practically but from the demand of God
114.
^^^See supra, Chapter III, pp. 227 ff.
^^^Cobb, God and the World, p. 96.
^^^Cobb, The Structure of Christian Existence, p.
^^^See ibid., pp. 114-116.
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In terms of his theological methodology, Cobb de­
fines love simply as the "positive valuation of an object 
. . This is a definition intended to cover the use
of the term "love" for general understanding and for vari­
ous cultures. For Christian existence decision making is 
to exercise its freedom in love. But this exercise can 
lead to levels of sin as well as to self-sacrificial love, 
to the most hideous crimes as well as the finest acts.^^Z 
This is the peril of God's gift of freedom. In Christian­
ity the demand is for love to be a motive in man's willing 
and acting. The demands of love as positive evaluation of 
an object come into conflict with man's "natural self- 
centeredness of feeling." It is a matter of doing the 
good with love, as Paul reminds us in I Corinthians 13.
Yet man does possess feelings of self-preoccupation. To 
exercise freedom in love beyond this self-centeredness is 
unattainable by man's own efforts. Man can love only when 
he knows he is already forgiven and loved himself. Then 
he can accept his self-preoccupation and be opened to 
others, accepting them as they are, not for his salvation
171Ibid., p. 127. In somewhat fuller terms, Cobb de« fines love as , , . any mode of relating to an object as apositive intrinsic value [as opposed to instrumental value], in which conscious psychic activity is decisively involved. By 'object' here I do not mean a mere thing in contrast to a person, but rather an intentional or epistemological ob­ject, which can be either personal or impersonal . . . .Love requires some distinction between the subject and the object." Ibid,; brackets added.
pp. 122-123. ^^^Xbld.. p. 133.
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but for their need.^^^
Again, the problem of conflict between natural man 
and God's demands arises here.^^S Cobb has defined sin as 
the corruption of man's capacity for love. This would sug­
gest that what is potentially there for man in a capacity 
for love is distorted in some way. Yet Cobb also suggests 
that to love conflicts with man's natural self-centeredness. 
Again, the problem to be raised with Cobb is not with the 
conflict but with the proposition of inevitability. Does 
the distortion caused by sin remove the capacity to love?^76 
Can man ever love even though man is self-centered in his 
nature? Surely Cobb's methodology must allow for this 
possibility even though he feels man must be helped in 
order to become the man that God purposes for him to become. 
It is this need for help which directs Cobb's attention to 
Christology.
Cobb proposes to approach Christology through an 
understanding of certain of Whitehead's concepts. In con­
trast to nineteenth century Liberalism, Cobb refuses to 
accept a Christocentrie theology which rejects all philo­
sophical reflections about God, claiming instead that He is 
known only in C h r i s t . F o r  Cobb the attempt to formulate
^^^Ibid.. pp. 134-136.
supra, Chapter III, pp. 235 ff.
^^^Cf. supra, Chapter II, p. 121, Footnote 111.
^^^Cobb, The Structure of Christian Existence (Phila- deIphia : Westminster Press , 1 9 6 7 ) p . % .
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a Christology must utilize concepts which can be explained
in terms of natural theology.
My argument is not that faith can never proceed directly to Christological formulations. Clearly it can do so . . .  . My argument is that even when it does so, a great deal is assumed that is not directly validated by faith itself.178
Is God distinctively present in Jesus? The philo­
sophical approach to this question must first ask if God 
can be present in any man. In Whiteheadian terms Cobb af­
firms that God can be present in a man in the same way that 
an actual occasion can be present in subsequent occasions. 
God also is datum prehended by an actual occasion. Thus
God can be present in a man without displacement, that is,
17Qwithout one entity replacing something in another.  ^ Like 
other data, God is objective to the subjectivity of an 
actual occasion. There is nothing in this point, however, 
to suggest a decisiveness of distinctiveness of God in 
Jesus. But the prehension of God by actual occasions is
^^^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 12, He argues that, " . 1 7 the attempt to rest belief in God solely on Jesus Christ is, from the perspective of system­atic theology, illusory. Neither Jesus nor the early church held that the God of whom they spoke had been un­known in prior times." Cobb, The Structure of Christian Existence, p. 40.
l^^Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 385. Cobb makes more of this point elsewhere. "The presence in me of other entities does not violate my unique individuality and seIf-determinism but rather makes that individuality and self-determinism possible. There is no displacement, there is rather empowerment." Cobb, "The Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian Perspective," p. 147. Such a presence makes choice, and hence freedom, possible.
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not the same for each occasion. Such prehensions are highly 
differentiated.
How does the differentiation or diversity occur? It 
occurs in one or more of three ways: first, God's initial
aim for any given actual occasion differs in that it is only 
for that particular occasion, and is, therefore, unique; 
second, the objective prehension by the actual occasion of 
the initial aim may be broader than mere objectification, 
it may also prehend something of the wider purposes of God; 
and third, the way in which an actual occasion in its free­
dom decides to respond to the initial aim differs from the 
response of other actual occasions, and such decisions influ*
loience the ensuent responses. With the proposal that one 
entity can be present in another without displacement, and 
that there is a differentiation in the relation of God to 
an actual entity through His initial aim for a given actual 
occasion, it would appear that Cobb is ready to offer his
IftOCobb also deals with the mind (psyche)-body analogy for using human experience to approach Christo­logical problems, but he separates this from an approach based upon the relation of one occasion of experience with other realities. The former tack is given some, though inadequate, attention in The Structure of Christian Exist­ence, pp. 143 ff. It is the latter approach being followed here.
IG^Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," pp. 387 ff. Hamilton's understanding of Whitehead for the third point offered by Cobb is to speak of the immanence in an entity of what is presented to it by another entity. What is ob­jective to an entity may become subjective by decision and then is objectively immanent in the experiential life of the entity. Peter N. Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modem Christology," Christ For Us Today* ed. by W. N. Pittenger, pp. 162 ff.
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Christological proposition. But he introduces apother in­
gredient at this point, namely the "unique 'I' of Jesus.
183For Cobb the historical view is important. Jesus 
must be an historical entity, a man. But Cobb is not im­
pressed with the claim that Jesus was fully human. Men 
differ profoundly from one another. One cannot designate 
any one structure of existence as embracing all human 
structures. Nor does an understanding of common humanity 
open the way by which one can understand what it was like 
to be Jesus, But the claim does establish that, "Strict 
identity of Jesus with God is simply nonsensical. But it is 
not nonsensical that God's presence in Jesus played a struc­
tural role in the actual occasions constituting his personal 
life which it has played nowhere e l s e . "^84 xhis is an af­
firmation which requires some explanation.
When Cobb speaks of "I" he refers to that relatively 
continuous center of one's personal life which tries to 
organize the whole psychic life. The "I" is autonomous, 
making its own decisions, bearing its own responsibility, 
becoming itself, not merely a part of a defined biological 
species or cultural community. Jesus* "I" also is autono­
mous, but "in such a way as to identify his perceptions with 
G o d ' s . "185 This is a claim for uniqueness and brings Cobb
182cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," pp. 388 ff. 
IB^Cf. supra, Chapter III, pp. 228 ff.
18^Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 390.
.. p. 392.
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to his Christological proposal.
In general, in their relation to God, men prehend 
the initial aim in such a way that " . . .  although the 
character of the initial aim is of crucial importance to 
the becoming occasion, the fact that it is derived from God 
usually plays little role in its conscious subjective 
f o r m . "188 Again Cobb implies that there is a natural dis­
position in man directed away from God, or at least from a 
conscious conception of His wider purposes, Cobb does grant 
that sometimes for some men the awareness of God's call does 
play an important role in the experience. Yet nowhere does 
Cobb suggest why the one form of prehension should take 
place any more than the other.18? In Jesus* case this pre­
hension was conscious. Yet it is not clear in Cobb's pre­
sentation if this consciousness makes a difference. The 
uniqueness of Jesus is constituted in this way:
God's aim for Jesus was that he prehend God in terms of that which constitutes him as God--his lord­ship, his love, and his incomparable superiority of being and value. This prehension was not experienced by Jesus as information about God but as the presence of God to and in him. Furthermore, and most uniquely, it was not experienced by him as one prehension along­side others to be integrated by him into a synthesis with them. Rather this prehension of God constituted in Jesus the center from which everything else in his psychic life was integrated. This means that at least in some decisive moments of his life he perceived the world, his own past and future, his emotions and reason, in terms of the presence of God in him.188
IB^ibid., pp. 392-393, italics added.
187Ibid.. p. 393. Cf. supra, Chapter III, pp.
188çobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 393.
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Does this seem to suggest a lessening of Jesus* freedom as 
an actual entity? That is, was God's initial aim for Jesus 
such that Jesus prehended what God wanted Him to prehend?
Was there choice for Jesus in this prehension? If no choice 
is involved, the idea of "conscious" prehension has little, 
if any, meaning.
Cobb rejects the extremes on the one hand of ortho­
doxy which holds that God determined to be uniquely present 
in Jesus, and on the other hand of liberalism which holds 
that God offers to all men the same relationship to Himself 
which was realized by Jesus, "No entity, including God, 
finally determines exactly how it will be prehended by any 
other e n t i t y ,"189 there is a high differentiation in 
man's prehensions, then a "high-grade" occasion may more 
fully prehend God's subjective aim, and more fully influ­
ence other entities. Cobb holds that the possibility of­
fered Jesus was distinctive, but it may have been offered 
others. Jesus did not initiate the possibility— that 
rested with God--but Jesus responded, though He was not 
compelled to do so. Jesus was unique because God was 
uniquely in Him. Jesus was fully human because God's 
presence in Him did not displace His humanity.
Cobb's proposal raises several questions. If Jesus' 
response is His own, what suggests the response? Barnhart 
suggests that empathy provides the c l u e H a m i l t o n  offers
189ihid., p. 394.
E. Barnhart, "Incarnation and Process Philos-
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"sympatique" as the clue to Jesus* response, and compatibil­
ity as the clue to God's call to J e s u s , H o w e v e r ,  Cobb 
suggests nothing to indicate the reason for Jesus' unique 
response. He affirms and describes that it has taken place. 
But in his affirmation has Cobb not violated the process 
tenet concerning the freedom of each actual entity? It is 
one thing to argue that God could be present uniquely in a 
man, while it is quite a different proposition to argue 
that God ^  present in one man, Jesus. Cobb's argument re­
garding the first proposal is attractive and reasonable in 
process terms, But his argument that Jesus is that man re­
quires much more attention than Cobb has given it. As pre­
sented it is more an affirmation of faith rather than a 
reasoned theological argument. But what of God's redemp­
tive activity in Christ, or, put another way, of God's 
redemptive influence through Christ on other entities?
What is a process view--Cobb's--of redemption?
It is in the very nature of process thought to be 
concerned with the decisions and actions of both man and God, 
and how these affect both. Hartshome puts it this way:
ophy," Religious Studies. Vol. 2, No. 2, April, 1967, pp. 225-2321 See infra. Chapter III, pp. 272 ff.
191pgter Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modem Christology," p. 163. See also pp. 170 ff. The problem with "sympathetique" is that it must either exist prior to the prehension or come into being with the prehension. If the former, then an apriori question must be raised which contradicts the freedom of an actual occasion. However, if the latter description is the case, then the uniqueness question is raised; why does it occur in Jesus' prehension of God's subjective aim and not in the prehensions of other men?
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. . .  I take "true religion" to mean serving God, by which I do not mean simply adoring or "obeying" him, or enabling him to give benefits to me and other nondivine creatures, but also, and essentially, con- tributing value to God which he would otherwise lack.
Hartshome distinguishes between the abstract absoluteness 
and the concrete relativity of God. God will exist regard­
less of man's activities, but the value of His concrete 
state will derive something from us it would otherwise lack. 
"It means that what happens makes a difference to God, that 
he has a future, and that we help to determine each new 
stage of the divine life as it becomes real or present."^93 
This suggests not only that God can be present in any man, 
and not only that God's subjective aim can be actualized in 
any roan, but also that any man's decisions and actions have 
an effect on God.
Dawe argues correctly that ontologically process 
thought accepts a limited God. It is rather an argument 
for a God who has limited Himself by creation and by His 
relationship to it. His will to love binds Him to sinners 
to seek their redemption. Here He is limited, God changes. 
He develops as the situation requires under his love and His 
will to save. The divinity of Christ is to be understood,
IQ 2Hartshome, "The Dipolar Conception of Deity,"p. 274.
^^%artshome. Reality as Social Process, p. 151. Hartshome goes on to say, " , . 7 by his sympathetic omni­science, our free acts are participated in by God, for weal or woe according to the quality of living which we present to him in these acts." Ibid, The reference to "omniscience" is somewhat out of character for Hartshome, but it is the rest of the statement which is pertinent.
247
not in the static terras of nature, but in the dynamic terms 
of His "reconciling a c t i v i t y , "^94 God can change, if He
can be affected by what men do, then Christ's work can in­
deed be valid work. That is, the traditional approaches to 
Christ's atoning work in which the work is held to be either 
one of a legal satisfaction for the penalty man's sin de­
serves, or one of the substitution of an innocent person 
for the penalty-bearing required of the guilty, are meaning­
less for process thinkers. Equally meaningless is the sub­
jective view of atonement in which the position is taken 
that the effectiveness of Christ's atoning work is to be 
seen in what happens to the man who confronts it. Process 
thought argues in principle that both God and man are af­
fected and changed by what Christ does. Both the tradi­
tional approaches and process thought would be in agreement 
that in Christ's work a new thing has come to pass. The 
question for process thought is whether or not the "new 
thing" is uniquq^
Cobb touches upon the problem of the work of Christ 
in two ways: the speculative and the historical. While
both ways require speculation, the first way is an approach
D o n a l d  G. Dawe, The F o ^  of a Servant (Philadel­phia: The Westminister Press, 1963), Chapter IX, A, SethPringle-Pattison argues that, " . . .  for a metaphysic which has emancipated itself from physical categories, the ultimate conception of God is not that of a pre-existent Creator but, as it is for religion, that of the eternal Redeemer of the world. This perpetual process is the very life of God . . , The Idea of God (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1917), pp. 411 ffl
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through the concepts of process thought, while the second 
way is an approach through an understanding of history, 
which Cobb and others find necessary to add to the insights 
of process t h o u g h t . ^95 jijote should be taken that Cobb 
separates the speculative from the religious, as does 
P r i n g l e - P a t t i s o n . Cobb wishes to recognize that that 
which affirms one as a Christian is being grasped by the 
claim of Christ, not by the results of speculative analysis. 
At the same time he holds that the claim without a concep-
1 Q7tuality to support it is w e a k e n e d . I t  is the conceptual­
ity he endeavors to offer. No less do the modem Antio- 
chenes, like Pittenger and Williams, stress the necessity 
of a conceptuality. But their starting point, as seen in 
the last chapter, lies in the religious claims. In contrast 
the process thinkers, like Cobb and Ogden, while acknowl­
edging religious claims, start with the conceptual demands. 
There is considerable merit in the argument that both move­
ments are in fact described, or at least circumscribed, by 
the claims of the Christian faith. But, in conscious theo­
logical orientation, the process thinkers build upon the 
philosophical concepts of Whitehead and H a r t s h o m e  ,^98
195Cf. supra. Chapter II, pp. 133 ff, for Pitten­ger *s position. Cf. also supra. Chapter III, pp. 228 ff.
198cf. supra. Chapter III, footnote 194, p. 247.
^97cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 395, Cf. also supra. Chapter III, pp. 239 ff.
^98cf. supra. Chapter II. pp. 107-110: footnote 103. pp. 117-118. — ^
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Cobb argues that Jesus * prehension of God was such 
that the center of His life was determined by God's presence 
in Him. This constitutes Jesus' claim of authority for us. 
His message has authority for us because of His unique rela­
tionship to God, Cobb distinguishes between intellectual 
belief and perception, in that perception conveys both an 
assent to the reality of God (intellectual belief) and a 
perception of the reality of the world in which one finds 
oneself (effective belief). He holds that the latter real­
ity is the one men heed, and it is held in tension with 
one's acknowledgement of God, presumably because men seek 
self-interest in terms of the world. Again the implicit 
presumption of a natural disposition set against God in 
Cobb's thought arises. But in the case of Jesus, "His per­
ception conformed with his belief. Hence he could speak
199directly out of his perception," Therefore, Jesus em­
bodies the kind of life we intellectually, but not effec­
tively, acknowledge. He presents to us the world as we 
know it must be; even as we already to some degree admit 
to be true.
Two points should be noted here. First, the mes­
sage Jesus presents is of the way reality actually is. He 
not only perceives God, He also reveals Him. Second, when 
Jesus spoke to men, the God He revealed was already known 
to them. To Jesus' authority is added the dimension of 
revelation. However, the revelation is not new, at least
^^^Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 395.
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not totally new. What is new is the total understanding 
brought to the revelation already at least partially known. 
Further this understanding, this reflection concerning Jesus* 
life and message, " . . .  has led to still further reconsid­
eration of the nature of God, to beliefs which were probably 
absent from Jesus* own consciousness. When history is read 
in terms of the centrality of Jesus, the total understanding 
of God is a f f e c t e d . T h i s  means that Jesus continues to 
reveal God to us in new ways.
At this point Cobb again presumes a distinction for 
all men which is not applicable to Jesus. It is the dis­
tinction of a form of inevitable sinfulness which he has not 
actually established. "The perceptions which determine our 
responses to the ever new situations of life are narrow and 
d i s t o r t e d B y  this limitation we cannot fulfill our 
ultimate potentiality, even though we can transcend the re­
sponses in recognizing that they are limited. In Jesus we can
Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 396.Though he does not do so, presumably Cobb is talking about the process principle that an actual occasion affects sub­sequent actual occasions, insofar as it becomes object to their subjective experiences. Thus, Christ's revelation as object to the subjective considerations and decision making of subsequent actual entities enables the actual occasion to be different than it could otherwise be. If Jesus prehends God in such a way that God is present in Him, and the center of His life is determined by this presence, then is Cobb's formulation so very far from Ritschl's whereby Jesus is claimed to have the value of God for us men? Further, does Jesus in this view become identical to, or part of, God's subjective aim for an actual occasion? If so, is the dis­tinction being blurred between the entity of God and the entity of Jesus?
^^^Ibid; cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 235 ff.
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recognize the embodiment of what man really, meaning 
"ideally," is. Does this imply that Jesus is the example 
for all men to follow? Here Cobb's thought is somewhat 
confusing. In Whiteheadian terras Cobb has to reject the 
idea of Jesus as the example. Both God's subjective aim 
for an actual occasion and the prehension by the actual 
entity involved in the occasion are for a particular time 
and situation. That is, they are concrete and not abstract. 
There is nothing to suggest that God endows us all with the 
particular aim with which He endowed Jesus. Abstractly, as 
Jesus was obedient to God in His situation, so we can try 
to be obedient to God in our different situations. Further,
as Jesus indicates what it is to live for and from God, so
202can we in our situations. This is as much as Cobb is 
prepared to say in conceptual terms.
In terms of history, however, Cobb goes much fur-
203ther. The process conceptuality just explored denies a 
direct effectiveness of the past upon the present. But in 
terms of the historical, Cobb proposes two principles or 
points of understanding. First, he suggests that God can 
be causally effective in men in history. "There are men 
whose lives are unintelligible to me apart from God's causal 
efficacy in them."^^^ A study of history is important
ZO^Ibid.. p. 397.
203See supra. Chapter III, pp. 227 ff., 247 ff.
204cobb, "Ontology, History, and Christian Faith," p. 286. Cobb also suggests that self-determination is equally as important as God's causal efficacy, but it is the latter which is being noted here.
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because it presents us with modes of the past which are pos­
sibilities for us now. For the Christian it is important to 
study the history of Jesus for contemporary application. If 
it does not apply, then the endeavor fails. But Cobb holds 
that the evidence supports the possibility for making such 
a contemporary a p p l i c a t i o n . ^^5 This is tied with a second 
principle.
Cobb argues that it is not an illusion to claim that 
Jesus is present to men in more than a merely informational 
way.206 gig argument assumes that cause precedes effect and, 
therefore, involves time. Following this line of reasoning, 
only something of the past has efficacy in the present, Cobb 
refers to this as "a causally efficacious n o n e x i s t e n c e ."207 
That is, all causal efficacy is now not-existing. Past ex­
periences do not have to be of the immediate past to be 
efficacious in the present. They may even be of the dis­
tant past, in much the same way that a childhood experience 
may suddenly be recalled after years. This argument may 
not establish the final claim for Jesus, but it is meant to 
suggest a context in which " . . .to take seriously the 
claim of some Christians that Jesus is immediately and ef­
fectively present in their lives . . . [that through Jesus 
one finds relationship to God] can only be confessed, not
p. 282.
^®®Cobb, "The Finality of Christ in a WhiteheadianPerspective," pp. 147-154.
2 0 7 l b i d . .  p. 150.
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argued.
Cobb finds nothing in process philosophy to prohibit 
such an a r g u m e n t .^^9 indeed, in process thought a past ex­
perience may act as object to an actual entity involved in 
a present actual occasion. But how does that past get 
to the present occasion? Further, the past consists of 
previous decisions which are somewhat restrictive. The 
past requires conformity of the decision making in the 
present. It is God's "lure forward" which, along with the 
creative freedom of the actual entity, opens the way to 
new possibilities. How is Jesus efficaciously present to­
day— meaning He leads us to new possibilities--unless He 
is part of God's subjective aim? If this is the case then 
it is the aim, not the past, which has efficacy and pre­
vails ,210
Finally Cobb acknowledges that in conceptual terms 
there is nothing to suggest that Jesus is the Saviour; that 
He effected change in God. But Cobb does suggest that what 
Jesus may do is to introduce into history a new structure of 
existence in which men can participate with both new possi­
bilities and new problems. "It is my conviction that Jesus 
brought into being for those who responded to him a final
P* 154, brackets added.
^Q^Ibid.. pp. 152-153.
210In fact, Cobb has elsewhere argued that we cannot go back to Jesus; we can only attend the "call forward." Cf Cobb, God and the World, p. 45.
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and unsurpassable structure of existence . . . [which] has
introduced new possibilities of sickness and fragmentation
as well as new possibilities of h e a l t h . C o b b  holds
that Jesus actualized a possibility beyond what we realize
in ourselves.
The new possibilities for interrelationship among men, and especially of relationship with God, for which we may hope, are already foreshadowed and em­bodied in [Jesus] . . . .  To move forward across new thresholds will not require some new impulse— only the fuller realization of what has already been given us in him.212
Does this point of view deny the "lure forward" by its stress 
on the realization of the already given? Does it not undo 
the concept of the "subjective aim" of God? Is Cobb con­
fused; has he contradicted himself; or has he so distin­
guished faith from philosophical theology that when the 
latter cannot clear the claims of the former, he is forced 
to uphold both sides?^^^
David Jenkins proposes that we can never know fin­
ally that Jesus is the Christ, We cannot get to a truth 
statement, only to a truth claim. "But a truth claim is the 
more authenticated the more it can be shown to have a crea­
tive and life-enhancing effect on and through those who
^^^Cobb, "A Whiteheadian Christology," p. 398, brackets added.
^^^Cobb, The Structure of Christian Existence, p. 144, brackets added.
, Cobb, "Christian Natural Theology and Chris­tian Existence," Frontline Theology, ed. by Dean Peerman (London: S.G.M, Press, 1967), p. 41.
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entertain it and assert it,"214 Cobb this is a faith
claim to which he is not opposed. But in conceptual terms 
he cannot, or at least does not, discuss it* In conceptual 
terms Cobb sees the role of Jesus Christ as primarily one 
to provide the formation and renewal of Christian existence 
as a possibility within history. He is also persuaded that 
our belief in the work of God in Jesus must be seen in the 
work of Jesus Christ. But Cobb sees his task to be one of 
developing the concepts in terms of a Christian natural 
theology to demonstrate how this can take p l a c e . ^^5 The 
work of Christ, however, in Cobb's thought, is a weak con­
cern, acknowledged but dealt with quite inadequately.
D . Schubert Ogden
A somewhat different approach to a process thought 
proposal for Christology is taken by Schubert Ogden. Like 
Cobb, Ogden has thus far devoted much more attention to the 
doctrine of God than to the development of a C h r i s t o l o g y
^^^David Jenkins, The Glory of Man (New York: CharlesScribner's Sons, 1967), p 34.
"Christian Natural Theology and Christian Existence," pp. 43-44,
^^^Ogden has not written as extensively as Cobb. Ogden's two books are: Christ Without Myth (New York: Har­per Bros., 1961) and The Reality of God (London; S.C.M.Press, 1967). The first book is an attempt to present the insights of Rudolf Bultmann corrected by the methodology of process thought. While the second book is a compilation of several essays, it is more appropriate for the purpose of this thesis, for Ogden has here moved away from Bultmann and swung more to process thought itself. Since Ogden gained attention first as an interpreter of Bultmann, it is too
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But while Cobb turns to Whitehead, Ogden, like James, fol­
lows Hartshome's lead for his theological undertaking. For 
Ogden the starting point for a Christology is to be taken 
from the doctrine of God. But in turn, God is to be con­
ceived in strict analogy with o u r s e l v e s T h a t  is, our 
experiences provide the clues to the concept of God. "All 
that a valid method of analogy requires is that the eminence 
attributed to God really follow from, rather than contradict, 
the positive meaning of our fundamental concepts as given 
them by e x p e r i e n c e ."^^8 Therefore, the proper reading of 
man yields the proper understanding of God. To be sure, 
there are differences between man and God. Man is "exis- 
tentially dependent" whereas God is "actually dependent."
We depend upon our bodies for existence and actuality, for 
our being, and for what we can do. God is not similarly 
dependent, but in terms of His work and purposes He is de­
pendent upon creation. For Ogden, therefore, activity is 
the clue to our understanding of ourselves and God.
seldom noted that Ogden began his theological studies at the University of Chicago where he encountered process thought. He studied under Bultmann after this exposure.The essays which provide the bulk of the material for The Reality of God were written over a period of seven years prior to the publication date. They indicate that Ogden's engagement in process thinking is, after all, where he stands. However, Ogden's legacy from Bultmann is to be found in the greater attention he gives to Bultmann's ex­istentialism. Cobb, for example, is somewhat critical of existentialism. Cf. supra, Chapter III, p. 230.
217Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 59. See also supra, Chapter III, p. 19T7
^^^Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 59.
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Before turning to the implication of this analogy 
for God, brief note should be taken of Ogden's anthropology. 
In Ogden's view man is a free and responsible being existing 
in the presence of God. By this he means that man possesses 
the ability to affirm or deny his creaturely destiny, while 
all other creatures may merely follow the destiny God has 
purposed for t h e m . ^^9 xan can consciously be a part of 
God's purpose. He is a creature of self-awareness. This 
provides the condition of his freedom and responsibility, 
for his self-awareness enables him both to recognize his 
relation to God's purpose and to act consciously upon that 
recognition. The purpose to which Ogden refers is " . . . 
none other than the maximum realization of all his distinc­
tive possibilities, in realizing which he fulfills his ex­
istence as a c r e a t u r e W h e n  Ogden speaks of the "dis­
tinctive possibilities" he reflects the strain of process 
thought in his thinking, but actually his anthropology goes 
beyond this. In process thought choices are concerned with 
the possibilities for the immediate occasion. Any one 
choice is somewhat limited, and not all potential possibil­
ities can be actualized in a given experience. Ogden adds 
the strain of existential thought, his legacy from Bultmann, 
whereby the choice is that man either affirms his destiny 
in obedience to God or attempts to deny this destiny in 
assuming to be his own creator. The choice is between
^^^Ogden, Reality of God, p. 193.
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authentic and inauthentic existence. Quite clearly it is 
only in relationship to God that man can become his authen­
tic self
It is in this context that Ogden introduces a hint 
of Schleiermacher*s t h o u g h t " E a c h  of us at the center 
of his selfhood is always aware of the One who is the begin­
ning and end of all created things and for or against whom 
we as men uniquely have the possibility of deciding . • ,'*223 
The latter part of this statement reflects Ogden's use of 
existentialism. But the first part seems to indicate a 
thought similar to Schleiermacher's idea of man's "feeling 
of dependence" by which man is aware of God, What Ogden 
is concerned to stress is first that God by definition is 
" . . .  whatever functions for anyone as the ultimate ground 
of his existence as a self. Then second, man in his
freedom possesses the possibility of designating anything
225as if it were ultimate. This would seem to suggest that
Ogden has departed from Schleiermacher in that a concern 
for an ultimate cannot be simply equated with a feeling of
^^^See Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 146-153 fora discussion of anthropbiogy in the relationship between process and existential thought in Ogden's view.
222K. Hamilton suggests all liberal Christologies are merely building on Schleiermacher's foundation. "Under Schleiermacher's Banner," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, 1963, pp. 564-573. Hamilton credits process philosophy with being one of the powerful influences leading the modem movement back to Schleiermacher. Ibid.. p. 571.
^^^ogden, Reality of God, p. 194.
224ibid.. p. 196. 225ibid.
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dependence,
What Ogden is after here, however, appears to be to 
develop a concept of God which provides for man room for 
decision making and action. That is, man must be able to 
decide in such a way that his decisions make a difference. 
This is Hartshome's point. Therefore, Ogden holds that
. . . the primary use or function of "God" is to refer to the objective ground in reality itself of our ineradicable confidence in the final worth of our ex­istence. It lies in the nature of this basic confi­dence to affirm that the real whole of which we exper­ience ourselves to be parts is such as to be worthy of, and thus itself to evoke, that very c o n f i d e n c e ,22/
This is a curious thought. The idea of God in Schleier­
macher 's and Tillich's thought is to establish the frame­
work of man's existence, the limits within which man lives. 
But in Ogden's suggestion the idea of God seems to be intro­
duced to establish the basis for the possibilities m  man's 
existence. The focus is on man. Yet the idea of God is 
clearly required for this focus. " . . .  one can only con­
clude that faith in God as the ground of confidence in 
life's ultimate meaning is the necessary condition of our 
existence as s e l v e s . "^28 God so conceived is not held to 
be the explanation of our existence but the condition of our 
being men of real freedom and responsibility. This concept 
of God, then, is enlisted in the cause of Ogden's anthro­
pology. The existence of God provides the ground of
supra. Chapter III, pp. 215 ff, 
227ogden, Reality of God, p. 37. 
p. 43.
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confidence by which man is a free and responsible being, 
able to choose the possibilities available to him for an 
authentic or inauthentic existence. Thus Ogden has sought 
to utilize the insights of both process philosophy and ex­
i s t e n t i a l i s m . Fortified by this confidence in the worth 
of his existence, man then knows his decisions and actions 
count. That is, there is a basis for moral action, for 
responsible behavior. God, establishing man's worth, also 
provides the transcendent ground for moral action so that 
there is a permanent significance to the choices man 
m a k e s . ^50 This briefly is how Ogden employs the concept 
of God to undergird his anthropology. Of greater concern 
for the development of his Christology is Ogden's under­
standing of what constitutes man.^^l
229Ogden sees this mutual insight as essential. "Until process philosophy is informed by the insights of existential analysis, its lack of an explicit anthropology, which handicaps it for theological employment, can hardly be remedied in keeping with its own implicit principles.On the other hand, unless the general ontology to which existential analysis seems to point is fully developed . . existentialism will either remain an 'anthropological frag­ment' or else be artificially engrafted on a traditional 'substance' ontology that undercuts its inmost meaning (as seems to have happened in the case of Tillich)." Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 152. It should be noted again, however, that Ogden's stress on existentialism has weak­ened considerably in his second book, while his accent on process thought has grown.
^^^Qgden, The Reality of God, pp. 34-37, 39-43. James argues that "Since God is in part temporal, relative and contingent, man can actually change reality through his finite decisions--his existence has ontological signif­icance." James, "Process Cosmology and Theological Partic­ularity," Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. by Brown, James and Reeves, p . 403.
231It would be helpful at this point if Ogden might
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In Ogden's argument our acts constitute our being. 
What he says is: "All . . . [the self's] outer acts of word
and deed are but ways of expressing and implementing the
232inner decisions whereby it constitutes itself as a self." 
These decisions take one of two forms; being open to the 
world— including self and others— which is the act of one 
who loves, or being closed to the world— turned away from 
others into a narrow se If--which is the act of one who hates 
Applying this analogically to God, Ogden then affirms with 
the Christian witness that God's being is constituted as 
love. The analogy is pushed further. For human beings 
there is an intimate and direct relation between the mind 
and the body. Our decisions exert a direct control over 
our minds and bodies, providing the basis by which Ogden 
can speak of our external acts as expressions of our deci­
sions. However, where our interrelationships with others 
are indirect through speech or bodily actions, God is not 
similarly limited. The whole world is, as it were, his
have dealt with the concept of sin. He says little about sin. What he does suggest but briefly— in Chapters I and VIII of The Reality of God— is that sin is what man does, including the consequences, when he decides for an in­authentic existence by affirming himself as creator, and denying the reality of God as the object of ultimate loyalty. However, the absence of any substantial dis­cussion of sin suggests that Ogden's Christology has been developed without it. Therefore, an attempt to introduce it at this point seems to result in a distortion of Ogden's argument. The pertinent question must be raised as to whether an adequate Christology can be constructed by Ogden without careful attention to the concept of sin.
oqoOgden, Reality of God, p. 177, brackets added.
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233body, making His relationship to it direct and immediate. 
Every creature is to some extent his act, since bodily 
action proceeds from the mind. God's actions also actual­
ize His essence. At the same time, in the analogical sense 
of the body's relationship to the mind, every man is to some
extent God's a c t .^^4
At the same time man is "uniquely the creature of 
m e a n i n g . "^55 has the ability to understand the meaning
of his existence, including its divine reality, and to give 
this meaning expression through symbolic forms in speech and 
action. This understanding is an existential one. To say 
of the reality of God that God acts as Creator is to affirm 
both that we are utterly dependent upon Him as the ultimate 
ground of power and love constituting our existence, and 
also that our decisions are continually responded to by His 
decision of l o v e . ^56 Similarly to say that God acts as 
Redeemer is to affirm both that as a gift of His grace God 
enables us to possess the possibility of an authentic ex­
istence of love, and also that we in turn contribute both
^^^Ibid.. pp. 177-178.
^^^Ibid., pp. 179-181. This argument for understand­ing or defining God through His actions is not too dissimilar to that approach taken by Bushnell. Cf. supra, Chapter X, pp. 23 ff. It is interesting to note that F. G. Downing also argues for an understanding of God through His actions rather than by deductive reasoning. Downing claims that man's af­firmation of God's activity is that God saves, not that God reveals Himself. Cf. Has Christianity a Revelation? (London: S.C.M. Press, 1964), pp. 281 ££.
23 SOgden, The Reality of God, p. 180.
^^^Ibld.. pp. 169, 178.
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to the self-creation of others and to the self-creation of
237God in His Own everlastingness. In terms of the analogy 
this means that man can "re-present" God as Creator and Re­
deemer through appropriate symbolic forms. Ogden has almost 
completed the groundwork for his presentation of Christology, 
but his analogy is to be followed one step further.
Our actions proceed from and give expression to our 
inner decisions and understanding. Everyone is to a degree 
expressed in his actions, for his actions are grounded in 
the decisions which enable him to actualize his essence. 
These actions are unique. We are known through them. How­
ever, we are not uniformly known through our actions, since 
some of our actions are more uniquely expressive of us than 
others. Similarly some of man's actions and words will not 
reveal, or express, God. Some actions are distortions of 
the truth. Other actions and words are distinctively 
revelatory, in which the transcendent actions of God as 
Creator and Redeemer are revealed. What characterizes this 
distinction? What makes some actions distortions and others 
revelatory? Ogden says two things clarify this suggestion. 
First, " . . .  there are some human actions, some specific
237jbid., pp. 178-179; cf. also supra, Chapter III,p. 257. In process terms we provide the objects for others* — including God*s--subjective exercise of freedom which actualize an occasion. Hartshome believes that man does contribute value to God; cf. supra, Chapter III, p. 246.This does not imply that God's existence depends upon us.God will exist regardless of what we do, but the value of his concrete state will derive something from us which otherwise would be lacking. Concerning God's gift of grace, see infra. Chapter III, footnote 240, pp. 265 ff.
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attempts to express the ultimate truth of our existence 
through symbolic words and deeds, that are vastly more than 
merely human actions," Second:
. . .  to say of any historical event that it is the "decisive" act of God can only mean that, in it, in distinction from all other historical events, the ultimate truth about our existence before God is normatively re-presented or revealed. The decisive­ness of the event, in other words, lies in its power to decide between all the different and conflicting historical claims to reveal the divine logos or mean­ing everywhere discernible to our e x p e r i e n c e .238
Presumably Ogden is suggesting in the first point that God 
acts, since the actions are "more than merely human." But 
in the second point, he reserves to man's judgment the de­
cision concerning the possibility of the revelation of God 
in an act, since such a re-presentation must be "discernible 
to our experience." This is a subjective characteristic 
which Ogden accepts. Revelation must be to somebody, as 
well as of something. At the same time what is revealed 
has an objective characteristic which is that it re-presents 
the existential choice for the true or authentic understand­
ing of life.
Ogden declares Jesus to be this re-presentation, 
Jesus re-presents or reveals God's essence. By the mind- 
body analogy, Ogden has established that any man, indeed any 
event, can re-present God's decisions and actions. This is 
consistent with the reasoning of process thought which holds 
to Whitehead's insistence that not even God can be an
9 O QOgden, The Reality of God, p. 184; italics added to both citations, except for "logos."
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exception to the metaphysical principle. Ogden criticizes 
Bultmann for his contention that God acts only in the his­
tory of Jesus Christ to redeem men. This argument mytholo­
gizes Jesus as God's act because it subjects Him to the 
objectifying categories of time and space.^39 But what 
makes Jesus the re-presentation of God? What makes Him 
unique, decisive, worthy to be followed? Ogden's view is:
The claim "only in Jesus Christ" must be inter­preted to mean, not that God acts to redeem only in the history of Jesus and in no other history, but that the only God who redeems any history--although he in fact redeems every history--is the God whose redemptive action is decisively re-presented in the word that Jesus speaks and is.240
239Ibid.. p. 173.
240ibid,; see also Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 144, 156. Ogden argues that Bultmann erred not in making Jesus Christ God's re-présentâtion of authentic existence, but in designating Jesus Christ as God's unique and decisive act which restores to man the lost possibility of an authen­tic existence. This latter, Ogden contends, is a mythologi­cal statement. Bultmann faulted when he appealed to the unique act of God in Christ to distinguish between theology and philosophy. The solution which Ogden suggests is to abandon the attempt to distinguish theology from philosophy. Ogden concludes, "Theology must recognize . . , that the summons to accept Jesus Christ as Lord, which is and must remain its proper concern, is a demand that is utterly transparent to the demand which has already been laid upon men by their Creator at all times and which, therefore, a truly adequate philosophy also properly knows and pro­claims . . . .  If the God whom we have been summoned to serve really is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and if what separates us from him is not some trick of fate but our own wilful refusal to submit to his holy will of love, then the possibility of any real distinction between theology and philosophy is excluded. Faith's own insistence upon the freedom and transcendence of God and the freedom and responsibility of man requires precisely the identity of theology and philosophy which is the clear imperative of our contemporary situation." Ogden, "Bultmann*s Pro­ject of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy," Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, July, 1957, p. 171. When Ogden speaks of God's grace in respect
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What this suggests is that Jesus is no less re-presentative 
of God than any other event or act. But is He any more re­
presentative? Unless He is in some way, then the term de­
cisive applies only in a general way to wherever God is re­
vealed, not in a particular or exclusive way in Jesus. How­
ever, the prior question remains: even if Jesus is not the
only re-presentative of God, what renders Him a re-presents- 
tive at all? Ogden's answer is two-fold. First, the Chris­
tian community affirms that in Jesus is expressed that 
understanding of life which discloses the ultimate truth 
about our existence before God; our authentic existence. 
Then, second, if this understanding is true then Jesus 
God's decisive act in h i s t o r y S u c h  an approach is sub­
jective with all the objective squeezed out, for man decides 
if the re-presentation is truly of authentic existence. 
Rashdall anticipated this argument:
If an historical person is actually pronounced by the moral and the religious consciousness to embody
to the possibility of man's achieving an authentic exist­ence of love— cf. supra, Chapter III, p. 262— he refers to a possibility givenby God from the beginning and not achieved by the contingent, historical event of Christ. Christ re-presents an authentic existence already possible to man. This possibility is the gift of God's action as Redeemer, even though it is also a possibility requiring man's decision. " . . .  although all theological state­ments directly or indirectly have an existential signifi­cance, the direct reference of some theological statements is not to man and his possibilities of decision, but to God and his action as Creator and Redeemer," Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 179. Ogden employs process thought to speak directly about God and His redemptive activity, which, he argues, Bultmann never can do.
^Reality of God, pp. 185-186. See also Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 188.
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the highest ideal of human life and of the true re­lation between God and man, such a person may be regarded on this ground alone as in a unique sense a revelation of G o d . 242
243Peters criticizes Ogden at this point. He argues 
that God acts consistently so that one act is no more or 
less characteristic of Him than any other act. Thus, Jesus 
is not definitive of but rather He reflects God's character­
istic actions which are everywhere. However, pertinent 
though the criticism may be, Peters has, himself, violated 
process principles. What man encounters in experience is 
not God's action, but the expression of a subjective de­
cision. In that decision God's subjective aim for the occa­
sion is only part of the objective presentation available 
to the organism which is also coupled with the subjectivity 
of the organism's freedom to decide. Therefore, there is 
no way in which one can speak of God's characteristic 
actions. Even God's subjective aim, which is the applica­
tion to events of God's primordial nature, is given individ­
ually for each specific event. It is possible, however, to 
speak of one given occasion more completely expressing God's 
primordial nature than any other occasion in that it chooses 
fully God's subjective aim for it. But the occasion is al­
ways one of free choice and cannot, therefore, be said to 
be, in a strict sense, God's act. This is Peters* second 
criticism. He then goes on to suggest that while Jesus
242Rashdall, Contentio Veritatis (London: J. Mur­ray, 1916), p. 49.
243Peters, The Creative Advance, pp. 114-117.
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cannot be decisive in terms of divine essence. He can be de­
cisive in another sense. To understand God requires that 
He be expressed concretely, preferably and ideally in a 
human being. For Christians this is symbolized in Jesus, 
not in thought, speech or act, but in an historical reality. 
Jesus* decisiveness means; "The living God— though possessed 
of a character no man can possess— is imagined in the Man of 
Nazareth with a fullness and power that I find incompar­
able."%44 This is a more subjective argument than Ogden's. 
Here Jesus is decisive not by what He does, or says, or 
even is, but rather He is decisive by what we imagine Him 
to be! In Peters' view, however, one can know Jesus only 
because one already knows God. If is the prior belief in 
God which is decisive, establishing the criterion by which
Jesus is recognized.^ 45
Griffin, a process theologian himself, also finds 
Ogden's account less than s a t i s f a c t o r y I t  is to Ogden's 
use of the term re-present or reveal that Griffin objects. 
For Ogden an act re-presents a man's inner being. Whether 
it does or not depends in part on the interpretation or 
reception of it by another. It is with this subjectivism 
that Griffin takes issue. He argues that for Ogden,
^44jhid., pp. 116-117, italics added.
^^^Ibid., pp. 115-116; see also supra, Chapter III, pp. 201 ff.
Griffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology and the Possibilities of Process Philosophy," Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. by Brown, James, arid Reeves.
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" . . . the 'specialness* of a special act is entirely a 
function of someone other than the person whose special act 
it i s G r i f f i n  wishes to balance subjectivity with 
objectivity so that an act is held to be an actual expres­
sion of one's inner being; so that something of the inten- 
tionality of the act is expressed. His suggestion is to 
use the term "express" for Ogden's "re-present." By "ex­
press" Griffin means that something is "pressed out" from 
one's inner being. An act expresses inner being, rather 
than merely potentially reveals it. It is this criticism 
which provides the basis for Griffin's own attempt to pro­
pose a process thought Christology.
Griffin turns to Whitehead's concept of the "ideal 
aim." "The ideal aim is the goal or possibility which, if 
actualized by the creature, would be best, given all the
relevant c i r c u m s t a n c e s .^48 Applying this to the Christo-
logical problem, Griffin finds two distinctions which, he 
believes, Ogden misses. The first is that creatures actual* 
ize the ideal aim of God in differing degrees, depending 
upon how each uses his freedom. Therefore, events differ 
in the degree to which they can be said to be acts of God.
A second distinction is that not all actions are equally 
expressive of our inner being. Some acts are more appropri* 
ate to such expressions than others.^49 terms of a
^^^Ibld.. p. 353.
"Schubert Ogden's Christology," p. 355. 
^49Ibid.. pp. 356-357.
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Christological approach, Griffin suggests, "God's aim for 
some human events . . , will be such that, if his will is 
actualized to a high degree by the person, the event will 
effectively express God's being."^50 Thus, an event can be 
both expressive of God's ideal aim to a high degree, and
also particularly appropriate for expressing God's being.
2 SIAn event can differ in both degree and kind. By using 
this aspect of process thought, Griffin feels that Ogden 
could present a Christological argument which would allow 
Jesus to be God's decisive act without making the event 
different in principle from God's other acts.^32
It seems unlikely that Griffin can avoid a Christo- 
logical position which requires adoptionism as its explana­
tion concerning the person of Christ. If God respects man's 
freedom then He must await an event which, or who, of its 
own volition accepts God's ideal aim and actualizes it to 
such a high degree that the event expresses the being of 
God. This is adoptionism. But if God initiates the re­
sponse in the event, then God has violated the principle of 
the organism's freedom. It is surprising that Griffin does 
not discuss God's persuasive power, which allows God to
250 Ibid., p. 357, italics added. Elsewhere Griffin uses the term ''unsurpassable degree" instead of "high de­gree." "Jesus as God's Decisive Revelation; A Whiteheadian Approach," unpublished manuscript.
251 Griffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology," p. 358. This can be compared with Pittenger's account of differ­ences in degree, cf. supra. Chapter II, pp. 144 ff.
^32criffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology," p. 360.
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initiate without violating the organism's freedom.
Griffin's own Christological suggestion is quite
near to that of Ogden's. He accepts the mind (psyche) and
body analogy. Like Ogden he recognizes the subjective
aspect of revelation, namely, that revelation must be
actually received by someone in order to be revelatory.
However, it is upon the objective aspect that Griffin
253wishes to concentrate. The objective aspect is con­
tained in what is implied about the person of Jesus when 
He is claimed to be God's decisive revelation. To speak of 
Jesus as God's revelation is to imply that before Jesus is 
received as this revelation He already had some special 
relation to God. This is not too dissimilar to Peters' 
suggestion.^^^ What does Griffin mean by revelation? It 
is that event which illumines other events. The decisive 
revelation would be that which illumines all our existence 
so that we can understand every aspect of ourselves and our 
world. Griffin then affirms that Jesus can be thought of 
as this decisive revelation. What this means is that
. . . the aims given to Jesus by God and actualized by him during his active ministry were such that the basic vision of reality contained in his message of word and deed was the supreme expression of God's eternal character and purpose.255
All of this argument appears in Griffin's unpub­lished manuscript, "Jesus as God's Decisive Revelation; A Whiteheadian Approach."
supra, Chapter III, pp. 201 ff.
^^^Griffin, "Jesus as God's Decisive Revelation,"p. 18.
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To speak of Jesus as the "supreme expression" is to empha­
size the objective aspect. Revelation is in part subjective 
as it requires that it be received by someone. But to speak 
of Jesus as the "supreme expression" of God's being is to 
lay claim to God's act which is not dependent upon its sub­
jective reception by another.
Has Griffin significantly advanced the argument be­
yond Ogden's position? By analogy the most that Griffin 
can say is that Jesus can be thought of as a decisive revela­
tion. Griffin assumes he advances beyond mere possibility 
in his stress upon the objective side, which he finds so 
neglected in Ogden's arguments. "Jesus is appropriately 
apprehended as God's self-revelation, because he was God's 
supreme act of self-expression. T w o  questions need to 
be raised. First, how does the declaration that Jesus was 
God's supreme act of self-expression differ significantly 
from the traditional affirmation of the Christian faith that 
God was in Christ? If it does not, then has Griffin really 
provided an objective reference point for his Christological 
analysis? Second, can the argument that Griffin advances be 
made without significant attention to soteriology? That is, 
does Jesus express God unless He also helps men find that 
meaning which illuminates reality, enables men to under­
stand themselves and their world, and helps men choose what 
Ogden refers to as an authentic existence? Yet Griffin does 
not pay attention to soteriology in his argument.
p. 19.
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While Ogden and Griffin utilize the analogy of mind 
(or psyche) and body to understand how God could be re­
presented or expressed in Christ, Barnhart suggests that 
the human experience of empathy is a better clue for process 
t h o u g h t S o o n e r  or later one who empathizes with another 
must either get involved with the other or withdraw from the 
relationship. Barnhart argues that God has empathy for all 
men. He is Creator and Redeemer at the same time. Thus,
God does not withdraw but gets involved. In turn, Jesus re­
sponds in empathy, and His response affects the being of God 
Jesus is lifted to an objective and enduring effect on the 
life of God, He becomes God's Christ. In turn, through 
empathy with the man Jesus, God became not a man but human, 
empathetically not ontologica1ly, "Because of Jesus, God's 
potential (primordial) humanity is now actual (consequent) 
humanity."^38 God's empathetic concern rises from His "pri­
mordial divine will-to-experience-humanity,"^^9 becomes
actualized, not created, in God's empathy toward Jesus. 
Jesus, subjectively the event or the man, then becomes ob­
jectively Christ for God, while God is received objectively
^^^J. E. Barnhart, "Incarnation and Process Philoso* phy," Religious Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, April, 1967, pp. 227-22^
^^^Ibid., p. 229. Barnhart's identification of potential humanity with God's primordial nature is in error There is nothing to suggest humanity is "everlasting." Events and decisions are. Further, for Whitehead God's con­ceptual nature already possesses final completeness. Hart­shome would have been a better guide here, but Barnhart does not turn to him. Cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 208 ff.
^^9gamhart, ibid.. pp. 229-230.
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by Jesus. Such mutuality is fittingly described in terms 
of a Father-Son relationship.
Barnhart accepts mutual adoptionism as the descrip­
tion of the relationship, though he insists upon the primacy 
of God's initiative. But nowhere does he discuss the grounds 
for this particular empathy. Why is it that Jesus becomes 
objectively God's Christ and not another? More than this, 
however, if the potential Christ were eternally in God's 
nature, then Barnhart can scarcely avoid dealing with the 
problem of how Jesus' response was able to actualize Christ, 
while the responses of others did not. If God initiated the 
response in a way more persuasive than that used with others, 
then a chief process thought principle in violated. Barn­
hart simply does not discuss it. Finally, empathy seems a 
weak analogy to bear the weight of the Person of Christ.
To feel for is not the same as to act. But when feeling 
gives way to action, then it is the action which is crucial. 
Does God act in or upon Jesus? If He does, then empathy is 
not the proper term to describe what happens. If God does 
not act, then the relationship becomes one of dubious real­
ity.
Is Christ mere revelation in Ogden's view? Or does 
Christ act in some way that is distinctly His own act?
Ogden has not as yet presented a clear or sufficient view 
of his position concerning the work of Christ. But note can 
be taken of several suggestions in his thought. In the 
first place, Ogden holds that nothing is spoken in Jesus
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that is not spoken e v e r y w h e r e T h i s  would suggest a
difficulty in establishing a claim for the work of Christ 
as worthy of emulation, or at least as being specially ef­
ficacious. In the second place, Ogden argues for the neces­
sity of man's subjective reception of anything received from 
God. As long as someone receives it as a symbol of God's 
creative and redemptive action, then any historical event 
can become an act of G o d A g a i n  the question of the dis­
tinctive work of Christ is raised.
If Christ's work is addressed to man's sin then His 
work must be to help us to an authentic existence. That 
is, Jesus must help us to find a faith which corresponds to 
the reality in which both God and man exist. He must help 
us to find our confidence in the reality of God, and in the 
significance of our life
263Ogden has already argued that the Christian wit­
ness confirms that God's being is constituted as love. To 
act as redeemer means that God enables us also to love, A 
decisive act of God is one which enables us to discern the 
essence of God amid all the historic claims.^64 jesus is
^^^Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 156. Cf. also supra, Chapter III, p p . 264 ££.
^^^Ogden, Reality of God, p. 183.
^^^Cf. Ogden, Reality of God, pp. 21 ff.
^^^See supra, Chapter III, pp. 261 ff.
264Qg^gj^ speaks of God's acts "whereby God actual­izes his essence . . . "  Reality of God, p. 180. A decisive act is one which also enables man to respond to the actual­ity of God.
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held by Ogden to be such an act; to re-present the actuality 
of God. This is held to be more than merely a symbol or a 
revelation. It also includes Jesus' work. For everything 
in Jesus* history is instrumental. He knows only the work 
of revealing God's love as both gift and demand. And Jesus 
allows no other claim than that which this love demands,
Ogden sees this work of Jesus as primarily that of 
a preacher who evidences in Himself both the norm and the 
fulfillment of man's authentic existence. It is a living 
work, rather than an exercise in intellect, with which God 
in Christ confronts our decision making. In the meth­
odology he follows, Ogden agrees with Bultmann that a Chris­
tian understanding of the meaning of existence can be known 
apart from Christ, but can it be realized apart from Him?
The New Testament holds, they argue, that we can exist in 
love toward God and neighbor only because God has already 
given Himself in Jesus C h r i s t . M a n  is so bound to his 
past that he is not free to act authentically. Thus he re­
quires faith in God, so that through trust in Him the past 
loses its determinative p o w e r . J e s u s  enables us to re­
spond to this faith. God alone gives the faith. "Man's 
decision is only whether he shall accept God's love for 
him and thus find himself freed for an authentic existence 
of returning love for God and for all the others whom God
^^^Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 161 ff. 
^^^Ibid.. pp. 72 ff. See also pp. 160-161. 
^^^Ibld.. p. 61.
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also embraces in his love."^*’® Ogden concludes:
But if this understanding of existence that Jesus re-presents is true, if we really are created and re­deemed by God's sovereign love, then, in a real sense, Jesus himself ja God's decisive act in human history.For in him, in the word that he speaks and is, God's action as Creator and Redeemer is expressed with utter decisiveness; and this can only mean , . . that he actually ia God's decisive act.269
Two notes should be taken of Ogden's thought. The 
first is his insistence that God saves by grace alone, free 
from any "saving work" on Christ's part.^^^ Christ re­
presents, He does not re-create I Jesus does disclose God's 
saving work, but the work is freely God's. The second point 
to be noted is a theocentric basis in Ogden's Christology. 
Firmly holding to the Biblical view that Christ is God's, 
Ogden argues that it is an elliptical assertion to assert 
that faith is "Christocentric." Further, he finds a delu­
sion in the latter position, for Christ does not make pos­
sible our salvation. Rather, " . . .  the only ground of 
salvation the New Testament knows anything about is the 
primordial love of God, which is indeed decisively revealed 
in Jesus the Christ, but is by no means simply to be iden­
tified with him."^^^
^^^Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 227.
^^^Ibid.. p. 186,
^^®Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 145.
271Ibid., p. 143. An appropriate comparison may be drawn to an argument in Pittenger's thought in which he argues that Christ is not all there is to God's divinity. See supra. Chapter II, footnote 238, p. 167.
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Neither Cobb nor Ogden are able to provide very 
satisfactory accounts of the work of Christ. By the defin­
ition of process thought an inherent limitation for Christo- 
logical conceptuality could not be bridged, even by their 
own commitment to the Christian faith. Even though process 
thought on its own terms opens a convenient way to a con­
sideration of Christ's work effecting a change in God, 
neither Cobb nor Ogden pursue it. In fact, both reject the 
possibility, and lay their main stress on God's act. It 
has been indicated previously that this strong attachment
to the doctrine of God has thus far somewhat crippled
272Christological developments in process thought. Fur­
ther, the methodology of both men does not allow for a 
finality claim for Christ, thereby weakening the view of 
Christ they do present. Without a firm grasp of soteriol­
ogy can any view of the Person of Christ long stand? Can 
process thought, given its presupposition, adequately 
deal with the concepts of sin and soteriology? At least 
in the writings of the theologians examined in this sec­
tion, the answer to this question is far from convincingly 
affirmative.
272See supra. Chapter III, pp. 201 ff.
CHAPTER IV
CHRISTOLOGY FROM BELOW
A. Introduction; A Methodology Starting; with Jesus
There is a third approach to the development of a 
Christology in post-Barthian Liberal Theology. It accepts 
as central to its task neither the modern Antiochene appeal 
to certain features in the Concilier period, nor the Process 
Thought approach through analogies derived from man's experi­
ence. Instead, it proposes that Christology, and, indeed, 
the whole Christian enterprise, commence with Christ. "We 
suggest that Christ himself is the best place to start.
The chief exponent of this view is Ne Is F. S. Ferre, and,
2to a lesser extent, Wolfhart Pannenberg.
This view proposes that an examination of Jesus 
will provide the clues Christian theology requires to arrive 
at a Christological position, and to establish concepts of 
God, man, the church. In this suggestion a significant
^Nels F. S. Ferre, Christ and the Christian (New York; Harper Bros., 1958), p.' '52.
2This is not meant to suggest that Pannenberg any less self-consciously proposes to start with Jesus than does Ferre, but there are moments in his thought which raise ques­tions concerning his faithfulness to this approach. These questions will be examined in due course,
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departure is taken from the process thought approach of 
Chapter No less a departure is it from the modem
Antiochene view of Chapter IX, which accepts and then builds 
upon some concepts of the Antiochene School in which God's 
relationship to man is made central.^ Two differences from 
these previous chapters should be noted.
First, in both of the contemporary liberal Christo- 
logical positions presented it was necessary to examine in 
some detail the background for each. The modem Antiochenes 
base their Christology upon the contribution of the Antio­
chene School of the Patristic era, and within that school 
upon the particular thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia. For 
those who endeavor to construct a Christology in terms of 
Process Theology, the basis for their thought is to be found 
in the School of Process Philosophy, and in the particular 
contributions of Whitehead and Hartshome, But the attempt 
to construct a Christology, and, indeed, to develop all 
Christian theological concepts, starting with Jesus, Himself,
Cf. supra, Chapter III, pp. 201 ff. Special atten­tion must be given to this statement. NeIs F. S. Ferre, a leading exponent of this point of view, did his doctoral work at Harvard University under the supervision of Profes­sor A. N. Whitehead. Ferre's writings frequently reflect that period of study. But, like the modern Antiochenes, he appeals to process philosophy to explain or to embellish his theology. Cf. supra. Chapter II, pp. 106 ff., footnote 103, pp. 117 ff. But for Ferre, theological considerations are primary.
4perre does acknowledge the debt Christian theology owes the Conciliât period. For example, he chooses to af­firm the Chalcedon formula. Ferre, The Universal Word (Phil­adelphia; Westminster Press, 1969), p. 170. See also Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 41 ff.
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is at least consciously an attempt to begin anew. It re­
mains to be seen if in fact such an attempt can successfully 
start anew. But that is the proposal. Second, lacking 
guidelines from previously established positions, those who 
propose to arrive at a Christology starting with Jesus, Him­
self, are forced to establish their own methodological ap­
proach. Therefore, an examination of method must be under­
taken at this point.
Ferre's Methodology
Before encountering Ferre's methodology it is neces­
sary to understand his particular use of reason.^ "By 
reason I mean the ability to identify, to discriminate, to 
evaluate, to interpret, to test, to order and to direct 
experience. In this view, reason is not merely a cere­
bral task, but is rather the whole person engaged in reason. 
Reason is "an ability," "a capacity of the self."^ "The 
only givenness of reason seems to be its inherent drive 
toward factuality outside and self-consistency inside the 
s e l f R e a s o n  is thus related to experience which provides 
its data, and at the same time reason acts upon experience, 
interpreting it, arranging it in the light of inner unity
The interplay of faith and reason has been a con­sistent theme throughout Ferre's writings. One of his ear­liest books is entitled Faith and Reason (New York; Harper Bros., 1946). A more extensive and recent treatment of this theme appears in Reason in Religion (London: Thomas Nelson.1963). -------------- ----
^Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 3.
7Ibid. ^Ibld.. p. 9.
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and direction. Man's life is shaped by his choices inQwhich reason plays an indispensable role.
At this point Ferre introduces a novel dimension to
reason. "At the centre of this work of evaluative reasoning
10concerning experience is human need." ^ This seems to sug­
gest that there are factors other than reason at work in the 
realm of what Ferre calls "reason." "Reason orders life by 
organizing experience in line with the main motivation of 
the self This is an indication of what N.H.G. Robinson
calls the "psychologism" in Ferre's thought. That is, 
man's needs are primary even in the use of reason. Reason 
is the servant not the master. What reason serves is 
the experiencing self seeking fulfillment. Whatever else 
it is, reason is not an objective process set over against 
man's desires and his intemperance. Man's needs form the 
center from which Ferre builds his methodology. If Ferre 
begins his Christology with Jesus, it must be recognized 
that he has already begun his thinking with man.
Religion is closely related to reason in Ferre's 
thought. "It is the organization of experience under the
9Ibid., p. 14. ^^Ibid., p. 6. ^^Ibid., p. 10.
^%.H.G. Robinson, "Article Review," The Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 23, No. 3, August, 1970, p. 346. Robinson uses the term to describe both Schleiermacher's concept of man's feeling of absolute dependence and Ferre's concept of the self's search for fulfillment. Further, Robinson finds this same "psychologism" in Ferre's use of religion where the decisive category is the "psychological one of need." Ibid.. p. 347.
^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, pp. 116-117.
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impact of some reality that calls for a basic r e s p o n s e , " ^ 4  
But it is more than this, it is also a conviction, "It 
arises in man's attempt to interpret, to order and to direct 
his experience. Religion, therefore, appears to be a 
natural response. But what is it a response to? Apparently, 
it is the response to one's life situation.
It is always related to life. The religious drive springs from roan's central desire to protect himself from evil powers, to be on good terms with helpful realities, and to be rightly related, in the totality of his interpretation, to whatever reality beyond experience is most responsible for
This seems to be a rather primitive definition of religion. 
Yet Ferre does insist upon the close relationship of reason 
and religion.
By religion I mean the conviction that there are realities and powers beyond ordinary experience that can help and harm man. Our task is to de termine what place reason has in religion, how religion can be helped or hurt by reason, and whether religion can assist reason.17
In the two passages just cited, Ferre has proposed that 
there is a reality beyond experience. Actually, the second 
citation speaks of it as that which is beyond ordinary ex­
perience . This is an important distinction, for Ferre 
argues that what is beyond ordinary experience can be truly 
experienced,
p. 17. l^ibld.. p. 16.
^^Ibld.. pp. 26-27, italics added.
^^Ibid.. p. 3, italics added.
^^Ibid.. p. 18.
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Ferre has identified two kinds of experience; 
ordinary experience; that which is beyond ordinary experi­
ence. But what lies beyond ordinary experience must be 
known in experience; must be affirmed by our experiences. 
"Knowledge is a matter of experience, at least so far as 
all knowledge is in experience. What is entirely beyond 
experience is also entirely beyond k n o w l e d g e E x p e r i ­
ence is the vehicle for carrying whatever knowledge is 
available to human beings. "The only way that we know what 
is beyond is by means of what is w i t h i n . " E x p e r i e n c e  is
the channel . . .  no matter what the content. Religion has
21to become personal in order to be real." At the same 
time, experience is not merely subjective. Inner experi-
22ence cannot exist apart from the experience of the world.
All of this is prologemena to Ferre's methodological 
approach. What is postulated is that man possesses a need 
to know the realities which exist beyond ordinary experi­
ence. One could easily offer the argument that Ferre con­
ceives of man as basically religious. If one understands
^^Ibid.. p. 61.
^^Ibid. See also p. 152.
21Ferre. Know Your Faith (New York: Harper Bros..1959), p. 20.
22Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 44. Ferre is not far from Cobb's position here." cf, supra. Chapter III, pp. 228 ff. However, Cobb, as one committed to process thought, lays the greater stress on the subjective side, the side of decision making. In contrast, Ferre goes on to argue for the primacy of the revelation given in the experience of the world.
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"basically" to mean "naturally," then the further contention 
could be made that Ferre is arguing for a natural theology. 
But to explore that possibility would be to detract from his 
Christological approach at this point. The more pressing 
question is: how is man to know the realities which exist
beyond ordinary experience? Ferre has established the 
boundaries for this answer within man's experience. How­
ever the realities are to be known, they must be known to 
man in his experiences within himself and of his world.
If the realities beyond ordinary experience are to 
be known to man within the framework of his experiences, 
then the quest is for that within experience which discloses
those realities. But what is the starting point within ex-
23perience through which to discover the realities? Ferre
puts the question in terms of the Christian faith.
The question is, rather, how can we recognize the human and historical channels of God's author­ity? Granted that God alone is the authority of
The use of the term "discover" here must not be misleading. It is not intended to convey the impression that man is the creator of the realities, For Ferre the process is one of revelation and discovery. " . . .  the revelation of God comes within the finite for the sake of the finite. As such it is accessible." Reason in Religion, p. 137. Man, then, can discover what is accessible, but he does not create it. "Human knowledge in general is mostly the act of God." Ibid.. p. 139, italics added. That is,God makes available to man the content for knowledge, but man in his understanding and use of the knowledge can dis­tort it so that what is known is not identical to that which is given. For example, man's sinfulness in respect to his refusal to accept his own finitude, leads man to put him­self at the center and, thereby, to distort his understand­ing of the realities he discovers.
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the Christian faith, how can we choose among con­flicting claims to historic a u t h o r i t y ? 24
The authority for which Ferre seeks must be such that
it does not violate our freedom either to act or to be-
lieve.23
Though experience provides the means by which 
knowledge of the realities is conveyed, Ferre rejects ex­
perience as the primary channel of authority for judging 
the knowledge. By sin's distortion of our knowledge 
and, therefore, of our subjective interpretation of what 
is given in experience, experience itself provides con­
siderably less than the authority required to weigh the 
various claims that purport to provide knowledge of the 
r e a l i t i e s F u r t h e r ,  past experiences and past inter­
pretations color the reception given an immediate ex­
perience, and, indeed, tend to bear upon it as judgment.
Ferre proceeds then to reject as the starting 
point for finding the realities beyond ordinary
^Ferre, ]^ow Your Faith, p. 16. Note should be taken that Ferre is speaking of the authority of the Chris­tian faith. At this point no question is being raised con­cerning other religions and the finality of Christ.
^5ibid.. pp. 16-17. 26Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
^^Cf. Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 25-26.
23perre, Reason in Religion, p. 125. See also Know Your Faith, p. l9. Process thought and Ferre's posi- tion are in agreement here. But the former does not seek in experience the authority which Ferre requires. Cf. Cobb's position, supra, Chapter III, pp. 232 ff., where Cobb speaks of God^s persuasion rather than authority.
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29 30experiences, the categories of reason, philosophy, the
B i b l e , t h e  Councils of the C h u r c h , a n d  the Church it­
s e l f .  33 xt is through revelation that the realities are 
made known to man, "Christian theology stands or falls 
with revelation. But the revelation of the nature of God 
is also the only proper categorical base for ultimate 
truth."34 Man's deepest need is for God.33 xt is via 
revelation that this need is met, and the ultimate reality, 
God, is made known.
Either Revelation affords the fullest ,seIf-dis­closure of reality or it is not Revelation. Revela­tion with a capital R means our final faith stance as to ultimates. Revelation claims that here reality has spoken at its central focus of self-disclosure, affording man a warranted faith.36
Reason cannot reach revelation by itself. Mystery is and
• 37must be involved in revelation.
29perre, Reason in Religion, p. 100.
3^Cf. ibid., pp. 106 ff.
3^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 35 ff.; cf. also. Know Your Faith, pp. 20 ff,
32perre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 41 ff.
33perre, Know Your Faith, pp. 26 ff,
34perre, The Living God of Nowhere and Nothing (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 236.
33perre, Reason in Religion, p. 228.
3^Ferre, The Universal Word (Philadelphia: West­minster Press, 1969), p. 62.
37"The Ultimate is necessarily the Ground for ex­plaining all else but cannot be explained by anything else." Ferre, Christianity and Society (New York: Harper Bros., 1950), pT?l In Ferre*s view, revelation in order to be
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Ferre’s methodological approach to Christology can 
now be stated. In order to become known to men, the real­
ities beyond ordinary experience must be revealed in 
ordinary experience. Ferre asserts that, indeed, they are. 
"Faith . . . lives on the knowledge that its highest ideals 
have come to be known and experienced within historic 
t i m e s . T h i s  expresses man’s hope that his religious 
ideals have been realized, or are true. But Ferre’s pri­
mary methodological assertion is that there is a self­
validating revelation of the beyond-experience in the ex­
perience men know. "What is beyond ordinary experience 
can best be seen . . .  in terras of the highest arrival in 
process of meaningful life. This is our t h e s i s . E l s e ­
where Ferre calls the "highest arrival" variously the 
"highest novel emergence, "history’s most high,
"the selective actual" and the "selective i d e a l . W h a t  
does Ferre intend by this term?
Some event within ordinary experience must be able 
to explain what is beyond ordinary experience. How can we
revelation must remain " . . .  essentially a mystery in depth and kind . , . *" Ibid.
Ferre, Faith and Reason, p. 229.
^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 63, italics added. See also pp. 51, 88. " ^
^^Ibid.. p. 66.
^^Ferre, Faith and Reason, p. 198; Evil and the Christian Faith (New York: Harper Bros., 1947), p. l40.
^^Ferre, Faith and Reason, p. 148; Evil and the Christian Faith, p. 16X7
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know what it is? What are its qualifications? There are 
s e v e r a l . I t  must be related to life but not completely 
explained by it, else it could not indicate that which is 
beyond life or ordinary experience. Second, it must relate 
to the total process, both old and new, both to history and 
to novelty. Third, it must describe and prescribe. That 
is, it must analyze the wrong and prescribe the good. 
Fourth, man is not the center of this arrival, the beyond 
is, but man is to be explained, to be seen in his need, to 
be cured by the "highest arrival." At the same time the 
model we seek must be selected from within experience it­
self to represent both its actuality and its potentiality.
Though supposedly this methodological approach 
would entertain all of experience, past and present, to 
find the "highest arrival," Ferre concludes that only the 
realm of the personal will be adequate for the "highest 
arrival."
. . .  we must choose this arrival from among per­sonal events . . . [we] must choose the most fulfilled life that can be set up as a standard for other lives, making available for faith the fulfillment of life. Whoever lived the most meaningful life, or at least whoever saw and accepted as a conclusively fulfilled ideal the reality and power that can most fully meet human need to such a degree that his life became an effective illustration of it, can alone provide the kind of life that is the most adequate standard and power for all the rest of human life.. . . The most fulfilled life indicates the kind of life that is the meaning of life.44
Ferre speaks of the "highest arrival" as having already
^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, pp. 63 ff. 
44Ibid.. pp. 65-66, brackets added.
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occurred. He proposes that the choice should be made from 
among the faith judgments of actual religions. "I hold 
that there is no rationally and morally normative religion. 
Nor is there a rationally constructive religion. But there 
is a religiously normative event in human history which is 
both the judge and the fulfiller of all r e l i g i o n s T h a t  
event is to be found in the life of Jesus. "The highest 
arrival of meaningfulness in human history, I suggest, is 
the life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus, called 
the Christ. The highest X have found is the love of God as 
lived and taught by Jesus." This conclusion provides the 
methodological center for Ferre’s Christology, as well as 
for the rest of his theology.
There is a question to be raised with Ferre’s method­
ology. Care has been taken in this presentation of his 
methodology to express what Ferre seems to be claiming for 
it, namely, that if one carefully defines one’s terms and 
proceeds to research all the knowledge that is available, 
one will inevitably conclude that Jesus is the Revelation 
of God! But does Ferre really ask the question regarding 
man’s knowledge of God, or is he actually addressing him­
self to the problem of how Jesus is to be seen as God’s 
revelation? Surely, it is the latter question to which 
Ferre gives his attention. If this is so, then is not
^^Ibid.. pp. 291 ff., italics added
4Glbid.. p. 67.
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Ferre’s methodology more an exercise in Christian apolo­
getics than it is an engagement in constructive theology? 
This would seem to be the case. It is granted that the 
distinction between the two must not be too finely drawn. 
Apologetics holds an honored place in Christian theology. 
That is not to be deprecated in any way. But Ferre seems 
to purport to be engaged in constructive theology rather 
than apologetics. Yet his conclusion to his method is 
what has obviously been his presupposition all along! 
Root’s criticism of this kind of thought process seems 
appropriate here.
. . . philosophical theology has been engaged in Christian apologetics. It has adjusted its sights to a narrower target, the defence of Chris­tian theism . . . .  The philosopher’s job is to inquire. The philosophical theologian has only pretended to inquire. His conclusions were pre- scribed from the outset.47
4?H. E. Root, "Beginning All Over Again," Soundings * ed. by A. Vidler, p. 4, italics added. Root adds Æat, "Theologians have worried less about logical propriety and have been chiefly dissatisfied with the premises and conclu­sions of the arguments [for the existence of God]. They are pessimistic about the powers of natural reason to encompass reality, and they find little or no contact between the God allegedly proved by argument and the God who, they say, can never be known except through that revelation they are charged to expound and safeguard," p. 10, brackets added. Further, "The philosophical theologian is condescendingly reminded that Christianity is a matter of history, not of metaphysics, as though this somehow conferred greater dig­nity and settled questions of truth and falsity." p. 12.Not all would agree with Root’s pessimistic outlook on the prospects for dealing with genuinely philosophical theology, or for reengaging in dialogue with natural theology. Such a prospect is examined by N.H.G. Robinson, "The Problem of Natural Theology," Religious Studies, Vol. 8, 1972, pp. 319- 333. He suggests that we would do well today to deal in terms of "an adequate empiricism rather than of a rational­ism and apriorism." p. 331,
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To be sure, Ferre explicitly rejects philosophy as an appro­
priate starting point for engaging in theology. But in 
spite of that disclaimer, Ferre's methodological approach 
seems designed to establish convincingly that Jesus as the 
"highest arrival" of Reality in experience is a conclusion 
which yields readily to man’s use of his natural gifts of 
reason and faith.
A further criticism offered by Molloy is that Ferre’s 
method is deficient in that it takes " . . .  its inception 
in the middle of nowhere, as it were."^^ It must be recog­
nized that Molloy examines Ferre’s thought in a continuing 
argument with Molloy’s own defense of Roman Catholic dogma 
and, in particular, its substantial reliance upon the Con­
cilier decisions and creeds. In spite of this defensive 
position, Molloy’s criticism has merit in that Ferre’s 
choice of Jesus as the "highest arrival" appears to be quite 
arbitrary. On the face of it there is nothing offered in 
the premises of his method to suggest that Buddha, or some­
one else, should not be selected. That is, there is no 
clear-cut evidence yielding to universal reason, common to 
all men, why Jesus is chosen except that Ferre is engaged 
in Christian theology. Yet Ferre does propose that a care­
ful examination of all possibilities must be undertaken 
before selecting the "highest arrival." But he moves very 
quickly from a position proposing the Christian faith as one
^^incent P. Molloy, "The Christology of Ne Is F. S. Ferre," (unpublished doctoral thesis. Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome), p. 93.
293
candidate for man's ultimate f a i t h , t o  a decision that it 
is the best candidate.
. . . the choice of ultimates is forced on us; all men live by faith. Faith in Christ is least arbitrary and most adequate, because it throws the most inclusive light on man s common experience, which also involves intensely the organic fulfillment of each individual
Having delineated and abandoned almost all of the tradi­
tional bases upon which Christian theology has variously 
taken stands, Ferre's proposal of Jesus as the "highest 
arrival" does, indeed, appear to be rather conceived in the 
midst of nowhere.
Pannenberg's Methodology
Like Ferre, Wolfhart Pannenberg proposes that the 
proper place to begin Christology is from "below," with 
Jesus Himself. He advances his argument in his major theo­
logical work, Jesus--God and Man.^^ Pannenberg rejects an
^^Ferre, Christian Faith and Higher Education (New York: Harper Bros., 1954), p. 58.
^^Xbid., p. 59, italics added.
^^Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesug--God and Man, trans. by Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane À. Priebe (Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1968). The original German title is Grundzuge der Christologie. Peter C. Hodgson finds the English title to be awkward and suggests the title should be simply "Christology." Hodgson, "Pannenberg on Jesus," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1968, p. 384. J. M. Owen's more literaltranslation is much better; "Basic Features of Christology." J, M. Owen, "A First Look at Pannenberg's Christology," The Reformed Theologi­cal Review. Vol. XXV, May/August, 1966, p. 53. Wilkins ' and Priebe s title is decidedly misleading for it suggests that Pannenberg presents a Christology in terms of the de­bates of the Concilier Period, supposedly resolved at Chalcedon in 451 A.D. This is decidedly not what Pannen­berg argues! Rather he relies primarily on what he feels
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52approach from "above" for three reasons.  ^ First, it pre­
supposes the divinity of Jesus, which is precisely the 
quest of the Christological question. Second, it is only 
with difficulty that such an approach can maintain the gen­
uine manhood of Jesus. Finally, we could follow the way of 
God's Son into the world only if we could stand in God's 
own position. Christology must start from "below" in Pan­
nenberg 's view. It must start with the question concerning 
the man Jesus. "A Christology 'from below,' rising from the 
historical man Jesus to the recognition of his divinity, is 
concerned first of all with Jesus ' message and fate and ar­
rives only at the end at the concept of the incarnation,"^^ 
When Pannenberg proposes to start Christology with 
the question of Jesus Himself, he means precisely that. 
"Christology must start from Jesus of Nazareth, not from 
his significance for us as, for instance, the proclamation 
directly offers it,"^^ Taking a stand counter to many of 
his theological colleagues, Pannenberg asserts that it is 
not only possible to go behind the apostolic kerygma to
the historical Jesus, but also that it is necessary to do 
55so. Only in this way, as Herrmann points out, can our
to be the Christological insights of the earliest Christian community, definitely prior to the Concilier Period,
52Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man. pp. 34 ff.
^^Ibid., p. 33, ^^Ibid.. p. 48.
^^Ibid., p. 23. Unlike the quest for the histori­cal Jesus proposals of his nineteenth century Liberal fore­bears, however, Pannenberg is quite aware of the problems involved in such a proposal— problems indicated first by
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faith be grounded in something fixed rather than merely in
faith itse lf.Further, such an approach is necessary to
gain an understanding of the unity of the New Testament
witnesses. That is, they all witness to Jesus, the one
57historic source behind the kerygma.
In his insistence upon Jesus Himself as the starting 
point for Christology, Pannenberg rejects other theological 
starting points besides the kerygma. In the second place, 
he also rejects contemporary Christian experience as the 
point of d e p a r t u r e . T h e  believer does witness to an 
experience of the living, present Lord, but the starting 
point for that witness lies in the past. Nor, in the 
third place, can soteriology be pressed into service as the 
starting point for Christology. The danger in a soterio-
Schweitzer, but which have become widely accepted as a barrier to any real discussion of the quest for the his­torical Jesus. Even the "new quest" proposals of theolo­gians like Fuchs, Ebeling, Robinson and others have ac­cepted most of the "no-quest" canons first instituted by Schweitzer, but so profoundly developed by Bultmann. In­deed, the "new quest" proposals of these men might more appropriately be designated as the "quest for the keryg- matic Christ."
^^For Pannenberg, essential though faith is, it does not take the place of knowledge. " . . .  the knowledge of Jesus' history, including his resurrection from the dead, is the basis of faith. Furthermore, this knowledge has the peculiarity that it leads on to faith. Knowledge is not a stage beyond faith, but leads into faith--and the more ex­act it is, the more certainly it does so," Pannenberg,"The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," Theology As History, ed, by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr.(New York: Harper Bros., 1967), p. 129.
^^Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man. p. 23 ff.
^^Ibld.. pp. 25 £f. Ibid.. p. 27.
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logical approach is that Jesus becomes of significance only 
for us rather than in Himself, in his historic Person. 
Soteriology must follow after the question of His signifi­
cance, not precede it.^^ Finally, important as the concept 
of the incarnation is for Christology, it is not "an inde­
pendent base for theological r e f l e c t i o n , T h e  incarnation 
does not yield the revelation, rather it is the revelation 
which interprets the incarnation. Pannenberg claims that a 
mythical characteristic attaches to incarnationa1 theology
in that the concept of the incarnation divides the earthly,
62present Jesus from the eternal Son of God,"
Where is Pannenberg*s starting point for Christology 
established? He has already identified that a Christology 
"from below" starts with the man Jesus, His message and fate, 
and leads to the establishment of His d i v i n i t y . Y e t  the 
first question to be raised about the man Jesus is His 
unity with God. The Christological question " . . .  does 
not begin with some preliminary aspect of his deeds and 
words or of his effect on men, but with his relation to 
God as it is expressed in the whole of his activity on
^^Ibid., pp. 47 ff.
^^Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," Revelation as History, ed. by Pannenberg, trans. by David Grans kou (New York ; Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 151. See also supra, Chapter IV, p. 294.
62Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. pp. 154 ff. See also pp. 296 ff.^ oSee supra. Chapter IV, p. 294.
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e a r t h , T h e  task of Christology is to delineate this 
relationship, Hodgson properly points out that although 
Pannenberg purports to approach Christology "from below"che gives his first attention to Jesus* divinity. However, 
Pannenberg is endeavoring to develop a Christology from
within the framework of the Christian faith. This dis-/tinguishes Pannenberg*s thought from that of Ferre and most 
other theologians. The traditional approaches to Christol­
ogy ask either or both of two questions; how can God be 
man, and how can a man be related to God? Pannenberg seems 
to ask a different question: how can we know that God's
revelation in Christ is true? To put it another way, Pan­
nenberg accepts the Christian ascription that Jesus is the 
Christ, and then goes on to ask what this means in terms 
of the entire life of Christ and of the Christian faith 
and our participation in it. If this is at all the case, 
then Pannenberg can quite properly assert that his is a 
Christology "from below" and that the first question con­
cerns the divinity of Jesus. However, Hodgson's point will 
be raised again shortly.
Where does Pannenberg begin his Christology? With 
Jesus, Himself? No, the starting point for the development
^^Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, p. 36.
^^Peter C. Hodgson, "Pannenberg on Jesus," p. 376. G. G. 0 'Collins finds Pannenberg's thought at this point "emphatically a Christology 'from below,'" and that the first order of investigation is properly a discussion of Jesus' relation to God. G. G. 0^Collins, "The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg," Religious Studies. Vol. 3, No, 1, October, 1967, p. 370.
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of Christology, Pannenberg suggests, is with the resurrec­
tion.^^ It is concerned with what happened to Jesus, rather
than with what He did.
However, a problem confronts those attempting to 
deal with Pannenberg's Christological thought. There is a 
difference between methodology and Christology. The former 
is concerned with establishing the basis, or taking a stand, 
upon which one then begins to delineate theological concepts. 
Christology, however, is a Christian theological concept 
concerned with a theological understanding— in traditional 
terms— of the Person and Work of Christ. In the thought of 
the M odem  Antiochene s, the Process Theologians, and Ne Is 
Ferre the difference between method and Christology is 
fairly clear. In Pannenberg*s thought the distinction is 
quite blurred. This blurring derives, perhaps inevitably, 
from the uniqueness of Pannenberg*s theological orientation 
discussed in the previous paragraphs, namely, that Pannen­
berg starts with a Christological assertion--Jesus is 
Risen!— and then attempts to get at its meaning through 
establishing a methodological approach. For example, he 
affirms immediately that Jesus is the man in whom God is 
revealed, and then he turns his attention to the task of 
establishing a basis for understanding what this means.
But in his writings the distinction is not so easily de­
fined. His thought is presented in a constant interweaving
^^Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen zur Aufer- stehung Jesu," Kerygma und Dogma. Vol. 14, 1968, p. 107.
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of Christology and methodology.Therefore, Pannenberg's 
thought seems to yield more readily to analysis if a separ­
ation of methodology and Christology is imposed upon his 
argument in a way that he, himself, never entertains. The 
obvious danger in taking such an approach is that a distor­
tion of Pannenberg*s view will result. That is not to be 
dismissed lightly, but the need for analytical clarity is 
never without risk. Further, it would seem to follow logi­
cally that once such a separation is imposed on pannenberg*s 
thought, the greater stress will occur on the methodological 
side. That is, Pannenberg proposes to examine the Christo- 
logical claims for Jesus in order to lay a basis by which 
these claims can be interpreted by Christians, and, at the 
same time, to provide a perspective for viewing these 
claims as grounded in truth, Pannenberg's concern has a 
decidedly apologetic dimension.
Pursuing this program then, what is Pannenberg's 
Christological affirmation? It is that in the man Jesus 
God is r e v e a l e d . T h i s  implies an identity of Jesus with 
God. How can we understand this identity, this relation­
ship of a man and God? " . . .  Jesus* resurrection is the 
basis for the perception of his divinity . , . " . . .
only Jesus * resurrection is the point of departure for the
6  7 Hodgson apparently fails to note this interweaving or else he chooses to ignore it. Consequently he is led to suggest that Pannenberg treats Jesus * humanity as a subordi­nate theme since his first consideration is for Jesus* divin­ity. Hodgson, "Pannenberg on Jesus," p. 376.
Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, p. 30.
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recognition of his unity with God,"^^ But how is the resur­
rection to be understood? This leads us to Pannenberg*s 
methodology. "Christology is concerned , . . not only with 
unfolding the Christian community's confession of Christ, 
but above all with grounding it in the activity and fate of 
Jesus in the past."?^ This involves us, Pannenberg argues, 
in understanding Jesus* resurrection through three themes 
or avenues for Christological knowledge: the historical,
the authoritative, and the revelational.
In Pannenberg*s methodology it is essential to under­
stand the historical context in which Jesus lived. Jesus 
would never have become the object of a Christology without 
the context of Israel's expectation. The one Jesus called 
"Father" is, after all, the God of the Old T e s t a m e n t . O n  
the one hand this means that Jesus and his hearers were ac­
quainted with the same God, the God of Israel, knowledge of
72whom preceded the message of Jesus, On the other hand.
Jbid., pp. 108 and 307. Pannenberg argues in the context in wEich these two passages appear both that his methodology differs from others who endeavor to develop a Christology "from below"— ostensibly because he focuses on the resurrection as the starting point--and that his posi­tion is closer to the earlier Christian traditions. ''With­out a doubt the oldest Christian community understood Jesus* resurrection from the dead as the decisive point in the his­tory of his relation to God." Ibid., p. 134.
70lbld.. p. 28,
71Ibid., p. 32. Cf, also, Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," pp. 139 ff.
72Peters, as a process theologian, makes a similar point, namely, that we must already know God in order to know Jesus. See supra, Chapter III, pp. 202, 221 and 267, Cf. also p. 249. But for Peters the knowledge is a cogni-
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this means equally that this is the God whom Jesus pro­
claimed in his message, namely, the God who in history has 
purposed a destiny for Himself and for Israel. "[Jesus *] 
message presupposed not only a knowledge of God, but the 
expectation of his future reign on earth.
The message Jesus proclaimed was that God's reign, 
long awaited by the Jews, is at hand. There was nothing 
new in this. It was part of the Hebrew tradition. What
tive one which relegates Jesus to a subordinate position, if, indeed. He need be referred to at all. In contrast, Pannenberg approaches such knowledge from a different per­spective. "Experience of the reality of history is super­ior to that connected with the contemplation of the cosmos." Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," p. 141. For Pannenberg such knowledge must proceed from the historical experiences with the God of Israel. "The answer to man's question about God is received . . . only through the particular experience of the reality about which the question asks. This always involves an experience of the whole of reality, but it involves this as it appears from the perspective of a definite occasion that produces it, from a definite point of view." Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, p. 131. That experience is of the God of Israeli For Pannenberg this view elevates Jesus to a pre­eminent position. "We do not first know who God is and then also something about Jesus, but only in connection with Jesus, do we know that the ground of all reality about whom every man inquires, openly or concealed, consciously or unconsciously, is in its real essence identical with the God of Israel." Ibid., p. 130. This conclusion an­ticipates an argument sti11 to be presented, namely, that of Jesus* authority. Cf. infra, Chapter IV, pp. 306 ff.But it does indicate Pannenberg *s insistence that knowledge of God must be all of a piece, and that Jesus must be a part of this knowledge or else there is nothing more to be said about Christology. " . . .  Christology finds God in the man Jesus." Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 186.
7 3 Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 103, brackets added. Pannenberg goes on to add, "One cannot understand Jesus* claim unless one realizes its presuppositions, namely, knowledge of God and the antici­pation of the future fulfillment of God's will on earth." Ibid.. p. 104.
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Pannenberg daims to be new was that Jesus* exclusive con­
cern with God's reign resulted in his becoming one with the 
message, and, at the same time, in his encountering conflict 
with other Jewish traditions, particularly those validated 
in the Law.?^ That is a Christological statement primarily, 
concerned with the Person of Jesus. What Pannenberg*s 
methodology requires at this point is the development of 
a historical understanding of the meaning of the Jewish 
expectation of the coming of God's reign.
The tradition of the Old Testament was that God acts 
in history to make Himself known. This view held both that 
men could know God, and that it was God's will to be known. 
The primitive ideas of a direct revelation of God in the- 
ophanies gave way, in the time of Moses, to a conviction 
that God is known indirectly through His actions. By anti­
cipating events which were to make God's divinity known, the 
prophets helped make these future acts discernible for the 
people as Yahweh's acts. Not always did these acts corres­
pond to the prophets * expectations. But fulfillment did 
occur. Israel came to recognize God's freedom over against 
the prophets' words. In time Israel also came to recognize 
that these acts were not isolated events, but were a part 
of a total history. This led them eventually to turn to 
the future. The apocalyptic movement began in the prophetic 
period, a movement which stressed the ultimate realization 
of God's plan decided before creation.
74ibld.. pp. 102 ff.
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Since knowledge of God's divinity was no longer expected from single events but from one final occur­rence which would gather together all earlier, single events into one single history, this ultimate knowl­edge had to be placed at the end of all history.Only when all occurrence is ended can the divinity of God be known on the basis of the connection of history.75
This understanding of history is closest to the modem sense 
of the term "revelation," God's "making himself known.
It is in the context of this understanding of the meaning 
of history that Pannenberg argues that men heard Jesus 
announce the nearness of God's reign.
Note should be taken here of a presupposition, which 
seems to be evident in Pannenberg's thought, and which may 
be an unwarranted one. It is understandable that for pur­
poses of his Christological methodology Pannenberg should 
argue for a self-conscious transition in Israel's thought 
from one which endeavors to understand God in His acts to 
one which awaits confidently the End of history. An apoca­
lyptic movement did develop in Israel, But was it as 
universally understood by the Israelites as Pannenberg's
^^Ibid., p. 122.
^^Ibid.. p. 123; see pp. 118-123 for the substance of this paragraph.
^^Pannenberg rejects the position of the historical positivist, separating history into facts and evaluations, or into history as known and history as experienced. Rather events have their meaning in the context of their occurrence and their traditions. At the same time, events are yoked to the present and its meaning through the inquirer. Ibid., pp. 125 ff. Pannenberg's understanding here is not too dissim- ilar to that which Cobb calls "real history." Cf. supra> Chapter III, pp. 228 ff.
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thought seems to r e q u i r e I f  it were not universal, then 
what is the historical context in which Jesus* hearers 
heard Him? The presuppositions of the Zealot movement 
would not seem to correlate with the tenets of apocalypti­
cism. Further, how does Pannenberg*s understanding of 
Israel's history accord with his understanding of the cru­
cifixion as Israel's rejection of Jesus?^^ Was Jesus re­
jected because He stressed only one aspect of the tradi­
tions? Or because He was not understood correctly by the 
people? At any rate, is Pannenberg prepared to argue that 
the historical context of understanding was the same by 
which Jesus was both heard and rejected? Surely not, for 
his methodology requires that the claim that Jesus is the 
man of God, the Christ, must be sustained, in part, on the 
premise that He is part of, and fulfills, the historical 
contextual understanding of the people with whom He lived. 
It would appear that Pannenberg has imposed an historical 
understanding that was not there at the time of Jesus. How­
ever, Pannenberg could argue that it was not necessary for
78o'Collins cites Rumscheidt, who asks, "What com­pels us to accept 'the horizon of the apocalyptic expecta­tion* of late Judaism in order to perceive God's revelation in Jesus?" Then 0*Collins goes on to raise the issue that if revelation occurs at the end, not the beginning of re­vealing history, then it must be connected with the past, "It is not immediately obvious how by itself reflection on the revelation contained in past events could have (legiti­mately) provided a category of interpretation for the resur­rection as the anticipation of the future end of all his­tory." G. G. 0 'Collins, "The Christology of Wolfhart Pan­nenberg," pp. 375-376.
79Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 70-72.
305
all men to possess the apocalyptic understanding. It is 
only necessary that some did, some who could then under­
stand Jesus* message and the apocalyptic meaning of His 
resurrection. But does this argument usher in the counter­
claim that the acceptance and proclamation of the resurrec­
tion of Jesus was a contrived proposition, the very claim 
Pannenberg*s appeal to the historical context was designed 
to avoid?
Based upon this contextual understanding of history, 
Pannenberg then offers the argument which presents the core 
of his Christological methodology. There was a proleptic 
aspect in Israelite prophecy in that the prophets preached 
a present announcement of God's future. Jesus stood in this 
tradition. Pannenberg finds justification for this proleptic 
nature of Jesus' message not only in Jesus* sayings, but also 
in the totality of Jesus' activities understood in the con­
text of the apocalyptic background. What this means is 
that Jesus' claim in His message that God's reign is already
at hand, like the pronouncements of the prophets, requires
81future confirmation. If confirmed, then Jesus' message 
in its own time and cultural context is already true in an­
ticipation of the future confirmation. This is the pro-
82leptic character of Jesus message." It suggests the
80Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. p. 63.
82"^Pannenberg discusses some differences between Jesus and the prophets, such as Jesus makes what happens to Himself the claim for truth. However, the discussion does
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question concerning Jesus* authority.
Why should His contemporaries accept Jesus* claim 
that God's reign is imminent? Why should we, for that 
matter? How can Jesus lead men to accept his authority?
A Christology that begins with the Incarnation assumes the 
authority without proof; while a Christology predicated 
upon Jesus' consciousness of His divine authority simply 
does not provide an answer as to why we should believe 
Jesus' c l a i m . P a n n e n b e r g  rejects both of these tradi­
tional Christological positions.
Pannenberg presents the argument for the establish­
ment of Jesus' authority in several progressive points. Put 
another way, Pannenberg addresses the problem of why men of 
Jesus' own time, men of the original audience, should have 
decided for Jesus* claim to speak the truth, God's truth to 
be e x a c t . T h e  message Jesus proclaimed of the nearness
not add much relevance for Pannenberg's proleptic assertion. Cf. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 61 ff. See also Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," p. 154, where Pannenberg suggests that the Word of God is " . . .  understood as a report of the event in which God is revealed, as the report of the fate of Jesus."
83Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen zur Aufer- stehung Jesu," Kergyma und Dogma, Vol. 14, 1968, p. 108.All translations or this German article are the writer's. Pannenberg feels that the latter approach establishes a condition which " . . .  then leads some to speak in quite uniquely pompous, dogmatic terms." Ibid., italics added.Cf. also Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. p. 66.
^^Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 110 ff.
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of God's reign was an eschatological message of the Israel­
ite tradition in which it stood. Men were to decide for 
the message, not for Jesus. But Jesus* proclamation con­
flicted with other traditions established in the Law. The 
ambiguity here could be resolved only " . . . by an act in 
which the God of Israel himself would confirm the message of 
J e s u s . T h e r e f o r e ,  in the second place, Jesus' claim of 
authority was linked to the past and the future for His audi­
ence, the past understanding of the apocalyptic message and 
the anticipation of a future confirmation. Thus far the 
claim for authority is the same as that claimed by any 
prophet. Even the proleptic claim of a future confirmation 
accords with a prophetic understanding. But, Pannenberg 
argues, the exclusiveness with which Jesus* message pointed 
to the future of God, established in the third place, that 
" . . .  the ministry of Jesus was already the dawn of the 
reign of God announced by him. The ground of the claim 
is now shifting in Pannenberg*s argument to include not only 
the message but also the ministry of Jesus Himself. There­
fore, Jesus' claim to authority is both for His message and 
Himself. This claim is overturned, however, if there is no 
act of fulfillment upon which a decision concerning Jesus' 
claim could be made. One may not agree in all respects
85lbid.. p. 111.
""ibid., p. 112. Pannenberg believes that Jesus apparently knew his difference from other prophets, and indicated this by calling John the Baptist the last of the prophets. Ibid. Pannenberg*s particular use of kenosis will be dealt with later. See infra. Chapter IV, pp. 364 ff.
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with Schweitzer's proposal of a "consistent eschatology," 
but, as Pannenberg points out, it was part of Jesus' expec­
tation •
But apparently Jesus * expectation of the imminent 
End was not fulfilled, at least not as Jesus and His con­
temporaries understood it. Yet because of Easter's message, 
Jesus' claim did not fail. "It was fulfilled, and thus con- 
firmed, though only in his own person."®^ Jesus' resurrec- 
tion is the event which confirms Jesus' claim. The resur­
rection has retroactive power; in it God confirms Jesus* 
pre-Easter claim, not only for Jesus' message but also for 
Jesus' identity with G o d T h e  acceptance of this event 
as the act confirming Jesus' claim required a shift in their 
eschatological understanding for Jesus' contemporaries. In 
the apocalyptic tradition the resurrection was for all man­
kind, not just one man. At this point, Pannenberg argues, 
we are driven to speak metaphorically since we do not know 
the reality corresponding to resurrection.^^ That is, 
whatever continuum lies beyond resurrection is hidden from 
our view. "To put it succinctly: the further continuation
of what happened insofar as it relates to Jesus remains
®^Ibid., p. 114. Cf. also Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 225 ff.
^^Ibid., pp. 134 ff.
®^Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 115.
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u n k n o w n . B u t  for His contemporaries, Jesus* resurrec­
tion established the authority of His claim.
There is still a problem to be faced in this pre­
sentation, How is the resurrection of Jesus linked with 
the Parousia? That is, if the End has come only in the fate 
of Jesus, in His resurrection, then how can His eschatologi­
cal claim be verified when all of His contemporaries re­
mained very much alive in this life? For Pannenberg this 
has already been answered in the previous discussion. First, 
His contemporaries realized that God's history is all of a 
piece, and that one event, the resurrection, can prolepti- 
cally reveal the End of the totality of history. Second,
His contemporaries realized that their own resurrection 
--sooner or later— is assured in Jesus' resurrection. There­
fore, Pannenberg is convinced that for His contemporaries 
the long delay in the arrival of the Parous ia was not seen 
as a refutation of Jesus' claim, and Christian hope and per­
ception " . . .  as long as the unity between what happened 
in Jesus and the eschatological future is maintained
^^Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen zur Aufer- stehung Jesu," p. 112, Pannenberg goes on to say, "The most that can be said historically about the event of Jesus' resurrection is, therefore, that Jesus--who died --'lives,' but that does not permit us to say precisely what this word 'life' means beyond observing that Jesus did not remain dead." Ibid. However, in a footnote on p. 113, Pannenberg begins to explore a different con­cept of life which might allow an understanding of resurrected life that would no longer be limited to the metaphorical.
91Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, p. 108.
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Thus Jesus* claim to authority is confirmed proleptically. 
Ultimate confirmation awaits His return.
This then suggests Pannenberg*s third methodological 
avenue for understanding his formulation of a Christology 
for which the starting point is Jesus* resurrection. Pan­
nenberg *s position is that we can understand Christology 
only through the event of the resurrection. In turn, we can 
understand the resurrection only if we understand the con­
text in which the resurrection event occurred and in which 
it was believed by the earliest Christian community. The 
first context for understanding the resurrection was the 
historical one of the apocalyptic expectation of Israel. 
Jesus * claim of authority in His message as a proleptic 
claim to be confirmed in His fate, provided the context of 
the second methodological avenue for understanding the 
resurrection. The third avenue, that of revelation, has 
already been anticipated.Revelation, for Pannenberg, 
is understood as God's indirect disclosure of Himself^^ 
in history, in actual e v e n t s . ^ 4  gy using the qualifying
9^See supra. Chapter IV, pp. 302 ff,
^^At times Pannenberg even uses the terms so often utilized by Barth, "veiled" and "unveiled." Cf. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 118.
^^Compare this with the Antiochene concern for im­manence, an idea P. T. Forsyth finds attractive if under­stood in terms of ethical action and not mere ontological presence. See supra. Chapter II, pp. 97 ff. See also supra, Chapter II, footnote 164, p. 138 for a brief dis- cussion on the possible usefulness of the concept of "theophany" to explain immanence; it is a concept which Pannenberg would reject. See supra, Chapter IV, p. 302.
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terra "indirect" as applied to God's Self-disclosure, Pan­
nenberg intends that both of two meanings should attach to 
the understanding of revelation.
First, God is not identical to the acts of His Self­
disclosure. The direct sense of revelation involves the 
proposition that there can be no distinction between the 
event and the essence of God Himself Rather what takes
place is an " . . . indirect self-revelation of God as a
96reflex of his activity in history," Every activity or
event can say something about God. Each stands on its own,
but does indicate God as the originator. "As acts of God,
these acts cast light back on God himself, communicating
something indirectly about God h i m s e l f . S e c o n d ,  at the
same time that God's revelation is indirect, it is also only
partial. Revelation takes place in history, indeed, it is
about God's history, God's future. But history is whole
only at the End, Any given act of God's revelation
. . .  is always surpassed with new events, new historical activity in which Jahweh presents himself in new ways, Thus . . . it is only the end of all
and see also, Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," pp. 125 ff.
^^Pannenberg, "Introduction," Revelation As History, ed. by Pannenberg (New York; Macmillan Co., I960), p. 7.
96 Ibid., p. 13,
Jbid., p. 16. Pannenberg discusses the more modem idea of revelation as God's self-disclosure which is suggested by Karl Barth and others. He argues that this proceeds from the influence of German Idealism, while he is more interested in the Biblical understanding. See ibid., pp. 4 ff.; and Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, pp. 127 ff.
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events which [can] bring in the final self-manifesta­tion of Jahweh, the perfection of his revelation.98
Therefore, the revelation of God is at the same time indirect
and incomplete. This is the meaning of revelation Pannenberg
finds consistent with the Biblical understanding. " . . .
an individual act of God, a particular event, can indeed cast
an indirect light on its originator, but cannot be the full
and complete revelation of the one God. Logically from
these premises it could be supposed that any revelational
event which stands at the End of history would be a complete
revelation. Indeed, Pannenberg will offer this argument in
the course of the discussion of his Christology itself.
Pannenberg*s methodological approach to Christology 
can now be summarized. As stated at the beginning of this 
discussion, this methodology is abstracted from Pannenberg's 
thought in a way that he, himself, does not entertain. To 
do so, however, yields greater clarity to his entire argu­
ment . The point at which Pannenberg chooses to begin his 
discussion of Christology is with the resurrection. It is 
his premise that such an undertaking provides the best clue 
for understanding the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. His 
methodology is concerned with the ways in which a proper 
understanding of the resurrection might be obtained. Ac­
cordingly he suggests that the resurrection event should be 
approached in terms of its importance for the Israelite
^^Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation," pp. 140 ff., brackets added.
^^Pannenberg, "Introduction," p. 19.
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understanding of their apocalyptic history, for the valida­
tion of Jesus* claim of authority, and for its place in 
God's revelational activity. Applying these approaches to 
the event of the resurrection should enable us to discover
who Jesus is and how we can understand Him.
Methodological Comparison
This chapter is concerned with that Liberal way of
understanding Christology which purports to begin "from
below." Both Ferre and Pannenberg lay claim to such an 
approach. But methodologically their individual approaches 
are widely diverse. A brief note should be taken of these 
differences.
When Ferre designates his approach to Christology as 
one which begins "from below," he means that our Christologi* 
cal understanding must begin with the materials available to 
us in our ordinary experience. His analysis of these mate­
rials leads him to conclude that in history's "highest ar­
rival" man finds God. That is, he concludes that if God 
wants man qua man to understand Him, then somewhere in his­
tory— in man's ordinary experience— there is a person by 
which man can know God. Ferre declares Jesus to be this 
"highest arrival." Accordingly, to understand Jesus is to 
understand God. Christology begins with Jesus. Some ques­
tions have been raised about this methodology,^^0 and it 
must be granted that Ferre's methodology presupposes not
lOOgee supra, Chapter IV, pp. 290 ff.
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only that God exists but also that God wills to make Him­
self known; nevertheless, once having determined that Jesus 
is the "highest arrival," Ferre's Christological methodology 
decidedly takes him to the point where Who Christ is is de­
termined by Who Jesus is.
In contrast, although Pannenberg has also designated 
his approach to Christology as one which begins "from below," 
Hodgson's criticism that he does not do so needs to be 
heeded.^01 it is true that Pannenberg is attempting to 
approach Christology in terms both of the confession of the 
Christian community and of an historical grounding to estab­
lish its truth claims. In and of itself that should not 
establish Hodgson's criticism. But if one proposes to 
approach the Christological question primarily through an 
analysis of the resurrection, is this not beginning "from 
above"? That is, insofar as the resurrection is God's 
act— Jesus did not cause it to happen to Himself--then is 
it not starting "from above" to ground Christology here, 
even if one argues that all acts result from God's crea­
tive activity, thereby defining the resurrection as an 
event like other historical events? However, in his 
methodological approach--albeit abstracted from his thought 
rather than offered self-consciously by Pannenberg, himself 
--the claim for Jesus is being advanced through avenues of 
experience and understanding available to man qua man. 
Further, it is essential to Pannenberg*s argument that
^^^See supra, Chapter IV, p. 297.
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that experience and understanding were available to Jesus*
contemporaries. Also Pannenberg proposes to approach a
Christological grounding in the resurrection event through
the utilization of the same kind of historical inquiry
that is applied to all historical events in order to in-
102vestigate and establish their truth claims. Therefore, 
it is quite proper for Pannenberg to claim that his is, 
indeed, a Christology beginning "from below." Yet in con­
trast to Ferre, Pannenberg*s Christological methodology 
takes him to the Christological starting point where Who 
Christ is is determined by Who the resurrected Jesus is.
In any case, though Ferre and Pannenberg self-con­
sciously stand on a common Liberal platform which holds 
that a doctrine of Christ can be developed "from below," 
their Christological suggestions are widely diverse. The 
contrast is helpful in gaining a perspective on this par­
ticular Liberal Christological approach, but it presents 
difficulties in holding together the thoughts of the two 
men. What insights can be drawn will have to await the 
presentation of their individual Christological positions.
B. The Christology of Ferre 
The conclusion of Ferre's methodological approach 
was that God can be known by man in the realm of ordinary 
experiences, but only by a personal event which most
102pannenberg*s argument for the historicity of the resurrection has not been heard yet and is still to come. That argument is a notable one for Christian theology. See infra, Chapter IV, pp. 352 ff.
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completely expresses life's fulfillment. That personal
event, that "highest arrival" in history, is found in the
103life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus. There­
fore, Ferre begins his Christological formulation with Jesus: 
Jesus as the "highest arrival" available to man; Jesus as 
" . . .  the ultimate category of being on which all else 
d e p e n d s . W h a t  this means is that theologically one be­
gins with God's work in the Incarnation, while historically
lOSone begins with the humanity of Jesus. That is, Ferre 
accepts for methodological purposes the premise that God 
makes Himself known to man. But the truth of this premise 
is not discernible in theological formulations of the concept 
of God. Rather the truth is found in a personal, historical 
event, namely, Jesus. It is through Jesus that we know that 
God has made Himself known, that He has, indeed, become In­
carnate. This is what Ferre means by the category of the
historical.106
When Ferre uses the term "incarnation" he is not 
speaking of the traditional concept which is largely con­
cerned with the question of how God could be a man. There
103gee supra, Chapter IV, pp. 288 ff.
The Christian Faith (New York: HarperBros., 1942), p. 1T6.
lOSperre, Christ and the Christian, p. 98.
lOGperre argues that the question of whether or not Agape— God— broke into history first through Jesus Christ is not a matter for analysis--philosophical or otherwise—  but for an historical investigation. The Universal Word, p. 158. ---------------------
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is no problem of divinity as against humanity in Ferre’s 
thought at this point. His use of Incarnation comes clos-
est to the term "revelation."
The view that God became incarnate ^  Jesus . . . starts with no view of God. Neither does it start with any view of man. it starts with Jesus as the historic manifestation of Agape. He is a person in history among other persons. But by seeing him we see through to God. We see God through him because He was in him.107
In spite of his claim here, Ferre has already suggested both
a view of God and a view of man. To argue that God becomes
incarnate at least presumes that God is such that He wants
men to know Him, and that He takes appropriate action to
enable this to happen. At the same time, Ferre's statement
presumes that man is such that he possesses at least the
potential ability to know God, and that man, in who He is,
1 A Qcan be the way in which God is known. °
At any rate, presumably Ferre's intent is to focus 
upon Jesus, and through Him to find an understanding both 
of the nature of God and the nature of man. 1^^ There is a
lO^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 191.
lOSperre has already argued that man's needs stand at the center of his evaluative reasoning. Therefore, man's ability to recognize Jesus as the "historic manifestation of Agape" does suggest a view of man both in respect to Who Jesus is and in respect to what man is as an experiencingbeing. "The real and only question is whether, in the lightof the roost critical and the most creative interpretation of experience, we can have a warranted faith to the effect that there is an ultimate nature of things and that we can know something of what this ultimate nature of things is." TheUniversal Word, p. 32. "To live is to be a believer." '"'ibid..p . 267. That says something about Ferre's view of man!
109ifThe thesis of our theology is that we must start with the Incarnation--or with that personal event in history
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sense, of course, in which Ferre's analysis of Jesus is re­
lated to one of the traditional meanings of the imago dei. 
Norris puts that meaning this way, "To say of man that he 
is in the image of God is to say, essentially, that in
man's nature and in his activities one may discover clues
110to aspects of the reality of the divine nature itself."^
The expanded application of this concept to Jesus qua man 
has occupied a revered place in Protestant theology since 
Luther.Ill But that is not the entire meaning involved in 
Ferre's focus upon the personal event of Jesus. For in 
Jesus Ferre also seeks the clue as to who man is. The 
"highest arrival" indicates both that which is "beyond 
ordinary experience" and that which is part of ordinary 
experience. Therefore, Jesus provides in His Own Person 
the clues to both God and man, Ferre's Christology starts 
with the Person of Jesus. Upon the basis of the understand-
which most fully illuminates, judges and offers help for life while also indicating, through its very pointing of the cosmic process, the nature of ultimate reality." Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 75. The question which must be put to Ferre is this : Is an incarnation a possibility inhis concept of reality; or does his concept of reality de­rive from the Incarnation? Ferre's methodological claim is that he does the former; the suspicion is that he engages in the latter approach and thus evidences Root's criticism. Cf. supra. Chapter IV, pp. 291 ff.
ll^R. A. Norris, Manhood and Christ (Oxford; Clar­endon Press, 1963), p. 14TI
llliiThat it is in the humanity of Christ that his divinity is most truly perceived, was also the position of Luther, and has been implicitly basic to almost all modem Protestant theologies." R. W, Farmer, "An Historical Essay on the Humanity of Jesus," Christian History and Interpreta­tion, ed. by Farmer, Moule and Niebuhr, p. 101.
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ing gained here, Ferre then offers his concept of man, in­
cluding the concept of sin, and finally turns to the work
of Christ, that of salvation. That is the Christological
112outline which will be followed.
How does Ferre understand Jesus? Jesus is the
Agape-man. "The life of Jesus, from the beginning of its
113mission to its end, seems to have been one of Agape."
In His actions. His teachings. His being rejected. His 
resurrection, Jesus expressed in Himself the understanding 
of God as Agape, as full, outgoing Love. Only in Jesus is 
this kind of love found, a love which reaches out because
119There is a problem involved in this outline. That is the problem caused by the inevitable interplay between the concept of Christ and the concept of man. Jesus was a man! The appropriate place to start understanding Jesus would seem to be by first understanding man. That is what the Modem Antiochenes do and, mutatis mutandis, so do the Process Theologians. But Ferre arrives at his understand­ing of man through the manhood presented by Jesus. Since Jesus is not only God's Incarnate One, but also the highest instance of man, to start to understand what our humanity ^ means by starting with Jesus involves us in an understanding of our highest potential, "The best exceptional instance of man most generally exemplified his potential nature," Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 75. Yet humanity is not always f ul f il le d humanity, What we have not yet become is also a part of who we are. In Ferre's own thought do we not recognize Jesus as the "highest instance" only because our actual humanity is not yet His, however similar we may be potentially? Is it not also necessary that there be established enough of a relationship between Jesus and us that we can recognize that His fulfilled humanity is yet one of us? Therefore, the problem involved in deriving an anthropology from Jesus is that of keeping the man Jesus in our sight!
^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 56; see also p. 73. Jesus l i v e s . I . under the constant standard of Agape," Ferre, Christianity and Society, p. 21.
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of its own n a t u r e . 114 This kind of love is also communal; 
it is about relationships. Therefore, Ferre suggests, 
"Christ is . . . the centre of history . . .  as the symbol, 
at least conclusively expressed in human history, of the 
maximum kind of love which is the power for the fullest 
possible community."11^ This love is discernible in Christ. 
The shift from Jesus to Christ is intended in Ferre's argu- 
tnent.
When Ferre speaks of Jesus as Agape, he speaks of 
the God-ward side of the revelation, of God Incarnate.
Ferre does not aim to develop a Christology in terms of 
those nineteenth century Liberal suggestions that we only 
need to know the human Jesus in order to know God. It is 
Christ Whom we encounter in Jesus.
. , . we . . . start with Christ himself as a his­torical figure, but not with history as such or with the historical Jesus as such. The approach, to be sure, is through history, for Jesus was in history, but only through the truth of eternity in history.We start with Christ only because in history we have found one who by his living and teaching affords us the ultimate context for interpreting life and cosmic process, and who . . . goes beyond both life and pro­cess as such only because God was at the center of
. . . the total carrying out of the meaning of outgoing love that is in no way motivated by the object but solely by the nature of love itself, so that the object of love becomes merely a conditioning element for the applica­tion of love is, to the best of ray knowledge, distinctly Christian." Ferre, The Living God of Nowhere and Nothing.
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 233. Elsewhere Ferre says, "In Jesus we see exhibited that creative concern for community that constitutes our peak understanding of God." Ferre, Searchlights on Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper Bros., 1961), p. l62.
321
his being and teaching. Such is, in fact, the truth of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is found in his­tory, but the center of its reality is never humanity or human history. Thus in starting with this pattern of Jesus Christ as Agape, the Event-Meaning, we have a historical approach that is nevertheless free of the detailed problems of the historical Jesus and that will eventuate in a different kind of theology from that which makes the historical Jesus central. Although we cannot know the historic Jesus, then, we can know the historic Christ.116
Several points are to be noted in this passage. First, God 
makes Himself known in history. Second, Jesus is the One in 
Whom God makes Himself known. Third, since Jesus is the One 
only because God was in Him, therefore the One we know his­
torically is Christ. Pannenberg, in contrast, does not so 
radically affirm that only in Jesus does God make Himself 
known. In fact, Pannenberg is able to confess Jesus as 
Christ because God has already made Himself known through 
other acts in history.11? Does Ferre intend to deemphasize 
Jesus* manhood which would tend to make his Christology 
docetic and Jesus but a mere theophany? This is definitely 
not Ferre's intention, for it is as essential for his theo­
logical method that the "highest arrival" be of ordinary 
experience as beyond ordinary experience. Christologically 
this means Jesus is not only revelation but also man, for 
Incarnation means God's revelation in the personal event in 
history. Ferre has affirmed that the center of the Incarna­
tion is God, not man. Jesus did not elevate Himself to
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 58, italicsadded•
^^^Cf. supra. Chapter IV, pp. 300 ff.
322
Christ by His Own bootstraps! Since Jesus is never known 
apart from His mission as Agape, accordingly the One
known in history is the C h r i s t , T h e n  how is Jesus* 
human nature to be understood
As the "highest arrival" Jesus shows what it means 
to be human, to possess a full, genuine humanity. Such a 
genuine humanity means " . , . to be organically united to 
God and fulfilled by the coinherence of God. Jesus lived 
love; God is love and has made men for l o v e S e v e r a l  
points need to be explored here. First, Ferre argues that
^^^See supra, Chapter IV, pp. 319 ff.
^^^Elsewhere Ferre discusses both the historic Jesus and the historic Christ. "By the historic Jesus I mean the concrete, human personality of ordinary human history. The historic Christ connotes, rather, the kind of person Jesus was according to our best reports ojThim.By the historic Jesus I denote the full course of an indi­vidual in all the complexities of detail from day to day.By the historic Christ I understand the main impression that life made on people in terms of what he was and taught. The historic Christ is the concrete universal, which the his­toric Jesus enacted. The exact human personality we cannot know with any certainty." The Universal Word, p. 169. But if we know the historic Christ through the enactment of the historic Jesus, then we must know something of the latter in order to know the former. At another place Ferre says that Jesus came to know God. "How well he knew God we can­not know. The specific details of Jesus* life and teach­ings are beyond reconstruction." Reason in Religion, p.69. Just how can Ferre guard such a view against the charge of subjectivism? Ferre is driven to the argument that Jesus knew that God's nature is love or else Jesus would not have lived and taught as He did. Ibid.
190Cf. Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 73 ff,
^^^Ibid., p. 73, italics added. Cf. with the Mod­e m  Antiochene position, supra. Chapter II, pp. 115 ff.; and with Cobb's brief suggestion, supra. Chapter III, pp.237 ff.
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Jesus possessed ordinary human nature. There was nothing
ab extra about His humanity. Only by being part of our
humanity could He be part of our history. But the humanity
of Jesus that we see is one in which He has actualized our
potentiality and thereby identified it as our proper nature.
We encounter Him in the normative sense of a true humanity,
122a realized potential. ■ To become Godpossessed is our 
potential nature. "It is to enter into a supernatural union 
with Godhead which is both the very nature of God when ex­
pressed in creation and, at the same time, our potential 
nature as intended in creation. This . . . is . . . what 
is truly 'natural* . . .
Incarnation then is held to be both singular and 
p l u r a l . I t  is singular in God's act in the Incarnation 
of Christ. Christ is unique and final, a single historical 
event. At the same time, God purposes Incarnation for all 
men, to fulfill all men by His presence. Therefore, Jesus 
Christ is final as He evidences the only right kind of re­
lation to God, but others can also enter this relationship.
122perre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 75-76.
^^^Ibid., p. 76. Ferre also speaks of it as Jesus* demonstration of the '^ mature nature of man." Know Your Faith, p. 75. This raises the question of "degree" or "kind" Christology. Does Jesus differ from us in a matter of degree or is He different in kind? Attention has al­ready been given to this question. Cf. supra, Chapter II, footnote 191, pp. 148 ff. John Hick induces Ferre as a "degree" Christological thinker along with Pittenger. He also refers to it as a "neo-Arian" view whose essence is adoptionism. Cf. supra, Chapter II, p. 159.
^^^Ferre, The Universal Word, pp. 167 ff.
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Thus Incarnation is also plural. Christ is final histori-
125cally, but all men can become sons of God with Jesus.
Yet human nature is to be seen both in terms of the
absolute and the relative, the ultimate and the proximate,
the potential and the actual. Accordingly, Jesus also
possessed our drive to selfhood, our desire for others,
our need for God.^^^ However, we cannot enter into Jesus*
self-consciousness in any way. What we know of Jesus*
sharing our actual humanity derives from the records. But
Jesus so fulfilled human nature as to suggest to us the
representation of a new creation in history, an overcoming
of temptation in such a way that He not only reveals hope
for a new history, but also the help to attain it. "Jesus
enmanned not only a new single man, but a new man generi-
128cally, potentially and representatively." In sharing 
our human struggles, Jesus turned them " . . .  to serve the 
development of an authentic personal experience learning 
through decisions and growing in the face of temptations
125See also Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 9. Ferre * s thought is akin to that of Pittenger here. Hick * s criticism applies, in which he asks why God has become in­carnate only once since there is nothing in this view to prevent its happening again. Cf. supra. Chapter II, pp.159 ff.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 79 ff.
127»jhis is the point Bushnell emphatically stresses. Cf. supra, Chapter I, pp. 24 ff.
128perre, Christ and the Christian, p. 85. The question of sin for Jesus will be dealt with in the next section.
^^^Ibid.. p. 90.
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Now Ferre turns to what he calls the "Godward side" 
of the Incarnation. He speaks of the act of God's Incarna­
tion in Jesus as one of "coinherence. Also he terms it 
variously as **co-presence,"co-subject,"interpene­
tration."^^^ In order to deal with this concept it is 
necessary first to understand Ferre's use of the terra 
"spirit." Ferre argues that the category of personhood is 
valuable in Christology as a way of explaining moral and 
rational elements, but it fails at the point of the Incar­
nation. That is, the category of the personal used to 
explain the Incarnation results in the traditional dilemma 
involved in explaining the two natures in C h r i s t . I n  
terms of a personalistic Christology, Ferre's use of the 
term "co-subject" would subject him to the indictment ofTOCNestorianism. Therefore Ferre appeals to the category 
of "Spirit" as the only adequate one for Christology.
Spirit is the capacity to be oneself and yet to create what is other than self; Spirit is the ability to be in oneself and yet to communicate with what is not self; Spirit is the power thus to transcend self by creative society and communication.136
p. 73, ^^4 b l d .. p. 66.
^^^Ibld.. pp. 79, 91. In footnote 27 on the latter page, Ferre accepts the two-nature theory.
133ibld.. p. 191. pp. 123 ff.
Ibid., p. 125. Cf. also, Ferre, The ChristianUnderstanding of God, pp. 189 ff.; see infra, Chapter IV. pp. 329 ff.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 129 ff. "Spirit is by nature both self-sufficient and relational.Spirit is capable of relational uniqueness." Ferre, TheUniversal Word, p. 151.
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Ferre believes that the use of "Spirit" overcomes the dif­
ficulties and deficiencies of both the concept of substance 
and process thought for Christology. He finds the concept 
of substance inadequate because on the one hand it requires 
by definition God's absence elsewhere if He is present in 
the Incarnation, while on the other hand it surely suggests 
that God can never really be man, can never really be In­
carnate, Process Thought is held to be inadequate for 
Christology since whatever is a product of process is by
definition repeatable and, therefore, not unique as a
138radical qualitative distinction between God and man.
Yet is Ferre's use of the concept of "Spirit" a signifi­
cant improvement? To be oneself but able to create that 
which is other than self, or to communicate with what is 
not self, are not clearly distinguishable from the sug­
gestions of those employing either the concept of substance 
or process thought. It may be fairly argued, therefore, 
that Ferre has not actually offered a third way, but in
consciously rejecting the other two approaches has actually
1 3Qleft himself devoid of a base, as Molloy has suggested.
But it is by the employment of the concept of Spirit that 
Ferre proposes to understand God in Christ.
^ ^ C f . Ferre, The Universal Word, pp. 145 ff.; Christ and the Christian, pp. 117 ff. But Ferre, himself, claims that God and man are "incommensurable relations." See infra, Chapter IV, p. 330.
138Cf. Ferre, The Universal Word, pp. 147 ff.
^^^Cf. supra, Chapter IV, pp. 292 ff. One of confusing factors xn Ferre's writings is the manner in
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By his definition of "Spirit" Ferre argues that 
God both remains eternally Himself and at the same time 
becomes incarnate. That is, God is both transcendent as 
the one personal God and immanent in the man Jesus, the 
historic manifestation of A g a p e . T h e  personal remains 
transcendent while the Spirit is outgoing and immanent.
But the two aspects are inseparable, God is transcendent 
as personal Spirit and incarnate as personal Spirit. The 
incarnation takes place, then, in this way; God initiated 
the action; Jesus the man responded!
Activity from the Godward side of the incarnate Son was offered to Jesus through the passive nature of God in man . . . .  It was God who came as Son . . . God had taken the initiative and had been accepted. The human nature, on the other hand, had become pliable to the divine for which it was made.141
On the positive side this suggests that man was made for
God, that it is of potential human nature to be sons of
God. However, while Ferre clearly centers the initiating
activity in God, he also maintains that there is freedom
inherent in human nature to make decisions. But on the
which he literally hurls new terms into his argument. At times the terms confuse the meaning he is trying to convey. To understand his thought requires the reader to pay close attention to the contextual rather than the literal meaning of his terms.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 191. Speak­ing of spirit in general, Ferre says it is " . . .  akin to the presence of energy in all things. Thus the God who was in Jesus was not only God as he is in himself but also the God as he is in all creation. He was the God who is in the rock and in the fish, indeed!" Ferre, The Universal Word, pp. 152 ff. Curious statement!
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 193 ff.
328
negative side the problems are immense with this proposal. 
First, what does it mean to become pliable? Does 
it not suggest that one has conceded his responsibility as 
a decision maker? Then can Ferre legitimately argue either 
that man is by nature divine, or that Jesus possessed an 
ordinary humanity? At another p l a c e , F e r r e  suggests 
that Jesus is like the rest of us both in terms of being 
a creature and in terms of possessing a human personality. 
But he differs from us in the content of His personality, 
in that in Him God is embodied and understood for the first 
time in history; and in that God gave Himself in a special 
way through Jesus that God does not give to the rest of us. 
Yet Ferre has made an essential premise of his Christologi­
cal statement that ordinary humanity can bear the weight of 
Incarnation. Or does Ferre hold to the claim of two natures 
in man, in which the nature of God in man remains passive 
until the more dominant human nature becomes passive, thus 
allowing the former nature to become the dominant factor? 
This possibility could certainly explain how Jesus became 
the Godman, but it leaves unanswered why other men have not 
followed the same path, and it begs the question of God's
^^^Ferre, The Christian Faith, pp. 112 ff. See also, pp. 124 ff.; Christianity and ‘Society, p. 21,
I43gven here Ferre is not consistent. In Jesus the "human drives become subordinated and aligned with the divine calling." The Christian Faith, p. 117. But at another point Ferre argues that '' . T . God never relates himself to anyone through anyone in such a manner as to take away the full originality of the individual," The Uni­versal Word, p. 167. If the former is necessary for Incar- nation, Jesus and ours, does not the latter prohibit it?
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initiative. That is, where is God's initiative--except in 
the way of a general creation, seemingly denied by Ferre's 
assertion that God has given Himself in a way to Jesus not 
given to the rest of us— if the Incarnation must rest ulti­
mately upon the decision of a man?^^^ Hick's criticism is 
fully relevant here.^^^ This leads to a second major prob­
lem.
In spite of his argument that by using the category 
of Spirit rather than person he has surmounted the Nestorian 
heresy, has not Ferre in fact succumbed to this very 
c h a r g e H i s  use of the terms "co-subject" and "co-inher­
ence" certainly suggest it. The charge of Nestorianism 
applies not in upholding a two-nature theory, namely, that 
of the divinity and humanity of Christ, but in so formulat­
ing the relationship between the two natures that they can 
never become One Incarnate Son. By using the category of 
Spirit, Ferre endeavors to avoid having to link two dis­
tinct persons. But his Christological formulation tends 
to suggest this very idea.
144Ferre attempts to answer the problem of the rela­tion of God's initiative to Jesus* response, but his answer essentially is that he does not know what the relation of the two is. See Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God, pp. 202 ff.
^^^See supra. Chapter II, pp. 159 ff.; and Chapter IV, p. 324.
^‘^^What is meant here is the heresy called Nestor­ianism, not necessarily the actual thought of Nestorius. This has been discussed at some length in Chapter II. See supra. Chapter II, pp. 81 ff., particularly footnote 10, p 7 %  ff.
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Jesus as a human personality came into being within the span of human history, but he accepted the eternal Son as the constitutive reality of his personality. After Jesus died his humanity re­mained . . . .  Jesus is . . . decisively more God than man, for God and man are incommensurable re­lations . I I .147
Here he utilizes the concept of personality, and he holds
that the relation between God and man is incommensurable I
The charge becomes clearer when Ferre suggests;
. . . God became incarnate primarily through his own choosing, his own calling, of his Son. Or the eternal Son called for the response in the himan son, until through the appropriation, over time, in free- dom and in growth, the Son of eternity and the son of humanity became the one personality or history who was xn one true personality Son and son, neither one nor the other, but both; and not both as such, but the one unique historic personality.148
Though the Spirit interpenetrates, and though there is one 
unique personality, Ferre is driven to speak of the person­
ality as Son and son. If after death the son remains while 
the Son is eternal, then it is difficult to comprehend the 
personality as one. That is, the Son and the son exist side 
by side. Ferre also proposes that the divine Logos came not 
as Jesus, for Jesus was real man, but "in, with and through 
Jesus."149 That suggests a borrowed humanity!
At any rate, Ferre continues to speak of the union. 
But he raises the question concerning the point at which the 
union became the basic fact of Jesus* life. Though he
added. ^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 200, italics
1 AQFerre, The Universal Word, p. 155, italics added.
149Ibid.. p. 162
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adroits to no way of knowing with any degree of certainty,
150he suggests that it probably occurred before His baptism. 
Ferre does not see this as a problem of Jesus* self-con­
sciousness and, therefore, he does not suggest a kenotic 
interpretation.Rather it is the question of the hypo­
static union. But it was a union in which Jesus had to
initiate the response of accepting the Incarnation. This
152suggests adoptionism at some p o i n t . Y e t ,  Ferre argues
that God must take the initiative. God did not have to
wait for the right man for Incarnation. Rather He pre-
153pared one, Jesus.
What do we know at this point about Jesus, the 
"highest arrival," in Ferre's thought? Jesus was the In- 
camiate One, the man interpenetrated by the Spirit of God, 
who responded to God's initiative and became God's Son.
In this event Jesus discloses that God seeks incarnation 
with all men, and that men are capable in their ordinary 
human nature of being lifted to an incarnational status 
with God. But before Ferre can address himself to a full
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 114 ff.
^^^The idea of kenosis appears but fleetingly in Ferre's thought. Cf. Christ and the Christian. p. 193.But it is not a matter of se1f-consciousness. Rather, what he says is, " . . . God never becomes man in the sense that God stops being God. He only divests Himself of those ac­tualities of presence that would destroy the manhood . . .He . . . accommodates Himself to the condition of humanity." Ibid., pp. 205 ff.
^^^Cf. supra, Chapter II, pp. 158 ff.
^^^Cf. Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God,pp. 197 ff. ------
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description of human nature, he first defines what he means 
when he claims Jesus Christ as Agape.
Agape is love understood as outgoing concern crea­
tively and redemptively. It is unconditional love, never 
dependent upon the object's response, but, rather, it is 
creative of f e l l o w s h i p W h a t  we see in Christ is God as 
universal holy Love.^^^ Therefore, Ferre holds that.
The heart of life is love. Love is fulfilment by wholeness of relations to self, others and to God.This wholeness God offers . . . .  [It] is obviously the central concern of the religion based on the highest arrival--the kind of life and love that Jesus lived and taught— to stress that God is love and the fosterer of love.137
Through Jesus we know that God is love, that He wills to be 
with men and to create community. At the same time, through 
Jesus we know that man, himself, is made for love.^^® How­
ever, man cannot love apart from God's love; he cannot ac­
complish it on his own.^^^ In love God and man are to be 
together. Society— fellowship— is God's i n t e n t i o n . T h i s ,
^^^Ferre, Christianity and Society, p. 44.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 63.
^^^Ferre, Know Your Faith, p. 80; Christ and the Christian, p. 53.
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 88, brackets added.
^^^Ibld.. p. 219.
^^^Ferre, Pillars of Faith (New York; Harper Bros.,1948), pp. 37 ff. "without God man is lost." Ibid., p. 108."Man is fulfilled by his presence in God and God'spresence in him." Reason in Religion, p. 93.
160perre, Christianity and Society, p. 42.
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then, introduces Ferre's concept of anthropology and sin.
Already Ferre has established the position that 
since Jesus possessed an ordinary humanity, then what took 
place in Jesus can take place in other men, potentially all 
other men. This means that man can receive an Incarnation; 
he can love, he can be fulfilled in community with God.
Yet he is not! Even as Jesus was free to accept God's In­
carnation, so are all men similarly free. But not even 
love can be imposed from w i t h o u t . M a n  can be fulfilled 
only in relation with God, but man has to choose this rela- 
tionship. "God never violates our freedom." Only 
through the exercise of his choice for acceptance or aliena­
tion, for good or evil, can man possibly be real,^^^ even 
though in Jesus man has come to see that only in terras of 
a true relation to God can he actually be right and real.^^^ 
The concept of freedom is quite pivotal for Ferre's under­
standing of man's nature.
God has made us for freedom and with integrity He 
respects our human n e e d s . T h e  meaning of being human is 
to develop through f r e e d o m . T h i s  involves genuine
IblF^rre, Christ and the Christian, p. 90. 
I62Ferre, Know Your Faith, p. 16.
^^^Ibid.. p. 62.
^^^Ibid., p. 46; see also p. 77.
^^^Ferre, The Universal Word, p. 152. 
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 238.
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choices, existential choices, which determine man's des­
tiny. Then Ferre's thought takes a most interesting
turn. Man's freedom is not an unlimited freedom, and the 
limits are part of God's purposes.
Nature is put between God and man, and between men, in order that men may become responsible ; they are allowed to come to see and to accept for them­selves what is good; they are permitted to refuse what is bad on the basis of their own experience.God thus teaches by indirection. He not only per­mits but enforces the freedom to learn; it is such responsible freedom that makes man real.168
This is what elsewhere Ferre calls the "pedagogical pro­
cess. It means that life with its risks is the very
way in which God indirectly is purposively at work so that 
we may leam on our own what it means to choose the good, 
to choose for Him. Even natural evil is seen in this per­
spective. As part of the pedagogical process, God's in­
direct way of helping us leam while respecting our freedom, 
man is created with the freedom to sin, to live estranged 
from God in the sense that man does not choose God naturally 
or easily. "Creation itself is for the sake of the kind of
IG^ibid., pp. 233 ff.
^GBperre, Christian Faith and Higher Education, p. 66, italics added. Cf. Ferre, Christianity and Society,
^^^Cf. Ferre, The Universal Word, pp. 129. 45. See also. The Living God of Nowhere and Nothing, p. 24.
^^^"Natural evil . . .  is simply the precariousness of nature for our sake in order that we might have the right kind of pedagogical environment." Ferre, Christianity and Society, p. 18.
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freedom that is meaningless apart from sin. " I s  Ferre 
suggesting that sin is essential? Apparently not, but the 
possibility of actually choosing alienation from God is 
required if man's freedom is to have any genuine meaning, 
and if, indeed, man is also to be free to accept God as 
Father.
What is man like? Every man wants to be accepted, 
to trust, to b e l o n g . A t  the same time, man is finite, 
and his reason is relative, colored by the interpretations 
of previous e x p e r i e n c e s I t  is man's refusal to accept 
his finitude— the limits of his pedagogical existence-- 
which leads man to put himself at the center of his knowl­
edge, so that the meaning of man is man, himself, and not 
God.^^^ Thus man becomes a sinner; he chooses for himself
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 141, italics added ; see also p. TOI,
172Ferre goes on to suggest that "God wants man to be authentically real and free in order that with mature in­sight and willing love he may accept God as Father and Friend," Ibid., p . 141.
Reason in Religion, pp. 31 ff. "A person is a distinct unity of experience, of seIf-reference, of interchangeable feelings." Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 123.
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, pp. 121 ff. Cobb speaks of the determinism of the past which seeks con­formity in the present. Cf, supra, Chapter III, p. 232.
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, pp. 132 ff. Ferre claims that a will to self-assertion is planted in man as a condition of freedom. Therefore, in itself it is not sin, but becomes sin when the exercise of freedom puts man at the center, Ferre states this in two propositions evident, he believes, even in childhood. "Every child . . . knows something naturally of God. Eternity is set in his heart." Pillars of Faith, p. 38. At the same time, "Every child.
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and against God. Sin is a relation to God, not discrete
acts. Choosing against God causes anxiety, so that fear
becomes the external sign of sin.^^° It is sin--the
choice for self and against God— not finitude--the limita-
177tion of knowledge --which is the heart of the matter.
But is man primarily sinful? Not at all! In the peda­
gogical process he is "situationally self-centred," There 
is no blame here. But man grows to approve this centrality, 
including his power over others. "Situational self-cen-
1 7 0tricity degenerates into spiritual self centredness.
Ferre holds that man is not required to sin either by God 
or merely by being man. There is no inherited original 
sin, only the occasion for it. No man can sin for 
another.
Having acknowledged man's sinfulness, Ferre also 
argues that man is as potentially a saint as he is a sin­
n e r . Even when man sins he is not damaged beyond repair;
deep down in his life, generally puts himself first." Ibid,, p . 40. He wants to be number one I p . 43.
I76Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 111. Ferre elsewhere lists all the signs of sin as: fear, pride, anger,doubt, indifference. Reason in Religion, pp. 163 ff.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 113.
^^^Ferre, Reason in Religion, pp. 161 ff.
^^^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 89. Ferre also argues that sin is personal as well as social. Ibid., p. 159. In this latter regard, Williams holds that sin is an act of the spirit. We do not see another man's sin, only the consequences of his sin. Cf. supra. Chapter II,p. 122.
180Ferre, Reason in Religion, p. 179.
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he is "sinful dangerously but not disastrously."^®^ Man is 
never so sinful as not to be able to do good.^^"^ Ferre is 
willing to make his affirmation of man even stronger than 
this.
God made man good. This is his essential nature. Man's fallen nature is not his real nature, but only the actual condition of his nature. He is in alien territory but he is still a citizen of h e a v e n . 1B3
Instead of original sin, Ferre suggests an original good­
ness! Yet he has taken sin with full seriousness. The 
statement also acknowledges that man's actual condition—  
the one for which, presumably, each man is responsible him­
self— is as a sinner. Ferre then goes one step further.
Not only is man made good, but he is " . . . made to over­
come sinfulness. His deepest drive . . .  is his being made 
for truth and right."^B4 jg this suggestion a form of 
supralapsarianism, in which God has both foreseen man's 
sinfulness and endowed man with the ability or the poten­
tial to overcome the results of the sin? This is apparent­
ly not Ferre's position for he subsequently argues that 
man cannot forgive himself; he knows he is up against God, 
and that it is God's forgiveness that he n e e d s . O n l y  
God can overcome s i n , a n d  He has acted to do precisely
p. 165.
^®^Ferre, Know Your Faith, p. 87.
^83ibld.. p. 62.
184pgrre, Reason In Religion, p. 180. 
^^^Ibld.. p. 181. 186Ibid.. p. 135.
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this in Jesus Christ. In this way, the Incarnation also 
carries God's redemptive action.
"Revelation and redemption are one in Christ. God 
has come to save man by transforming him from within 
through his work in history and by participating Himself 
as man's chief partner in his own life."^^^ In the Incar­
nation God initiates the redemptive process as well as the 
revelational one. Respecting man's freedom, God does not 
impose His salvation. He uses the pedagogical process to 
encourage men to respond to Him. This is His indirect 
work. He also works directly through Jesus, the Godroan.
But whether working indirectly or directly, God so re­
spects man's freedom to decide issues for himself that
190always God aims to save man from within himself. This 
is also how Ferre understands the Incarnation: God initi­
ates, Jesus responds. Ferre's understanding is consistently 
applied. Thus he is justified in speaking of Incamational 
theology.
As the "highest arrival" Jesus shows what it is to
"Redemption depends on Incarnation, God in man " Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 186.
188.Ibid,, p. 117.
IB^See infra, Chapter IV, pp. 345 ff.
190ii.jhe whole secret of the Incarnation and of in­camational theology is exactly that God becomes man in order that in God and by God we be saved, yet saved not externally, but from within our own true nature, or from our nature fulfilled by God's presence, purpose and power." Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 185.
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be truly h u m a n H e  is, indeed, the best exceptional in-
192stance of man which exemplifies man's potential nature.
Jesus' true self shows us what our true selfhood is, and,
193at the same time, exposes us to our false selves. In 
Jesus potential man became true man. By seeing Him we can 
regain trust in God and acknowledge the sin within us, 
"Christ shows us what we can become and empowers us to at­
tain our v i s i o n , A t  this point, however, Ferre does 
not make it clear how this empowerment occurs. Jesus is 
portrayed as the Ideal Man, a suggestion also made by some 
nineteenth century Liberal theologians.^^5 Though Ferre 
carries his concept of redemption further than this pro­
posal, still a similarity is to be noted. The "Ideal Man" 
approach to Christology by the earlier Liberals seemed 
produced from the needs and desires of man. It was man's 
idea of Christ rather than Christ, Himself, which domi­
nated their thinking. Ferre specifically rejects the prop­
osition that an idea or an ideal will be sufficient in the
191lbid., p. 73.
192lbid.. p. 75. At other points Ferre refers to Jesus in this regard as man's "standard," Know Your Faith, p. 58; as "a model, a pattern," The Universal Word, p. l65
193pgrre, Know Your Faith, pp. 47 ff.
^^^Ibid., p. 55.
^^^Cf. supra, Chapter I, pp. 28 ff., particularly the summary on p. 33. However, Ferre has already rejected this concept in terms of the Incamational Revelation. Cf supra, Chapter IV, pp. 320 ff.
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redemptive p r o c e s s . B u t  he frequently Speaks of the 
motivation of human needs as a primary center for under­
standing.^^7
No less is Jesus also the pattern as well as the 
presence of God, and there is no salvation apart from this 
pattern and p r e s e n c e . S a l v a t i o n  means getting right 
with God in accordance with His will, and it also involves 
getting right with men. It involves accepting the security 
which comes from trust in God, from putting Him and not our­
selves at the center. In this relationship, man gains also 
a new personal freedom for himself and from his own fears 
and bad habits, and man also moves into a genuine relation­
ship with other persons, a relationship freed from the 
tyranny of personal i n s e c u r i t y . ^^9 is revealed in
Jesus Christ, so that we see in Him both the mature nature 
of man and the perfect nature of God.^^O it is, indeed, 
Christ that we see, and it is through Him that God saves.
^^^Cf. Ferre, The Christian Faith, p. 162; see alsop. 207.
^97cf. supra, Chapter IV, pp. 282 ff. Interesting­ly, Ferre claims that man's religious longings remain even when his nature is corrupted by sin. Reason in Religion, p. 174. -------------- ----
^^Bperre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 138 ff.
^^^Ferre, Know Your Faith, pp. 88 ff. "In Christ we see the kind of life that endures and how to find it , . ,He stands between us and the falls, bidding us to have faith and to let go of our fear." Ferre, Pillars of Faith, p. 32.
^O^Ferre, Know Your Faith, p. 75.
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but it is God Who is the Savior. Only God can repair the 
relationship broken by sin.^O^ Jesus, the Incarnate One, 
the Godman, reveals both man as he can be and God as He is. 
In Christ we look two ways: toward the ultimate and toward
the world.202 Christ is what Ferre calls the "reflexive 
superspective," which is
, . . the center of that final coherence which is based on the nature of the ultimate, at the same time transcending process yet also selectively actual within it. It is the light of eternity embodied within a historic event, and, seen from the opposite direction, a historic event affording us, existen- tially, a window opening out of our kind of time onto eternity.203
But neither example setting nor revelational knowledge is 
sufficient for Christ's work of redemption. Something more 
is required, something which enables the potential to be­
come the actual. That "something" is the Atonement.
The Atonement, in Ferre's thought, is made possible 
because of both aspects of Christ's nature, Godhood and co­
operative manhood.2^^ As for the Incarnation, the Atonement
2®^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 135, 146,184 ff.
202Ferre, Christian Faith and Higher Education,p. 59.
2^^Ferre, Faith and Reason, pp. 151 ff. In spite of the fact that Ferre's Christology is Incamational, while Pannenberg starts from the resurrection to portray Christ, the similarity at this point is rather striking. But for Pannenberg, Ferre's "reflexive superspective" would occur in the resurrection rather than in the Person of Christ.That is, the resurrection casts light both ways; ahead to the End of time, and back to the present, unfulfilled time. Cf. supra. Chapter IV, pp. 311 ff. and infra, pp. 357 ff.
204perre, Christ and the Christian, p. 135.
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is a matter of God's act and man's response. Man's re­
demption requires God's initiative and action. We are 
in fact dependent upon Him. But man is also a morally 
responsible being. Although man cannot redeem himself, he 
must be part of the redemptive process. Man requires God, 
and God needs man's cooperation.^05 What is Christ's part 
in the process?
Ferre suggests that Christ's death has three inter­
related meanings.206 First, Jesus died as our example; 
obedience, faith, humility, and love. He lived the life 
we are to live. Atonement calls upon us to change our 
lives to His. Second, He died to enable us to have the 
power to follow Him, to continue in His power. "We must 
become co-workers with God in redemption, not in the sense 
that our humanity can achieve any way to God, but in the 
sense that our humanity becomes the means whereby God finds 
a way to m a n . "267 Finally, Christ died as our sacrifice in 
that God gives Himself for us, in contradistinction from 
those views which hold that Christ's sacrifice is some kind 
of payment. Christ suffers as man faithful to God, and as 
God faithful to man. "God loves man with a redemptive pas­
sion that withholds nothing of i t s e l f ."268 jesus witnesses 
to a new way of life, and on th^ Cross to God as
^^^Ferre, The Christian Faith, pp. 154 ff. 
266perre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 172 ff. 
ZO^Ibid.. p. 182.
^®®Ferre, The Christian Faith, p. 159.
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"unstintingly and unreservedly agape."209
There are still two questions to be answered; why 
did Jesus have to die or how is Jesus* death related to our 
redemption, and how does the Atonement lead us to redemp­
tion and a redeemed life? Ferre suggests that Jesus had 
to die because of His revelation of Çod.
Jesus had committed the crime unpardonable by man: the removing of man's insulation from God.Jesus had made God real to the people and had let Him draw near to man. No worse "crime" can be committed by any human being I But precisely be­cause Jesus, representing in this life God Himself, had opened man's eyes to the full truth of God, giving them no excuse for their sins, he himself could not acquiesce in that sin and must therefore become its victor. Thus from the point of view of God as well as that of man, Jesus had to die for man's sin^210
Sin makes man anxious, defensive, self-protective. Its out­
ward manifestation is fear. It stems from distrust of God 
and it involves a lack of love as the direct result of a 
lack of faith. As man, Jesus knew sin. That is, He, too, 
experienced the will to power, anxiety, fear. But Jesus
209 Ibid., pp. 159 ff. In consistency with the rest of his Christoiogical proposals, Ferre could here speak of both the revelation and the Incarnation in atonement, in the Cross, It is surprising that he does not, for it would add clarity to his presentation. That is, even as God is re- demptively at work in the Incarnation, so is God Incar­nated also at the Cross in Ferre's view. It is God who is expressing Himself at the Cross and in Christ. Ferre comes close to this possibility in saying, "Incarnation is the key to all ultimate truth for humanity. Man is made for God, but not until God becomes man can man become man.There was no other good enough to pay the price of sin." Christ and the Christian, p. 184.
‘^■'■^ Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 166: alsosee pp. 163 ff.
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did not deliberately rebel against God, He did not actually
sin in terms of gross acts of misconduct, and he turned
211these drives not to sin but to a new level of manhood.
The very drives of self-protection, anxiety, fear and dis­
trust which led men to crucify Jesus were surmounted by 
Jesus in accepting Calvary. In this dimension Calvary is 
related to man's redemption in that Christ on the Cross 
reveals what it is to be truly man, related to, dependent 
on, trusting in and loving God.
But, Ferre holds, atonement is more than example
212setting. Jesus died to give us power for salvation.
This leads to the second question; how does the Atonement 
lead us to redemption? Ferre argues that the concept of 
the Atonement requires an understanding of its substitu-
2^^See Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 86 ff., 110 ff., 167 ff.; Know Your Faith, pp. 44 £f. Ferre argues both that we do not know that Jésus was sinless even though our general impression is one of dominant goodness in Him, and that, at any rate, such a claim for sinlessness is irrévélant to the reality of the Incarnation. Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God, pp. 186 ff.; see also p. YUn John McIntyre suggests that there are points to be made on both sides of the proposals that Jesus assumed a sinful or a sinless humanity. If Jesus assumed a sinful humanity then the redemption He effected is of our human­ity. But the position raises the difficult proposition of demonstrating how Jesus could be sinless with a sinful humanity. Further, did Jesus have to atone for His own sinful humanity? On the other hand, as St. Anselm points out, it is the non-necessary death of Christ's sinless humanity which establishes Christ's claim of merit for His fellows before God. McIntyre concludes that it is unlikely any one synthesized view could conserve the strengths of both views. John McIntyre, "Representative Humanity," (unpublished manuscript), pp. 11 ff.
21 2Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 176.
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tionary n a t u r e . T h e  Christian faith claims no one de­
serves salvation. Man cannot get to salvation on his own, 
for man does not make the most moral gains when left to 
face his own consequences. Men are redeemed in fellowship. 
By suffering on Calvary, God's love "gave us faith in a 
personal Savior who could effect the salvation which we 
sought but could not find, which we struggled to achieve 
and could not effect. When God took on Himself our sins.
He made for us a living w a y T h e r e  are two streams of 
life, one of sinfulness, the other of redemption. Man must 
choose. He joins the second way by surrender to Christ.215 
Apparently what Ferre means by the substitutionary nature 
of the Atonement is not the traditional understanding that 
Christ substitutes for us in confronting sin, but rather 
that God opens a new possibility of communication with us 
through Calvary's Christ. What is substituted is a differ­
ent way. Therefore, to surrender to Christ is the appro­
priate response by which to engage in this new way. But, 
in effect, is this not a response to the example set in 
Jesus? Does it not resound the "psychological-effect" type 
of nineteenth century Liberal Christol o g y ? 216
There is another dimension to be added to Ferre's 
understanding of the Atonement. It is concerned with the
21^Ferre, The Christian Faith, pp. 163 ff. 
214ibid.. p. 166. 215ibid.. p. 168
°Cf. supra. Chapter I, pp. 34 ff.
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21 7tension in God between His holiness and His love, In 
love God wishes to establish fellowship with all men, but 
such a fellowship can only exist upon the basis of God's 
agape which is what holiness recognizes and demands. Peda- 
gogically God's holiness pushes sinning man away from Him 
so that man might know the loneliness and despair of the 
loveless life. Therefore, God sent His Son
, , . that man might see and trust God's way of salvation. Salvation is by faith because it is the power of trust in God's redemption . . . .  God's holiness repudiates man's sinfulness, pursues man into meaninglessness or despair until he leams to face the love of God, to be judged by it, to be forgiven by it, and to walk by faith in its power,
The Atonement is, then, the actualization of God's love in
history.219
The problem, as already indicated, is that Ferre's 
concept of atonement is not really far advanced from the 
"psychological-effect" type of nineteenth century Liberal 
Christology, and it suffers from the same defects, namely, 
the crucifixion is less atonement than example, the dis­
tinction between revelation and redemption is blurred, and 
the unlocking of the human possibility is more germane to 
the concept of redemption than is the life and career of 
Christ H i m s e l f . 220 ^^e these results not inevitable when
217perre, The Christian Faith, pp. 169 ff.
21^Ibid., p. 172; cf. also, Christ and the Chris­tian, pp. 168 ff.
219Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 186.
220Cf. supra. Chapter I, pp. 44 ff.
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one has, as Ferre does, made man's cooperation the key to 
the concept of redemption? Ferre has consistently main­
tained that all must yield to the crucial centrality of 
man's inner decision making. The Incarnation is dependent 
upon Jesus * free response of acceptance. Freedom is the 
chief characteristic of Ferre's anthropology. Revelation 
is limited by the pedagogical requirements of man's need 
to leam and decide. Finally, the effectiveness of the 
redemptive process is largely determined by man's coopera­
tion. Even though man desperately needs forgiveness, even 
God cannot grant it until man decides to open up to truth 
and community. "Forgiveness presupposes the fact of free­
dom. "221 At the same time such an approach does make man 
a fully responsible moral being, who cannot reallocate his 
guilt by reassigning it to Christ. Yet, is not the danger 
ever present here that what purports to be cooperation 
between man and God may in effect become the view that man 
really is responsible for his own redemption? It is clear 
that Ferre would not self-consciously endorse the latter
p o s i t i o n . 2 22
One last question remains concerning Ferre's
221perre, Reason in Religion, p. 181.
222For example, Ferre acknowledges that man's free­dom is limited by the pedagogical process, by the culture in which one lives, and by the choices one has already made. In speaking of the conditioning in which man is involved, Ferre says, "The actual self . . .  is not free to choose the good if by freedom is meant equal inclination." The Christian Faith, p. 188.
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Christology. What is the uniqueness of Jesus, and is He 
final? Since Ferre argues that Jesus is what potentially 
all other men can be, it would seem unlikely that a claim 
for uniqueness could be made for Jesus other than one of 
"degree." At least Jesus is not unique because God was in 
H i m . 223 ^or is His resurrection unique because in essence 
it is not different from our own f u t u r e . 224 perre suggests 
that there are three senses in which Jesus is unique: as
historical, as Final, as m a n . 225 the last case, since
every man is unique on his own account, Jesus is unique as 
a common human characteristic. It is in the other two 
points that more insight is to be found. Jesus is unique 
as an historic event. "The uniqueness of Jesus is the 
uniqueness of a historic fact, not of a relation to God 
inaccessible to anyone else,"  ^ Even though God is in 
relation to all men, at least potentially when not actually, 
in Jesus this relation is manifested in history, a genuine 
historical event, Jesus of Nazareth. "The distinction of 
Jesus lies in the uniqueness of the divine manifestation 
in h i m . "227 gut it is a distinction to be shared with His
223Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 212,
^^^Ibid., pp. 216 ff.
225perre^ The Universal Word, p. 157.
226perre, Christ and the Christian, p. 213. See also The Universal Word, p. 165.
227perre, The Christian Faith, p. 122. Ferre points out that "Spirit is capable of relational unique­ness." The Universal Word, pp. 151, 147 ff.
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brethren. God could come anew, but it would occur in a 
"different historic media of I n c a r n a t i o n . "228 Therefore, 
Jesus is unique in that no other historical incarnation of 
God could be the same. The Christ-event in Jesus of Naza­
reth is unrepeatable, though what took place in Jesus is
potentially repeatable.229
Finally, Jesus is unique as "model" or "pattern." 
He is the first fully human b e i n g . Through Him man can 
know Who God is and what God expects of us and offers to 
us.2^^ His is the only way to be right with G o d . 232 That 
is where Ferre chooses to place his greatest stress. "Fi­
nality comes . . . not as a human being, not as a historic
22%erre, The Universal Word, p. 151.
229" . . . no one else can take His place. He has come once for all at a particular time in human history." Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 207. See also p. 219. Cf. also, Ferre, The Universal Word, p. 167; "The kind of experience will be the same for all, for there is only one God, but the nature and the concrete content of the experi­ence will also differ for each person." It would appear that Ferre entertains an inconsistency in his thought at this point. He suggests that " . . .  the important thing about Jesus is not wherein Jesus is like us all, but where­in he differs radically from us all," The Christian Faith, pp. 112 ff. This point has been made by F. T. Forsyth; see supra, Chapter II, p. 148, footnote 191. Were Ferre only talking about what is actualized in Jesus, there would be no inconsistency. But he speaks of differences in Jesus from us which proceed from God^s special way in Him. If it is special, it cannot be ours, and, therefore, is not even potentially repeatable.
23^Ferre, Christ and the Christian, p. 212.
231"The meaning and nature of things become finally disclosed in Jesus Christ." Ferre, The Universal Word, p. 157. -------------------
239Ferre, Christ and the Christian, pp. 217 ff.
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person in whom the Word became flesh, but as the only right 
way to become related to G o d . "233 ^he finality is attached 
to the relationship with God rather than to the man, albeit 
the Incarnate One. That relationship in terms of Jesus is 
normative, not exhaustive; it is the way to open onto a 
relationship with God for others to enter into and develop. 
Ferre even speaks of Jesus continuing to grow to all eter­
n i t y . 234 Jesus is to be taken as final only because God 
is final. It is God Who incarnates. Who reveals, Who re­
deems, Who is final.
C. The Christology of Pannenberg 
Though also starting "from below," there emerges in 
Pannenberg*s thought a quite different Christology from 
Ferre's. The starting point for Ferre's Christology is 
with the "highest arrival," the Incarnation, and his under­
standing of the Person and Work of Christ derives from this
^Ferre, The Universal Word, p. 166. "Misspent adoration wants Jesus to be entirely unique." Ferre, Know Your Faith, p. 42.
234pg^re, The Universal Word, p. 166. Since Ferre lays his primary stfess on God's actions in and through Jesus, this idea is not surprising. Elsewhere he states that " . . .  God's revelation in Jesus is not even the full revelation of Himself. He reveals love in Jesus as far as an individual can reveal it. But love is most fully re­vealed in a fellowship . . . Jesus is not the whole Christ." The Christian Understanding of God, p. 174. Ferre suggests that the full Christ came with the revelation in the Church. Ibid. Ferre also states, "The Father, the One God, did not become incarnated in all his fullness, but the fullness (qualitatively) of God did." The Christian Faith, p. 112. The point is quite similar to one suggested by Pittenger and criticized by Hendry. Cf. supra. Chapter II, p. 167, footnote 238.
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perspective. Pannenberg proposes that the resurrection be 
utilized as the clue to Who Jesus is and what He does. His 
methodology establishes the significance of the resurrec­
tion and the way in which it is to be understood. It re­
mains to apply this significance and understanding to the 
Person and Work of Christ.
What does the resurrection of Jesus tell us? If 
it is true, if it can be believed, the resurrection then 
tells us that the message Jesus proclaimed is also true, 
and that Jesus is Who He says He is. This statement is not 
without problems. First, it means that Pannenberg must 
ground the resurrection in credibility; that is, the resur­
rection roust be authentically historical. It must survive 
verification by historical analysis. Second, in his meth­
odology Pannenberg argues that Jesus * claim to authority 
shifted from His message to His fate.235 Then which Jesus 
is it that the resurrection discloses? The question of 
Jesus* self-knowledge is raised, for example. Finally, if 
Jesus' message was a proclamation of the imminent coming of 
the reign of God's Kingdom, then what is the applicability 
of that message today? That is, is the message mere proc­
lamation or does it involve the work of Christ? These 
questions provide the outline which will be followed in 
developing Pannenberg's Christology. The first concern is 
With the historicity of the resurrection.236
235cf. supra, Chapter IV, pp. 307 ff.
236The argument could be advanced that the question of the historicity of the resurrection more properly belongs
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"The greatest difficulty, which stands in the way 
of every attempt to re-ground Christology on the resurrec­
tion of Jesus, is undoubtedly the problem of the histori­
city of this e v e n t . "237 spite of the difficulties, the
problem cannot be avoided if Jesus* resurrection is to be 
taken seriously. "Knowledge that is critically certain 
about events of the past cannot be arrived at, except by 
the heat of historical c r i t i c i s m . "233 Therefore, Pannen­
berg proposes to examine the meaning of the resurrection 
in the light of historical criticism.
pannenberg denotes and rejects three conventional
O O Q"prejudices" against such a critical examination.  ^ First,
in the area of Pannenberg*s methodology. Such an argument might claim that the question of historicity is concerned with establishing definitions, sorting out claims, evalu­ating evidence and proposing axioms. Therefore, it is a question of method. Meretorious as that argument might be, it is not appropriate to Pannenberg*s thought. For Pannenberg, the resurrection is the grounding for the Chris- tological claim. "Thou art the Christ" is always for Pan­nenberg, Thou art Christ, the Resurrected One! The resur­rection is linked inescapably to Christ, and Christ is linked inescapably to the resurrection. To examine the resurrection is, in effect, to examine the Person of Christ. However, the examination must be subjected to the same cri­teria as is the rest of man's knowledge. "To be sure, the life of the resurrected Jesus, which is no longer limited by death, cannot be designated as past, but surely the event of his resurrection, which has taken place once at a definite time, can be so characterized. For this reason we must inquire about the historicity of this event." Pan­nenberg, Jesus— God and Man, p. 113.
237pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen," p. 108.
238
239
2 3 8 i b i d . ,  p .  1 0 9 .
Ibid., pp. 109 ff. See also, Pannenberg, Jesus — God and Man, pp. 88 ff. In this section Pannenberg deals at some length with the possibility of a psychological explanation--the "subjective-vision hypothesis"— for the
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there is the claim that any contention that one who is dead 
could rise again is, in principle, unbelievable, regardless 
of documentation. Pannenberg holds that every event is 
unique, and the absence of other applicable analogies is 
but a peripheral consideration for uniqueness. Second, it 
is claimed that science cannot accept a proposal that a 
dead man can return to life. But the laws of science 
describe normal structures, rather than ruling out unique 
incidents unless they violate the law, in which case the 
law is invalid. Further, actual events are more complex 
than the abstractly defined laws. Therefore, it is an 
error to describe the event as violating scientific law. 
Finally, it is claimed that the event of the resurrection 
would usher in God's New Age which could not be seen through 
old world eyes. Rather, Pannenberg argues, it should be 
stated that the old world eyes are being renewed by the 
very sight of the new creation seen in the I n c a r n a t i o n . 240 
Therefore, Pannenberg concludes that there are insufficient
disciples* witness. Presumably in the article, "Dogma­tische Erwagungen," which is more recent, Pannenberg has subsummed the thrust of the lengthy section on psychologi­cal possibilities under his first point,
M. Owen argues that Pannenberg*s position requires that Jesus has to prove Himself as the ground of our faith in terms of our present reality, "His view is essentially undualistic and, to that extent, uneschatologi* cal." J. M. Owen, "Christology and History," The Reformed Theological Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, May/August, 196), p . 61. But Pannenberg's suggestion above suggests a dual­ist ic view. However, Owen's knowledge of Pannenberg*s views was based primarily on Jesus--God and Man. for "Dog­matische Erwagungen" was published later.
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grounds for denying the possibility of the actuality of 
Jesus* resurrection prior to a critical evaluation of the 
sources,
The sources to be evaluated are those of the early 
Christian witnesses, those who knew the earthly Jesus and 
could recognize Him in the appearances that happened to 
them. Only this will suffice historically. No self­
revelation to us today can be historical, for there are 
no grounds, per se, upon which to base a critical evalua­
tion that the One appearing is, indeed, identical to Jesus 
of Nazareth. The evaluation must stand or fall on the 
basis of the early w i t n e s s e s They, alone, can provide 
the basis of identification. Therefore, " . . .  the ex­
amination of the Easter-traditions of early Christianity 
remains the decisive touchstone for the judgment concerning
the historicity of Jesus* r e s u r r e c t i o n . "242
There are two independent but somewhat interrelated 
early Easter traditions : the one concerning the resurrec­
tion appearances of Jesus ; the other concerning the empty 
tomb. Pannenberg accepts the assumption on exegetical and 
historical grounds that the appearance tradition and the
241"The Christian tradition concerning Jesus* resur­rection and its validity remains decisive for either an ac­ceptance or a refusal of such an event even when one in­cludes the hypothetical possibility of a direct, present- day self-revelation on the part of the resurrected One," Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen," p. 110. Cf. also, Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, p, 99, where he speaks about "intuitive perception."
242Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen," p. 111.
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243grave tradition emerged independently of each other•
Then by
, , , mutually complementing each other they let the assertion of the reality of Jesus* resurrection . . . appear as historically very probable, and that always means in historical inquiry that it is to be presupposed until contrary evidence a p p e a r s . 244
It is at this point that the most difficult area of inquiry
into the historicity of Jesus* resurrection is encountered,
namely, the historical questions of time and space.
An historical event--whatever else may be true of it— must in any case take place in time and space, and must be either maintained or denied in respect to a definite point of time and a definite place which is distinguished from all others.245
Jesus * resurrection can be said to be an event in time. It 
can be dated approximately, if the appearances to the dis­
ciples and the discovery of the empty tomb are dateable. But 
it is much more difficult to deal with the question of space. 
In terms of Jerusalem and the vicinity of the tomb, a loca­
tion is involved. However, normal events take place in such 
a way that there is a continuity with previous events. But 
in terms of Jesus as the resurrected One that continuity is 
missing both in respect to space and time. That the dis­
ciples * experiences of the resurrected Christ can be said 
to have taken place in space and time does not necessarily 
include the appearing Reality. Whatever continuum--if 
any--pertains to the resurrected One remains unknown to
243pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. pp. 104 ff. 
244ibid.. p. 105.
^^^Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen," p. Ill
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u s . 246 Since we do not know what alive means for Jesus, we 
cannot even say, historically, that He was dead and is alive 
again. We can say concerning Jesus* resurrection that Jesus 
Who died lives, but we do not know precisely what this means 
beyond observing that Jesus did not remain dead. What the 
historian has to say at this point is " . . . that an event 
took place the further condition of which escapes his judg­
m e n t .  "247 Jesus was no longer dead, but what this means, 
the historian does not know. This "critically limited 
claim" is positive in its negation, for it protects the 
mystery of Jesus* resurrection.248 «jo attempt to deal with 
the problem of Jesus* existence after death is to go beyond 
what is historically verifiable. The proper language for
this attempt, Pannenberg suggests, is the Jewish-apocalyp-
249tic eschatology.
The eschatological understanding of resurrection is 
that it is a resurrection to an incorruptible life. But 
what is the present reality of the resurrected One? Where 
has Jesus been living since His resurrection? "How can we 
. . . conceive of the present reality of the resurrected 
One, in order that we do not find ourselves facing the fatal 
conclusion that the resurrected One has disappeared into 
nothing?"250 pannenberg feels it is not important to clar­
ify the cosmological views of antiquity or the middle ages.
p. 112. Ibid.. pp. 112 ff.
^^^Ibid.. p. 113. ^^^Ibid.
250ibid.. pp. 114 ff.
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nor the relation between resurrection and ascension. It is 
the meaning that is involved which is important, and that 
meaning is " . . . union with God . . . • The life of the 
resurrected One in heaven has . . .  no other meaning than 
that He lives with God, shares in God's life,"251 There­
fore, Pannenberg believes that it is necessary to deal with 
the doctrine of God in order to discover the meaning in­
volved in understanding the life of the resurrected One, 
Pannenberg discusses one concept of God, the one involved 
in Jesus* proclamation of the "arrival of God*s r e i g n . " 2 5 2  
To speak of the coming of God *s reign is to suggest the 
futurity of God's being God. That is, it is to suggest 
that God is to be conceived not as the First Cause, but as 
the Highest Good--a Good yet to come, but which already 
determines the present. Thus, the One Who is coming is 
already present. He is already contemporary to every time. 
Therefore, the reality of the resurrected One means that 
He is taken away into God's future, participates in God's 
new life— a life which has not yet appeared in our world—  
and, concomitantly, is contemporary to all things, includ­
ing His own earthly existence through God's power. Thus, 
the resurrection confirmed Jesus * claim, and through it
God's future appeared in Him in such a way as to make it
253retroactively efficacious for His entire earthly life.
p. 115. ^^^Ibid.
^^^Ibld.. p. 116.
358
There is a problem in this presentation. It has 
to do with Pannenberg*s concept of time. Though he argues 
that the resurrected One appears out of continuity with 
other events in time and space, does not his understanding 
ot a future that is retroactively present actually depend 
upon the continuity Pannenberg claims is not there? That 
is, in order for the future to be present— even retro­
actively— now it must exist in continuity with the present 
time, or else it simply could have no reality for the dis­
ciples. How could they witness to the Resurrected One un­
less He appeared in their time? This criticism also in­
volves space, for the earthly life of Jesus occupies real 
history. If that real history also contains the future-- 
albeit retroactively present— then a continuity with pres­
ent history or space is also required. This would seem to 
suggest that in the earthly life of Jesus, as well as in 
the presence of the Resurrected One, we already know some­
thing of the life beyond the resurrection. At least this 
would appear to be a logical possibility in Pannenberg*s 
thought, though he, himself, does not take this step. It 
does seem clear that Pannenberg*s concept of time is un­
clear, if, indeed, it is not deficient. At any rate, Pan­
nenberg *s attempt to deal with the question of the his­
toricity of the resurrection, and not merely the empty 
tomb, is a notable one. It is an effort to take with full 
seriousness both the preeminence given the resurrection by 
the early Church long before the development of incamational
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theology began, and the constant need in Christian theology
to pay attention to the historical tests for its faith
claims without which it is difficult to avoid the débilitât-
254ing effects of subjectivism.
Having established the historical credentials of 
the resurrection, to which he has added the interpretation 
derived from the historical context of Jewish-apocalyptic 
eschatology, Pannenberg believes that he has not only opened 
the possibility for utilizing the resurrection to understand 
the Person of Christ, but also that the resurrection pro­
vides the best basis for this u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 255 would
seem that if one begins one's understanding of the Person 
of Jesus from the resurrection, the question concerning 
Jesus' humanity would become a most difficult one. That 
is, if one proceeds from the view that Jesus lives in God's 
future which is contemporary to every "now," including 
Jesus* own earthly life, then it would seem either prob­
lematic or superfluous to speak of His humanity. Yet the
There is a constant tension or problem of balance in Christian theology between subjectivism and objectivism. Though nineteenth century Liberalism attempted to find an objective basis for Christian claims in the verification methods available to other fields of inquiry, Barth cor­rectly saw that when the tide swings too far toward man and man's own methods, the result is not greater objectiv­ity but rather greater subjectivity. On the other hand, when the tide swings too far away from man and the tools he possesses for evaluating truth claims, then it is also difficult to avoid the charge of subjectivism for there is no ground left to man upon which to examine the claims.Cf. supra, Chapter I, pp. 61 ff. Barth's own "mid-air" theology is a case in point. It is with the proper bal­ance that Pannenberg*s theology seems concerned.
25 5-^Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. p . 307.
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absence of humanity would proleptically--to borrow Pannen­
berg *s methodology— render the resurrection meaningless.
It is noteworthy that Pannenberg suggests— or is driven 
to suggest— the appropriate synthesis of Jewish apocalyp­
ticism with the Hellenistic idea of revelation as epiphany 
in order to understand God's revelation in Jesus in his­
tory .256 Nevertheless, Pannenberg holds it to be self- 
evident that Jesus was a man like us, and that His earthly 
behavior was more or less analogous to ours.
Pannenberg's argument for Jesus humanity is very 
brief. Salvation means the fulfillment of ultimate destiny 
toward which men strive. This requires the dual work of 
an openness to God by men, and God's revelation as the 
opening of men for G o d , 257 The work of Jesus' office is 
to call men to this openness to God and is fulfilled by
9  C OJesus in the conduct of His office, Jesus is repre­
sentative both of God to men and of men over against 
G o d . 259 Jesus* particular humanity must have universal 
significance, or men could not have community with Him,
Were Jesus * uniqueness to lack analogy with men, there 
could be no basis of community with Him, and, therefore,
256cf^ ibid., pp. 69, 115, Pannenberg agrees with the Hebrew rejection of their own early Hebrew use of the- ophany. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, p. 302, Yet, as previously observed in connection with Modem Antiochene views, this concept might be a most useful one in dealing with God's revelation in Jesus. See supra. Chapter II, footnote 164. pp. 138 ff,
257Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp, 192 ff, 
258ibld.. pp, 194 ff, 259lbid.. p. 195.
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no fulfillment of the hopes of m e n . 260 Pannenberg*s argu­
ment for Jesus* humanity seems to be advanced upon the 
ground that it is required for the work Jesus must do both 
for God and for man. The dominant motif is one of soteri- 
ology. Pannenberg has, himself, pointed to the dangers in 
such a position. "Has one really spoken there about Jesus 
himself at all? Does it not perhaps rather involve pro­
jections onto Jesus* figure of the human desire for salva­
tion and deification, of human striving after similarity 
to God . . . ."261 But Pannenberg does propose that, 
"Jesus* works are to be conceived in the light of [the 
difference between fate and activity in the life of the 
pre-Easter Jesus] as those of Jesus of Nazareth who lived 
at that past t i m e ."262 The resurrection reveals that Jesus 
is the true man, the real human being that is every man's
destiny.263
266%bid., pp, 202 ff. In a section quite similar to Ferre's thought, Pannenberg says, "There is no salva­tion that is not related to the needs of those to whom it is imparted." Ibid., p. 205. Cf, supra. Chapter IV, pp. 282 ff., including Rob ins on * s comment, footnote 12. It is granted that Pannenberg states that these must be "true needs," and that man's wishes and desires may contradict raair*¥ real destiny, but he does suggest that man possesses some knowledge of his true needs. Jesus— God and Man, p. 205. -------------------
26^Ibid., p. 47. Cf. also, ibid., p. 204.
262jbij  ^^ p. 211, brackets added. Such works are not held to^e alien to Jesus' humanity, p. 344.
263IBid., p. 205. Pannenberg finds no difficulty in acknowledging that Jesus erred in his expectation of the imminence of the End, p. 226; cf. also, pp..332 ff. Jesus is the Son of God but precisely "in his particular humanity." p. 342.
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What of Jesus* relationship to God, what of His 
divinity? Pannenberg indicates three steps which lead 
from the concept of revelation to the concept of Jesus* 
d i v i n i t y .264 pirst, Jesus* resurrection is the actual 
event of God's self-revelation in that the End of God is 
revealed. Second, if God is the same throughout eternity, 
then He can reveal Himself completely only in one revela­
tion. A second revelation can do no more than repeat the 
first.265 Third, if it is God's self-revelation which is 
involved, then the Revealer is identical with what is re­
vealed. Therefore, " . . .  Jesus belongs to the essence
of God himself."266
pp. 129 ff.
Process thought accounts for the requirements of different situations and different times. The problem is not so much what God does, as it is what man understands God to be doing, Pannenberg does not face this question, because the primacy he places on the resurrection disallows other considerations, He does suggest that various given acts of God's revelation surpass each other, insofar as they are partial. But the revelation from the end of all things is final and complete. It alone can be termed "self- revelation." The resurrected One is such a complete revela­tion. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, pp. 311 ff.
266Ibid., p. 129. "If Jesus was the final revela­tion of God because of the eschatological importance of his appearance and of his resurrection from the dead, then we cannot think of God in any more appropriate way than that suggested by Jesus, And that means that Jesus belongs to the very idea of God and thus, himself, is one with God." Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 124 ff, Cf. also, supra, Chapter IV, foot­note 72, pp. 300 ff. This view contrasts considerably with that of Ferre who contends that the revelation in Jesus is not the full revelatiôn of God. Cf. supra, Chap­ter IV, footnote 234, p. 350. Cf. also with Pittenger*s position, supra. Chapter II, p. 167,
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For Pannenberg it is the revelation of the resur­
rection which determines Jesus* unity with God. He rejects 
the concept of mutual interpenetration, a concept Ferre 
finds attractive, for it starts with the incarnation as 
the principle of u n i t y , S i n c e  the resurrection has 
retroactive power, then by the resurrection event Jesus 
has always been the Son of God, not to be separated from 
God in any way.^GB The incarnation is not the starting 
point, but the conclusion concerning the whole of Jesus*
life in the light of the r e s u r r e c t i o n .2^9 However, Pan­
nenberg holds to no synthesis of humanity and divinity 
in Jesus, Jesus is himself God, and, thereby the unity 
of God and man in Him is too intense to he conveyed by the 
concept of synthesis. Pannenberg opts for a dialectic 
explanation for Jesus * identity with the eternal Son of 
God,
, , , the understanding of this man, in his humanity changed into its opposite, leads to the confession of his eternal divinity. Conversely, anything said about an eternal Son of God can be sufficiently established only by recourse to the particularity of this man, to his unity with God,The synthesis of this dialectic, the unity of God
267Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, pp. 296 ff. For Ferre's suggestion, cf. supraV"Chapter IV, pp. 325 ff.
268pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 133 ff. See also, pp. 154, 321, 336; and '’DogmatTscb!e Erwagungen," p. 108.
269Cf. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 307; *'Dog« matische Erwagungen,** p. lOW. The incarnation is an irre­placeable concept in interpreting " . . .  the historical self-vindication of God in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth.** Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses," p. 151,
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and man in Christ, emerges fully only in the his­tory of his existence.2/0
Such a view raises two questions. On the one hand, 
the concept of dialectical unity suggests the substantive 
problems either of displacement or of God's absence from 
elsewhere in His creation. On the other hand, by Pannen­
berg 's methodology of retroactive power--proleptic con­
firmation— the dialectical unity must always have existed. 
This calls Jesus* humanity into serious question. That 
humanity is not ours! Pannenberg argues that the personal 
unity of God with Jesus fulfills human destiny, is the true 
man. Yet Pannenberg then goes on to claim that only in 
Jesus has God become an individual man. All others can be
V 271related to God only by participating in Jesus Sonship.
If the incarnation is not the starting point for 
Christology, but is retroactively confirmed, does this 
imply that the concept of kenosis must be pressed into 
service for Pannenberg * s thought? The usual application 
of the concept of kenosis is in response to the problem of
^Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, pp. 342 ff. Pannenberg suggests the appropriateness of Rahner's de­velopment of the dialectic of the divine self-differenti­ation. "That God can be himself in creating what is dif­ferentiated from himself, in devoting himself and emptying himself to it . . .is certainly not yet God's unity with what is differentiated from himself . . . .  But it is the presupposition of such unity from God's side (or in our understanding of God). Perhaps one may even speak in this connection of a tendency in God to such unity." Ibid., p. 321, Ferre proposes that the utilization of thecategory of "spirit" yields a better understanding of God in Christ. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, 325 ff.
^Pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man. pp. 344 ff.
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what happens to God's divinity when He becomes Man in the 
two-nature theory of Christology, Pannenberg does not find 
the two-nature theory attractive because it endeavors to ex­
plain Christology in terms of the Incarnation. Therefore, 
he rejects this application of the concept of kenosis. 
However, his own Christological method requires the con­
cept. If the confirmation of Jesus* Person and authority 
pertains to the resurrection, and is only retroactively 
efficacious, then there can be no confirmation during 
Jesus* earthly life. What exists can be no more than pro- 
leptic expectation. Even from Jesus, then. His unity of 
essence with God was hidden until its reality was confirmed
by the resurrection. "It was hidden because the ultimate
273decision about it had not been given." This does not
mean that Jesus in His pre-Easter life and consciousness
274lacked a sense of mission. He spoke with an authority 
in His message and with a sense of unity. This self- 
consciousness of unity was stamped by His message of the 
nearness of God and the coming of His Kingdom. Jesus knew 
Himself as related to God, but the rightness or wrongness 
of Jesus* message and activity would have to await God's 
future decision. Of this latter, Jesus was ignorant. Pan­
nenberg accepts from Rahner the suggestion that ignorance
272For his discussion of kenosis, see ibid., pp. 307 ff. ----
^^^Ibid., p. 321; see also p. 322,
274%bid.. pp. 325 ff.
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in terms of reflective knowledge is not in all respects an 
imperfection, and, indeed, the knowledge of one's ignor­
ance is a condition of human openness and freedom. Thus, 
Jesus' ignorance of both His own Personhood as well as of 
the Day of Judgment is " . . . actually the condition of 
Jesus* unity with . . . God."^^^
If openness is a condition of Jesus* unity with 
God, it is no less a condition of the process of salvation. 
Thus, Jesus* unity with God as well as His humanity suggest 
that the question of Jesus * work is crucial to the under­
standing of His P e r s o n h o o d . T h e r e  are two aspects to 
pannenberg*s understanding of salvation: the one concerns
salvation in respect to God and man, while the other con­
cerns Jesus* part in that understanding.
Salvation is the fulfillment of man's destiny. It 
is actually obtained " . . .  when the destiny of man be­
comes identical with his present existence, when man is 
united in his present with his past and his future.
In an understanding not too dissimilar to a suggestion in 
process thought, Pannenberg refers to the destiny as a
275ibid.. pp. 333 ff.
^^^Pannenberg has already argued both for the neces- sity of openness for salvation and for soteriology as the dominant motif of Jesus' humanity. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, pp. 360 ff. Pannenberg also holds that there is no separ­ation between the divinity and the saving significance of Jesus. Jesus--God and Man. pp. 38 ff.
^77%bid., p. 193. See also Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwagungen, * * p . 117. Cf. supra. Chapter III. pp. 211 ff.. 231 ff.
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"lure." It is the pull of the future over against man's 
present resources. As a condition of the future salvation 
belongs to God, and, therefore, only openness to God pro­
vides the way to man's destiny. Such openness is required 
both of man so that his question of his destiny remains 
open to God, and of God so that He provides the way through 
revelation for men to become opened to Him.
Man's destiny is in openness to God by which ful­
fillment can take place. It is not, however, a matter of 
creating choices as man does in the face of the situations 
he encounters in the midst of finite reality. Man can re­
fuse openness to God. But both openness and the refusal 
to openness are taken up in respect to God, and not to 
other possibilities, Man falls into sin as a consequence 
of his behavior in relation to men and things wherein he 
insists upon a self-centeredness— a supposed self-interest 
--which denies an openness to God. Such a choice is a 
contradiction to man's destiny, to his true self-interest, 
and to his actual reality.^78 Thus the question is not 
about how man can choose to be a true man. Man can only 
really be man in openness to God and in fulfillment by 
God of man's destiny. Man can accept or refuse this con­
dition; he cannot change its reality for himself.
278Cf. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 352 ff,; see also p , 326.
^^^There is an echo here of process thought, Cobb suggests that man chooses for or against the reality he acknowledges, but he does not create the reality, Ogden argues, with some help from Bultmann's adaptation of
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It is not clear in Pannenberg's thought if he in­
tends "openness" and "faith" to mean the same thing. As 
he uses the term "openness," it carries a rather passive 
connotation. That is, openness is seen in contradistinc­
tion to a decision making process by man. Man is as much 
opened by God as open to God. The latter appears dependent 
upon the former. Faith is trust toward the future. Man 
comes to faith via an event— a divinely revealed event— but
faith is not dependent upon a particular form of the event,
280rather faith relies on the God Who reveals Himself in it. 
Both openness and faith are quickened by God's revelation. 
Both are directed beyond man's own resources to God's 
future and thus have transcending power. Both have a posi­
tive result in salvation and a negative result in sin.
This same passivity also applies to the work of 
Jesus. Pannenberg distinguishes between Jesus' activities 
and His fate. Both are related to openness and salvation, 
but His fate includes the crucifixion and resurrection,
while His activities include His ministry and message. It
281is the latter which will be considered first.
Jesus* ministry--the work of His office--was to
existentialism, that man affirms or denies his destiny only in relation to God. Cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 234 ff.,257 ff. — ^
^80pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses," pp. 137 ff.
^81pannenberg follows this order in his own presen­tation in Jesus--God and Man; Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with Jesus' activities, while Jesus * fate provides the con­tent of Chapter 7.
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call men into the Kingdom of God. He stood in the Israel­
ite tradition, calling the people back into the nearness 
of God.^^^ Pannenberg prefers the term "office" to Ritschl's 
"vocation," because the former more clearly designates 
Jesus * work as a calling of men into the imminent Kingdom 
of God, and because "office" also more clearly denotes 
Jesus* servanthood to God rather than the idea of a voca­
tion. At the same time in the conduct of His office 
and in His destiny Jesus fulfills openness. Even as Jesus* 
message was exclusively attached to the proclamation of 
God's imminent reign, so was Jesus, Himself, exclusively 
dedicated to His office as One completely dedicated to 
G o d . 284 Thus, He is both God's representative to man, and 
He also represents to God the human situation which re­
quires openness to be true man. The work of Jesus' office, 
Pannenberg maintains, is not concerned with the satisfac- 
tion of sin, but with the fulfillment of man's destiny.
Thus, the work of Jesus' office is seen in respect to the 
universal significance that His particular individuality 
possesses.286
.. p. 193. ^^^Ibid.. p. 194.
^^^Ibld., p. 195. Theodore of Mopsuestia had given full weight to the work of Christ in obedience to God. Cf. supra, Chapter II, pp. 88 ff., 94 ff. Pannenberg acknowl- edges that the thought of both Appollinaris of Laodicea and Theodore of Mopsuestia are of special importance to the per­spective of his book, Jesus— God and Man, p. 17.
285paimenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 195 ff.
288%Hid., p. 204. For Pannenberg's discussion of this historical grounding of the proposal of Jesus as
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How is this related to salvation? In two ways, 
Pannenberg maintains. First, by responding to Jesus and 
identifying with the community Jesus' humanity represents-- 
for His destiny to community is the essence of man— man can 
participate in eschatological salvation, that is, in the 
future salvation already present in Jesus' preaching; a 
salvation confirmed in the r e s u r r e c t i o n . 287 Second, as one 
responds wholeheartedly to Jesus* message, one cannot help 
but put God's Kingdom, not self-concern, first and, thereby, 
be opened to God.288 puts God first, one starts to
act as God acts, to forgive as one is forgiven, to open the 
future for others as God has opened one's own future through 
forgiveness. Jesus' demand is not utopian, but He imparts 
power to His hearers to open to their future and their 
neighbor through love, a love which is ever i n v e n t i v e . 2 8 9  
However, salvation is also related to Jesus* fate, Jesus* 
work relates to human destiny, while His fate relates 
specifically to Jesus.290
Jesus is the man we11-pleasing in the eyes of God in the dedication to his office, in the obedi­ent acceptance of his fate, and through his resur­rection to a new life. Only for this reason can other men's community with Jesus become the guaran­tee of their community with God, just as Jesus had claimed for himself,291
representative humanity, an individual possessing universal significance, see pp. 200 ff., 344 ff.
pp. 193, 227 ff., 345.
^^^Ibid.. p. 232. ^^^Ibid.. pp. 232 ff.
^^°Ibid.. p. 210. 291ibid,, p. 197,
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By the resurrection God has confirmed that Jesus* message 
is true and that Jesus is the Person He says He is. There­
fore, the resurrection confirms " • . . the claim of the 
earthly Jesus that in [man's] decision in reference to him 
and his message the future salvation or condemnation is 
already being decided for those who meet him and his
p r o c l a m a t i o n . "292 ^o the claim of Jesus' message is added
that of His Person,
How does Pannenberg understand Jesus' fate, ex­
pressed in what happened to Him in the crucifixion and 
resurrection, to be part of God's salvation? Jesus did 
not choose His fate. He accepted it. He was obedient, as 
one dedicated to God. Man does not decide about the con­
dition of openness to God. He can only accept or refuse 
the openness.293 Jesus obediently accepted His fate.
He trusted, not in His own mission which He wholeheartedly 
embraced, but in God so that the failure of His mission to 
call men into the Kingdom of God, a failure reflected in 
His crucifixion by His fellows, is itself self-sacrifice to 
God's will. "Thus Jesus is not confirmed by the resurrec­
tion in something which he might have been by himself, but 
precisely in his having reserved nothing for himself in 
his human existence . . . .*'294 jesus* personal community
2 9 2 Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Erwâgungen," pp. 116 ff., brackets added.
2^8ggg supra, Chapter IV, pp. 366 ff.
294Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man. p. 335.
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with God is confirmed in the resurrection, and it is con­
firmed retroactively for all of Jesus' earthly life, so 
that Jesus, Himself, is of the essence of God. Therefore, 
in respect to His Person, men already participate in the 
future salvation or condemnation.
Three concepts traditionally associated with Jesus 
in Christology should be noted here: freedom, sinlessness,
uniqueness. To propose the necessity of freedom in doing 
God's will would make the act one of a human will and not 
the will of God. The only possibility is acceptance or 
refusal, though Jesus' dedication to the Father made the 
latter choice impossible for Him, Pannenberg, therefore, 
does not regard the assumption of freedom as essential to 
the characteristics of human nature.2^^ In respect to sin­
lessness, since Jesus* work in His fate is not an act of 
His own will, but one of obedience in which God acts, the 
question of Jesus * sinlessness is not really germane to 
Pannenberg's Christology. However, from that view of sin 
seen as a refusal of openness to God and a choice instead
^^There is an argument to be offered here which, surprisingly, Pannenberg does not appear to advance. If openness to God provides the essential condition for salva­tion, and if Jesus is of the essence of God, openness to Jesus would appear to be equally required. Further, since men cannot decide the issue, but only accept or refuse, then men also do not decide about Jesus. They can only accept or refuse Him.
^^^Ibid., pp. 349 ff. The argument presented is not too dissimilar to that offered by Temple, who held that duty not freedom characterizes the will. Temple uses the point to establish the divinity of Christ. Cf. supra, Chapter I, pp. 42 ff.
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to place self at the center of life, it would be held that
Jesus was sinless. Also this conclusion can be reached by
God's judgment rendered in Jesus' resurrection which retro-
297actively applied to all of Jesus' earthly life. Finally, 
there is the question of the uniqueness of Jesus. "If the 
fate of Jesus is the anticipation of the end, and thus the 
revelation of God, then no further revelation of God can 
happen , . , [for even though God continues to reveal, He 
can do so in no fundamentally new way]."
There are several problems in Pannenberg's thought
which require notice. In Pannenberg*s argument the future
is contemporary, not in actuality but in hope. Does Pan­
nenberg mean that the future is revealed now as the future 
rather than as present reality? That is, if the future 
exists contemporaneously with the present does it not have 
to do so as a parallel reality in time and space? If this
is at all the case then how can Jesus* revelation, as pro­
posed by Pannenberg, be other than an irruption into the 
world and definitely not of this world? Is this not a 
position near to the proposal of Barth, who would have no 
grounding in human history? And that is a position in
2^7^^ pannenberg, Jesus— God and Man, pp. 354 ff. It is the concept of the victory over sin that draws Pan­nenberg *s attention.
2 ^  ^ "Dogmatic Theses," pp. 143 ff., brackets added, Cf, also. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 130 ff.; Jesus— God and Man. pp. 189 ff, God was present in Jesus in a way that cannot be surpassed, p. 69. Jesus' resurrection made it clear "that no other Messiah was to be expected." p. 235.
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exact opposition to the one self-consciously proposed by 
Pannenberg.
Does not the conceptual use of resurrection to ex­
plain the Person of Christ suffer the same defect as the 
conceptual use of incarnation, namely, that the humanity 
suffers in the delineation of the Christological proposal? 
That the confirmation of Jesus * unity in essence with God 
takes place after the earthly life is over does not alter 
the conclusion that it has been there all along, which is 
where incamational theology begins. The advantage of 
utilizing the resurrection is that there were witnesses and 
an historical grounding can be attempted, whereas an in­
camational approach is inevitably speculative, That gain 
is definitely advantageous for Christological theology.
Finally, though he skirts the issue, the appropri­
ateness of adoptionism seems pertinent to Pannenberg*s 
thought. With all of its risks, the concept of adoption­
ism is not without merit in preserving the genuine human­
ity of our Lord. Pannenberg*s proposal of the retroactive 
unity of Jesus with God's essence throughout His earthly 
life does not of itself rule the concept of adoptionism 
out of court. Pannenberg*s failure to exploit some form 
of adoptionism, or to suggest some other proposal to take 
Jesus* humanity into sufficient account prior to Easter, 
is surely a deficiency in his thought.299
2QQ ^^ There are moments in the thought of Lewis F. Steams which seem to suggest Pannenberg. Cf. supra, Chapter I, pp. 52 ff. Steams suggested that Goo made Jesus divine in the resurrection.
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D. From Below; Evaluation of a Trend
Both Ferre and Pannenberg have engaged in the Chris­
tian theological enterprise of attempting to construct a 
Christology "from below." This enterprise, standing within 
the broadly defined movement described by this thesis as 
"Post-Barthian Liberal Theology," is far from a unified 
effort which could properly be called a school, as is 
clearly the case of the Modern Antiochenes and the Process 
Thought Theologians. Accordingly, the Christological con­
struction of Ferre and Pannenberg are sufficiently diverse 
as to require the separate treatment given each in this 
chapter. That diversity can now be indicated briefly in 
several respects.
Ferre *s Christology can properly be called incama­
tional. That is, Jesus is the Christ because God was in­
carnate in Him, For Pannenberg, the concept of God*s in­
carnation in Christ is a conclusion, not the starting point 
for Christology. Instead Pannenberg finds in the resurrec­
tion the proper framework for building a Christology "from 
below." That is, it is the resurrection which, through the 
proper examination due any historical event, yields the 
material upon which a Christology is constructed for Pannen­
berg, Even though the Christology thereby proposed seems 
rather traditional it in nowise detracts from the unique­
ness of Pannenberg*s attempt to ground the Christology 
"from below." Ferre elects Jesus from amid all the can­
didates for disclosing the nature of ultimate reality, and
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constructs a Christology upon this selection. In contrast, 
Pannenberg probes the resurrection through an historical 
analysis to arrive at what he considers to be the legiti­
mate truth claims upon which he establishes his Christo­
logical view. For Ferre, Jesus makes us aware of what lies 
beyond history; while for Pannenberg Jesus identifies the 
God Who acts in history and Who is to be known only through 
those acts.8^®
Once having established his methodology, Ferre 
ceases to talk of Jesus, arguing that it is only Christ 
Whom we can know. That is, the One Whom we encounter in 
history is the One in Whom God is incarnate. This means 
that Christ's reality is centered in God, so that to speak 
of the historic Jesus is not only to distort historical 
reality but also to miss that reality. For Pannenberg it 
is the historical Jesus Who is central. It is in the fate 
of Jesus that Christ is revealed by God, That the Christ 
is proleptically revealed in Jesus is God's revelatory act 
not Jesus', and occurs only because Jesus is a genuinely 
historical person.
For both Ferre and Pannenberg the unity of Jesus 
with God is essential. Ferre suggests that the union prob­
ably occurred before Jesus* baptism. Pannenberg finds the 
unity in the resurrection but proleptically anticipated in
It is this emphasis upon God's acts in history which provides some correlation between Pannenberg and the Antiochenes. See supra. Chapter IV. footnote 94. p. 310.
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Jesus' life and fate. Both Ferre and Pannenberg argue that 
the union of Jesus with God is real throughout Jesus * life, 
but the union is not a matter of Jesus' own self-conscious­
ness. This suggests a kenotic treatment which neither 
seems willing to accept. The alternative would appear to 
be an appeal to some form of adoptionism. Kenosis or adop­
tionism? This question suggests the first point to be in­
dicated as germane to those who would argue for a Chris­
tology starting "from below."
The obvious advantage of beginning the Christologi­
cal discussion "from below" is that the genuine humanity of 
Jesus can be upheld. One does not have to inquire how God 
could be this man. Rather, the relevant question concerns 
how this man could be related to God? The primary stress 
is upon the humanity. Though Ferre and Pannenberg differ 
significantly in the way in which they treat the problem of 
Jesus' humanity, they do indicate clearly that the real man­
hood of Jesus is a primary part of starting a Christology 
"from below." At the same time, it appears that a Chris­
tology which starts "from below" must inevitably face the 
problem of Jesus* union with God. Once the real humanity 
of Jesus is accepted, the problem to be confronted concerns 
the uniqueness of this man, Jesus. Neither Ferre nor Pan­
nenberg seems bothered by the question of Jesus' uniqueness. 
Rather, they both confront this question indirectly through 
the concept of Jesus' union with God. What is unclear and 
unfinished in the thought of both men is the degree to which
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they apply the concepts of kenosis, or adoptionism, or both 
to the p r o b l e m .801 Neither Ferre nor Pannenberg self­
consciously embraces either the concept of adoptionism or 
kenosis. But their difficulty in treating satisfactorily 
the union of Jesus with God suggests that grounding a 
Christology in a position which starts "from below" may 
resolve the question of Jesus ' real humanity at the expense 
of a uniqueness in His Own Personhood.
The second point to be noted in a Christology 
which begins "from below" is that the uniqueness of Jesus 
is to be found not in His nature, nor in His accomplish­
ments, but in the finality of God's revelation which occurs 
in Jesus. That is, to render Jesus unique in His Own Per­
sonhood is to incur the theological risk of destroying His 
humanity. Similarly, to establish a uniqueness for Jesus 
on the basis of a soteriological work by Jesus is to sug­
gest that Jesus possessed an effective relationship to God 
that is not available to other men, and, therefore, either 
to suggest a defect in our humanity which is "uniquely" not 
present in the humanity of Jesus, or else to claim for 
Jesus* humanity a characteristic uniquely opened to God 
which is not a trait possessed by the rest of us men.
Either suggestion renders Jesus* humanity not identical to
301^^ The usual application of the concept of kenosis is to an incamational view of Jesus * union with God. How­ever, whenever an appeal is made to the concept of adop­tionism to explain the union, the question must be raised concerning the self-consciousness of Jesus regarding His adopted state of union with God. The solution may suggest some form of kenotic theory.
379
ours. Therefore, the weight of "uniqueness" is thrown onto 
the side of God in the Father-Son relationship. It is the 
revelation of God*s redemption through Jesus that is unique 
in this view. It is not the man, but God acting through 
the man that establishes the claim of uniqueness. In this 
respect, any man could be the avenue through whom God can 
fully and finally reveal Himself. But, insofar as God's 
revelation is final, then no other revelatory event, even 
a revelatory act through another man, can add anything to 
what has already occurred in Jesus Christ. Jesus* humanity 
is preserved, but is it at a price? This question leads to 
the third point to be noted in this view.
As already noted, to preserve the humanity this 
view lays its stress upon God's act. Concomitantly,
Jesus* action is one of obedience, actually passive obedi­
ence to God. This is a necessary part of the concept of 
God's action, lest Jesus* actions become efficacious, 
thereby suggesting a uniqueness to His Person which dis­
tinguishes His humanity from ours. But can such passivity 
be truly reflective of our humanity? Man can choose to be 
obedient, but the passivity that this view holds to be the 
nature of Jesus * obedience is simply not true of the human­
ity we experience in ourselves. Though Ferre insists that 
to be human means to develop through freedom, while Pannen­
berg insists with equal intensity that Jesus* obedience is 
not a matter of freedom of choice but of an acceptance of 
God, there is common ground occupied by both men. That
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ground is that while men are to cooperate in God's redemp­
tive process, man cannot create the process. To approach 
Christology "from below" may be to suggest a possibility 
for humanity which humanity cannot bear. Accordingly, the 
humanity of Jesus is so defined that nothing within that 
humanity can be taken to be divine in some special sense 
not reserved to all men. The question which must be con­
fronted in this view is whether enough remains to Jesus ' 
humanity to be able to call it our real humanity. To be 
sure, Ferre opts for God's redemptive activity in and 
through Christ in order to deal with soteriology in terms 
of Jesus, while Pannenberg establishes the limits of Jesus* 
redemptive participation in terms of Jesus * passive obedi­
ence, but do not both approaches actually deprecate the 
humanity that approaching Christology "from below" pur­
ports to uphold?
For the "from below" Christological thinkers the 
resurrection is treated in a somewhat different manner 
than it is by other liberal theologians. For both Ferre 
and Pannenberg the resurrection is not unique in that it 
is held to be the harbinger of what is to occur for each 
man. The resurrection is but the future (Ferre) or the 
fate (Pannenberg) which awaits every man. This conclusion 
seems to be an inevitable one for anyone who starts Chris­
tology "from below."
Finally, it appears unavoidable that the attempt to 
ground a Christology "from below" will result in a strong
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engagement in an apologetic effort. The aim of both the 
Modem Antiochenes and the Process Thinkers is to provide 
Christianity with an intellectual or philosophical under- 
girding for its Christological claims. Little attempt is 
made to persuade non-Christians of Christianity's Chris­
tological claims. Yet that very attempt lies at the roots 
of the Christological discussion for those who ground 
Christology "from below," At least this is obviously the 
direction taken by both Ferre and Pannenberg.
These key features of a Christology "from below" 
do not constitute a sufficient basis for the appropriate 
designation of such thought as a school, but a trend is 
definitely present. The contributions made by those who 
attempt to ground a Christology "from below" are not to be 
ignored nor slighted. Ferre and Pannenberg are held to­
gether in this chapter so as to pay heed to the contribu­
tion of this approach. If a sufficient number of other 
thinkers join them in this approach then it may well happen 
that different paths will be taken and perhaps different 
schools may develop. That development has not yet occurred.
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
An examination of the three major Christological 
trends in post-Barthian Liberal Theology has now been com­
pleted.1 It remains to examine these trends as they relate
There is a newly developing trend in post-Barthian Liberal Theology which has not been examined. It utilizes the concept of "representative" to propose an understanding of Christ. The idea of this approach is contained in Christ the Representative by Dorothea Solle (London; S.C.M. Press Ltd., 1967), translated by David Lewis. This theme has been given some attention by Professor John McIntyre in an unpub­lished address, "Representative Humanity," delivered at Oxford, March 28, 1968, before the Society for the Study of Theology, J.A.T. Robinson also utilized Solle's suggestion in his presentation of the Hulsean Lectures at Cambridge University, October and November, 1970, The main thrust of this view holds that "representative" provides a better Christological clue than "substitute," The latter concept --albeit a quite traditional one--has the disadvantage of opening the way to an understanding of Christ by which He acts as God instead of for God. It has been this under­standing which has often deprecated Christ's humanity. In­deed, the suggestion follows that Christ acts as Man instead of for men. To stress "representative" as the clue to Christology, its adherents suggest, is to distinguish Jesus from the Father, and, at the same time, to view Him in his­tory at a particular time and place, Bushnell argued a cen­tury ago that Christ represents God not as the Absolute, but as the Father, Cf. supra, Chapter I, p. 25. Solle's defini­tion of Christ as "representative" requires the additional help of "identification" in order to sustain the proposition that Christ is related to all men. That is, there is a ne­cessity for Christ to identify with those whom He represents, lest His work become singularly designated as only God's revelation. By this self-identification Christ as our repre­sentative relates Himself to us in a continuing relationship as well as in our salvation. However, this trend requires much more investigation and amplification than it has thus far received before it can be given a serious place in con­temporary Liberal Christological reconstruction work,
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to each other in terms of the Person and Work of Christ, 
Finally, an appraisal must be undertaken to evaluate the 
position of post-Barthian Liberal Theology in relation to 
its nineteenth century progenitors. This will involve an 
examination of the proposal of chapter onei a proposal 
prompted by Barth's criticism.
A. Comparisons in General
The Modem Antiochene trend proceeds upon a founda­
tion established by the Antiochene School of the Patristic 
period. A distinctive character thereby accrues to this 
trend. That character is determined by a basically Old 
Testament view of God and man, though the modem anthro­
pology is decidedly informed by the contemporary insights 
of both the fields of psychology and history. It can be 
fairly argued that it is the most Biblically oriented of 
the three trends, though Pannenberg would wish to lay some 
claim to that position. The Modem Antiochene view holds 
both that God can be present immanently in a man, and that 
man is properly fit qua man to be incarnated of God, The 
first establishes what is possible to God; the second, what 
is potential for man.
Accordingly a great deal of attention is devoted 
in this view to anthropology; to what man is like both as 
potential Son of God and as sinner, Man is the clue to the 
understanding of God and of God's Christ. It is in these 
terms that the Modem Antiochenes can be said to present a 
Christology in search of a philosophy consonant with its
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religious presuppositions and developed concepts. No such 
philosophical system was available to the original Antio­
chenes . But the M o d e m  Antiochenes have found process 
philosophy to be a compatible system. Accordingly they 
adopt process thought to the philosophical requirements of 
their Christology, adapting wherever necessary, but with 
ever a firm commitment to the primacy of the religious
perspective.
The second post-Barthian Liberal Christological 
trend begins directly with process philosophy, itself. A 
commitment to this philosophical system is obvious from the 
very beginning,2 For the theologians of this persuasion 
the first question is concerned with the nature of God,
Here they establish that philosophical understanding of 
God which holds Him to be both the repository of all 
potentiality (primordial nature) and the recipient of all 
human decision making and activity (consequent nature).
God is not uninterested--like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover—  
in the decisions of men who are free to decide and to act. 
Therefore, God endeavors to "lure" men in a given situa­
tion (God's subjective aim) toward a decision consonant 
with the potential for it. Starting from this philosophical 
perspective process theology then endeavors to propose a
oThis is not to infer that such thinkers are less committed to the Christian faith than are the Modem  Antio­chenes , Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that such a commitment has in large measure prompted their theologi­cal search. But self-consciously their theological start­ing place is in process philosophy. Cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 227 ff., 255 ff. — ^
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Christology in keeping with this perspective. The concepts 
of anthropology and sin are but weakly noted. Thus far no 
process theologian has presented a definitive Christology. 
The most that is offered are various Christological pro­
posals; indications of the ways in which a full Christology 
might be presented in process terms. But the Christologi­
cal trends which emerge from this philosophical approach 
tend to concentrate on the question of how God could be 
present through a roan, Jesus. The focus is clearly on God, 
with a consequence being a diminished emphasis upon the 
Person of Christ. The result may suggest that a primary 
reliance upon a philosophical system, rather than a utili­
zation of the system in explanation and defense of theo­
logical concepts and claims, tends to undo Christology.
At least for those who approach Christology from a founda­
tion in process philosophy there appears to be a serious 
difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory Christological 
position. The Modem Antiochenes are not similarly ham­
pered for while they utilize process philosophy to deal 
with their Christological views, the theological concepts 
remain primary.
The third Liberal Christological trend examined, 
like the M odem  Antiochenes, begins with the theological 
premises. That is, those who start their approach to Chris­
tology "from below" do so by examining some facet of the 
life of Jesus. Pannenberg starts with the resurrection as 
the principal event to study in order to develop a
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Christology. Ferre actually starts with man's experience 
of Jesus, even though his avowed aim is to understand God 
by a faithful examination of all experience. But his con­
clusion is what has obviously been his presupposition from 
the beginning, namely, that Jesus is the clue to God.
The aim of this trend is to examine first neither 
the theological claims nor the philosophical presupposi­
tions, but rather to investigate the kind of knowledge 
available to men in their ordinary encounters in life.
This knowledge is gained directly by reflection and analy­
sis from experience (Ferre) or from history (Pannenberg),8 
The advantage of this approach to Christology is that it 
starts with Jesus, Himself. At least that is what this 
view claims to do, and though it successfully avoids the 
historical problems of the nineteenth century quest for 
the historical Jesus, the result appears to be remarkably 
similar, namely, the actual diminishment of the life and 
work of Jesus. But this will be examined in due course.
The three trends can clearly be held apart even 
though all can appropriately be designated within post- 
Barthian Liberal Theology. Starting with an acceptance of
This separation is not to suggest that Ferre ig­nores history— for his reflection is upon all that is avail­able to experience, and this experience involves that which is historical— nor that Pannenberg ignores experience or natural process— for in his understanding history involves the natural process, indeed relies upon it. Rather, the separation is drawn sharply to accentuate something of the distinctiveness of the theologians of this Liberal Christo­logical trend.
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the theological insights of the Antiochene School of the 
Patristic period, the Mo d e m  Antiochenes then enlist the 
contributions of depth psychology, modem historical analy­
sis, and process philosophy to analyze and explain those 
theological insights. But throughout, the theological con­
cepts remain primary. In contrast, the Process Theologians 
begin with process philosophy, itself, and try to derive 
a Christology that is compatible with that philosophy.
Those who start Christology "from below" shun both theo­
logical presuppositions and philosophical concepts— though 
it is questionable if they can do either— to attempt to 
approach a Christological understanding from some view­
point within Jesus * Own Personhood.
In spite of the separation existing between the 
three trends, are there also similarities? Can some in­
sight be gained into post-Barthian Liberal Theology through 
the Christological views presented? The Christological con­
tribution will be examined first.
B . Post-Barthian Liberal Christology
The earliest Christological questions were concemed 
with the humanity and divinity of Christ, tuming in time to 
the question of the unity of the' two in Christ. Braaten 
correctly observes that the search for analogies or philo­
sophical concepts to maintain that unity provides the con­
tinuity between modem theology and the Christological
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systems of the fifth century.^ However, today the ques­
tions are directed toward the Person and Work of Christ. 
Wesson finds in John Knox's suggestion that Christology 
ought to concentrate on the event of Christ rather than the 
nature of His Person, an echo of Bonhoeffer*s claim that 
Christology is best served by the "Who" rather than the 
"How" question. It is Wesson's conclusion that to speak 
meaningfully of the "Who" inevitably involves the signifi­
cance of His Person. "In other words, theology cannot be 
simply equated with Christology, because to do so empties 
that Christology of m e a n i n g . I t  is with the Person of 
Christ that this evaluation of the attempted reconstruction 
in post-Barthian Liberal Christology is first concerned.
"Who do you say that I am?" This is the Christo- 
logical question every Christian theological position must 
answer. Theology faces the inevitable necessity of dealing 
with the Person of Christ, regardless of whether one starts 
with Bonhoeffer's "Who" rather than "How" question or by con* 
centrating on Christ's benefits as do Melanethon and those 
who follow his clue, or by asserting God's disposition to 
reveal Himself to men as suggested by many, including Barth. 
Only one trend in nineteenth century Liberal Christology was 
concerned directly with His Person, namely, the "Ideal-Man"
^Carl E. Braaten, "Modem Interpretations of Nes- torius," Church History, Vol. XXVII, 1963, p. 266.
^Anthony J. Wesson, Review of The Humanity and Divinity of Jesus Christ, The New Christian, Vol. 6?, AprilT5, 1968,-p: lT.
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trend, although it was the idea of Jesus rather than Jesus, 
Himself, with which this trend dealt. The other nineteenth 
century trends tried to approach Christology by fastening 
their attention on Christ's work. Have the post-Barthian 
Liberals fared any better in this area?
By starting from an acceptance of certain Antio­
chene concepts, the Modem Antiochenes do postulate the 
premise that God can be immanent as well as transcendent, 
and, therefore, it is legitimate to discuss human nature as 
a clue to God's disclosure. This view accepts the humanity 
of Jesus as a primary axiom in conflict neither with an 
affirmation of the transcendence of God, nor with the 
scientific analysis of nature, including human nature. 
Christian theologians faced a dilemma for Christology in 
the midst of the scientific temperament of the nineteenth 
century. On the one hand they could embrace a scientific 
view which when applied to Jesus had the effect of making 
Him disappear from history as in the works of David Strauss, 
The choice on the other hand was to skirt the scientific 
problem for Christology by rejecting philosophical and 
natural categories while in effect accepting Kant's con­
cept of the Noumenal by holding theology to be its own, 
independent realm of knowledge which when applied to Chris­
tology resulted in the subordination of Jesus * reality to 
a primary stress on God's revelation.^ The twentieth
£It is usual to refer to the nineteenth century as the time when Christian theology rediscovered the real humanity of the Person of Jesus Christ, As indicated by
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century is not the nineteenth. No longer is that scientif­
ic dilemma a principal problem for the Post-Barthian Liber­
als . The Modem Antiochenes are able to propose a Chris­
tology which takes seriously the real manhood of Jesus 
while affirming no less God's revelational initiative seen 
in Him, However, the weight of the argument rests upon the 
discussion of anthropology. If one accepts the divinity- 
humanity typology, and the Modem Antiochenes do, the ques­
tion has to be raised whether a primary concern for anthro­
pology results in either an intolerable diminishment of 
Jesus * divinity— Pittenger is driven to discuss a differ­
ence in degree only between Jesus * humanity and ours— or 
a serious challenge to God's redemptive initiative and 
action. Crawford says the latter is the weakness in this 
view. ^
Is the two-nature theory of the Person of Jesus 
necessary to Christology? Are docetism or humanism the 
only alternatives? Though the Modem Antiochenes might 
have built their concept of Christ's Person upon the Bib­
lical view of God acting in a man, the transcendent in the 
immanent, they fail to do so. Actually they remain within
the dilemma above, the nineteenth century did not, in the main, discover Jesus' humanity at allI
^R. G. Crawford, "The Two-Nature Doctrine of Christ," The Expository Times, Vol. 79, 1967-68, p. 6, Crawford finds that the stress upon immanentalism, which he claims is a nineteenth century fault, is being repeated in much contemporary Christological writing. He argues that Barth needs to be heeded again, p. 8.
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the confines of the two-nature theory with its inevitable 
problem of achieving the correct balance between the 
divinity and the humanity.
In contrast, process theology escapes the horns of 
the two-nature dilemma by beginning with philosophical 
categories. By starting with philosophy process theolo­
gians undo theology's bias against philosophy begun with 
Schleiermacher. While the M odem Antiochenes are con­
cerned with the question of how human beings, especially 
Jesus, can be related to God, process theology directs its 
attention to the question of the nature of God and how God 
can be involved with human beings, especially with Jesus.
The strength of the "process" view lies in its ability to 
handle the problem of God's involvement with the world 
without on the one hand stripping God of that which desig­
nates Him as God,^ and on the other hand denying to man the 
real ability to make decisions in genuine freedom. Conse­
quently, the preponderance of attention in process theology 
is directed toward the doctrine of God. Christology becomes 
a subordinate concept of that doctrine. Christ's Person is 
viewed only in the light of the nature of God. To be sure, 
there is much to commend such an approach in terras of pro­
viding a consistency of Son with the Father. The problem
oThat is, without denying to the concept of God those attributes traditionally described as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, though process philosophy rejects these attributes, per se, as valid. It is God's ability to know and to be involved without destruction to the genuine freedom of organisms with which process phi­losophy is chiefly concerned.
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with such an approach is two-fold. First, it makes it more 
difficult to propose a valid Christology. One is driven 
constantly in the midst of Christological construction to 
return to the discussion of the nature of God.9 There 
appears to be a reluctance among the adherents of this 
view to push the concept of God's subjective aim to that 
point which Christian theology has indicated by saying 
that "in the fulness of time" God became manifest in His 
Son.
Second, the traditional Christian affirmative is 
that he who has seen the Son has seen the Father, that in 
Jesus Christ we behold the Father. Process theology has 
reversed that direction. In its view it is a matter of 
seeing the Son through the Father. But if that is the 
case, then does not the Son become an unnecessary, if not 
a useless, concept? Christian theology has always held 
that the Son is necessary because men do not genuinely see 
and relate to God. Christ becomes the Way for this knowl­
edge and this relationship. But if God is known, and 
knowledge of Him precedes any knowledge of Christ, then why 
Christ?^^ The Person of Christ suffers in this view, if.
Not only did neither Whitehead nor Hartshome present a Christology, none of their theological disciples has as yet made a full-scale assault on the construction of a Christology.
^^Cf. supra. Chapter III, p. 202. Indeed, White­head and Hartshorne did not allow themselves to be drawn into Christological debates. Cf. supra. Chapter III, pp. 185 ff.
393
1 1indeed, it can be said to emerge at all.
In the Christological trend "from below" an accept­
ance of the reality of the humanity of Jesus is a primary 
postulate. This trend takes seriously the Christian af­
firmation that the Son shows us the Father, In its treat­
ment of the Person of Christ, however, this postulate 
undergoes a radical transformation. The primary focus 
shifts from the Person of Christ to the revelation in 
Christ. Like the nineteenth century Liberal Christologi- 
cal views, the historic Personhood of Jesus also diminishes 
for the Christological trend "from below." Though Ferre 
did not intend to convey such an image, there is in his 
Christological thought that which suggests an Ariaii in­
clination, It must be pointed out that in spite of the 
declared heretical nature of Arianism there is much in 
its imagery which presents a logical way for men to con­
ceive of the Son. But the result is a presentation of 
the Person of Christ in which Jesus is mere revelational 
example, with the consequent diminishment of Jesus' Own 
individuality. Pannenberg tries to establish the Person 
of Christ through the historical event of the Resurrection. 
It is an effort which is seldom made, and deserves serious 
attention. This approach has the advantage of establishing 
an authority for Jesus' claim. Retroactively the Resur­
rection confirms that Jesus has been God's Son all along.
^^See Reeves* criticism on precisely this point. See supra. Chapter III, p. 202, footnote 75.
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even from eternity. However, does this not diminish that 
very humanity which Pannenberg claims to be an essential 
premise of his Christological view? The effective result 
of the views of the Christological trend "from below" is 
one which does not affirm the actual humanity of Jesus, 
but reaffirms God's revelational activity.
In respect to His Person, the Modem Antiochenes, 
of the three trends examined, present the soundest view, 
one which upholds Jesus * humanity by upholding the poten­
tial of all humanity. Both other trends swing too far 
Godward to present an effectively human understanding of 
the Person of Christ. How do they compare in respect to 
the Work of Christ?
Considerable attention in nineteenth century Lib­
eral Christology was devoted to the effect of Christ's work. 
Throughout various proposals the emphasis was upon the re­
sponse men make to Christ's work viewed primarily as an 
example. None of the post-Barthian Liberal Christological 
trends repeat that emphasis. In part this stems from the 
greater attention given to the concept of sin by the con­
temporary theologians. At least no contemporary theologian 
argues that the way out of the dilemma of sin is easily 
achieved. Redemption is required. There is real work for 
Christ to do.
In respect to the work of Christ the Modem Antio­
chenes and the theologians "from below" present arguments 
not too dissimilar. The work of Christ is two-fold. First,
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Christ lives God's Way through obedience; and this life of 
obedience provides the clue to our humanity. That is,
Jesus' obedience is not a moral act alien to our humanity; 
other men can be obedient. But at this point the two trends 
begin to divide. For the Modem Antiochenes the obedience 
is seen as a very real human possibility. Jesus' obedience 
is a fully human obedience. But for the theologians "from 
below" the character of their concept of revelation and 
God's initiative leads them to suggest a passive kind of 
obedience so that whatever is accomplished through the 
obedience is held to be clearly God's act. That definition 
seems to suggest a humanity not like ours, for the reality 
of sin surely indicates that man is not passive either about 
obedience or sin. Man is one who decides and acts.
The second aspect of the work of Christ is to be 
seen in terms of its effects. Here again the M ode m Antio­
chenes and the theologians "from below" are initially in 
agreement. Whatever happens because of Christ's life and 
work, it cannot be understood in terms of compensation for 
sin nor of any other form of juridical accountability. The 
effect of Christ's work is not to be seen in terms of what 
happens to God because of it, but in terms of what happens 
to man. A nineteenth century Liberal Christological ap­
proach reappears here, with its stress on an atonement 
primarily aimed at changing man. The problem with this 
approach is to be found in understanding how the effect of 
Christ's work becomes man's; that is, how does Christ's
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work become effective for and in man? At this point the 
two contemporary trends diverge.
For the Modem Antiochenes Christ's obedience is a 
human one in which all can participate. Obviously, then, 
one effect of Christ's work is that of setting an example 
for us men. But an act of will is required to follow an 
example. How does Christ's work effect a change in man's 
disposition so that man eschews sin and embraces obedience? 
What Pittenger concludes is that the effect is made pos­
sible for us men by reflection and by participation in the 
community of believers. In this process, involving free 
decision making by man, man begins to behave like Christ,
Williams, leaning more heavily on some of the in­
sights of existentialism, finds in Christ's work an em­
powerment not available to man on his own. A new field 
pf force is created which enables man to respond to that 
human possibility realized in the loving work of Christ. 
Williams is careful not to indicate that a new humanity is 
the result, in terms of a new creation. But can he com­
pletely escape the charge? A new field of force not pre­
viously available to man definitely suggests that Christ 
engaged in real work, but did Christ also participate in 
a new creation? Surely Williams follows an important clue 
in proposing that Christ's work ought to be viewed in terras 
of the activity of love rather than of penal satisfaction. 
And surely love is not a new field of force. Yet the 
suspicion of a new creation lingers.
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If Christ's work is effective--that is, not merely 
revelational in which God discloses what has always been 
true— the dangers to be faced on the one hand are a proposal 
for a new creation, while on the other hand it becomes a 
proposal for a change in God, or at least in God's judgment. 
A balanced view is not always achieved. The Modem  Antio­
chenes, in the final analysis, opt for their anthropology 
and suggest that the efficacy of Christ's work is to be 
found in the genuine chance for a change in human attitudes 
and behavior. What delivers them from the unacceptable 
limits of nineteenth century Liberal Christology is that 
the change required is seen both as serious and difficult 
because of sin's effect on man and as a process which re­
quires God's help. ^
In contrast, the theologians "from below" propose 
a passive obedience as the description of Christ's work 
in order to insure the clarity of their view that God is 
Creator, Initiator, and Redeemer. Christ's work disappears 
in revelation. At the same time Christ's human reality 
also comes into question. Given the rest of their theo­
logical view both Ferre and Pannenberg would be well ad­
vised to entertain more seriously the concept of adoption- 
isro in order to uphold the idea of Christ's real humanity.
At any rate, in their view Christ's effective work is to 
be seen in terms of revelation rather than in terms of 
anything Christ accomplishes,
Process theologians do have available to them a
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concept for proposing a genuine work for Christ, namely,
that of the consequent nature of God. The argument offered
12by this concept is that what happens affects God. That 
is, human decisions can and do change God in terms of His 
consequent nature. That God changes is a basic tenet of 
process philosophy. Therefore, Christ's decisions could 
change God, not in His primordial nature, but in His conse­
quent nature, thereby affecting His subjective aim, which 
is the application of His primordial nature to a given, 
contextual, actual occasion. Accordingly, Christ could so 
act as to affect God's relationship to man. But process 
thought never seems to follow this clue. In part this may 
be due to the system's requirement that all men are simi­
larly affective on God. But mostly, process thought 
focuses so strongly and singularly upon the concept of 
God that little or no room is left for any other concept, 
even that of Jesus as Christ. The final result of process 
theology's approach regarding Christ's work is to suggest 
no real work except by deduction. That is, Christ is God's 
revelation and if this is true it must also be true that 
Christ is God's work. The conclusion of process thought 
in this regard is similar to that of the theologians "from 
below."
The post-Barthian Liberal Christological trend 
theologians have an easier time dealing with the Person of
Cf. supra, Chapter III, pp. 205 ff. Hartshome even argues that novel events change the reality of God. Cf. supra, Chapter III, pp. 208 ff.
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Christ than with the work of Christ. A strong reliance 
upon the concept of revelation to understand the Person of 
Christ may lead somewhat inevitably to a major difficulty 
in understanding the work of Christ. The Modem Antio­
chenes come closer to proposing a real work for Christ than 
the other two trends, but in the process they risk the 
danger of repeating the views of the "psychological-effect" 
Christological trend of the nineteenth century, even though 
in modem garb. But if there is no real work in which 
Christ engages, it seems unlikely that the genuineness of 
His humanity can be maintained. Yet, as Mackintosh re­
minds us, an insistence upon Christ's humanity is "reli­
gious and practical,
Neither nineteenth century Liberalism nor its con­
temporary successors have been able to deal satisfactorily 
with the question of Christ's uniqueness. To insist upon 
Christ's genuine humanity is to incur this problem. Ac­
cordingly, the post-Barthian Liberal Christological think­
ers are more apt to discuss the question of Christ's final­
ity than His uniqueness. That is an appropriate and fair 
shift required to preserve the humanity.
There is a constant problem in Christology which 
was only heightened not resolved by the Chalcedon formula. 
That problem is the achievement of a balance between the
l^H. R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p. 233, Mackintosh concludes, "We are undone i£ we cannot say, 'This Man is God*." Ibid. Surely the more appropriate conclusion is "Truly, this man is the Son of God."
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divinity and the humanity of Jesus. No attempted solution 
has as yet accomplished a satisfactory balance. Nineteenth 
century Liberalism did much to recall attention to Christ's 
humanity which had been largely neglected since Chalcedon. 
But it fastened attention upon the humanity through an 
analysis of man. In those views where Jesus became the 
idea of man, Christ's actual humanity was severely depre­
cated. The post-Barthian Liberal Theologians who approach 
Christology "from below" tend to repeat that defect, Ferre 
speaks of Christ often in terms of One produced from the 
needs and desires of man, himself; while Pannenberg talks 
about the passivity of Christ's humanity. Is it possible 
that there is a deficiency lurking in the premises which 
produced Chalcedon? If there is, and if the attempts at 
reconstructing Christology are limited by that inherent 
deficiency then it is probable that no attempt at balance 
can produce a satisfactory statement until the deficiency 
is examined.
Although such an examination would require a thesis 
in itself, perhaps a brief indication of the deficiency can 
be offered here. The premise behind all Christological de­
cisions of the Concilier Period was an automatic acceptance 
of Greek philosophical dualism expressed as spirit versus 
the material, the ideal versus the actual, the divine versus 
the human. Since the philosophical premise upon which 
Christology was structured was itself a distinct and un­
bridged dualism, then no satisfactory balance is possible
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In the resultant Christological formula, A valuable clue 
to a resolution of the problem was available, but ignored, 
perhaps not even fully realized.
That clue is to be found in the thought of Theodore 
of Mopsuestia. It was the realization that a Jewish non- 
dualistic understanding of God provided the best basis for 
understanding Christology. Theodore was a man of his time, 
a time heavily dependent upon Greek philosophical thought, 
so that even he did not realize the full implication of 
his suggestion. The Modern Antiochenes build upon Theo­
dore's insights, but are themselves men under dualistic 
philosophical bondage. Accordingly, they, too, do not 
follow the implication of Theodore's clue.
Kant endeavored to resolve the dualism epistemo- 
logically by proposing two categories for knowledge, the 
noumenal and the phenomenal. Process thought tried to re­
solve the dualism by unification. In their solution God 
is both the ideal (primordial nature) and the actual (con­
sequent nature). But, by this proposal the dualism is 
actually retained, and both Whitehead and Hartshome are 
driven to speak of the dipolar concept of God, For Chris­
tology the problem becomes one of applying this concept to 
the actual entity and the actual occasions historically 
known as Jesus Christ. In the final analysis process 
theologians are forced to say not that Jesus uniquely 
related to God, but that He could be in terms of possi­
bilities .
402
The theologians "from below" sense something of 
Theodore's clue. Pannenberg, particularly, in his attempt 
to deal historically with the event of the Resurrection, 
devotes considerable attention to a Jewish understanding, 
especially of the apocryphal understanding in Jesus' own 
day. But the dualism surfaces again in a kind of Arian 
definition of Christ for Ferre, and in Pannenberg*s insist­
ence upon a retroactive efficacy for Jesus given by God 
from the end of history, so that Jesus' relationship to 
God is not seen nor determined in history but from the 
realm beyond history.
A Christology constructed on that clue of Theodore's 
would undo Chalcedon's premise. It would make it possible 
to deal with Jesus * Person and Work as no violation of 
God's Own creative and redemptive activity, for in this 
approach God can be present in history and events. Fur­
ther, positions declared heresies in the light of the 
dualistic premise of the Concilier period, could and should 
now be reexamined. Adoptionism is one such concept. There 
is much to commend its reexamination as a way by which God 
can act in history. Indeed, both Ferre's and Pannenberg*s 
positions logically suggest the possibility of adoptionism. 
At least these are some suggestions to provide a sounder 
basis for the development of a Christology today, though 
it is only a beginning rather than a final position. Dyson 
remarks most appropriately that
403
. . . the theologian who handles the theme of Jesus Christ can never expect that his subject- matter is once and for all defined, that his re­sults are in any way assured, that his task will ever be complete,14
C. Post-Barthian Liberal Theology
The examination of this thesis has been of post- 
Barthian Liberal Christological trends. But, as Norris 
correctly indicates, "To understand and to criticize a 
Christology is to understand and criticize a total theo­
logical outlook, a total intellectual framework for por- 
traying the relation of man to God." For Christian 
theology, it is through the concept of Christ that the 
theologian approaches the concept of God. This is not 
without risk, Owen argues.
. , . the modem stress on the centrality of Jesus Christ for faith and theology has layed added responsibility on the man working in Chris­tology, for it implies that there, if anywhere, firm foundation for all theological assertion is to be uncovered.
In large measure, then, an examination and evaluation of 
post-Barthian Liberal Christological trends is an examina­
tion and evaluation of post-Barthian Liberal Theology.
However, Barth's criticism of Liberal Theology was indi-
1 7cated in three areas: experience, sin, redemption. '
0. Dyson, Who Is Jesus Christ? (London: S.C.M.Press, 1969), p. 120.
l^Horris, Manhood and Christ, p. vii.
^^J. M. Owen, "A First Look at Pannenberg's Chris­tology," p. 52.
^^See supra, Chapter I, pp. 72 ff.
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How has post-Barthian Liberal Theology fared in respect to 
these criticisms?
No less than its nineteenth century forebears, 
contemporary Liberalism adheres to the necessity of the 
category of experience for any theological endeavor. Ex­
perience is held to be the proper area for an evaluation 
of truth claims and for devising the analogies which allow 
men to discuss these claims. But unlike the earlier Lib­
erals, the contemporary theologians stress discontinuity 
as well as continuity ; they recognize that revelation 
takes place by God's direction in ways which are not always 
historically or naturally continuous. Contemporary Liber­
alism is notable in its appeal to revelation. And though 
the final epistemological appeal is still to experience, 
that which is to be examined, that which provides content 
for Christian religious knowledge is given by revelation. 
Revelation, both as available through the natural order and 
through special events, is held to be God's, It is finally 
God, and only God, Who reveals. This may not be a step 
Barth would allow to be taken, for it puts much revelatory 
activity at man's disposal. But it is certainly a step 
most nineteenth century Liberal theologians would not have 
taken either, for it makes man epistemologically as well 
as existentially dependent upon God. Of the three Chris­
tological trends examined, process theology remains closest 
to the nineteenth century position on experience. Its 
basic tenets provide a way for dealing with revelation—
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through God's subjective aim— but in practice process theo­
logians do not pursue this route.
In respect to the concept of sin, too much history 
has intervened to make any thinking person oblivious of the 
reality of man's evil to man. History has made impossible 
today the nineteenth century Liberal's optimism about the 
human possibility. Every Christological trend examined 
indicates the reality of man's inability thus far to 
achieve his potential. For both the Modem Antiochenes 
and the theologians "from below" the inability can be over­
come only by God's redemptive activity, though activity 
may more appropriately be translated as revelation for the 
latter trend. In terms of their personal religious tradi­
tions the process theologians can speak of sin, but in 
terms of process thought itself the difficulty in dealing 
with the concept of sin seems almost insurmountable. With 
due respect to the reality of evil, process thought indi­
cates a progressive move by man toward the future. In 
the final analysis, in respect to sin, process thought 
may not unfairly be judged to be at one with the nine­
teenth century. It may also be this defect which finally 
renders it difficult, if not impossible, for process 
through to construct a satisfactory Christology.
There is no way to reconcile Barth and Liberalism 
in respect to the concept of sin. To Barth's man is left 
standing no remnant of a relationship or an attachment 
to God. Liberalism's man is held to be so potentially
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related to God that any man could be as Christ was, even 
though none has as yet. But for the modem Liberals, that 
potential relationship is no longer a guarantee of an auto­
matic achievement of goodness. The reality of sin is ac­
cepted. The presence and work of Christ is required.
Finally, nineteenth century Liberalism seemed to 
place the effective activity of redemption in man's own 
hands. Even though God was held to have acted in Christ, 
it was man through his own decision who made redemption 
efficacious for himself. At first glance the post-Barthian 
Liberal theologians do not seem to have advanced this 
Liberal premise significantly. Man remains in charge of 
his own decision making. However, God's initiation of 
redemptive activity is more strongly stressed. Further, 
when this stress is coupled with the more serious treat­
ment of the reality of sin by modem Liberals, an empha­
sis is provided which would not have been held by many 
nineteenth century Liberals. The result has been that the 
modem Liberals have yielded to God a more prominent role 
in redemptive activity while not diminishing the necessity 
of man's decision making. The modern position would be 
no more acceptable to Barth than the nineteenth century 
one. But with an attention directed toward the reality 
of sin, the modem Liberals have come to suggest that re­
demption requires God as much as it requires man. No 
modem Liberal view holds that man can go it on his own.
Is Liberalism a viable option for Christian
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theological concern today? Insofar as theology is never a 
closed or final question, then assuredly Liberalism retains 
a place at the theological discussion table. But does it 
have anything to contribute to that discussion? Again the 
answer must be assuredly affirmative, for there are at 
least three main conceptual contributions it has to give.
First, Liberal Theology has a concern for anthro­
pology receptive to and informed by the modem world, 
which enables theology in turn to talk with modem man. 
Second, it possesses the temperament to reexamine Chris­
tology to question any predisposition to a Chalcedon 
dualism so that Christology may open the door for modem 
man to understand his relationship with God. Third, it 
engages in a search for viable philosophical options by 
which to express our Christian theology. It is difficult 
to conceive how theology can continue to function effec­
tively in today's world until this door, so long shut in 
theological efforts, is opened again.
These contributions do not suggest any one Liberal 
Theological view. Rather they suggest areas for examina­
tion and development in the never-ending theological quest 
to express the truth in ways that men and women may come 
to affirm the truth. That truth is that God acts in love 
to redeem men, to enter into community with men, and this 
we know because of Jesus Christ. As post-Barthian Liberal 
Theology engages in this quest, it will, indeed, be justi­
fied of those who labor in its precincts and for God, the 
Father of Jesus Christ, and our Father.
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